Second Battle of Sirte

The Second Battle of Sirte (on 22 March 1942) was a naval engagement in the Mediterranean Sea, north of the Gulf of Sidra and southeast of Malta, during the Second World War. The escorting warships of a British convoy to Malta held off a much more powerful squadron of the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). The British convoy was composed of four merchant ships, escorted by four light cruisers, one anti-aircraft cruiser and 17 destroyers. The Italian force comprised a battleship, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and ten destroyers.[1] Despite the initial British success at warding off the Italian squadron, the Italian fleet attack delayed the convoy's planned arrival before dawn, which exposed it to intense air attacks that sank all four merchant ships and one of the escorting destroyers in the following days.[2]

For other uses, see Battle of Sirte.

Second Battle of Sirte
Part of the Battle of the Mediterranean of Second World War

British cruisers Cleopatra (making smoke) and Euryalus (foreground) moving into action
Date22 March 1942
Location
Gulf of Sidra, Mediterranean Sea
34.0°N 17.5°E / 34.0; 17.5
Result See Analysis section
Belligerents
 British Empire  Italy
Commanders and leaders
Philip Vian Angelo Iachino
Strength
4 light cruisers
1 anti-aircraft cruiser
18 destroyers
1 submarine		 1 battleship
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
10 destroyers
1 submarine
Casualties and losses
39 killed
3 light cruisers damaged
2 destroyers disabled
3 destroyers damaged		 No casualties
1 battleship slightly damaged

Background

Malta

Up to the end of 1941, 21 ships with 160,000 long tons (160,000 t) of cargo had reached Malta without loss and a reserve of seven months' supplies had been accumulated. Three convoys to Malta in 1941 suffered the loss of only one merchant ship. From January 1941 to August 1942, 46 ships had delivered 320,000 long tons (330,000 t) but 25 ships had been sunk and modern, efficient, merchant ships, naval and air forces had been diverted from other routes for long periods; 31 supply runs by submarines had been conducted.[3] Reinforcements for Malta included 19 costly and dangerous aircraft carrier ferry operations to deliver fighters.[4] Malta was also a base for air, sea and submarine operations against Axis supply convoys and from 1 June to 31 October 1941, British forces sank about 220,000 long tons (220,000 t) of Axis shipping on the African convoy routes, 94,000 long tons (96,000 t) by the navy and 115,000 long tons (117,000 t) by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm (FAA). Loaded ships sailing to Africa accounted for 90 per cent of the ships sunk and Malta-based squadrons were responsible for about 75 per cent of the ships sunk by aircraft.[5] Military operations from Malta and using the island as a staging post, led to Axis air campaigns against the island in 1941 and 1942..[6]

General map of Malta

By early 1942 the Allies had lost the initiative in the central Mediterranean as Italian and German forces isolated Malta and made plans to remove it as a threat.[7] After a series of Allied defeats, the Italian Navy achieved naval superiority in the central Mediterranean by spring 1942.[8][9] As Malta was running short of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, fuel, food and ammunition, convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March.[10][11] The British expected opposition from German and Italian aircraft as well as Italian surface units. In December 1941, the two battleships (Queen Elizabeth and Valiant) stationed in the eastern Mediterranean had been disabled by an attack by Italian frogmen, leaving the fleet with only cruisers and destroyers. A diversion was organised from Gibraltar, on the morning of 20 March, the battleship Malaya—with the aircraft carriers Eagle and Argus, supported by the cruiser Hermione and eight destroyers—sailed. The next day, the squadron aborted the operation and returned to port—the carriers were unable to launch aircraft reinforcements to Malta due to defective long-range fuel tanks.[12] The escort of convoy MW10 relied heavily on destroyers—including lighter-built destroyer escorts—to provide anti-submarine protection and included the anti-aircraft cruiser Carlisle. More destroyers and another light cruiser were sent from Malta.[13]

British plan

Admiral Sir Philip Vian, commanding the convoy, organised his ships into six divisions plus a close escort of five Hunt-class destroyers for the convoy .[14]

In case of an Italian surface attack, the first five divisions were to stand off from the convoy to face the enemy while the sixth division laid smoke across the wake of the convoy to obscure it.[14] The first five divisions would act as a rearguard to lay smoke and delay the Regia Marina while Carlisle and the Hunt-class destroyers proceeded with the cargo ships to Malta.[15]

Battle
The Italian light cruiser Giovanni delle Bande Nere. During the battle, she landed a 6.0 in (152 mm) round on the bridge of the cruiser HMS Cleopatra with her second salvo, disabling the radar and radio.[16]

At 14:30 the next day, the British were faced by a pair of heavy cruisers and escorting destroyers. Admiral Vian immediately implemented his plan; the cargo ships and escorts turned away to the south while the light cruisers and remaining destroyers laid smoke and charged the Italians. After an exchange of fire, the two Italian heavy cruisers backed off in an attempt to lure the British toward the incoming main Italian squadron, and at 16:37 they returned to attack with the battleship Littorio, a light cruiser and their screening destroyers.[17] The battle raged for two and a half hours, with the British ships leaving the safety of their huge smoke screen to fire a few volleys and then returning to it when the Italian salvos got too close.[18]

During one of these exchanges, Havock suffered heavy damage from a near-miss when fired at by the Italian battleship Littorio, and was ordered to withdraw from the battle line and join the convoy. At 18:34, Vian decided to send his destroyers in to launch torpedo attacks from about 5,000 yd (4,600 m), the closest the Italians would allow the British to approach. None of the torpedoes found their targets, but as Kingston turned she was hit hard by a round that penetrated her boiler room and ignited a fire, temporarily bringing her to a halt.[19] The battle began with a 25 kn (29 mph; 46 km/h) wind blowing to the north-west, with the wind continuing to increase during the day; a factor which favoured the gunnery of the larger Italian ships throughout the battle but the direction of the wind aided the laying of smokescreens by Vian's ships.[20]

Lively was also struck by shell splinters from the battleship's main guns that pierced a bulkhead, causing some flooding but no casualties.[21] At 18:55, Littorio had been hit by a 4.7 in (120 mm) shell, with negligible damage. Her floatplane caught fire from the blast from a salvo of her after turret at the same time. This led to the claim by the British that one of the torpedoes struck home.[22][23] At dusk, before 19:00, the Italians gave up and turned for home. Without radar, they would have been at a significant disadvantage in a night action, as in the Battle of Cape Matapan.[24] The Italians outgunned their British counterparts but they appeared unwilling to close for a decisive blow, perhaps wary of the torpedo threat from the numerically superior British destroyer force.[25]

Aftermath

Analysis
The Italian cruiser Gorizia firing her 203 mm (8-inch) guns at the British destroyers during the battle

Almost all authors have assessed the battle as a British victory, credited to the escort of light cruisers and destroyers which prevented the Italians from damaging the convoy by repulsing an Italian squadron composed of a battleship and two heavy cruisers during massed Axis air attacks.[26] Some authors, while generally acknowledging the British success, write of the battle as a partial Italian achievement in delaying and turning the convoy aside.[27] Nearly all sources acknowledge that the Italian fleet inflicted significant damage and several casualties on the British squadron while suffering minimal damage and no casualties in return.[28][29][30][31] Axis aircraft caught the British convoy at sea, chased the surviving steamers to the harbour and more than 80 per cent of the supplies were lost. The British convoy operation was a strategic failure.[32][33]

Regia Marina

Merchant Navy

Royal Navy

Battle damage

According to British reports, "HMS Cleopatra was struck on the after part of the bridge at 16:44"[38] by a 152 mm (6.0 in) hit from the light cruiser Giovanni delle Bande Nere; 16 seamen were killed.[39][40][41] According to Admiral Iachino, the hit was instead achieved by Littorio's secondary guns, based on the range between the opposite warships at the time.[42] Cruisers Euryalus[43] and Penelope were also damaged, with Euryalus straddled by Littorio at 16:43 and at 18:41.[44] Kingston was hit amidships by a shell from Littorio that killed 15 men of her crew.[45][46][47] and left the destroyer dead in the water, with her starboard whaleboat torn apart, her anti-aircraft guns, searchlight tower and torpedo launchers shattered by the explosion. Some sources claim that she was hit by the guns of the heavy cruiser Gorizia.[48]

Although Kingston had an engine in flames and a flooded boiler, she managed to get back up to speed, reaching Malta the next day.[49] Havock was also badly damaged in a boiler by a near miss from Littorio at 17:20;[50] eight sailors died.[47] Lively was forced to retreat to Tobruk for repairs at 18:55, after a near miss' splinter from Littorio's aft turret holed her hull, resulting in some flooding.[51][52] Three more destroyers—Sikh, Legion and Lance—suffered lesser damage from 8 in (203 mm) cruiser fire.[53] The Italian fleet expended 1,511 rounds of all calibres upon the British squadron; the only Italian destroyer to open fire was Aviere.[54] The British cruisers had replied with 1,553 rounds and the destroyers with about 1,300 rounds as well as 38 torpedoes.[51][55] Axis aircraft made continual attacks, mainly against the convoy, throughout the naval action and Royal Navy AA gunners claimed the destruction of seven Axis aircraft and damage to several more.[56]

Subsequent operations
Destroyer HMS Kingston suffered heavy damage from Littorio's main guns during the battle, and while in drydock at Malta she was attacked by German bombers which further damaged her, this time beyond repair.

Most of the escort force, short of fuel and ammunition and unable to find the convoy, turned back for Alexandria.[57] The damaged destroyers and the cargo ships were sent on to Malta, with Carlisle, Penelope and Legion. The next day, they were subjected to continuous air attacks. The cargo ship Clan Campbell was sunk twenty miles from harbour and the oil tanker Breconshire was too damaged to reach Valletta.

The merchantmen, Talabot and steamer Pampas, reached Malta's Grand Harbour virtually unharmed. Pampas had been hit by two bombs but these failed to explode.[58] Penelope attempted to tow Breconshire, but the tow parted in heavy seas.[59] She anchored short of the protective minefields and the destroyer Southwold attempted to take her in tow, hitting a mine in the process. She was eventually towed into Marsaxlokk Bay by tugs.[60]

Axis air raids against Malta on 24 and 25 March failed to damage the three surviving convoy ships.[61] However, on 26 March, German dive bombers scored bomb hits on all three ships, sinking Talabot and Pampas that day with Breconshire capsizing on 27 March.[62] Much of Breconshire′s oil was salvaged through the hole in her hull. Only about 5,000 short tons (4,500 t) of cargo had been unloaded, of the 26,000 short tons (24,000 t) that had been loaded in Alexandria.[63] The Italian fleet units were no luckier after the battle. After failing to destroy the convoy, they were caught en route to their bases by a severe storm that sank the destroyers Scirocco and Lanciere.[64] While under repair in dry dock at Malta, Kingston was attacked a few days later by German aircraft and suffered further damage, this time beyond repair. She was scrapped in situ in the following months.[65]

Whilst docked at Malta, Havock, was a target for Axis aircraft and sustained further damage. On 3 April the ship was ordered to Gibraltar before her repairs were complete. Havock ran aground off Kelibia, Tunisia, in the Strait of Sicily on 6 April and was wrecked, with one crewman killed in the incident. Another one died from wounds in the following days.[66] On 8 April an Italian boarding party from the tug Instancabile (former Royal Yugoslav Navy Spasilac) searched the wreck looking for secret information.[67] Havock's crew and passengers were interned by the Vichy French at Laghouat in the Sahara but were released in November as a result of Operation Torch.

See also
  • Malta convoys
  • Margit Johnsen
  • The Ship (1943) by C. S. Forester is a fictionalised account of the battle, seeing the action through the eyes of the crew of a Royal Navy light cruiser "HMS Artemis" (it is dedicated to "the officers and ship's company of H.M.S. Penelope"). It depicts the Italians as inept and cowardly, even though deploying a superior force of two battleships, three heavy and four light cruisers; but it seems fairly accurate on the action (while overstating the accuracy of British fire) and gives an excellent account of the roles of different crew members. Published in 1943, the novel did have a propaganda/morale-raising aspect, stressing that everyone's efforts were important, and not mentioning the loss of merchant ships afterwards. Forester, best known for his Hornblower R.N. novels, sailed with both the British and American navies during the Second World War to gather material.

Footnotes
  1. O'Hara, 2009 p. 163
  2. O'Hara, 2009 pp. 169–70
  3. Playfair 2004, p. 324.
  4. Roskill 1957, p. 298.
  5. Richards & Saunders 1975, pp. 169–170.
  6. Playfair 2004, pp. 324–325.
  7. Bragadin, pp. 155–156
  8. "The Alexandria operation showed the recovery from the grave crisis under whose menace the Italian Fleet had lain for two months, and indirectly it delineated a definitive Italian victory in the ′first battle of convoys′. In fact, it opened a period of clear Italian naval supremacy in the east-central Mediterranean." Bragadin, p. 152
  9. Sadkovich, p. 219
  10. Woodman, p. 293
  11. Thomas, p. 143
  12. Woodman, p. 295
  13. "With Vian's cruisers, Carlisle and the Hunts, the escort was well provided with anti-aircraft firepower as the entire force united on the morning of 21 March." Woodman, p. 294
  14. Playfair (165)
  15. Woodman, page 298
  16. O'Hara, 2009 p. 165
  17. Woodman, pp. 299–300
  18. O'Hara, 2009 p. 168
  19. O'Hara, 2009 p. 168
  20. Llewellyn, pp. 37–53.
  21. Greene & Massignani, p. 220
  22. O'Hara, 2009 p. 167
  23. Bragadin, p. 162
  24. "However, without radar, Iachino could not exploit his success after the sun had set, and so at 18:41, well before the hit on the Littorio and a half-hour after Rome had ordered him to return if he could not close to Vian, he decided to turn for home." Sadkovich, p. 245
  25. "Despite the difficult weather conditions, the Italian ships had manoeuvred perfectly correctly along the lines laid down by their commander, and they fought the long battle with decision and tenacity. The British manoeuvred in a disorganized fashion and with unusual timidity – except for the last courageous attack carried out by their destroyers. It should not be forgotten either, that while the Italians had greater firepower on three of their ships, the British had the advantage in number of units engaged, and this factor was unquestionably important given the particular conditions of the battle." Bragadin, pp. 165–166
  26. Archibald: "the best cruiser action of the war" (221)
  27. Belot (162–163), Bernotti (79), Bauer & Young (762), Llewellyn (52), Macintyre (136), De la Sierra (365), Stephen (115) and Wilmott & Fowler (45)
  28. Cunningham, p. 454: "Nor must the mistake be made of thinking the Italians were inefficient in this action. Our destroyers...were received by heavy and accurate fire, and was only by the mercy of Providence that many were not sunk and still more severely damage."
  29. Bragadin, p. 164: "As far as the balance sheet of the shooting is concerned, no Italian ship was damaged in the least, disregarding some scratches on the Littorio's deck caused by shell fragments. On the other hand, the Italian gunfire, in spite of its handicaps, caused considerably more damage to the enemy."
  30. "However qualified, Iachino had certainly won a moral victory." (Sadkovich, p. 247)
  31. Sus oponentes se retiraban, conscientes ya de los peligros de la noche pero no vencidos. ("Their adversaries [The Italians] withdrew, aware of the dangers of the night, but undefeated.") (de la Sierra, p. 365)
  32. Woodman, page 316: "Although the squadron had achieved a noteworthy tactical victory against considerable odds, as Vian's immediate knighthood attested, Operation MG1 as a whole had been a strategic failure."
  33. Stephen, p. 115: "In many ways the Battle of Sirte is like the Glorious First of June 1794. Tactically it was a brilliant success for the British but operationally and strategically it was a failure. Iachino had succeeded in forcing the convoy to manoeuvre so far south that Axis air power was able to act in synergy to ensure its destruction."
  34. Greene & Massignani, p. 217
  35. HMS ZULU (L 18) – Tribal-class Destroyer, archived from the original on 23 December 2012, retrieved 27 December 2011
  36. Thomas, p. 145
  37. Thomas, pp. 144–145
  38. Harwood, section 2, paragraph 12.
  39. Llewellyn, p. 43: "The shell hit the starboard side of the Air Defense position, putting it out of action, also W/T and radar. One officer and fourteen ratings were killed; one officer and four ratings were seriously wounded. Splinters from near misses killed one rating and caused superficial damage."
  40. Mason, Geoffrey B. (2004), "HMS Cleopatra – Dido-class AA Cruiser", Service Histories of Royal Navy Warships in World War 2, www.naval-history.net, archived from the original on 28 November 2012, retrieved 23 May 2011
  41. Greene & Massignani, page 219
  42. Mattesini, Francesco (2014). La Seconda Battaglia della Sirte – 22 Marzo 1942. Società Italiana di Storia Militare. p. 33.
  43. Woodman, page 301
  44. O'Hara, 2009 pp. 165, 168
  45. "www.naval-history.net". Archived from the original on 7 October 2012. Retrieved 23 May 2011.
  46. Llewellyn. p. 49: "A 15-in. shell hit Kingston as she was about to turn..."
  47. Smith, Smith (ed.), "Royal Navy casualties, killed and died, March 1942", Casualty Lists of the Royal Navy and Dominion Navies, World War 2, Naval-History.net, archived from the original on 9 April 2010, retrieved 26 August 2008
  48. O'Hara, 2009 p. 168: "Kingston had been hit in the battle by an 8 in (203 mm) shell fired by the Italian heavy cruiser Gorizia"
  49. Thomas, p. 152
  50. O'Hara, 2009 p. 166
  51. O'Hara, 2009 p. 169
  52. Sierra, p. 364 (probably from Vian, Adm. Philip: Action this day, London, Frederick Mueller Ltd., 1960). Also "No. 38073". The London Gazette (Supplement). 16 September 1947. p. 4380.: "At 2248 LIVELY reported that she was unable to maintain more than 17 knots and she was detached to Tobruk where it was considered she could repair damage before proceeding to Alexandria."
  53. Woodman, pp. 301–305
  54. Greene & Massignani, p. 221
  55. Llewellyn, p51: The cruisers fired the following number of main armament rounds: Cleopatra; 868, Dido; 200, Euraylus; 421 and Penelope; 64. The destroyers fired 275 4 inch rounds, with the remainder being 4.7 inch.
  56. Llewellyn, p. 51.
  57. Woodman, pp. 307–308; Llewellyn, pp. 51–52: "As soon as the Italian ships had disappeared, Rear-Admiral Vian collected his force and steered to close the convoy, 10 miles or so southward. At 19:40, in the growing darkness with the convoy not yet in sight, the Rear-Admiral decided to shape course for Alexandria with force "B" and to send the convoy to Malta under the arrangements laid down in the operations orders."
  58. Llewellyn (52), Thomas (150), Roskill (55), Playfair (170–171), Macintyre (136), Holland (246), Bradford (206), and Greene & Massignani (220–221). By contrast, Woodman (309) claims a near-miss from a Ju 88 on Pampas that shook the ship and caused the taking of water aft. On the other hand, Belot (162–163) maintains that Clan Campbell and Breconshire were sunk on 23 March, while Sadkovich (245) has all four convoy ships sunk on 23 March.
  59. Breconshire at RedDuster.co.uk Archived 11 June 2009 at the Wayback Machine
  60. Green & Massignani, pp. 220–221.
  61. Bragadin strongly implies that Breconshire, Talabot, and Pampas were all sunk sometime between 24 and 25 March. Shores, Cull, and Malizia (145, 148), however, state that Axis aircraft failed to hit the ships on those days.
  62. For Talabot and Pampas: Playfair (172), Macintyre (139), Shores, Cull, and Malizia (150), Bradford (207), Woodman (313–314), Greene and Massignani (221), Llewellyn (52), Thomas (151), and Holland (245–246). For Breconshire: Roskill (55), Playfair (171–172), Macintyre (221), Shores, Cull, and Malizia (151), Bradford (206), Greene and Massignani (221), and Llewellyn (52). However, Holland (248) avers that Breconshire sank on 26 March.
  63. O'Hara, 2009 p. 170
  64. Thomas, page 150
  65. "Memories of Leading Seaman William Davinson". Archived from the original on 11 October 2008. Retrieved 26 August 2008.
  66. Hepper, David (31 July 2022). British Warship Losses in the Modern Era. Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 978-1-3990-9769-7.
  67. Goodey, David; Osborne, Richard (30 September 2017). Destroyer at War: The Fighting Life and Loss of HMS Havock from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean 1939–42. Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-5267-0902-8.

Sources
  • Bauer, Eddy; James L. Collins, Jr; and Peter Young: The Marshall Cavendish Encyclopedia of World War Two. Marshall Cavendish, 1985. ISBN 978-0-85685-954-0.
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  • Cunningham, Andrew: A Sailor's Life, New York, 1955.
  • Greene, Jack & Massignani, Alessandro: The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, 1998. ISBN 978-1-86176-057-9.
  • Gigli, Guido: La Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Laterza, 1964. (in Italian)
  • Guglielmotti, Umberto: Storia della marina italiana. V. Bianco, 1961 (in Italian)
  • Harwood, Admiral Sir Henry H., Despatch on the Battle of Sirte 1942 Mar. 22., Supplement to the London Gazette, 18 September 1947.
  • Holland, James: Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege, 1940–1943, Miramax Books, New York, 2003. ISBN 978-1-4013-5186-1.
  • Hough, Richard Alexander:The longest battle: the war at sea, 1939–45. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986
  • Jellison, Charles A.: Besieged: The World War II Ordeal of Malta, 1940–1942, University Press of New England, 1984. ISBN 978-0-87451-313-4.
  • Llewellyn, M. J.: The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys: A Naval Staff History, Naval Staff History series, Routledge, London, 2007. ISBN 978-0-415-39095-8.
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  • Richards, D.; Saunders, H. St G. (1975) [1954]. Royal Air Force 1939–45: The Fight Avails. Vol. II (repr. ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-771593-6. Retrieved 13 December 2015.
  • Roskill, S. W. (1957) [1954]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Defensive. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. I (4th impr. ed.). London: HMSO. OCLC 881709135.
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  • Secchia, Pietro: Enciclopedia dell'antifascismo e della Resistenza. La Pietra, 1989.
  • Shores, Christopher and Brian Cull with Nicola Malizia: Malta: The Spitfire Year, 1942. Grub Street, London, 1991. ISBN 978-0-948817-16-8.
  • Sierra, Luis de la: La guerra naval en el Mediterráneo, 1940–1943, Ed. Juventud, Barcelona, 1976. ISBN 978-84-261-0264-5. (in Spanish)
  • Simpson, Michael: A life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham. A Twentieth-century Naval Leader. Routledge Ed., 2004. ISBN 978-0-7146-5197-2.
  • Stephen, Martin; Grove, Erik: Sea Battles in Close-up: World War Two. Naval Institute press, 1988. ISBN 978-0-7110-2118-1.
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Further reading
  • Belot, Raymond de (1951). The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939–1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-8371-1067-7.
  • Bernotti, Romeo (1954). La guerra sui mari nel conflitto mondiale: 1943–1945 (in Italian) (2nd ed.). Livorno: Tirrena Editoriale. OCLC 893329459.
  • Roskill, S. W. (1956). The Period of Balance. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. II. London: HMSO. OCLC 174453986.
  • Weichold, Eberhard (1959). "Die deutsche Führung und das Mittelmeer unter Blickwinkel der Seestrategie" [German Leadership and the Mediterranean from the Perspective of Maritime Strategy]. Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau (in German). Berlin: Verlag Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn. ISSN 0509-9722.
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