Foreign policy of China

The People's Republic of China emerged as a great power and one of the three big players in the tri-polar geopolitics (PRC-US-USSR) during the Cold War, after the Korean War in 1950-1953 and the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, with its status as a recognized nuclear weapons state in 1960s. Currently, China has one of the world's largest populations, second largest GDP (nominal) and the largest economy in the world by PPP. China is now considered an emerging global superpower.

In 1950-1953 it fought an undeclared war in Korea against the United States. Until the late 1950s it was allied with the Soviet Union but by 1960 they began a bitter contest for control over the local Communist movement in many countries. It reached détente with the United States in 1972. After CCP Chairman Mao Zedong died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping led a massive process of industrialization and emphasized trade relations with the world, while maintaining a low key, less ideological foreign policy, widely described by the phrase taoguang yanghui, or "hide one's talent and bide one's time".[1] The Chinese economy grew very rapidly giving it steadily increasing power and ambition.

Since Xi Jinping assumed to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, China has expanded its foreign policy ambitions on the global scale, with special emphasis on the East China Sea. China is investing heavily in global infrastructure, citing a desire for economic integration. It is also investing in strategic locations to secure its trade and security interests. It calls these programs the Belt and Road Initiative (formerly "One Belt, One Road") and the "Maritime Silk Road", which it sees as part of its goal of self-sufficiency.[2] In the 2019, the Pew Research Center made a survey on attitude to Xi Jinping among six-country medians based on Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and South Korea. The survey indicated that a median 29% have confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs, meanwhile a median of 45% have no confidence. These number are almost same with those of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (23% confidence, 53% no confidence).[3]

Since 2017 it has engaged in a large-scale trade war with the United States. It is also challenging U.S. dominance in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, expanding its military naval and diplomatic efforts.[4] Part of this is the String of Pearls strategy securing strategic locations in the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca region.[5]

Foreign policy institutions

The main institutions of foreign policy are the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CCP International Liaison Department, and the CCP United Front Work Department.[6] Generally, the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission's Office has greater authority than the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[7]^: 77–78

The Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group (FALSG) has historically been a semi-institutional foreign policy coordination body.[8]^{: 177–178} Created in 1958, it was disbanded during the Cultural Revolution and restored in 1981 as Deng Xiaoping increased the number of stakeholders involved in the development of foreign policy.[8]^: 177 It became a forum for the central leadership in charge of foreign policy to meet regularly with top bureaucrats to discuss priorities, achieve consensus, and prepare recommendations for the Politburo.[8]^: 178 It was the only standing foreign policy coordination body until the aftermath of the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which prompted the creation of the Central National Security Leadership Small Group (NSLSG) in 2000 to coordinate national security crisis response.[8]^: 178

To address policy coordination on maritime issues, Hu Jintao created The Protecting Maritime Rights and Interests LSG in 2012.[8]^: 179

In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG.[8]^: 180 The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters.[8]^: 180 Xi introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."[9]^: 3

China traditionally operates separate tracks of government-to-government and party-to-party relations, the latter for example via the CCP's International Liaison Department.[10]^: 137

On security issues, China generally prioritizes military-to-military exchanges.[9]^: 217 China typically views military personnel as more effective interlocutors on security matters than civil personnel.[9]^: 217

International relations framework

Chinese scholars observe that the country's international relations differentiate between major powers, states on China's strategic periphery, developing countries, and multilateral international fora.[9]^: 4 These categorizations are not strict and multiple may apply.[9]^: 4 The major powers are the economically developed states, including the United States, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, and various European Union states as well as the European Union as a whole.[9]^: 4 Strategic periphery countries are generally geographically proximate ones, traditionally including Russia, East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.[9]^: 4 In the broader category of developing countries, China distinguishes between major developing states, newly emerging powers, and other developing states.[9]^: 5

China establishes bilateral partnerships with other countries that range from broad strategic partnerships to those with more discrete areas of cooperation.[9]^: 25 "Comprehensive strategic partnerships" are the broadest, with "strategic partnerships" and "comprehensive cooperative partnerships" used to describe relations with less broad cooperation.[9]^: 25

Chinese foreign policy documents with countries it views as strategic partners frequently assert the concepts of the validity of different developmental paths, non-interference in domestic affairs, and different understandings of democracy or human rights.[9]^: 4

Within the Global South, China focuses particularly on countries it views as hub states in each region.[9]^: 5 Although Chinese diplomatic understandings change over time, hub states have often included Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand (in Southeast Asia); India and Pakistan (in South Asia); Kazakhstan in Central Asia; Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria (in Africa), Iran and Saudi Arabia (in the Middle East); and Argentina and Brazil (in Latin America).[9]^: 5

Long-term goals

China uses the term "core interests" to define the primary goals that determine its foreign policy choices.[11]^: 193 This concept was developed by diplomat Dai Bingguo during Hu Jintao's administration.[11]^: 193 The core interests are: maintaining the power of the Communist Party, continuing China's social and economic growth, and preservation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[11]^: 193 China also views these core interests as red lines that other countries' behavior should not cross.[11]^: 193

During the Xi Jinping era, the Community of Shared Future for Mankind has become China's most important foreign relations formulation.[9]^: 6

Political scientist Dmitry Shlapentokh argues that CCP leader Xi Jinping and his top leadership are developing plans for global predominance based on rapidly growing economic power. The ideological framework is a specialized blend of Marxism–Leninism, coupled with China's pre-1800 historic claims to world dominance. China's trade policy and drive for access to essential natural resources, such as gas, are articulated in terms of these ideological approaches. Beijing balances both purely economic goals with geopolitical strategies regarding the United States, Russia and other powers. Balancing those two powers gives China a clear advantage, for its totalitarian government could plan for generations and could change course regardless of the wishes of the electorate or clearly defined interest groups, as is the case with the modern capitalist West.[12]

Lowell Dittmer argues that in dealing with the goal of dominance over East Asia, Beijing has to juggle its relations with the United States, which has more military and economic power in the region because of close U.S. ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia and other countries.[13]

Analysts argue that Beijing is not yet ready to become a major force in shaping regional politics in the Middle East.[14][15][16] While China has major commercial interests in the Middle East and a long history of relations with Gulf Cooperation Council countries, its involvement in Gulf security affairs is relatively recent.[17]^: 30 China articulates a "zero-enemy policy" in the Gulf region, taking a balanced attitude towards both incumbent governments and opposition forces, Sunni and Shi'a, republics and monarchies, and Iran and the Arab countries.[17]^: 32

Since the late 1990s, China has articulated its new security concept, the overarching principle of which is that no single state, even the most powerful, is capable of coping with all security challenges alone.[8]^: 71

China has shown a moderate interest in the Caribbean region in recent years, but not nearly on the same scale as its interest in Asia and Africa. It has been developing ties with Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, as well as Colombia. These small countries have not by 2019 noticeably changed their foreign or domestic policies because of their new economic linkages with China. Nevertheless, the governments pay more attention to Beijing's views. On the other hand, China's push into the Caribbean is increasingly resented by the United States and further escalation between the two major powers is a possibility in the region.[18][19]

In 2014, Xi announced the New Asian Security Concept at a summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA).[8]^: 97 Implying that Asian countries can handle their security without the involvement of the United States, the core of the New Asian Security Concept is that "Asian issues should be taken care of by Asians, and Asian security should be maintained by Asians."[8]^: 97

China opposes the use of unilateral sanctions and trade discrimination to achieve foreign policy goals and has generally positioned itself as a proponent of global free trade.[20]

Non-interventionism

In its foreign policy, China emphasizes the principle of non-interventionism.[9]^: 336 As a corollary, China asserts that other countries must not involve themselves in matters that China deems as its own domestic affairs.[9]^: 336

China's approach to non-interventionism has been particularly well-received in its relations with African countries.[9]^: 336

Since 2006, China has modified its approach to non-intervention, particularly because of political issues involving Africa.[9]^{: 336–338} These changes began in 2006, when under pressure from Western governments and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China altered its position on the Darfur conflict.[9]^: 338 Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Sudan and met with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who afterwards accepted the United Nations-Africa Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur.[9]^: 338 China also modified its typically non-interventionist approach during the 2011 Libyan crisis, when pressure from the African Union and the Arab League prompted China to support an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze and to abstain from voting on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone.[9]^: 338

South-South cooperation

China has a major role in fostering cooperation among the global south countries in the area of climate change and clean energy.[21]^: 18 China engaged in South-South climate and clean energy cooperation through: (1) bilateral clean energy agreements, (2) multilateral clean energy cooperation, (3) expanding exports of its clean energy technology to other developing countries, and (4) foreign energy infrastructure development via the Belt and Road Initiative.[21]^: 221 Much of China's overall South-South Cooperation is now explicitly linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.[21]^: 226

The "Ten, Hundred, Thousand" program is China's overarching initiative for South-South cooperation in addressing climate change.[21]^: 224 As of 2023, China had signed partnerships with at least 27 other developing countries as part of this initiative.[21]^: 224 Additionally, the Belt and Road Initiative brings energy technology and expertise to other developing countries.[21]^: 18

BRICS is a further mechanism for China's cooperation with the global south and functions as a forum for policy coordination among its members.[22]^: 249

Wolf warrior diplomacy

Wolf warrior diplomacy is an aggressive style of coercive diplomacy[23] adopted by Chinese diplomats under Xi Jinping's administration. Wolf warrior diplomacy is confrontational and combative, with its proponents loudly denouncing any perceived criticism of the Chinese government and its policies on social media and in interviews.[24] As an attempt to gain "discourse power" in international politics, wolf warrior diplomacy forms one part of a new foreign policy strategy called Xi Jinping's "Major Country Diplomacy" (Chinese: 大国外交; pinyin: Dàguó Wàijiāo) which has legitimized a more active role for China on the world stage, including engaging in an open ideological struggle with the West.[25][26]

Status of Taiwan

The People's Republic of China (PRC) considers Taiwan area administered by Republic of China (ROC), part of its inviolable sovereign territory. The ROC was founded in Mainland China in 1912 deposing the Chinese monarchy while Taiwan was under Japanese rule from 1895 and regained in 1945, but Taiwan became the seat of the ROC central government since 1949 and later lost its international representation as "China" in the United Nations in 1971 to the PRC.

Along with the ROC, in PRC's perspective, Taiwan is described a separatist, breakaway province that must be reunified, by force if necessary. Under the One China policy, any polity exerts efforts for countries recognizing either the PRC or ROC to switch their recognition to the other.[27][28][29][30][31][32]

The PRC has passed the controversial Anti-Secession Law authorizing the use of military force in the event of unilateral separatist activity by the Democratic Progressive Party-led Pan-Green coalition,[33] as outlined in § PRC's condition on military intervention.

South China Sea

China has staked its territorial claims in the disputed South China Sea with the nine-dash line. Its claims are disputed by other countries.[34] The contested area in the South China Sea includes the Paracel Islands,[note 1] the Spratly Islands,[note 2][35] and various other areas including Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. The claim encompasses the area of Chinese land reclamation known as the "Great Wall of Sand".[36][37][38]

The United States Navy has conducted freedom of navigation operations asserting its position that some waters claimed by China are international waters.[39]

On July 12, 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that China has no legal basis to claim "historic rights" within its nine-dash line in a case brought by the Philippines. The tribunal judged that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or resources within the Nine-Dash Line.

The ruling was rejected by both Taiwan and China.[40][41] The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants.[42] However, the tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries.[43][44]

Scholars have been probing the Chinese motivations and long-term expectations. One approach is to compare trends in multilateral Code of Conduct negotiations between 1992 and 2016. In general, the sovereignty issue regarding contested waters is no longer a central major concern For three reasons: the inconsistency of China's official claims over time, China's increased bargaining power, and the importance of the shelved sovereignty axiom since the era of Deng Xiaoping.[45][46]

Notes

The Paracel Islands are occupied by the PRC, but are also claimed by Vietnam and the ROC.
The Spratly Islands are disputed by the Philippines, PRC, ROC, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, who each claim either part or all the islands, which are believed (hoped) to sit on vast mineral resources, including oil and gas.

References

In a 1990 speech, Deng Xiaoping succinctly stated his foreign policy as "Observe affairs calmly, maintain our position, respond with deliberation, hide our talent and bide our time, disguise our weakness, never seek leadership, and act with intention." (Original Chinese: "冷静观察、稳住阵脚、沉着应付、韬光养晦、善于藏拙、决不当头、有所作为。")
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