Sunda Straits Crisis

President Sukarno of Indonesia was a driving force behind Konfrontasi.

Indonesia, meanwhile, and especially her longtime president Sukarno, was vehemently opposed to the creation of the Federation. Sukarno opposed both the preservation of the 'imperialist' British presence in Southeast Asia, a region in which he aspired to be the supreme power, and the incorporating of the Borneo colonies into the new Federation, as his goal was to control the entire island. Indeed, through possession of the Kalimantan region, Indonesia already controlled the vast majority of the massive island. To improve Indonesia's position at the negotiating table before the Federation was created, Sukarno initiated a period of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) with Malaysia. Consisting initially of frequent raids by Indonesian 'volunteers' into Malaysian territory, the conflict was not considered a war by either side, least of all by the Indonesians. In fact, when questioned on what exactly the Confrontation was, Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia replied, "Confrontation does not include war, because it can be carried on without war."[2]

To Sukarno, this sort of operation had a number of merits. Starting a military operation against 'imperialists' would help to bind together the antagonistic forces of the army and the Communist Party (PKI) in supporting him, while not creating a fully escalated conflagration would prevent the militarily superior British and their Commonwealth allies from using their full force. Indonesia had also pulled off a successful operation using similar techniques in the West Irian campaign against the Dutch a decade previous, a raiding campaign into Western New Guinea had ended with the Dutch ceding that territory to prevent Indonesia from 'falling' to Communism.[4]

Indonesian troops captured after a raid at Kesang River on the Malay Peninsula.

The main part of the Confrontation is generally split into three distinct phases. In the first, Indonesia supported revolts against the Anglo-Malaysian rule in Northern Borneo, most notably the Brunei Revolt in December 1962. In the second, the guerrilla raids for which this conflict is most reputed for began in earnest, from April 1963 onwards. The fighting in this phase, while causing some damage and casualties, was relatively small in scale and the incursions were usually only made by small bands of no more than platoon size crossing the Kalimantan border into Sarawak and Sabah. These operations were the essence of the initial strategy to improve the Indonesian negotiating position and continued alongside said negotiations throughout the summer of 1963. However, 16 September, the negotiations concluded with the formation of the Malaysian Federation, which included Malaya, Singapore, and most importantly, the two Borneo states (Sarawak and Sabah). In response, the raids were intensified into larger groups working with or consisting of Indonesian regular troops. This was the beginning of the escalation of the conflict into its third and most dangerous phase.[5]

However, that phase was a year in coming. After spending most of 1964 engaged in northern Borneo and becoming ever more frustrated with Britain's opposition to her plans, Sukarno delivered a groundbreaking yet bitter speech in Jakarta on 17 August for Independence Day. In it, he railed against the Western powers, particularly Britain and America, for their policies in Vietnam and Malaysia. Most famously, he declared that the following year would be a "year of living dangerously"[6] for Indonesia. This speech, especially as it came a week after Sukarno had acknowledged North Vietnam's statehood, was to be a signal of intent, and Sukarno meant to back his words up with action. That very night, a small contingent of Indonesian soldiers landed at Pontian, in the state of Johor on the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. Though the raiders were quickly apprehended by elite Malaysian security forces of the Senoi Praaq, it was clear to all parties that the Confrontation was rapidly expanding. A threatened Malaysia declared a state of emergency and put pressure on the British to act in their defense.[7]

HMS Victorious underway in the Pacific in 1964.

On 26 August, the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious sailed from Singapore with her two escorting destroyers, HMS Caesar and HMS Cavendish, bound for Fremantle in Western Australia. The genuine purpose of the voyage is still disputed, but it is probable that the carrier group was passing through as a show of strength to Indonesia in the wake of the Pontian landings as well as the routine 'goodwill visit' that the vessel was purportedly making to Britain's ally.[8][9] The task force was surprisingly met by very little Indonesian response as it passed through their territorial waters, the carrier reporting only a single Tupolev Tu-16 aircraft making a flyover as the warships passed through the Sunda Strait the following day.[10] The ownership of the Strait itself was complex, as Indonesia claimed it despite British assertions that it was an international waterway that her warships could pass through at any time. Following standard British procedure in such a situation, the British Military Attache in Jakarta had telephoned ahead to the Indonesian Director of Naval Intelligence that the squadron would be passing through Indonesian territory without seeking their clearance, a precedent set the last time Britain had used the Straits in October 1963.[11] This policy, engineered by the Foreign Office, had the dual purpose of notifying the Indonesians of a possibly provocative action without recognizing what they thought to be exaggerated claims on international waters. The return date to Singapore was not set exactly at the time of sailing but was to be sometime in mid-September.[12]

Foreign Minister Subandrio, pictured here in 1964.

The following day (28 August), Deputy Foreign Minister of Indonesia Suwito summoned the British Charge d'Affaires complain that the British notification had been far too casual, and whilst not asking for the British to receive Indonesian permission for such an action, he asked Britain to give a more formal, preferably written, announcement next time.[12] Or else, Suwito warned, "present tension might result in an unplanned, unwanted but serious incident," a statement that was quickly passed on to the British government.[13] The Charge d'Affairs replied that any further notice would be in writing, so as not to provoke any issue. Several days later, on 2 September, the day after the Labis landings, Subandrio took an even tougher line, telling the Australian Ambassador to Jakarta that the Victorious would be refused return passage through the Strait. The motivations for such a ban are not clear, as official documents on from the time are unavailable, but Subandrio's announcement was in line with government policy on passage through Indonesian waters, which was moving towards cracking down on unauthorized passages after an American carrier group had made the voyage earlier in the month.[14] Indonesian policy-makers was also likely worried about the threat of British air power so close to Jakarta as well as the possibility that the British were attempting to provoke a response similar to the Vietnamese had made against America during the Gulf of Tonkin incident earlier that year. The latter seems exceedingly probable given Sukarno's furious response to the incident, and it is unsurprising in such a context that the response to the British incursion was equally forceful. In any case, the pervading thought in the Indonesian command was that this was a direct retaliation to the Pontian landings and a signal of British resolve, which although worrying could not overtake the British violation of their nautical claims in importance.[15]

The Foreign Office, meanwhile, was determined not to back down in the face of what was seen as a further affront to British prestige and a challenge. Thorneycroft argued that if the Victorious did not pass through the Straits on her return journey, Britain "should suffer a substantial political defeat with unpredictable effects on our military position in the Far East," and was supported in this view by Admiral Mountbatten and David Luce, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.[16] Mountbatten went even further, warning Thorneycroft that a failure to meet the challenge would have "serious repercussions" on Britain's "whole military stature, not only in the Far East but worldwide." Luce and Mountbatten also thought this the perfect opportunity to put pressure on Jakarta for the first time, Luce stating that the return passage "might pass the initiative to us" and Mountbatten seeing it as an opportune moment to divert Sukarno from his Malaysian raiding. At the very least, innocent passage through the Strait had to be defended.[13]

The views of Whitehall were not echoed by the naval commanders, especially Sir Varyl Begg, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the region, who believed that the carrier was too weak to defend herself against Indonesian attack or strike in turn against them. Begg adjudged that the narrowness of the Strait combined with local geographical features restricted the ships' movement and negated their radar, while custom prevented the carrier from flying its aircraft or even carrying them on deck, rendering it and the escorts extremely vulnerable in case of attack. He offered instead to send the destroyers, which were far more expendable than a fleet carrier. His views were supported by the High Commissioner to Malaysia, Lord Antony Head, who argued that there would be very little gain for Indonesia and loss for Britain if the carrier was not risked. Luce, however, remained adamant that the Victorious must sail through herself, but in order to assuage Begg's fears assured him that the more modern carrier HMS Centaur would be on hand to provide air cover for the task force. Reinforcements were also rushed to Singapore to meet any Indonesian provocation.[16] Thorneycroft ordered Begg to begin planning for the forced passage of the Strait, as officials determined on 3–4 September that the carrier must not be diverted.[13]

In the resulting Cabinet meeting on naval deployments on 7 September, Thorneycroft and Mountbatten argued the case for the forcing of the Strait with the task force, acknowledging that though the carrier would be at risk of severe damage or loss, preventing Sukarno from achieving a victory of brinkmanship was worth the peril. Though Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler strongly represented Begg's argument that the Victorious was too valuable an asset to lose, Thorneycroft's arguments won out. The Cabinet concurred that the ship should not be diverted, as a blockage of the carrier would increase Sukarno's prestige to no end, and approved preparations for Operation Althorpe, a plan to wipe out the Indonesian air force in retaliation for an attack.[17] Although no precipitous decision was made, and though the Cabinet had agreed to examine the matter further.[18]

On 9 September, Suwito informed a British diplomat that the Strait would be closed for naval exercises and that it would be appreciated if British warships steered clear of the area in the interim. To Britain, this seemed an escalation of the Crisis, as if the task force sailed through they might have to fight the Indonesian Navy directly, though in fact Indonesia was lessening its resolve to refuse the task force passage through the Strait, and hoped to keep the British from attempting to force their way through via more indirect means.[19] This was not the way the British interpreted it, however, and the announcement triggered a new round of debates over the forced passage. Thorneycroft reviewed the plan with the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence, and the Commonwealth Relations Office, most of whom told him to consider the opinions of the commanders on site. After remembering the influential Lord Head's endorsement of Begg's views, Thorneycroft was swayed, and decided that the two destroyers should proceed through the Strait without the Victorious, using the aircraft of that vessel and the Centaur for cover.[20] Though worried about the psychological effect of the non-passage of the carrier, he was reminded that Britain had not informed Jakarta that the ship would return that way in the first place.[17]

In the Cabinet meeting of the next morning, Butler raised the issue once more, informing them that Indonesia was attempting to prevent the innocent passage of the Victorious through the Sunda Strait on the pretext of naval exercises. Thorneycroft then spoke, stating that Sukarno would "gain in prestige" if he stopped the vessels from sailing through and that he might close other waters to the Royal Navy should he be successful. He acknowledged that he had originally planned to send the carrier through the Strait herself, but after discussion with Head and Begg decided to send the destroyers through instead, and send the Victorious north around Sumatra. The ships would still be able to uphold the right of passage while forcing Sukarno to either attack them or let them through. If Indonesia did attack the ships, "it would be an act of war... and we [Britain] should have to retaliate in force." Though the Cabinet noted that the destroyers could be lost if attacked, it was deemed necessary not to bend to Sukarno. Britain and Indonesia were on the precipice of all-out war.[20]

What the Cabinet did not know yet, however, was that Indonesia had prepared an alternative to going over the edge. That same day, 10 September, Suwito asked for Britain to avoid a terrible 'misunderstanding,' and in a secret offer asked them to use the Lombok Strait instead. While further away from Jakarta, it was still claimed by Indonesia and might help the British attempt to save face while not stepping into a war they did not truly desire. With the Foreign Office's backing, Thorneycroft and Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home approved the compromise and notified Suwito that the ships would take the Lombok Strait instead. Suwito appeared, according to eyewitnesses, "extremely relieved" at having avoided full conflict.[21] The Victorious, after rendezvousing with the destroyer HMS Hampshire along with the frigates HMS Dido and HMS Berwick, sailed safely through the Lombok Strait on 12 September.[9]

The debate over who came out the best from the Crisis, Britain or Indonesia, continues on into the present, and though many historians depict a British advantage (admittedly, these historians are British and American) there is a credible case for the success of both sides.[25]

A preponderance of historians favour the story that though the Victorious had sailed through the Lombok Strait rather than the Sunda, Britain had come off easily the best through a show of force during the Sunda Straits Crisis. Numerous accounts, including Gregory Fremont-Barnes' History of Counterinsurgency, are content with a simplified version that Indonesia closed the Strait for one reason or another, and that the arrival of the task force assembled around the aging carrier had intimidated Sukarno into reopening it.[26] A common argument is that the passage was an effective and daring show of force, and often ignores the Sunda Strait issue altogether.[8] This was a sentiment shown by the crew of the Victorious herself, who during their passage through the Lombok Strait went to action stations at the sight of an Indonesian submarine and prepared to fire on it if there was any sign of hostility, and believed that the Indonesians thought it wiser to hold back in fear of their power.[9] This was not a view that the British official reports sought to dissuade, depicting the result as a compromise concession by the Indonesians, who had in brinksmanship terms, 'blinked first' after British refusal to back down. The Foreign Office even went to the extremity of claiming that the Lombok Strait was just as convenient for passage as the Sunda Strait, despite its far greater distance from Singapore and Australia.[27] At the very least, the subsequent Indonesian United Nations defeat and Abdul Rahman's agreement to avoid retaliation was a very positive result for Britain to take from the incident.[23]

In contrast, historian Toh Boon Kwan[28] argues at length the cause of the Indonesians, asserting that their claim to victory is equally as valid, if not more than that of the British. He states that British policy makers, in their relief at being let out of the spiral towards war, had forgotten that the Lombok Strait was militarily advantageous to Indonesia, as Indonesian warships could screen the task force easily from a nearby naval base. Symbolically, too, the forcing of ships of the vaunted Royal Navy to take the long way around their territory can be regarded as a major diplomatic success. Indonesian politicians gained strength from the Crisis, now believing that they could go toe-to-toe with 'Imperialists' and survive "brushes with danger." This, acknowledged Toh, oddly contrasts with the defeatist views of the army, who were irritated at how close they had come to war, and who in any case carried out the policies of the Confrontation with little relish. It was the army, he asserts, that sent the peace initiatives to the Tunku in September.[29]