Operation Gibraltar

Following the First Kashmir War (1947–1948), which saw India maintaining its hold over two-thirds of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win the remaining Kashmir areas. In 1960s Pakistan received 700 million dollars of military aid from United States, by signing a defense agreement in 1954, which significantly modernized Pakistan's military equipment.[19][20][21] After the defeat in 1962 Sino-Indian War Indian Military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armor over India, which Pakistan sought to utilize before India completed its defense build-up.[21] The Rann of Kutch episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed, resulted in some positives for Pakistan. Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic[22] from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt.[23] These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir.[24][25][26] Assuming that a weakened Indian military would not respond, Pakistan chose to send in "mujahideens" and Pakistan Army regulars into Jammu and Kashmir.

The original plan for the operation, codenamed Gibraltar, was conceived and prepared as early as the 1950s; however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward given the scenario. Backed by then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained irregular force of some 40,000 men, highly motivated and well armed. It was reasoned that the conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the words of retired Pakistani General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war."[27] As a result, groundwork and intelligence gathering for execution of the plan was laid by launching "Operation Nusrat", the purpose of which was to locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) that were to serve as entry points for the mujahideen, and to gauge the response of the Indian army and the local population.[28]

Despite initial reservations by the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, the operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources put it at 24 July)[29] Pakistani troops who were members of Azad Kashmir Regular Force (Now Azad Kashmir Regiment) began to cross the Cease Fire Line dividing Indian- and Pakistani-held Kashmir across the Pir Panjal Range into Gulmarg, Uri and Baramulla. Several columns were to occupy key heights around the Kashmir valley and encourage a general revolt, which would be followed by direct combat by Pakistani troops. According to Indian sources as many as 30,000[5][30] – 40,000 men had crossed the line, while Pakistani sources put it at 5,000 -7,000 only.[31] These troops known as the "Gibraltar Force"[5] were organized and commanded by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Division.[6][7] The troops were divided into 10 forces (5 companies each).[5] The 10 forces were given different code names, mostly after historically significant Muslim rulers.[30] The operation's name, Gibraltar, itself was chosen for the Islamic connotations.[32] The 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from Gibraltar, a situation not unlike that Pakistan envisaged for Indian Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Operation Gibraltar. The areas chosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in the populous Kashmir Valley.

The plan was multi-pronged. Infiltrators would mingle with the local populace and incite them to rebellion. Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare would commence, destroying bridges, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking airfields,[33] with a view to create the conditions of an "armed insurrection" in Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed that India would neither counter-attack,[34] nor involve itself in another full-scale war, and the capture of Kashmir would rapidly follow. Out of the 9 Infiltrating Forces, only Ghaznavi Force under command Maj Malik Munawar Khan Awan managed to achieve its objective in Mehndar-Rajouri area.[35][36][37][38]

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existence of hundreds of infiltrators in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

While the covert infiltration was a complete failure that ultimately led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, military analysts have differed on whether the plan itself was flawed. Some have held that the plan was well-conceived but was let down by poor execution, but almost all Pakistani and neutral analysts have maintained that the entire operation was "a clumsy attempt"[42] and doomed to collapse. The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.[43]

According to then Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Nur Khan, there was little coordination amongst the military services on the impending operation.[44] According to him "the (Pakistan) army "misled the nation with a big lie" - that India rather than Pakistan provoked the war - and that Pakistan won a "great victory. And since the "lie" was never rectified, the Pakistani "army came to believe its own fiction, (and) has continued to fight unwanted wars".[45] Pakistani author Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema notes that Musa Khan, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, was reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action.[29] Many senior Pakistani military officers and political leaders were unaware of the impending crisis, thus surprising not only India, but also Pakistan itself.[46]

Many senior officials also were against the plan, as a failure could lead to an all-out war with India, which many wanted to avoid.[47][48][49][50]

• Operation Desert Hawk
• Indo-Pakistan Wars
• Kargil War

• Abbas, Hassan (2004), Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror, M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 0-7656-1497-9
• Musa, Muhammad (1983), My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, Wajidalis
• Kapur, S. Paul (2017), Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani State, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-976852-3

• Brigadier Shaukat Qadir of PAF on Operation Gibraltar: Battle that never was – Hosted on Rediff.com
• Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities by Major (Retd.) Agha Humayun Amin, Defence Journal (Pakistan), September 2000
• Operation Gibraltar — An Unmigitated Disaster?