Haim Bar-Lev

Born Haim Brotzlewsky in Vienna and raised in Zagreb, Bar-Lev made aliyah to Mandate Palestine in 1939. From 1942 through 1948, Bar-Lev served in various Jewish military units, such as the Palmach. He became both a pilot and a parachutist, which would later serve him in developing both of these military branches in the young Israel Defense Forces.

In 1946 Bar-Lev blew up the Allenby Bridge near Jericho to prevent Arab militiamen in Trans-Jordan from entering Jewish towns west of the Jordan River. During the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Bar-Lev was the commander of the Eighth Battalion (Mechanized) in the Negev Brigade, which fought in the southern part of the country and the Sinai.

During the 1956 Suez Crisis he commanded the 27th Armored Brigade, which captured the Gaza Strip before turning southwest and reaching the Suez Canal. By 1964 he became of Director of Operations within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

During the June 1967 Six-Day War he served as the Deputy Chief of Staff in the IDF. In late 1968 he accepted Maj. Gen. Adan's proposal that a high sand-dune wall be built along the east bank of the Suez Canal to prevent the Egyptian military from observing Israeli defenses along the Suez Canal. Behind the sand dune a line of fixed fortifications was constructed. This became known as the Bar Lev Line.

Between 1968 and 1971, Bar-Lev served as IDF's Chief of General Staff, which made him the highest-ranking military officer.

During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, although retired from the IDF and serving as the Minister of Trade and Industry, he was recalled by Prime Minister Golda Meir back into military service to replace Shmuel "Gorodish" Gonen as chief of the Southern Command, which defended the Sinai Peninsula. Bar-Lev played a pivotal role in the war. Before his appointment the Southern front was in disarray to the point of near total collapse and Gonen was proving unable to effectively control the situation. Bar-Lev immediately took charge and worked towards stabilizing the front. His political and negotiating skills also proved instrumental in controlling his field generals who were feuding amongst themselves since each had their own notions, sometimes competing ones, regarding how the war in the South should be carried out. The effect that Bar-Lev's arrival had on the chaotic Southern command headquarters was described by Gonen's deputy, Uri Ben-Ari, in testimony to the Israeli military's historical department:

Bar-Lev brought calmness on all of us. Finally there was a feeling that we had a real commander in charge. This feeling spread between us and later also in the battlefield radios like fire. Bar-Lev also managed to calm Gorodish down. Prior to his arrival, general staff meetings were one loud shout out of Gorodish's mouth. Bar Lev instituted orderly working routines. No one challenged his authority. The country owes much to him. "Dvelah" went back to being a real war-room, a compartmentalized one. No one [who did not belong there] was allowed entry. Serenity descended on the war room. The general staff officers switched to carrying out their tasks in well organized shifts. Even Arik [Ariel Sharon]'s tone of voice changed when Bar Lev arrived.

• List of Israel's Chiefs of the General Staff

• Moshe Ben Shaul (1968). Generals of Israel. Tel Aviv: Hadar Pub. OCLC 2648484.
• Chaim Herzog (1982). The Arab–Israeli Wars. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-394-50379-1.

• Haim Bar-Lev on the Knesset website
• Interview 25 February 1990 on YouTube by Leon Charney on The Leon Charney Report