Emergency State (book)

In the first chapter, Wagner introduces the concept of the Emergency State, the manner in which the State functions during an existential crisis such as famine, pandemic, or war drawing comparison to other historic crises.[1]^: 9,16

Wagner notes that most modern states have legislation to allow emergency powers where constitutional protections for fundamental rights can be suspended. He cites the case of Liversidge v Anderson where the House of Lords Judges ruled that the Home Secretary need not provide any reason for their decision to indefinitely detain someone for that decision to be reasonable.[1]^: 29

Wagner traces the history of the emergency powers in the Public Health Act to the SARS outbreak of 2002,[8] after which the World Health Organization had encouraged states to create emergency legislation.[1]^: 31 He notes that there was concern about the breadth of powers during parliamentary debate at the time of reading.[1]^: 32

Wagner traces the history of lockdowns, arguing that while social distancing has a long history national lockdowns are new.[1]^: 33 He draws comparisons to plague orders in England during outbreaks of the bubonic plague,[1]^: 35 and notes that Sierra Leone had a three-day lockdown in response to Ebola in 2014.[1]^: 38

Wagner discusses the history of the European Court of Human Rights, ECHR, as a means to stop the slide into authoritarianism.[1]^: 46 He cites Pierre-Henri Teitgen, a founder of the ECHR as arguing that the risk authoritarianism was not appreciated before its rise in the 1900s,[1]^: 47 and argues that at times authoritarians do not take power by force but are invited.[1]^: 48 Wagner discusses the imposition of lockdowns imposition of COVID-19 lockdowns internationally during the early period of the pandemic.[1]^: 48–56

In this chapter, Wagner discusses the imposition of lockdowns and stay-at-home orders during the early stages of the pandemic in the UK.

He argues that the lockdown regulations implemented by Matt Hancock fundamentally altered the relationship of the citizen with the state in that they only allowed certain activities rather than banning them and were 'Napoleonic' in nature.[1]^: 61 Wagner notes vagueness surrounding lockdown laws and the difference between governmental guidance the law.[1]^: 63 He discusses the issuing of fixed penalty notices, FPNs, during COVID-19,[1]^: 68 and the effects of Dominic Cummings' violation of lockdown guidance.[1]^: 70–73

This chapter discusses lockdowns effects on education.[1]^: 79–81 Wagner argues that lockdowns affected some such as those who were pregnant, those who lived alone, in cramped flats, without access to a garden, had abusive partners, or had ill relatives and that they widened social and ethnic inequalities.[1]^: 82–84 Wagner discusses the fact that COVID amounted to a ban on sexual relations for those who did not cohabit,[1]^: 85–89 arguing that it was ironic that Matt Hancock who approved most covid measures resigned due to having an extramarital affair with an aide in the workplace.[1]^: 89

This chapter discusses lockdowns during the summer of 2020.[1]^: 90 It gives the example of a local lockdown in Leicester that was imposed and enforced before the legislation approving local lockdowns had been published.[1]^: 93–94 Wagner notes that legislation surrounding COVID-19 restrictions changed very quickly, with the laws on averaging changing once a week,[1]^: 97 and the chaotic way in which they government commiunicated legislation.[8] He draws parallels to the covid regulations and the concept of a "dog law" used by Jeremy Bentham, a law that it is impossible to know or follow ahead of time.[1]^: 95–96 Wagner discusses the prosection of protests against lockdowns and the ethics surrounding the right to protest during pandemics.[1]^: 97–100

In this chapter Wagner discusses the Winter of 2020-2021.[1]^: 101 Wagner discusses rules to quarantine in hotels,[1]^{: 132–137} and legal challenges to emergency legislation brought by Simon Dolan.[1]^{: 119–123}

Wagner discusses an exception to covid regulations made that allowed hunting and grouse shooting.[1]^{: 103–104} This is given an example[1]^: 104 of a form of banal corruption that could have arisen from Covid Operations Cabinet Committee having so much power.[1]^: 105 The Committee consisted of four members Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, Rishi Sunak and Matt Hancock as well as a few other key officials.[1]^{: 105–106} Wagner equates this the Hannah Arendt's concept of banal evil where officials claim to just follow orders.^: 104

This chapter discusses vaccination against covid and the use of vaccine passports,[1]^{: 139–142} issues surrounding the policing of the vigil for Sarah Everard,[1]^{: 142–147} who had been murdered by a police officer, and the emergence of partygate, the revelation that a number of illegal gatherings had taken place in the houses of parliament during lockdown.[1]^{: 151–157}

In the concluding chapter, Wagner argues that Boris Johnson's government saw democracy as an inconveniece.[1]^: 161 Wagner argues government was able to take over rule from parliament for two years due to a submissive parliament, weak legal protections, politicians who saw democratic process as an inconvenience, and lacked integrity.[1]^{: 161–162} Wagner notes his lack of scientific qualifications but argues that some form of social distancing is still unavoidable during the initial stages of pandemics.[1]^: 165

Wagner argues that the Public Health Act is a flawed piece of legislation allowing government to legislate without accountability, noting that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 still gives the government immense power while providing Parliament more scrutiny both in terms of the timeliness of review at the ability for parliament to amend legislation.[1]^: 162 Wagner contrasts the United Kingdom legislation to Scotland, Sweden, Finland, New Zealand and Singapore as providing more scrutiny of measures.[1]^: 163

He notes a process of "follow the science", where decisions were taken but Covid-19 Cabinet Committees based on advice from the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts presided over by four ministers which were highly secretive.[1]^: 163

Wagner offers four suggestions to reduce the power of the Emergency State. Firstly, that the powers of the Public Health Act should be limited in the same way as the civil contingencies act,[1]^: 165 secondly that all prosecutions and fixed penalty notices issues under COVID regulation should be reviewed,[1]^: 166 thirdly that there should be a codified constitution,[1]^: 166 and lastly that human rights should form a central part of decision making during emergencies.[1]^: 167