State Intelligence Agency

The State Intelligence Agency (Indonesian: Badan Intelijen Negara), commonly referred to as BIN, is Indonesia's primary intelligence agency. The BIN is responsible for coordinating information sharing and information gathering operations with other Indonesian intelligence agencies, as well as conducting independent operations.

State Intelligence Agency
Badan Intelijen Negara
Seal of the State Intelligence Agency
Flag of the State Intelligence Agency
Agency overview
Formed7 May 1946 (1946-05-07)
JurisdictionIndonesia
HeadquartersJl. Seno Raya, Pejaten Timur, Pasar Minggu. South Jakarta, Indonesia
Employeesclassified
Annual budget10 trillion IDR (480 million USD) (2020)[1]
Agency executives
Websitewww.bin.go.id

Prior to 2001, it was known as Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence Coordinating Agency"); its name change was a result of restructuring in the agency.[2] At the time of its name change in 2001, the BIN's role in co-ordinating interagency operations was de-emphasised. However, in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombing, its co-ordinating function was re-strengthened as part of a general expansion of the agency's mandate, which included an expanded budget.[3] Since 9 September 2016, the agency has been headed by Budi Gunawan.[4]

History

1943–1965

The origins of the agency are rooted in the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. In 1943, Japan established an intelligence organisation known as the Nakano Military Intelligence School. One of its graduates was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who would go on to lead Indonesia's first intelligence agency.

After declaring independence in 1945, the Government of Indonesia established its first intelligence agency, called Badan Istimewa. Colonel Lubis returned to lead the agency, as did about 40 former special military investigators. After undergoing special intelligence training period in the Ambarawa region, around 30 young men became members of the Indonesian State Secrets Agency (BRANI) in early May 1946. This agency would go on to become an umbrella organization for the Indonesian intelligence community.

In July 1946, Minister of Defense Amir Sjarifuddin formed "Defense Agency B", which was headed by a former police commissioner. On 30 April 1947 all intelligence agencies, including the BRANI, were merged into the Ministry of Defense to become part of Defense Agency B.

In 1949, Indonesian Minister of Defense Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX was not satisfied with the performance of the Indonesian intelligence community, as it operated independently and was considered poorly coordinated. Hamengkubuwono formed the Special Service or DC, also known by the pseudonym Ksatria Graha. The DC was intended to be able to respond to future issues of Indonesian security. The recruitment program was the first Indonesian intelligence program involving non-military personnel trained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Candidates for the DC were sent to Saipan for training until the DC restarted training in Indonesia. DC agents participated in various clandestine operations such as Operations Trikora and Dwikora, as well as the massacre of suspected members of the Communist Party.

In early 1952, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, T.B. Simatupang, demoted the intelligence agency to the Badan Informasi Staff Angkatan Perang (Armed Forces Staff Information Agency). During 1952–1958, due to competition within the military the various military branches and police each had their own intelligence services without national coordination. As a result, on 5 December 1958, President Sukarno formed the Intelligence Coordinating Body (BKI) with Colonel Laut Pirngadi as the head.

On 10 November 1959, the BKI was again reorganized into the Central Intelligence Agency (BPI), headquartered at Jalan Madiun and headed by Dr. Soebandrio. From the 1960s until the beginning of the New Order, Soebandrio's influence on the BPI was particularly strong, especially amidst internal conflict between left- and right-wing factions of the armed forces.

1965–present

After the 1965 upheaval, Suharto headed Kopkamtib (Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, "Operational Command for Restoring Security and Order"). Subsequently, an Intelligence Task Force was formed in each region. On 22 August 1966, Suharto established the State Intelligence Command (KIN), headed by Brigadier General Yoga Sugomo and directly responsible to Suharto.

As a strategic intelligence agency, BPI was merged into KIN; KIN also had Special Operations Opsus under Lt. Col. Ali Moertopo and assistants Leonardus Benyamin (Benny) Moerdani and Aloysius Sugiyanto. On 22 May 1967, less than a year later, Suharto issued a Presidential Decree (Keppres) to redesign KIN as BAKIN (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence Coordinating Agency"). Major General Soedirgo was appointed as the first head of BAKIN.

Under Major General Sutopo Juwono, BAKIN had Deputy II, which was under Colonel Nicklany Soedardjo, a military police officer who graduated from Fort Gordon, US. In early 1965, Soedardjo created the PM's intelligence unit, Detasemen Pelaksana Intelijen or Den Pintel POM. Officially, Den Pintel POM was Special Intelligence Unit Satsus Intel, then in 1976 it became Implementing Unit Satlak and in the 1980s it became the Implementing Unit 01.

Starting in 1970 there was a reorganization of BAKIN, Deputy III was added as an Opsus post under Brigadier General TNI Ali Moertopo, a Suharto insider. Opsus is considered the most prestigious posting in BAKIN, involved in events ranging from Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat of West Irian[5] and the birth of the Golongan Karya (Golkar)[6] to the Indochina issue.[7] In 1983, as Deputy Head of BAKIN, L. B. Moerdani expanded intelligence activities and BAKIN became BAIS (Badan Intelijen Negara, "Strategic Intelligence Agency"). Afterwards, BAKIN remained as a contra-subversion directorate of the New Order.

After removing Moerdani as Minister of Defense and Security, in 1993 Suharto reduced BAIS's mandate and changed its name to BAI (Badan Intelijen ABRI, "ABRI Intelligence Agency"). In 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid changed BAKIN to BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence Agency"), which it remains.

Thus, since 1945, the state intelligence organization has changed its name six times:[8]

  1. BRANI (Badan Rahasia Negara Indonesia, "Indonesian State Secrets Agency")
  2. BKI (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen, "Intelligence Coordination Agency")
  3. BPI (Badan Pusat Intelijen, "Central Intelligence Agency")
  4. KIN (Komando Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence Command")
  5. BAKIN (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence Coordination Agency")
  6. BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence Agency")

Organizational structure

Main organization

The organisational structure is mainly based on Presidential Decree No. 90/2012 (State Intelligence Agency).[9] The organizational structure was last amended by Presidential Decree No. 79/2020 (Second Amendment of Presidential Decree No. 90/2012 Re: State Intelligence Agency), signed on 20 July 2020.[10] Under the Presidential Regulation, BIN's organisational structure consists of nine deputies, which was later expanded by Chief BIN Decree No. 01/2022:[11]

  • Chief: lead in performing the duties and functions of the BIN; has financial, administrative and other facilities on par with the Minister.
  • Deputy Chief: helping and giving aid to the intelligence chief.
  • Main Secretariat: coordinating the implementation of tasks, coaching and providing administrative support to all organizational units within the BIN, consisting of:
    • Bureau of Planning and Finance
    • Bureau of Human Resource
    • Bureau of Law, Organization, and Management
    • Bureau of Logistics
    • Bureau of General Affairs
  • Deputy of Foreign Affairs (Deputy I): policy formulation and implementation of activities and operations of foreign intelligence field. It consists of:
    • 1st Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of International Cooperation
    • Directorate of Asia and Pacific
    • Directorate of Africa and Middle East
    • Directorate of America and Europe
  • Deputy of Home Affairs (Deputy II): policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or operations in the field of domestic intelligence. It consists of:
    • 2nd Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of Java and Bali
    • Directorate of Sumatera and Kalimantan
    • Directorate of Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara
    • Directorate of Maluku and Papua
  • Deputy of Counter Intelligence (Deputy III): policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or counterintelligence operations. It consists of:
    • 3rd Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of Counter-espionage
    • Directorate of Counter-terrorism
    • Directorate of Counter-separatism and Counter-conflicts
    • Directorate of Counter-infiltration and Counter-sabotage
  • Deputy of Economy (Deputy IV): policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or intelligence operations in economics. It consists of:
    • 4th Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of Agriculture, Agrarian, and Marine Affairs
    • Directorate of Energy, Mineral Resources, and Population Affairs
    • Directorate of Industry, Trade, Cooperations, Transportation, Tourism, Telecommunication, and Maritime Affairs
    • Directorate of Finance and Banking Affairs
  • Deputy for Technology Intelligence (Deputy V): policy formulation and implementation of activities and intelligence operations technology. It consists of:
    • 5th Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of Telematics
    • Directorate of Engineering
    • Directorate of Geospatial Intelligence
    • Directorate of Monitoring
  • Deputy for Cyber Intelligence (Deputy VI): policy formulation and implementation of activities and cyber intelligence operations. It consists of:
    • 6th Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of Early Detection
    • Directorate of Counter-cyber intelligence
    • Directorate of Analysis and Forensics
    • Directorate of Threats Response
  • Deputy Communication and Information (Deputy VII): policy formulation and implementation of activities and intelligence operations in Communication and Information. Prior 21 July 2017, this deputy was numbered as Deputy VI. It consists of:
    • 7th Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of Mass Communication
    • Directorate of Social Communication
    • Directorate of Inter-Institutional Relations
    • Directorate of Dissemination and Publication
  • Deputy Apparatuses Security Intelligence (Deputy VIII): performing background checking for state apparatus and its candidate; granting appropriate clearance for those who need it; policy formulation and implementation in the field of processing and the production of intelligence in apparatuses security; providing suggestions and recommendations for safeguarding the government's governance; and managing and maintaining databases of state officials and other renowned figures. This deputy is the latest deputy formed in July 2020. It consists of:
    • 8th Directorate of Activities and Operations Planning and Control
    • Directorate of State Apparatuses
    • Directorate of Non-State Apparatuses
  • Deputy Intelligence Analysis and Production (Deputy IX): policy formulation and implementation in the field of processing and the production of intelligence. Prior 21 July 2017, this deputy was numbered as Deputy VII. It consists of:
    • Directorate of Planning and Production of Intelligence Products
    • Directorate of Intelligence Analysis of Ideological, Political, Social, and Cultural Affairs
    • Directorate of Intelligence Analysis of National Security
    • Directorate of Intelligence Analysis of Economical Affairs
    • Directorate of Intelligence Analysis of Foreign Affairs
  • General Inspectorate: oversight of BIN internal affairs. At present, BIN has a main inspectorate and 3 subordinate inspectorate offices:
    • Main Inspectorate
      • Inspectorate I (Performance)
      • Inspectorate II (Personnel)
      • Inspectorate III (Administrative)
  • Expert Staffs: giving recommendations to the chief on specific matters. Currently, BIN have expert staffs in several fields:
    • Political and Ideology
    • Social and Culture
    • Law and Human Rights
    • Defense and Security
    • Natural Resources and Environment
  • Centers are supporting units or centers established by BIN for specific purposes. The centers formation is regulated by Chief BIN Decrees. As in 2022, these centers are:
    • Intelligence Professional Development Center
    • Research and Development Center
    • Education and Training Center
    • Medical Intelligence Center
    • Psychology Center
  • Regional BIN Offices are regional offices located in each province where BIN functions in domestic intelligence. These offices are subordinate to Deputy II. All regional BIN offices possess same structure:
    • Office of Head of Regional BIN Office
      • Division of Operations
        • Section of Activities Planning and Intelligence Operations
        • Section of Analysis, Evaluation, and Reporting
        • Section of Operational Support and Administration
        • Section of Preparation of Technology and Cyber Supports
        • Section of Administration
      • Areal Coordinators (placed in every cities and/or regencies under the province)
  • Extra-territorial BIN Representative Offices are BIN representative offices located in foreign lands. These offices are subordinate to Deputy I.
  • Technical Implementation Units are specialized units founded by BIN to perform specialised functions and implementation. Currently, there are two Technical Implementation Units:
    • State Intelligence College, the primary training facility of BIN
    • State Intelligence Museum, the intelligence museum operated by BIN for training and doctrine purposes
  • Task forces are units operated under auspices of the Office of Head of BIN. They are not permanent, but temporarily formed and activated for special functions.

Training facility

BIN possesses a primary education and training facility called STIN (Sekolah Tinggi Intelijen Negara, "State Intelligence College"). It has undergraduate, master, and doctoral level educationa programs for intelligence in Indonesia. All BIN graduates will become part of BIN human resources after graduation.[12] During the COVID-19 pandemic, in September 2019, Budi Gunawan announced that STIN would open a Medical Intelligence program.[13] In April 2021, STIN opened their Medical Intelligence program, and expanded other programs under STIN.[14]

The current training programs of STIN are:

  • Undergraduate
    • Intelligence Agent
    • Intelligence Technology
    • Cyber Intelligence
    • Economic Intelligence
  • Master
    • Intelligence Studies
    • Applied Economic Intelligence
    • Applied Cyber and Technology Intelligence
    • Medical Intelligence
      • Chemical and Nuclear Hazard
      • Biohazard
  • Doctoral
    • Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Aside from STIN, BIN possesses another education and training facility called Education and Training Center, under the Main Secretariat office. Unlike training provided by STIN, training at the Education and Training Center is more specialised.[15]

Para-commando unit

BIN also possesses at least one para-commando force unit. A unit codenamed "Rajawali" (Eagle) was disclosed by Bambang Soesatyo, Speaker of People's Consultative Assembly. The existence of the unit surprised many Indonesians. The unit is signified by black full-body clad military attire, similar to Koopsus combat attire. In the press release, BIN acknowledged that Rajawali Force is a BIN force specially trained in "special threats handling and deterrence". BIN also said that the unit does not has specific name, as it changes annually. Most other details of the unit remain undisclosed.[16][17][18]

Activities
  • In 1973, BIN initiated Operation Onta (Camel), a ten-day stakeout against members of the Iraqi embassy and Yemeni consulate. Two further surveillance operations (Onta II and Onta III) were conducted against the same targets that year.[7]
  • In September 1973, intelligence task force Satsus Intel drew up plans to permanently station a team at Jakarta's Kemayoran Airport. The team soon began archiving color photographs of Arab passports from over a dozen nations and comparing the names to a terrorist watchlist compiled by foreign intelligence services. Especially suspicious of Yemen, BIN conducted surveillance on the Yemeni consulate for almost a decade but never found important information and, despite fears, communism was not spread to Indonesia.[7]
  • In 1982, BIN and Kopkamtib managed to capture Alexander Pavlovich Vinenko, a GRU agent; he had disguised himself as an Aeroflot manager in Jakarta. Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Egorov, the Soviet assistant military attaché, and Lieutenant Colonel Susdaryanto, an officer in the Indonesian Navy, cooperated in catching the soviet spy. He had previously been arrested by BIN for selling information about the oceans around Indonesia and the Indonesian Navy, but due to political pressure from the Soviets, was released after being made persona non grata; Susdaryanto continued to work with BIN to uncover other Soviet spies.[7]
  • In 1998, José Ramos-Horta said that Indonesian intelligence was spying on East Timorese exiles around the world.[19]
  • In early 2002, BIN was derided by ministers and senior politicians when it emerged that it had written separate, and contradictory, reports on the economy for cabinet ministers and for a parliamentary committee. BIN also prepared an error-filled briefing for parliament's Foreign Affairs and Security Commission prior to John Howard's visit to Indonesia in February 2002. The briefing alleged that Australia's Lt-Gen Peter Cosgrove had written an autobiography denigrating Indonesia's role in East Timor. The briefing also asserted that the Howard government had formed a secret twelve-person committee to engineer Papua's secession from Indonesia.[20]
  • In 2002, BIN, in coordination with Kopassus's Anti-Terror unit Sat-81, successfully captured Islamist militant Omar al-Faruq. He was later handed over to US authorities.[21]
  • In 2004, retiring chief of BIN, General Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono, admitted that Indonesia had wiretapped the Australian embassy in Jakarta during the 1999 East Timorese crisis and has tried to recruit Australian spies.[22][23]
  • In 2005, BIN was found to have used the charitable foundation of former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid to hire a Washington lobbying firm to pressure the US government for a full restart of military training programs in Indonesia.[24]
  • A United States diplomatic cables leak suggested that BIN was involved in the poisoning of Indonesian human rights activist Munir Said Thalib on board a Garuda Indonesia flight from Jakarta to Amsterdam.[25] [26] Top level BIN officials were implicated in his murder, and a BIN deputy chairman, Muchdi Purwopranjono, was tried for the assassination attempt and acquitted; his trial was internationally condemned as a "sham trial". In 2014, former BIN chief A.M Hendropriyono admitted that he bore "command responsibility" for the assassination, and he was prepared to be tried.[27]
  • In 2015, the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) teamed up with BIN to generate more reliable data on political and security conditions in new investment sites. BKPM chief Franky Sibarani said BIN could provide accurate information on the local social and political condition, which would help generate site-specific investment policies. Some environmental activists warn that these reports could be manipulated to stymie community opposition to development projects.[28][29]
  • In 2020, the Indonesian chief security minister admitted that the US CIA has provided data about Indonesian militants who fought for the Islamic State abroad. Indonesia has refused to repatriate more than 600 militants from Syria, Iraq, Turkey and other countries, but may allow the return of children orphaned by the war.[30]
  • During the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, BIN play significant role in controlling the situation.[31] While this initially caused controversy, BIN had a legally mandated role in controlling and neutralizing medical threats; the controversy later died out.[32] BIN, together with the wider Indonesian intelligence community, research centers, universities, and ministries researched COVID-19 and potential Indonesia-made vaccines, test kits, and cures. They also joined with local health departments to administer tests and vaccinations.[33][34] Joko Widodo endorsed BIN performing door-to-door vaccination in the community, which involved sending out medical agents so people from remote and inaccessible locations, or who were unable to attend the vaccination sites, could get vaccinated.[35] BIN also provide funding for universities for COVID-19 researches in Indonesia.[36]
  • In September 2021, not long after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, Deputy VII of BIN, Wawan Hari Purwanto, said that they continued to communicate with the Taliban to prevent terrorism from reaching Indonesia. BIN also continued monitoring groups with ties to the Taliban, and was communicating with former Indonesian fighters who had joined the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War to prevent acts of terrorism in Indonesia.[37][38]
  • In 2022, Conflict Armament Research reported that in October 2020, BIN purchased more than 2,500 mortar shells from Serbia for use in Papua. CAR said the mortar rounds were manufactured by Krušik, a Serbian state-owned arms manufacturer, and later modified to be dropped from the air (rather than fired from a mortar tube). They said the arms also included 3,000 electronic initiators and three timing devices typically used to detonate explosives. Reuters was not able to independently confirm certain aspects of the CAR report, including whether BIN had actually received the shipment. Reuters could not establish who authorised the purchase of the munitions or who used them in Papua. Some experts believe that the shells would have been used in retaliation for the death of the head of BIN, which occurred in Papua in April 2021.[39][40]

References
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  10. Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia (20 July 2020). "Peraturan Presiden Nomor 79 Tahun 2020 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Peraturan Presiden Nomor 90 Tahun 2012 tentang Badan Intelijen Negara" (PDF). JDIH Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia (in Indonesian). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2 July 2023. Retrieved 17 April 2021.
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  25. Osman, Nurfika (10 September 2011). "WikiLeaks US Cables Point to BIN Role in Munir Murder". Jakarta Globe. Retrieved 6 September 2014.
  26. Siboro, Tiarma; Saraswati, Muninggar Sri (16 November 2004). "Rights campaigner Munir dies on plane". The Jakarta Post. Archived from the original on 16 November 2004. Retrieved 3 May 2021.
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  34. Khadijah, Nurul (4 March 2021). Nurfajriani, Rahmi (ed.). "BIN Ikut Aktif Meneliti Virus Corona, Klaim Temukan 2 Kasus Varian B117 dari 426 Spesimen di Indonesia - Pikiran-Rakyat.com". pikiran-rakyat.com (in Indonesian). Retrieved 3 August 2021.
  35. Lubabah, Raynaldo Ghifari (28 July 2021). "Jalankan Perintah Jokowi, BIN Gelar Vaksinasi Door to Door di Serang". merdeka.com. Retrieved 3 August 2021.
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  37. "BIN Menjalin Komunikasi dengan Taliban, Cegah Perang Melebar ke Indonesia". 2 September 2021.
  38. Wardah, Fathiyah (23 August 2021). "BIN Lacak Kelompok Teroris di Indonesia yang Dekat dengan Taliban". Voice of America. Retrieved 22 March 2023.
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