< Canadian Refugee Procedure

This is a book about the legal processes involved in claiming refugee status in Canada, focusing particularly on the Refugee Protection Division Rules of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Tens of thousands of people file a claim for refugee protection in Canada every year. The ensuing process that they navigate is governed by the set of laws described herein.

Preliminary

About this text

There are many books about the substance of refugee law, in Canada and internationally. They cover subjects such as what it means to have a well-founded fear of persecution and when a claimant has access to adequate state protection. This is not one of them. This is a book about the legal processes involved in claiming refugee status in Canada, focusing particularly on the Refugee Protection Division Rules of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Tens of thousands of people file a claim for refugee protection in Canada every year. The ensuing process that they navigate is governed by the set of laws described herein.

Refugee law itself may be regarded as a combination of administrative law, human rights law, civil procedure, and international law,[1] and as such, this text seeks to weave those strands together. That said, this text does not aspire to be an all-encompassing description of Canadian legal processes related to refugees, but instead confines itself to the in-Canada asylum process, setting aside discussion of the overseas resettlement provisions in the IRPA. In part, this is because of the nature of those resettlement decisions. As the government of Canada states, resettlement is managed as an administrative process, and "as a result resettlement decisions are not subject to the same level of formality as asylum determinations."[2] The Canadian government notes that, in addition to being less costly to administer, this allows for quicker decision-making than is the case for asylum adjudication.

Refugee admission is described as an area of immigration law that "remains controversial" and is "difficult to administer".[3] As Clayton Ma notes, refugee procedures in Canada have been characterized by speedy policy changes, often occasioned by "new governments and shifting popular opinions".[4] That said, in recent decades, such policy changes and procedural innovations have taken place against the stable background of Canada's international commitments, particularly the commitments enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The policy change in this area of law means that rules and processes are regularly under development and in flux. This can be a challenge for claimants and lawyers both - as Jeremy Bentham observed, "miserable is the slavery of that people among whom the law is either unsettled or unknown."[5] This text strives to assist with remedying such a condition, primarily by describing the law as it exists (lex lata) but also by providing descriptions inflected by a conception of the law as it should be (lex ferenda). This discussion strives to include consideration of historical context. In this way, this text is influenced by the observation of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. that "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience" and as a result focuses on the history and evolution of the rules in question over time.

References

  1. Jenny Poon, A Legal Pluralist Approach to Migration Control: Norm Compliance in a Globalized World, 34 Emory Int'l L. Rev. Recent Dev. 2037 (2020). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr-recent-developments/4 at page 2039.
  2. High Commissioner's Forum, Resettlement and Convention Plus Initiatives, discussion paper, Doc FORUM/2003/02 (18 June 2003), para. 13.
  3. Troper, Harold. The Canadian Encyclopedia, s.v. "Immigration in Canada", Last Edited September 19, 2017, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/immigration
  4. Encyclopedia, The Canadian. "Canadian Refugee Policy".  The Canadian Encyclopedia, 10 November 2020, Historica Canada. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/canadian-refugee-policy. Accessed 30 December 2020.
  5. Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712

Glossary

Acronyms

Common acronyms used herein:[1]

  • BOC: Basis of Claim Form
  • CBSA: Canada Border Services Agency
  • CIC: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (the former name for IRCC)
  • COI: Country of Origin Information.[2]
  • DCO: Designated Country of Origin[3]
  • IRCC: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
  • DFN: Designated Foreign Nationals
  • IRB: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
  • IRPA: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
  • JG: Jurisprudential Guide[2]
  • NDP: National Documentation Package[2]
  • RAD: Refugee Appeal Division
  • RPD: Refugee Protection Division
  • IRCC: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
  • NDP: National Documentation Package
  • PIF: Personal Information Form (Predecessor to the BOC)
  • POE Claim: Port of Entry Claim[3]
  • PRRA: Pre-Removal Risk Assessment
  • UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Terms

  • Asylum seeker: individuals whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.[4]
  • Country of origin information (COI) is defined as "Information about the situation in a country that is relevant to the refugee determination process and obtained from publicly available sources that are viewed as, whenever possible, reliable and objective" in the Board's Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings.[2]
  • Identity: for commentary on the meaning of the term "identity" as it is used in the IRPA and the RPD Rules, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#"Identity" as the term is used in the Act and the Rules refers to personal/national identity.
  • Inland office: Any office of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) or the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) inside Canada.[5]
  • Jurisprudential Guide (JG) is defined as "A decision identified by the Chairperson as a JG pursuant to section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)" in the Board's Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings.[2]
  • Landed Immigrant: this is an old term that was used under the previous immigration Act and has been replaced by the term "permanent resident".[6]
  • Member: Decision maker on the RAD or RPD.[3]
  • National Documentation Package (NDP) is defined as "A selection of COI documents on a given country from which refugee claims originate, compiled by the RD based on information that is, whenever possible, accurate, balanced, and corroborated" in the Board's Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings.[2]
  • Non-refoulement is the legal principle banning expulsion and non-admittance of refugees at the border of States Parties[7] where they would be returned to a country in which they face serious threats to their life or freedom.[8]
  • Permanent resident: The right to live, work, study and remain in Canada under specific residency obligations.

Definitions

  • Interpretation refers to the oral transfer of meaning between languages.[9] See, in contrast, translation.
  • Translation refers to the written transfer of meaning between languages.[9] See, in contrast, interpretation.

The Refugee Protection Division Rules themselves include a definitions section, which see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions. The Act also includes a definitions section, which see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions, objectives, and application of the IRPA#IRPA Section 2.

References

  1. Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants, 2019, Page 1 <https://refugeeclaim.ca/wp-content/themes/refugeeclaim/library/guide/rhpg-vancouver-en.pdf>
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings, Effective date: June 5, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/national-documentation-packages.aspx> (Accessed August 30, 2020).
  3. 1 2 3 Legal Aid Ontario, Refugee Case Law Toolkit <https://www.legalaid.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Refugee-Case-Law-toolkit-EN.pdf>, page 7 (Accessed January 25, 2020).
  4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, <https://www.unhcr.org/en- us/asylum-seekers.html> (Accessed May 9, 2020).
  5. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant's Guide (Print version), Version 5 - 2018 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/Pages/ClaDemGuide.aspx> (Accessed January 25, 2020).
  6. Woo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 69120 (CA IRB), par. 2, <http://canlii.ca/t/20z95#2>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
  7. Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2–11 (Division of International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1997), 13–37.
  8. UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
  9. 1 2 Tess Acton, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf>, page 39 (Accessed January 23, 2020).

The history of refugee procedure in Canada

Early refugee policies

Globally, the first record of the term ‘refugee’ is popularly credited in application to French Huguenots who relocated to neighbouring European territories around Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1695.[1] One million Huguenots left France and settled across the European continent around this time. It is no coincidence that the term "refugee" emerged at this time in the 17th century, shortly after the Peace of Westphalia that birthed key concepts in modern international relations, including the inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Indeed, Harsha Walia labels the concept of an "asylum seeker" as a "state-centric taxonomy only possible because of a prevailing assumption of the border as a legitimate institution of governance".[2]

Despite this, related concepts, including those of migration, exodus, asylum, and refuge long pre-date the modern usage of the term "refugee". (Im)migration and refugee processes, of a sort, have long been present in the territory of Canada. For example, some First Nations would absorb war captives and refugees from neighbouring First Nations, as with the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) who are said to have pursued an ancient ideal that they “extend the rafters of the longhouse” by absorbing their neighbours into one nation, thereby producing a universal peace.[3] Warfare between First Nations also created what could be called refugees who would flee to new regions, for example, with the coming of the fur trade in the 16th century, the Haudenosaunee embarked on campaigns to subjugate or disperse neighbouring groups and the French-allied Huron-Wendat were dispersed from their homeland after several villages were destroyed in 1649; such dispersal campaigns would also impact the Petun, Neutral and Erie in the following decade.[4] Forced displacement of indigenous persons also resulted from the actions of the colonial regimes that emerged in Canada, for example, with the physical displacement inherent in the reserve system, which abrogated many relationships with traditional territories, as well as related social, cultural, and political displacements.[5] In the words of the section of the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples on Displacement and Assimilation:

[The impact of colonialism on indigenous populations was profound.] Perhaps the most appropriate term to describe that impact is 'displacement'. Aboriginal peoples were displaced physically — they were denied access to their traditional territories and in many cases actually forced to move to new locations selected for them by colonial authorities. They were also displaced socially and culturally, subject to intensive missionary activity and the establishment of schools — which undermined their ability to pass on traditional values to their children, imposed male-oriented Victorian values, and attacked traditional activities such as significant dances and other ceremonies. In North America they were also displaced politically, forced by colonial laws to abandon or at least disguise traditional governing structures and processes in favour of colonial-style municipal institutions.[6]

In the 1700s and 1800s, the British instituted policies to encourage immigration to British North America, including by those who would rightfully be termed refugees today. For example, 50,000 United Empire Loyalists, supporters of the British in the American revolution, migrated north in response to American republicanism.[7] Many of them migrated northward not by choice but by default, either because they did not wish to become citizens of the new American republic or because they feared retribution for their public support of the British during the War of Independence.[8] The retribution meted out to loyalists in the United States included beatings, imprisonment, and other forms of harassment.[9] Among these loyalists who migrated northward were an estimated 2000 members of the aboriginal peoples bordering the Thirteen Colonies who had supported the British cause, believing that an alliance offered the best hope for preserving their independence and protecting their territories from land-hungry colonists.[10] The loyalists also included thousands of free black persons, some of whom had heeded a British proclamation issued early in the war offering freedom to any slave who deserted his (sic) American master during the Revolution and volunteered to serve with the King's forces. Most of the new black arrivals responded to an offer of freedom made late in the conflict that guaranteed that all slaves who made formal claim to protection behind British lines would receive their freedom.[11] Upon arrival, many of these black loyalists faced the scourge of racism and dismal agricultural prospects in Nova Scotia, and, bitterly disappointed, 1,200 sailed for Sierra Leone to start afresh on the west coast of Africa in 1792.[11] Nonetheless, over the next century an estimated 30,000 African Americans came to Canada as the final stop on the underground railroad, seeking protection from slavery in that country.[12]

Overall, from the point of view of western states, before the First World War (WWI) people used to enjoy a certain freedom of movement in the world and, as such, defining a refugee was not a major concern for the reigning powers.[13] In the 19th and early 20th centuries, displaced, persecuted, and poor populations in Europe and North America simply moved to new jobs and opportunities in other regions.[14] Passports, for example, were not generally required for European and North American travel until the First World War.[15] There were also explicit efforts to entice refugees to choose to come to Canada. For example, John Graves Simcoe, the first lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, issued a proclamation in 1792 inviting Americans to emigrate to Upper Canada. This included a special appeal to the members of pacifist religious communities, including Quakers, Mennonites, and Dunkards, which promised them an exemption from military service.[16] A century later, in the 1870s and 1880s the Canadian government specifically sought to entice Mennonites to settle in western Canada. The Mennonite search for a new home was precipitated by the introduction of a policy of Russification in the schools of the Ukraine, where they lived, and by the implementation of universal conscription, which went against their pacifist beliefs.[17] The Canadian government not only offered them freedom from military service, but also freedom from swearing the oath of allegiance, a requirement which conflicted with their religious beliefs.[17] Other people who immigrated to Canada during this time period included 138,000 Jews who immigrated between 1900 and 1921, many of them refugees fleeing pogroms in Czarist Russia and Eastern Europe,[18] as well as the arrival of Doukhobors from Russia, where they suffered persecution.[18]

Not all migrants, however, were similarly welcomed by Canadian society. Canada's first Immigration Act, passed in 1869, initially reflected the laissez-faire philosophy of the time by saying nothing about which classes of immigrants should be admitted and which categories should be proscribed.[19] Subsequent amendments to the legislation, however, specifically discriminated against people on the grounds of class, race, and disability.[20] Through policies such as the Chinese head tax at the turn of the century, and the internment of Ukrainians,[21] the government selectively excluded certain groups of migrants.[12] As Jan Raska describes it, the Canadian government admitted refugees based on prevailing sociocultural, economic, and political views of the ‘desirable’ immigrant.[22] The government amended the Immigration Act in 1910 to prohibit all "charity cases" who had not received written authority to emigrate to Canada from the superintendent of immigration at Ottawa or the assistant superintendent of emigration for Canada in London. As Valerie Knowles writes, this clause was inspired by the large number of impoverished British immigrants who had arrived in Canada with the assistance of charitable organizations eager to rid Britain of paupers and to provide them with a new start in Canada.[23] Facially neutral legislative provisions were also employed in discriminatory ways; for example, while nothing in the Immigration Act specifically barred black Americans, any immigrant could effectively be denied access to Canada for health reasons under the Act's medical provisions. The government in 1911 instructed immigration inspectors along the American border to reject all black persons as unfit for admission on medical grounds. As Harold Troper notes, "There was no appeal."[8] Canada also turned away ships bearing refugees, such as the 376 passengers, most of whom were Sikhs, on the SS Komagata Maru in 1914, which was not allowed to dock in Vancouver. After a two-month stalemate, the Komagata Maru was forced to turn around and sail back across the Pacific Ocean, only to have some of its passengers massacred by the British Indian police upon arrival in India.[12] For a three-year period starting in 1919, Doukhobors, Mennonites, and Hutterites were specifically prohibited entry into Canada because of, in the words of the relevant order-in-council, "their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property, and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry."[24] Canada, like many states at the beginning of the 20th century, also implemented a requirement that travellers to Canada carry passports. As Kaprielian-Churchill writes, the passport requirement appears to have been implemented for the purposes of exclusion.[25]

League of Nations era

In response to an appeal from the International Committee of the Red Cross,[26] Member states of the League of Nations approved the creation of a refugee office in 1921 and appointed Fridtjof Nansen as the first High Commissioner for Refugees.[27] In 1922, Nansen created the so-called 'Nansen Passport' for Russian refugees.[28] This was an international identity certificate facilitating the movement and resettlement of refugees uprooted by the events of World War I, the Russian revolution, and the Armenian genocide in Turkey. It has also been pinpointed as the beginning of international refugee law.[29] This institutional innovation provided several million post-WWI European refugees with a forum in which they could seek protection and assistance.[27] In 1925, the Refugee Service of the International Labor Organization (ILO) took on responsibility for issuing these Nansen Passports. Five years later, the League of Nations entrusted the humanitarian aspect of refugee work to the International Refugee Office[30] ("Nansen International Office for Refugees").[31]

Canada refused to endorse any of these international initiatives aimed at aiding refugees. Canada steadfastly refused to recognize the Nansen Passport on the basis that Canada would only accept Nansen Passport bearers if they were returnable to another country in the event that they became criminals or insane, something that Kaprielian-Churchill describes as a smokescreen and means of rejecting refugees.[32] In fact, even once other countries strove to accommodate the Canadian demand for returnability, Canadian officials continued to refuse refugees, finding other grounds for rejection.[33] In 1931, Canadian officials spoke with pride that only "a dozen refugees" had been admitted to Canada on the League of Nations' Nansen Passport.[34] In order to address the fact that the agreements underpinning the Nansen Passport lacked the status of treaty law,[35] an international conference was convened in 1933 which led to the League of Nations' Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. Canada neither attended the conference nor subscribed to the agreement.[36]

WWII-era refugee policies

Irving Abella and Petra Molnar write that “Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism permeated Canada, and there was little public support for, and much opposition to, the admission of refugees... until after the Second World War.”[12] For example, in the 1930s, Canada restricted the admission of European Jews who sought safe haven from antisemitism and the emergence of fascism in Germany, but welcomed Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in search of refuge given that they were considered to be more 'desirable' immigrants.[22] In 1938, the US government brought together 30 countries for a conference on the subject of the worsening refugee situation in Europe. Canada was a reluctant participant, tarrying for months before accepting the US invitation to attend the Evian, France event. Valerie Knowles describes Canada's participation at the summer 1938 conference as having been "minimal" and states that it was to Canada's relief that the delegates at the conference accomplished little more than to produce a statement of lofty principles not actually necessitating more liberal immigration policies.[37] The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICGR) that was established in the late 1930s, mandated to assist Jews from Germany and Austria, operated without Canadian involvement.[38]

A visible manifestation of the antisemitism that marked Canadian policy was the decision to deny admission to 930 Jewish refugees on the SS St. Louis seeking asylum from Nazi Germany. These refugees were instead sent back to what awaited them in Germany. Later in the war, in 1943, Canada did announce that it intended to admit some Jewish refugees who had made their way to the Iberian peninsula. This is said to have "ignited a storm of protest from anti-refugee interests", with Quebec opposition leader Maurice Duplessis holding rallies to charge that that provincial and federal Liberals were set to allow the "International Zionist Brotherhood" to, in his words, settle 100,000 Jewish refugees in Quebec in return for election financing.[39] Ultimately, Canada admitted 5,000 Jewish refugees during the Second World War. In contrast, the US welcomed 240,000, Britain 85,000, China 25,000, Argentina and Brazil over 25,000 each, and Mexico and Colombia received some 40,000 between them.[12] When Canadian immigration officials were asked how many Jews the country would admit after the war, their famous response was, “None is too many.”[40]

Measures were also employed to exclude "enemy aliens" during the Second World War, such as the internment of Japanese persons.[12] In February 1942 the government ordered the expulsion of some 22,000 Japanese Canadians from a 100-mile swath of the Pacific Coast. The majority were relocated in the interior of British Columbia, often in detention camps in isolated ghost towns. Japanese Canadians were forced to remain in these detention camps until the end of the war. Then, after the conclusion of hostilities, about 4,000 would surrender to pressure and leave Canada for Japan under the federal government's "repatriation" scheme. Of these, more than half were Canadian-born and two-thirds were Canadian citizens.[37] During the war, the British government also transported 2,500 "enemy aliens" to Canada. For the most part, these were German and Austrian nationals, many of them highly educated Jews, who had been living in Great Britain when the war erupted. Valerie Knowles describes their reception in Canada as follows:

The Canadian government agreed to receive these male civilian internees in the belief that it would be assisting hard-pressed Britain by accepting custody of a number of "potentially dangerous enemy aliens". Canadian authorities were therefore astonished to see a large assortment of teenage boys, university students, priests, and rabbis step ashore at Quebec. Despite their misgivings, however, the Canadians proceeded to place all in camps that resembled maximum security prisons. And it was here that scientists, theologians, musicians, teachers, artists, and writers, among others, would be forced to bide their time for months to come.[39]

Knowles notes that, fortunately for these prisoners, the British government soon realized that it had done a possibly grave injustice to many of the internees and initiated steps to have them released. In 1945, Canada reclassified these one-time prisoners as "Interned Refugees (Friendly Aliens) from the United Kingdom" and invited them to become Canadian citizens. 972 chose to do so.[41]

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO)

In 1943, with the end of World War II in sight, the allied powers began to lay the foundations of a post-war refugee regime. also started to be laid at this point. In that year, they established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) in preparation for the liberation of Europe.[42] The UNRRA was not a refugee agency, but, rather, was focused on the repatriation of displaced persons. As Shauna Labman writes, it was during this period that the reality shifted from an individual's inability to return home to his or her unwillingness to return home.[42]

After the Second World War, the Canadian government began to receive more pressure both domestically and internationally to fulfill its humanitarian responsibility of hosting displaced persons.[43] There were over a million displaced persons and refugees in crowded shelters maintained by United Nations agencies in Europe. Some of these people were concentration camp survivors, others individuals who had been dispatched to labour camps in Germany and Austria, and still others were those refusing to be repatriated to Communist regimes.[44] Canada started by providing funding to the UNRRA, which distributed about $4 billion worth of goods, food, medicine, and tools, at a time of severe global shortages, and also assisted displaced persons in returning to their home countries in Europe in 1945-46.[45] In 1946, the Canadian government signed an order-in-council that allowed Canadians to sponsor displaced family members in Europe.[46]

The activities of the UNRRA began to be enmeshed in Cold War politics. The organization was faced with large numbers of Displaced Persons who were reluctant to be returned to countries where communist parties were taking a firm hold. Many Polish, Ukrainian, and Baltic persons were thus residing in camps, asking to be referred to a non-Communist country, as opposed to their country of citizenship. Soviet officials objected to any willingness to countenance such demands. In response, in December 1946 Western governments decided to create the International Refugee Organization as an instrument of resettlement. Unlike UNRRA, however, the IRO had no Soviet participation.[27] In 1947, Canada began to accept refugee referrals from the International Refugee Organization.[47] Canada also deployed Canadian immigration officers overseas for the purposes of selecting from among the displaced persons.[48] These arrivals comprised what was called the Displaced Persons Movement, which successfully resettled 186,154 refugees to Canada over the course of six years.[46]

When announcing the government's willingness to allow the movement of war survivors to Canada on May 1 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King articulated the government's position as follows: "It is not a 'fundamental human right' of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy. Immigration is subject to the control of the parliament of Canada."[49] This speech was also notable because it can be seen as the beginning of Canada accommodating the concept of human rights enshrined in the then-new United Nations Charter -- in deference to the UN Charter, Mackenzie King announced that the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 would be repealed and that Chinese residents of Canada would be able to apply for naturalization.[50] Despite this growing accommodation to human rights rhetoric, King's realpolitik was reflected in Canada's actions; David Corbett wrote in the 1950s that the tens of thousands of displaced persons that Canada accepted during this post-war period were "carefully selected, and most of them would have satisfied our standards if they had been applying as immigrants".[51]

The founding of the UNHCR, negotiation of the Refugee Convention, and growing refugee intake

When the June 1950 termination date for International Refugee Organization arrived, refugees continued to abound in Europe. Indeed, they were increasingly arriving across Western European borders from the Eastern Bloc.[52] As a result, on December 14, 1950, the UN General Assembly formed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and gave it the mandate to provide for the protection of refugees and forcibly displaced people and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local assimilation, or resettlement to a third country.[53] At this point, the UNHCR was only meant to be temporary, with the UN General Assembly giving the organization a 3-year mandate to address the needs of displaced Europeans from World War II.[54]

The next year, the foundational treaty for modern refugee protection, the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, emerged on July 28, 1951 from negotiations spearheaded by the UNHCR. The negotiations took place via an ad hoc committee of the UN Economic and Social Council titled the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. The treaty that emerged from this process sought to deal with situations arising immediately after World War II, and by its terms was limited to persons who became refugees before January 1, 1951.[55] During the drafting of the Convention, Canada was seen to be a leader in its creation: Canada was one of twenty-six countries to send a delegate to participate in the conference which negotiated the Convention;[22] in fact, a Canadian, Leslie Chance, chaired the conference;[56] Canada was the country in the Americas that presented the most proposals during the process of drafting the Convention, voicing comments during discussions that were otherwise dominated by the European States; and Canada was a part of the working group vested with the responsibility of drafting arguably the key part of the Convention - the definition of a refugee in Art. 1 of the document.[57] Canadian chairman Leslie Chance reported “we have been regarded throughout as taking a forward attitude.”[58] As an aside, Chance's statement could be regarded as somewhat self-serving given the shifting positions Canada took at the conference, for example arguing, contra France and the United Kingdom, for the inclusion of temporal and geographical limitations in the Convention, prior to flipping that position and arguing against such restrictions.[59] In any event, Canada did ultimately advocate at the conference "in favour of the widest possible definition" and took the position that "the purpose of the Convention was to protect refugees, not states."[60]

In 1951, Canada declined to ratify the resultant Convention. By way of explanation, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson announced the government was concerned that the Convention would give the refugee “the right to be represented in the hearing of his appeal against deportation” and, further, that the Convention would “grant rights to communists or to other persons who believed in the destruction of fundamental human rights and freedoms.”[58] The Canadian government also noted with concern that, "some sections of the convention appeared to prohibit states from deporting 'bona fide' refugees, even on grounds of national security".[61] Without Canada, the Refugee Convention entered into force on April 22, 1954.[62] Despite not signing the convention, Canada financially supported the UNHCR from its establishment[47] and, in 1959, began to sit on the then-new UNHCR Executive Committee, an advisory body of states that gives guidance to the High Commissioner.[63]

In the years following the UNHCR's creation, Canada also allowed for refugee entry on an ad-hoc basis, ranging from small groups, such as when Canada admitted 39 Palestinian families in the wake of the displacement occasioned by the founding of the State of Israel,[64] to larger movements, including the 37,000 Hungarian refugees Canada admitted following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.[65] By 1962, Canada had also admitted nearly 250,000 displaced persons from Europe,[66] many of whose journeys to Canada had been subsidized by a Canadian government seeking to recruit more workers for a booming economy.[67] That said, Canada's overall immigration laws continued to restrict manner persons for reasons of race, class, and health, and "national security" concerns, related to the fear of communism, were used to reject more than 29,000 applications to enter Canada between 1946 and 1958.[66]

Non-discrimination measures and Canada's ratification of the Refugee Convention

By the 1960s, values were changing across Canada, and around the world, and Canada’s racially-based, Eurocentric approach to immigration and refugee policy was becoming less and less aligned with how the country both viewed itself and wished itself to be seen. Further, this race-based approach clearly contradicted the then-new Canadian Bill of Rights.[68] Canada began to repeatedly liberalize who it was prepared to admit, for example admitting 325 tubercular refugees and their families around 1960, the first time that Canada had waived its health requirements for refugees.[18] In 1962, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Immigration Minister tabled new regulations in the House that eliminated racial discrimination as a major feature of Canada's immigration policy. With this revision, historian Valerie Knowles states that the last vestige of discrimination which remained in the immigration regulations was a provision that allowed immigrants from Europe and the Americas to sponsor a wider range of relatives, something that was inserted at the last moment because of a fear that there would be an influx of sponsorships by persons from India.[69] Then, in 1966 Lester B. Pearson's government created the Department of Manpower and Immigration and mandated it with the responsibility of processing refugees without “discrimination by race, country or religion”.[58] That department set to work and in 1967 all vestiges of discrimination were removed from the immigration regulations, if not the statutes themselves, and the government implemented its much-vaunted 'points system' in the regulations to guide the selection of many categories of immigrants.[23]

In the late 1960s, negotiations were underway to expand the temporal and geographic scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As articulated by the UNHCR, one of the motivations behind this initiative was to ensure that the de facto racial distinctions built into the 1951 Convention yielded to a growing anti-discrimination postcolonial zeitgeist:

The Convention had led to an unfortunate discrimination among the different groups of refugees, in particular with regard to the African refugees. Such discrimination conflicted with the Statute of his Office and was contrary to the universal spirit of the Convention itself.[70]

Canada refused to commit to the initiative to negotiate a protocol to the Refugee Convention while it was preparing what it termed its White Paper on Immigration.[71] In 1966, the government released the White Paper to, in researcher Clare Glassco's words, "test the waters" for making more fundamental changes to the immigration regime. Among many initiatives, the White Paper committed to the establishment of an immigration admissions policy that was free from discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, or ethnicity. Further, the Paper proposed both the introduction of a refugee determination process within Canada’s borders, as well as the ratification of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. As immigration official E.P. Beasley noted in 1966, in reference to the need for a clear refugee policy, in his view Canada had “become a country of first asylum,” and, thus, “the time may have come to set forth in legislation machinery and a methodology for determining these individual cases more precisely and more fairly.”[72] The concept of a "first country of asylum" in this context refers to a situation where Canada is the first country that grants protection to an individual, as opposed to resettling individuals who have already found effective protection elsewhere.[73] At this time, Canada was increasingly seeing itself as a country of first asylum as Cold War crises caused thousands to seek safe haven in the West.[22]

In June 1969 Canada ratified the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (signed at Geneva in 1951) as well as the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (signed at New York in 1967),[74] which extended the territorial and temporal scope of the Refugee Convention to cover refugees outside of Europe and those displaced for newly emerging reasons.[75] Despite these ratifications, no statute-based, official refugee policy existed in Canada until the implementation of the 1976 Immigration Act.[76] Instead, Canada issued a “Guideline for Determination of Refugee Status” in 1970 to give immigration officers criteria for selecting refugees overseas.[77] In 1973, the Canadian government established its first formal administrative structure to deal with refugee claimants. An interdepartmental committee comprised of representatives from the Departments of External Affairs and Manpower and Immigration met to assess individual claims and forward their recommendations to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration who had the authority to decide whether a refugee claimant would remain in Canada or be deported.[22] At this point, inland claims occurred at the level of hundreds per year. Individual orders-in-council granted a person status in Canada at the minister’s discretion and were based in part on humanitarian, economic, and political considerations.[22]

Founding of the Immigration Appeal Board

In 1967, the Immigration Appeal Board Act was passed, giving anyone ordered deported the right to appeal to the Board on grounds of law or compassion.[18] This Board had emerged from what was called the Sedgwick Report, drawn up by Joseph Sedgwick, Q.C., a one-man board of inquiry which had been commissioned by the government to study a series of highly controversial deportations. Chief among the recommendations was the establishment of a completely independent immigration appeal board.[78] Almost immediately, the Board was swamped with a backlog that, at existing case processing rates, was expected to take more than 20 years to go through.[79] As a result, in 1973 the government amended the Immigration Appeal Board Act to abolish the universal right of appeal for all persons in Canada. In order to clear the backlog, the government also instituted a one-time amnesty program, which more than 39,000 people availed themselves of, including a significant number of US draft dodgers.[80]

1976 Immigration Act

The revised Immigration Act introduced into Parliament in 1976, and brought into force two years later, was a watershed moment for Canadian immigration policy. It overhauled the statute for the first time more than two decades, expunged the last vestiges of open discrimination in the statute, for example by lifting a ban prohibiting gay men and women from immigrating,[22] and, after a broad national debate, introduced a series of objectives into the statute which largely remain to this day. It was with the introduction of the 1976 Immigration Act into Parliament that the government reinforced its willingness to assume its international share in refugee resettlement.[34] It was this legislation that, for the first time, incorporated Canada's Refugee Convention obligations into statutory form.[81] The refugee status determination program that the legislation created for asylum seekers already within or arriving in Canada set up a new process where the claims began to be decided by the Minister of Immigration. The program was very small: it processed only a few hundred claims per year throughout the late 1970s, mostly in the form of paper applications.[82] In the year that the revised Immigration Act came into force, for example, 4,130 refugees were admitted to Canada, all of whom were fleeing communism.[83] The system did include limited appeal rights to the Immigration Appeal Board;[84] under this system, in its last year of operation, about nine percent of claimants determined by the Minister not to be refugees were determined by the Board to be refugees.[85]

At the same time that Canada incorporated its obligations under these international treaties into domestic law, a series of (ultimately fruitless) international efforts to expand the scope of those treaties were underway. In 1967 the United Nations adopted a Declaration on Territorial Asylum[86] which provided, in Article 3, that no person entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier. A conference was then held in 1977 to embody this and other provisions in a revised convention, a proposed UN Convention on Territorial Asylum,[87] and while a draft was produced,[88] the conference ended in failure.[89]

In the 1970s, most refugees that Canada accepted came via overseas resettlement, not an in-Canada asylum process. In the early 1970s Canada accepted its first non-European refugees by resettling a group of 228 Tibetan refugees and developing a “Tibetan Refugee Program” to host them.[90] Tibetan refugee hosting opened the doorway to other refugee resettlement, as Canada accepted about 7,000 ethnic South Asians expelled from Uganda under the dictatorship of Idi Amin in 1972-73, 7,000 Chilean refugees fleeing Pinochet’s regime in 1973, and about 10,000 Lebanese refugees fleeing the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1978.[91] In the 1970s, the U.S. was the largest source country of immigration, in part because of the large numbers of draft dodgers and deserters unwilling to fight in Vietnam who found refuge in Canada.[18] Historian Valerie Knowles states that it is impossible to arrive at hard numbers for the number of draft resister and deserters who escaped to Canada during the Vietnam War, but estimates range from 30,000-40,000 from the Canadian Council for Refugees to between 80,000-200,000 according to Mark Fruitkin, a "draft resister" and author.[92] Later that decade, from 1978 and 1981, 60,000 refugees from Southeast Asia were accepted - a figure that represents 25 percent of the number of immigrants admitted in these years.[66] During this time, Canada resettled more refugees from overseas than any other country on a per capita measurement.[93]

That said, decisions to accept these groups of individuals were ad-hoc and highly political; for example, fearing that most of the Chilean political refugees were too left wing, and not wishing to alienate either the American or new Chilean administrations, the Canadian government restricted the numbers, which is what limited Canada to only accepting about 7,000 Chileans during that 30-year conflict.[12] Similarly, while Canada accepted some Ugandan Asian refugees, there was marked public opposition to the move, with a poll in 1972 indicating that only 45 percent of Canadians approved of the government's decision; some in the government came to view this initiative as having cost the government seats in that year's election.[94] To address demands from civil society to have more of a role in refugee sponsorship, and criticism about government refugee sponsorship decisions, in 1978 Canada established a Private Sponsorship Program through which citizens could assist fully or partially in privately sponsoring new refugees.[95]

Background to the founding of the Immigration and Refugee Board

The background to the creation of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada lies in the growing number of refugee claims that were being made during the 1980s. Rebecca Hamlin states that Canada signed the above-noted international treaties making commitments to refugee protection before it began to consider itself to be a country of first asylum and before asylum seekers started coming to its shores in significant numbers.[96] In 1980 Canada received what today looks like a very modest 1,488 refugee claims.[84] By the middle of the 1980s, however, such a large number of people were making in-country asylum claims that the system had become completely overloaded, with 8,260 claims being made in 1985.[84] This increase in Canada mirrored similar increases elsewhere in the world, for example, while in 1976 Western European nations received 20,000 asylum seekers, in 1980 there were 158,000 such applicants and by 1986, more than 200,000 annually.[97]

In response to these growing numbers, as well as concerns about political interests potentially affecting decision-making on claims, in 1982 decision-making was transferred to the newly created Refugee Status Advisory Committee.[98] This system involved only written submissions, assessed by the committee in private, with the committee ultimately making recommendations to the Minister of Immigration,[99] although in 1983 having an oral hearing began as a pilot project in Toronto and Montreal.[22] The Committee consisted equally of members from private life, the Department of Immigration, and the Department of External Affairs.[100] The reasons offered for decisions on claims at this point were scanty; as refugee lawyer David Matas describes it, the reasons often consisted of "merely a few sentences" which "seldom relate the findings of fact on which their conclusions are based".[101] In short, he states, what were offered were conclusions, as opposed to reasons.

The government also commissioned a series of major studies, specifically the Robertson Report (1983) entitled Illegal Migrants in Canada, the Ratushny Report (1984) entitled A New Refugee Status Determination Process for Canada, and a report by Rabbi Gunther Plaut (1985) entitled Refugee Determination in Canada, to recommend approaches for a new asylum determination system that would address both the need to be heard, and balance the competing interests of fairness and efficiency.[84] This impetus for change was bolstered by a 1985 decision from the Supreme Court of Canada, Singh, which established that where the credibility of a claimant is at stake, an oral hearing before the then-Immigration Appeal Board must be held. In so ruling, the court set aside the previous system under which an application for an oral hearing had to be made.[102] The Singh decision is often seen as a watershed that enforced Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protections for migrants on arrival on Canadian soil, thereby requiring an overhaul of the then-extant refugee determination process to ensure that fair oral hearings started to be offered.[84] At the same time, concerns about the integrity of the then-extant system were being expressed; for example, in their 1988 platform, the Reform Party invoked what has been labelled "inflammatory language" about "immigration abuses, bogus refugees, [and] improper selection of immigrants".[103]

The Canadian government of the day proposed a tribunal model for the new asylum system. The relevant legislation, Bill C-55, or the Refugee Reform Act, was introduced in the House of Commons in 1986. There was lengthy debate about the legislation and it was not passed until 1988.[84] One concern raised by civil society about the bill was with the Safe Third Country Regime that it introduced. In response to public criticism of the Safe Third Country Regime, Barbara McDougall, who as then minister of employment and immigration, became persuaded that the United States might send refugee claimants deported from Canada back to Central America where their lives would be in jeopardy. As a result, she announced in December 1988 that she was "prepared to proceed with no country on the safe third country list ... We think the new system will be able to function without it."[104]

The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada emerged from this legislation, and it represented a fresh start for asylum policy-making in Canada. It came into existence as an independent administrative tribunal on January 1, 1989 with 115 members.[105] At that time, it consisted of only two divisions: the Convention Refugee Determination Division and the Immigration Appeal Division. Gordon Fairweather, a former Attorney General of New Brunswick and the first Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, was appointed the first Chairman of the IRB.[22]

As part of the transition to the new system, the government instituted a one-time expedited review program that amounted to a general amnesty for people with pending asylum applications. While under the previous system, overall, 30% of applicants had been accepted,[106] under the expedited review program, acceptance rates were much higher - approximately 85% of the 28,000 applicants processed in 1986, for example, were accepted. The amnesty was designed to clear the decks and allow for a fresh start in asylum policy-making.[82] It essentially amounted to an amnesty for refugee claimants who had entered Canada before 21 May 1986 where individuals were permitted to stay in Canada and become permanent residents if they were already employed or likely to secure employment in the near future and had no medical, security, or criminal concerns.[22]

Growing numbers of claims and increased resources

Increasing numbers of claims and resources

Since the Board's 1989 founding, the number of people making refugee claims has increased greatly, both in Canada and internationally. Looking at the numbers globally, during decade of the 1980s, there were 2.3 million applications for asylum lodged worldwide, mostly in western Europe, the United States, and Canada. During the 1990s, this number grew to 6.1 million applications filed, and the list of receiving nations grew to include Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, and southern Europe. During the 2000s, there were 5.5 million new applications filed worldwide, and countries such as Ireland, Greece, Poland, and South Africa became popular new destinations.[107] Today, roughly one million individuals apply for asylum globally each year,[108] with those classified as refugees representing 7–8 per cent of the global migrant population.[109] Similarly, in Canada, while the volume of new claims has gone through cycles, volume has trended upwards over time. Since the inception of the IRB in 1989, three notable case decision backlogs have occurred: in 2002 with over 57,000 claims, in 2009 with over 62,000 pending claims,[110] and post-2017, where the Board has 90,000 claims awaiting decision.[111]

The resources dedicated worldwide to Refugee Status Determination (RSD) are appropriately described as "immense". For example, although exact figures are difficult to determine, academics note that it is likely that the combined cost of RSD performed by states and UNHCR approaches or exceeds the total cost of direct humanitarian assistance provided to refugees by UNHCR.[112] Hathaway has estimated that the Global North alone spends $10 billion on RSD, a number which is a scale of magnitude larger than UNHCR’s budget and exceeds even total UN expenditures.[113] At the same time as the IRB has been operating, Canada has continued its overseas resettlement programs for refugees and has had the capacity to scale these initiatives up when crisis have occurred, for example when the former Yugoslavia was imploding in 1991-92, Canada fast tracked the admission of more than 25,000 refugees from Bosnia.[114]

Broader interpretations of the refugee definition

Canada's interpretation of the Refugee Convention was marked by an expansive and progressive turn by the newfound Immigration and Refugee Board. In 1991, Canada became one of the first countries in the world to recognize sexual orientation-related persecution as a basis for claiming asylum.[115] Canada then issued guidelines on the handling of gender-based asylum claims in 1993, something that was associated with a growing acceptance of claims related to gender-based persecution.[116] In 1996, the IRB adopted guidelines on child refugee claimants, reportedly the first such policy initiative of its kind adopted by any State system.[117] Much later, in May 2017, the Board, for the first time, implemented guidelines on the adjudication of claims involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression (SOGIE).[118]

Deterrence and efficiency measures

There was a time when the refugee "problem" was thought to be solvable.[119] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was originally set up for only three years. The office was renewed by the United Nations General Assembly thereafter, but only for successive five-year periods. This UNHCR's temporary nature, and repeated renewals, continued until December 2003. At that time, the UNGA removed the limitation and created a framework for refugee protection that is set to continue indefinitely, "until the refugee problem is solved"[119] In Shauna Labman's words, the removal of the temporal limitation on UNHCR's mandate speaks to the recognition of the increasing unlikelihood of such a resolution.[119] Ebbing expectations of any permanent solution to refugee issues have come at the same time as refugee numbers have grown, asylum claimants have come from further afield, and concomitant refugee status determination costs have increased. In response, in Bríd Ní Ghráinne's words, states have begun to employ increasingly "creative" means to constrain refugee flows and restrict the number of individuals they recognize as refugees.[120] Such measures have included curtailing the entry of refugees onto their territories through what she terms “relatively invisible—and hence politically expedient—non-entrée measures”[120] such as the following, which have been deployed by Canada to an increasing extent in recent decades:

  • Restrictive Visa Policies: Limited access to visas for entry into Canada restricts access to the asylum process.[118]
  • Carrier sanctions: Carrier sanctions refer to obligations placed on airlines and other transportation services to take care that they not transport anybody without a visa, if they are required to have one.[121]
  • Biometric requirements: In the early 1990s, the Mulroney government introduced a requirement that asylum applicants be fingerprinted.[122]
  • First country of asylum principles: Canadian immigration legislation has permitted the designation of safe countries since 1998.[123] This provision has been used to authorize the safe third country agreement between Canada and the United States.
  • Stricter port-of-entry interviews and security screening: In the early 1990s, the Mulroney government introduced deterrence measures design to push down the number of refugee claims, including stricter port-of-entry interviews.[122] Then, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the then Immigration Minister announced that there would be much greater utilization of the strategy of "Front-End Security Screening" (FESS) of refugees as they arrive in Canada.[124]
  • Pushback operations: For example, in 1998 Canadian officials arranged for the interception by the Senegalese navy of a boat carrying 192 Tamil persons from Sri Lanka, individuals who were then returned to Colombo before they could arrive in Canada.[125]
  • Limitations on appeal: In the early 1990s, the Mulroney government introduced limitations on the ability to appeal decisions.[122] To this day, there are a number of restrictions on the ability to appeal negative decisions, including that claims by designated foreign nationals (DFNs) do not have a right of appeal.[126]
  • Stricter enforcement: CBSA employees called migration integrity officers work overseas, ensuring that individuals who are travelling to Canada have proper travel documentation.[127] Canada's interdiction programs abroad are a component of what is termed its Multiple Borders Strategy (MBS). Under the MBS, liaison officers are tasked with preventing persons who lack Canadian authorization or other required documents from boarding planes or boats bound for Canada.[128] In 2012 the government reported that there were 63 such officers in 49 locations worldwide.[129] Between 2001 and 2014, such liaison officers intercepted over 86,000 persons offshore.[130]
  • Restrictions on employment for claimants: In the early 1990s, the government prevented refugee claimants from working. This was changed later in the 1990s.

Such measures have often been implemented in Canada in recent decades in response to claim backlogs and perceived crisis situations. An example of such a crisis emerged in the late 1980s the federal government recalled Parliament for an emergency session to amend the Immigration Act after 174 Sikh persons arrived by lifeboat near the fishing village of Charlesville, Nova Scotia.[22] At that time, the Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory Council reported that most business and labour leaders felt the government had "lost control of the border".[131] Parliament's resultant law, Bill C-84, the Refugee Deterrents and Detention Act, was considered to be a restrictive piece of legislation.[132]

A later piece of legislation, Bill C-86, passed by the Senate in December 1992, was perceived to be more concerned with efficiency. It eliminated a screening system for claims at the IRB and transferred authority for determining whether an applicant was eligible to claim refugee status from the Board to senior immigration officers at the immigration department.[133] Specifically, the legislation previously included a procedure whereby all applicants had a hearing before a panel of two in which a claimant had the burden of proving that they were eligible to have their claim determined and that there was a credible basis for the claim.[134] If either of the two panel members were persuaded, then the claim would be heard by the Refugee Division of the Board. In the name of efficiency, Bill C-86 transferred the eligibility determination step to the department and abandoned the screening process designed to eliminate claims with “no credible basis”.[135]

One efficiency measure that was implemented at the time of the IRB's founding was that refugee claimants no longer had the ability to appeal a refusal of their claim under this revised system. This aspect of the new process was much criticized by legal counsel for refugees at the time.[136] That said, during the 1990s, refugee claimants appeared before panels of two decision-makers, only one of whom needed to accept their claim for their application to be successful (a cost-saving initiative announced in March 1995 to move to one-person panels was not implemented until the next decade).[137] Furthermore, unsuccessful refugee claimants were able to apply for post-determination review by an immigration official to evaluate whether removal would result in compelling personal risk. This review assessed "risk to life, inhumane treatment, or extreme sanctions," and could provide protection to persons not covered by the 1951 Convention and Protocol.[138] Approximately 2-3% of such applications were accepted.[139] As discussed below, this process eventually became the foundation for what is now s. 97 of the IRPA.

Rebecca Hamlin situates the rise of this regime to deter asylum claims in the following way: "the rise of the regime of deterrence is, in part, a story of unintended consequences, because international commitments made by each country in a particular political moment came back to haunt future generations of policymakers. Had these countries' leaders anticipated the financial, security, and political challenges of the present-day situation, they might not have been as willing to make commitments that, at the time, were largely an abstraction."[96]

The 2002 move from the Immigration Act to the IRPA

In the late 1990s, the federal government began a process to overhaul the then-Immigration Act, including with a lengthy public consultation period.[140] It commissioned a report entitled Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration which set out priorities for the reformed system. The resulting Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) was an entirely new statute and represented the first complete revision of immigration legislation in Canada since 1978.[141] The shift from the Immigration Act to the IRPA in June 2002 also marked a new era of asylum policy in Canada - one that has been described as being focused on relieving administrative burdens. In the drafting and development of the IRPA, considerable public attention had been devoted to the question of whether to have one act governing immigration matters and a separate act governing refugee law. The idea, motivated by concern about the fundamental differences between immigration and refugee law, and advocated for in the Not Just Numbers report, was ultimately rejected; however, the Act's new title and the establishment of a separate division of the legislation devoted to refugees reflect this concern.[142] Highlights of the new legislative framework include the following:

  • Creation of the RAD: The IRPA created the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), which would review negative decisions on their merits, though this took ten years to fully implement.[143] Specifically, after the Act was passed, Citizenship and Immigration Canada announced that as a result of “pressures on the system” implementation of the RAD would be delayed.[144]
  • Shift from the CRDD to the RPD: The Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) became the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), to reflect the fact that it now had jurisdiction over the consolidated grounds for refugee protection and, because the IRB backlog was a huge concern, the staff time required to support the RAD was created through a shift from two-member panels to single-member hearings so that half the number of Board members would be required for each case.[145]
  • Consoliated grounds for refugee protection: The IRPA also expanded the categories of persons who are entitled to refugee protection. Under the former immigration legislation, the only category of person who was clearly entitled to protection was a person who fell within the definition of “Convention refugee”. IRPA expanded the scope of coverage to include persons who are at risk of torture and to persons who are at risk of cruel and inhumane treatment upon deportation to their country of nationality or former habitual residence.[146] Canada had ratified the Convention against Torture on June 24, 1987, but did not implement it directly in Canadian domestic law until this point.[147] Rebecca Hamlin writes that there is no evidence to suggest that Parliament considered the introduction of s. 97 to be monumental when it discussed IRPA before voting on it in 2002. When the bill was being debated, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Elinor Caplan assured members of Parliament the IRPA "gives us the ability to streamline our procedures, so that those who are in genuine need of our protection will be welcomed in Canada more quickly and those who are not in need of protection will be able to be removed more quickly. That streamlining is extremely important."[148] Immediately after IRPA went into force, the IRB Legal Services division produced a lengthy guide for decision makers on how to make Section 97 decisions; the guide states that these decisions were subsumed under the IRB mandate to avoid the "delays and inconsistencies" of the previous "fragmented" and "multilayered approach".[148]
  • PRRA: The IRPA transitioned from the Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class (PDRCC) to the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) process.[149] When the government announced the creation of CBSA in 2003, originally the plan was to transfer PRRA responsibility to them, but in the wake of pressure from NGOs, PRRA responsibility remained with Citizenship and Immigration Canada.[150]
  • Increased security provisions: Sharryn Aiken, et. al., write that the most significant shift signalled by the IRPA is that it demonstrates a marked security turn in Canadian immigration law. They note that "this is hardly surprising in legislation that was passed in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.[140]

Over the next decade, there were several attempts by some members of Parliament to pass another act forcing the implementation of the RAD, including a very near success in summer 2008.[151] While the above overhaul of the system represented considerable change, it is also notable that some of the changes argued for in the Not Just Numbers report were ultimately rejected. For example, that report had recommended that the processing of overseas and inland refugee claims be unified within a single system with shared decision-makers for both of them. Having a single system reflected a desire for more consistent decision-making on refuge status, but, in Shauna Labman's words, "[brushed over] the additional necessity of the selection aspect in overseas resettlement."[152] The proposal was not adopted.

Safe Third Country Agreement

A provision for safe third country agreements was included in Canada's Immigration Act in the 1980s. Canada attempted to negotiate such an agreement with the United States in the decades following, and it was only in the wake of 9/11 that Canada was able to successfully conclude such an agreement.[153] Specifically, on December 5, 2002, Canada signed its Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) with the United States.[154] That agreement came into effect on December 29, 2004 when the hitherto dormant safe third country regime in Canada's immigration legislation was first utilized.[155] The immediate impact of the STCA was to significantly lower the number of inland refugee claims in Canada; there was a 40 percent drp in claims made at the Canada-US border after the agreement came into effect. This trend, however, did not last.[156]

2010 and 2012 refugee reform

Two pieces of legislation made significant changes to the refugee system in 2010 and 212, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (BRRA, 2010) and the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (PCISA, 2012). As Neil Yeates describes it, the thrust of these reforms was for faster processing of claims, with a view that bona fide claimants would be more quickly approved, and failed claimants, after access to the new Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the IRB, would be more quickly removed from Canada.[157] Various changes were made to assist this, including:

  • Legislated timelines for hearings.
  • Implementation of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). As part of this reform, the RAD came into being on December 15, 2012.[158]
  • Public servant decision-makers: Shifting from Governor-in-Council appointees to public servants as first-level decision makers at the IRB’s Refugee Protection Division. The shift away from Governor-in-Council appointees reflected a key recommendation from the government's own immigration-law advisory committee, namely that qualified public servants should be named to the Immigration and Refugee Board, not political appointees.[159]
  • Creating a list of Designated Countries of Origin (DCOs), countries that were not generally considered to be refugee-producing, and where claimants therefrom consequently received an expedited hearing.[160] The Designated Country of Origin list was introduced in 2012 by the Conservative government as part of the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act. The implications for asylum seekers coming from DCOs included an expedited hearing process with shortened timelines, no access to the Refugee Appeal Division, no automatic stay of removal for failed claimants, limited access to PRRA, and no eligibility for a work permit or associated benefits while awaiting a decision on their claim. Designation as a safe country was dependent on a combination of qualitative observations of countries’ levels of democratic process and human rights records and two quantitative thresholds, including when 75 percent or more of previous claims by nationals of a country had been rejected by the IRB or 60 percent or more of previous claims by nationals of a country had been withdrawn. The initial DCO list included 25 countries and was eventually expanded to include 42 countries.[161]
  • Mandatory detention for Designated Foreign Nationals (DFNs): The PCISA reforms established a mandatory detention regime for DFNs.[162]
  • The IRB doing PRRA: The Balanced Refugee Reform Act also transferred authority over the PRRA from the Minister to the IRB, although this transfer has never actually been brought into force.[163]
  • Limitations on the Interim Federal Health Program: A strategy to create disincentives for refugee claimants to come to Canada was a 2012 policy decision to cut access to health care for some categories of claimants.[164] This policy was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Court in 2015, with the court concluding that the resultant regime amounted to "cruel and unusual treatment" prohibited by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[67]

The current version of the Refugee Protection Division rules came into force on October 26, 2012 following the coming-into-force of this legislation.[165] The Immigration and Refugee Board, in its public comments, emphasized these rules and the importance of decisions being guided by them. This aligned with comments at the time from the Immigration Minister Jason Kenney of this sort: "I think most Canadians intuitively understand that broad public support for immigration, and, frankly, diversity in our society is contingent on having a well-managed, rules-based, fair immigration system. I think they understand that we all have a stake in maintaining such a system".[103]

Resettlement programs

Canada actively resettles thousands of refugees per year within a voluntary burden-sharing scheme. This act places Canada near the top of a small group of approximately thirty countries worldwide willing to offer refugee protection through resettlement in addition to the promise of non-refoulement in the Refugee Convention.[166] Three states have traditionally been the leaders in resettlement: Canada, Australia, and the United States. Combined, they have tended to receive approximately 90 percent of the UNHCR's resettlement referrals.[167] By way of example, in the 2017 calendar year, the United States resettled 33,400 refugees, while Canada resettled 26,600 refugees, and Australia resettled 15,100 refugees.[168] In line with this tradition, Canada launched a program to resettle more than 25,000 Syrian refugees in 2015.

Irregular border crossing controversy

The number of asylum claims worldwide has grown in recent years; states and UNHCR rendered 1.5 million decisions on individual asylum claims in 2017[169] and as of 2018 there were 3.5 million asylum seekers in the world.[170] The issue of persons crossing irregularly from the United States into Canada became a significant political issue starting around 2017 and controversy has continued in years subsequent.[103] Such crossings occurred primarily at Roxham Road on the Quebec-New York border and Emerson, Manitoba. Since 2017 more than 59,000 people have crossed the Canada-US border in an irregular manner and claimed asylum in Canada,[171] including 20,593 claimants in 2017, 19,419 claimants in 2018, and then 16,077 claimants in 2019.[171] As of 2017, polls indicated that 70 percent of Canadians felt that security along the Canada-US border should increase.[172] This increase in border crossings between the United States and Canada has triggered calls and legal action to suspend or end the Safe Third Country Agreement, and a challenge to the agreement is now before the Federal Court of Appeal.[173] In their 2019 platform, the Conservative Party of Canada reiterated a commitment to prioritizing "economic migration" and favouring those facing "true persecution" over "bogus" refugee claimants.[103]

Elimination of Designated Countries of Origin (DCO) list

On May 17, 2019, following a Federal Court ruling in which specific provisions of the DCO policy were struck down for not complying with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Government of Canada announced that it would remove all countries from the DCO list.[161]

Eligibility for claimants who have claimed in other "Five Eyes" countries

In April 2019, amendments were made to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in Bill C-97, the Budget Implementation Act. These changes introduced new grounds of ineligibility for refugee claimants where a person is ineligible to make a refugee claim in Canada if they have previously requested asylum in a country with which Canada has an information-sharing agreement or arrangement. In practice this means that if they made a previous claim in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, or New Zealand they are ineligible to claim refugee status in Canada via the Immigration and Refugee Board. Idil Atak describes this omnibus Bill as having been "adopted hastily in the lead-up to the 2019 federal election" as part of the government's measures to respond to the irregular border crossing controversy.[174] Those found to be ineligible to make a claim to the IRB submit applications for a pre-removal risk assessment instead.[175]

Covid-19

In 2020, in response to the Covid-19 virus, fifty-seven countries shut their borders to asylum seekers.[176] At first, the Canadian government announced that all claimants arriving outside ports of entry would be screened for the virus and then quarantined if the test results were positive. The Canadian government changed its position days later, announcing that all claimants would be deflected back into the United States.[177] As part of this, the two countries reached a temporary agreement which allows Canada to send back to the US individuals entering Canada from the US to make an asylum claim.[178] The agreement applies between official ports of entry along the land border and at air and marine ports of entry. The Refugee Protection Division also shut down all hearings for several months as a result of the pandemic.

References

  1. Julia Morris, The Value of Refugees: UNHCR and the Growth of the Global Refugee Industry, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11 January 2021, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa135 at page 4.
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  125. Andrew Brouwer and Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, <https://www.unhcr.org/afr/4963237d0.pdf> (Accessed December 19, 2020), at page 21.
  126. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 919.
  127. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 34.
  128. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 909.
  129. Hansard, Testimony of Pierre Sabourin, Vice-President, Operations Branch, Canada Border Services Agency, before the Citizenship and Immigration Committee, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 21 (14 February 2012), online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/CIMM/meeting-21/evidence>.
  130. Efrat Arbel, "Bordering the Constitution, Constituting the Border" (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 824 at 839.
  131. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 41.
  132. David Matas with Ilana Simon, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 224.
  133. Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2015, March 2016, ISBN 978-1-45973-285-8, Dundurn Press: Toronto, p. 240.
  134. Marlys Edwardh and Daniel Brodsky, Media Access to Refugee Proceedings in Canada, 1991 29-3 Alberta Law Review 701, 1991 CanLIIDocs 227, <https://canlii.ca/t/slxm>, retrieved on 2021-01-19, page 702.
  135. Canadian Council for Refugees, The challenge of fair and effective refugee determination, 23 July 2009 <https://ccrweb.ca/files/fairdetermination.pdf> (Accessed April 24, 2020).
  136. David Matas, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press, Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 145.
  137. Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2015, March 2016, ISBN 978-1-45973-285-8, Dundurn Press: Toronto, pp. 244-245.
  138. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 87.
  139. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 89.
  140. 1 2 Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 29.
  141. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 158 of the PDF.
  142. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 27.
  143. Marlene Epp, “Refugees in Canada: A Brief History,” Immigration And Ethnicity In Canada 35 (2017), <https://cha-shc.ca/_uploads/5c374fb005cf0.pdf>, at 24-25.
  144. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 88.
  145. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Pages 49-50.
  146. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 159 of the PDF.
  147. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Refugee Law After 9/11: Sanctuary and Security in Canada and the United States, UBC Press 2020, Law and Society Series, ISBN 9780774861465, page 25.
  148. 1 2 Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 170.
  149. Covarrubias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 3 F.C.R. 169, para. 27.
  150. Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2015, March 2016, ISBN 978-1-45973-285-8, Dundurn Press: Toronto, p. 262
  151. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 89.
  152. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 43.
  153. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Refugee Law After 9/11: Sanctuary and Security in Canada and the United States, UBC Press 2020, Law and Society Series, ISBN 9780774861465, page 219.
  154. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “A Partnership for Protection: One Year Review,” Executive Summary (November 2006) at 5.
  155. Mark Rook, Identifying Better Refugee Policies for an Evolving Crisis, April 21, 2020, University of Pennsylvania Honors Thesis, <https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=ppe_honors> (Accessed May 9, 2020), page 132.
  156. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 912.
  157. Neil Yeates, Report of the Independent Review of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Government of Canada, April 10, 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/irb-report-en.pdf> (Accessed April 27, 2020), page 1.
  158. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 89.
  159. Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2015, March 2016, ISBN 978-1-45973-285-8, Dundurn Press: Toronto, p. 248.
  160. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 36.
  161. 1 2 Chantel Spade & Tearney McDermott, ‘Safe’ countries and ‘fraudulent’ refugees: Tools for narrowing access to Canada’s refugee system, Spotlight on Migration No. 2020/4, August 2020, Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS), <https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/centre-for-immigration-and-settlement/RCIS/publications/spotlightonmigration/2020_4_Spade_Chantel_McDermott_Tearney_Safe_countries_and_fraudulent_refugees_Tools_for_narrowing_access_to_Canada’s_refugee_system.pdf> (Accessed September 13, 2020), page 3 of PDF.
  162. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 51.
  163. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 171.
  164. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 916.
  165. Tastsoglou, Evangelia and Shiva Nourpanah. "(Re)Producing Gender: Refugee Advocacy and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Refugee Narratives." Canadian Ethnic Studies, vol. 51 no. 3, 2019, p. 37-56. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/ces.2019.0019, page 42.
  166. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 59.
  167. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 6.
  168. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf at 30.
  169. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 29.
  170. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, Published 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/> (accessed 17 April 2019).
  171. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Irregular Border Crosser Statistics" <http://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/statistics/Pages/Irregular-border-crosser-statistics.aspx> (Accessed August 23, 2020).
  172. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 120.
  173. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 54.
  174. Idil Atak, Zainab Abu Alrob, Claire Ellis, Expanding refugee ineligibility: Canada’s response to secondary refugee movements, Journal of Refugee Studies, 14 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa103 at page 2.
  175. Chantel Spade & Tearney McDermott, ‘Safe’ countries and ‘fraudulent’ refugees: Tools for narrowing access to Canada’s refugee system, Spotlight on Migration No. 2020/4, August 2020, Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS), <https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/centre-for-immigration-and-settlement/RCIS/publications/spotlightonmigration/2020_4_Spade_Chantel_McDermott_Tearney_Safe_countries_and_fraudulent_refugees_Tools_for_narrowing_access_to_Canada’s_refugee_system.pdf> (Accessed September 13, 2020), page 4 of PDF.
  176. Harsha Walia, Border & Rule, Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, ISBN: 9781773634524, page 10.
  177. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 913.
  178. Idil Atak, Zainab Abu Alrob, Claire Ellis, Expanding refugee ineligibility: Canada’s response to secondary refugee movements, Journal of Refugee Studies, 14 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa103 at page 7.

Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice

Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure

Fundamental justice requires that a tribunal which adjudicates upon rights must act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial temper, and must give the opportunity for parties to adequately state their case.[1] The standards of conduct for the Board are fundamentally based on and recognize two principles: (i) that public confidence and trust in the integrity, objectivity and impartiality of the IRB must be conserved and enhanced; and (ii) that independence in decision-making is required.[2] This section of the book will explore the principles that have been used when interpreting these requirements in the refugee context.

Procedural fairness interpretation principles as derived from caselaw

The following are some of the principal principles regarding the interpretation and application of procedural fairness as they have emerged in the refugee context caselaw:

Principles about the expectations that one reasonably has of the Board

  • A high duty of procedural fairness is owed in the refugee context. The court has stated that “The independence of the Board, its adjudicative procedure and functions, and the fact that its decisions affect the Charter rights of claimants, indicate that the content of the duty of fairness owed by the Board, including the duty of impartiality, falls at the high end of the continuum of procedural fairness.”[3] This obligation arises not only from Canada’s domestic administrative law, but also from Canada’s international commitments and obligations; in Agiza v. Sweden, the UN Committee against Torture found that article 3 of the CAT carries with it an implicit right to an ‘effective, independent and impartial review of a decision to expel’.[4] The Board's duty of fairness is also said to be heightened when it is dealing with self-represented claimants: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#The Board has a heightened duty of procedural fairness when dealing with self-represented claimants.
  • The tribunal and its procedures should be as accessible as possible.[5] To this end, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR recommends that states provide refugee claimants with the necessary guidance as to the procedure to be followed.[6]
  • The Board’s procedures should be predictable. The basic principles of equal protection and due process reflected in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man require predictable procedures.[7] Canada’s position is that it implements the relevant parts of the American Declaration using the standards and procedures of the IRPA.[8] Similarly, UNHCR states in its Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination that "RSD applications must be processed pursuant to transparent and fair procedures".[9]
  • It is not the Board's role to provide legal advice to claimants. In Sundaram v. Canada the Federal Court stated that it was "not prepared to read into the immigration scheme an obligation on officials to give advice on practice and procedures. The situation of giving advice is markedly different from those Court decisions which have held that officials must provide prospective applicants with the necessary forms. People are entitled to government forms; they are not entitled to receive free legal advice from RPD officials."[10] Put another way, "it is not the obligation of the Board to 'teach' the Applicant the law on a particular matter involving his or her claim".[11]
  • The Board must not fault parties for its own deficiencies. For example, in Huseen v. Canada, the government pointed out that the IRB Office in Toronto only received a venue change request one day before the abandonment hearing. The court commented "this speaks to the internal communications between regional offices at the IRB, as the Calgary IRB office was handed the change of venue request, in person, about three weeks prior. It would be unfair to fault the Applicants for the Board’s delay in internal communications, over which the Applicants had no control or influence."[12]
  • Decision-makers should prepare thoroughly. The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members shall make each decision on the merits of the case, based on thorough preparation, the assessment of evidence properly before the member and the application of the relevant law."[13]
  • Decision-makers should consider all of the evidence before them. There exists a presumption in Canadian refugee law that decision-makers have considered all of the evidence before them.[14] The more important the information, particularly where it contradicts a finding being made, the more the requirement that it explicitly be referred to and distinguished in the reasons provided. This requires time. Asylum cases are said to be ‘highly fact intensive and depend upon presentation and consideration of numerous details and documents which can take no small amount of time.[15] Evidence from previous social psychology studies of judging suggests a relationship between time taken and accuracy. Judges with higher caseloads have been found to be more likely to make inaccurate decisions, as they rely less on deliberative reasoning and careful processing of information and more on their gut feeling and intuition.[16] But see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate#The Board should consider the most up-to-date country conditions evidence.
  • Claims should be processed expeditiously. For details, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of efficient procedures.

Principles about the expectations that one reasonably has of claimants and counsel

  • Parties are responsible for their own files. The Federal Court has noted that there exists "[abundant case law] to the effect that the applicants are responsible for their files and cannot use their own wrongdoing as a means to justify fatal omissions, procedural though they may be."[17] While "a failure to comply with procedural obligations does not automatically disqualify a claimant from relief on fairness grounds, [] at some point a claimant will be considered the author of their own misfortune."[18]
  • Claimants may be expected to submit asylum claims promptly. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention provides that states shall not impose penalties on asylum seekers, but only if they present themselves to authorities without delay: "The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence."[19] Similarly, Canada's Federal Court has noted that claimants may be expected to submit asylum claims promptly: "refugees and asylum-seekers have duties and obligations to respect national laws and measures to maintain public order, including obligations to cooperate with the asylum process, which may include presenting themselves to authorities and submitting asylum claims promptly".[20]
  • Parties should be aware of the information on file. The Board Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings states that "the RPD provides the parties with information as to where the [National Documentation Package] can be found on the Board's website, and it is the parties' responsibility to check the IRB website for the newest version of the relevant NDP(s) prior to their hearing."[21] This is also stated in the Important Instructions claimants receive when they make their claim: “You should also check the IRB website for the newest version of the NDP prior to your hearing” and is stated in similar terms in the Claimants’ Guide.
  • Parties will cooperate with the asylum process and supply all pertinent information. The Federal Court holds that a person whose safety is threatened in his or her country of origin and who is seeking the protection of a country of refuge is necessarily keen to comply with the legal framework that has been established for that purpose.[22] The legally non-binding refugees handbook issued by UNHCR stipulates that the applicant should assist the examiner to the full in establishing the facts of their case and supply all pertinent information concerning themself and their past experience.[23] The Federal Court states that "refugees and asylum-seekers have duties and obligations to respect national laws and measures to maintain public order, including obligations to cooperate with the asylum process, which may include presenting themselves to authorities and submitting asylum claims promptly, or complying with procedures to regularize their stay."[20] For details about how this principle takes shape in the RPD Rules, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What documents does a party need to provide when?.
  • Claimants will comply with the law and be honest. The Federal Court has held that in immigration matters, "the jurisprudence is clear that applicants have to provide complete and accurate information.... There is a duty on an applicant to ensure that their submissions are complete and correct".[24] This obligation stems from, among other things, the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees Art. 2, which provides that, “Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.”[23] Similarly, the legally non-binding refugees handbook issued by UNHCR stipulates that the applicant should tell the truth.[23] The Federal Court has stated that "refugees and asylum-seekers have duties and obligations to respect national laws and measures to maintain public order".[20] In Canada, such legal obligations require that a claimant answer truthfully all questions put to them in the refugee claim process.[25]
  • Deficiencies in counsel's conduct are properly attributed to their clients. The Federal Court has held that in immigration matters, "the jurisprudence is clear that applicants have to provide complete and accurate information and are bound by the submissions made by those who represent them in the process".[24] The general rule is that you do not separate counsel's conduct from the client. Counsel is acting as agent for the client and, as harsh as it may be, the client must bear the consequences of having hired poor counsel.[26] This principle is reflected in the instructions in the Basis of Claim form that every claimant receives as part of the claimant process, which note that "If you have counsel, you are responsible for making sure that your counsel meets the deadlines."[27] That said, there are exceptions to this principle where counsel’s conduct falls sufficiently below the standard expected of competent counsel: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#In what contexts will counsel incompetence render a hearing unfair?.
  • Concerns about defects of procedural fairness should be raised by parties at the earliest opportunity. The general rule is that a party should raise allegations about procedural fairness at the earliest possible opportunity.[28]

Principles about the manner in which the Board is to exercise its discretion

The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada is based on the IRB's dedication to the following values - honesty, good faith, fairness, accountability, dignity, respect, transparency, openness, discretion, cultural sensitivity and loyalty.[29] These values should be evinced by all of the Board's conduct and decisions. In particular:

  • Justice must be seen to be done. The Board has an institutional responsibility to ensure that the tribunal's adjudication is both actually performed at an optimum level of competency, fairness and objectivity and is perceived to have been so performed.[5] A tension exists between the imperative to be efficient and work rapidly through multiple cases on the one hand, and the imperative to be considered, deliberative, and just on the other (and to be seen to be so).[30] The first set considerations must not undermine respect for the second sort. For example, in one hearing where the Refugee Protection Division had double-booked a Member, who then tried to complete two hearings in the time ordinarily allotted to one, the court commented as follows: "while I find it commendable from an efficiency standpoint that the Member was prepared to deal with both matters, the aura of urgency that pervaded the hearing undermined the process. A reading of the transcript suggests some sense of impatience and concern on the part of the Member about being able to complete the hearing."[31]
  • Administrative convenience should not override fundamental justice, which includes procedural fairness.[32] Asylum adjudication is situated within administrative law structures, where tensions between values such as efficiency and economy are precariously balanced with fairness and justice.[33] As noted by Lord Dyson in his 2015 decision condemning the so‐called Detained Fast Track (DFT) in the United Kingdom, "justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency".[34] Instead, as Canada's Federal Court holds, the Board “… is required to strike a balance between expeditious proceedings on the one hand and procedural fairness or natural justice on the other.”[35]
  • The rules should not be interpreted in a way that is overly rigid. In interpreting these rules, the courts have held that one must "avoid the mire of procedural dogma"[36] as "procedure should be the servant of justice, not its mistress".[37] The Federal Court has stated that "the door should not slam shut on all those who fail to meet ordinary procedural requirements. Such a restrictive reading would undermine Canada’s commitment to its refugee system and underlying international obligations".[38] The court has gone on to note that "the opportunity to free a family from the scourge of persecution should not rest on an overly rigid application of procedural requirements."[39] The tenor of the Rules is that flexibility is needed to guard against form trumping substance and the interests of justice and to guard against decisions not being made on their merits.[40] Refugee applications may be allowed to proceed, despite procedural defects, to ensure that the requirements of natural justice are fulfilled.[41] This applies with special force during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic; the principle set out in the Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings is that the Board will apply the rules flexibly in light of Covid-19.[42]
  • Claimants are entitled to representation and rules should be relaxed for unrepresented litigants. The representation of refugee claimants is described as “an expression of a fundamental constitutional and common law value: that individuals facing complicated legal proceedings with serious consequences should be allowed to be represented so as to ensure that there is a full and fair hearing.”[43] The court has stated that an unrepresented party “is entitled to every possible and reasonable leeway to present a case in its entirety and that strict and technical rules should be relaxed for unrepresented litigants”.[44]
  • The Board's procedures should not be restricted to the judicial paradigm. The courts have recognized that administrative agencies such as the IRB "are often required to be procedurally innovative in order to handle a heavy caseload effectively and to make the most efficient use of scarce resources."[45] The Board’s procedure "should not be confined in a model of due process that draws exclusively on the judicial paradigm and discourages innovation. Nonetheless, procedures designed to increase quality and consistency cannot be adopted at the expense of the duty of each panel to afford to the claimant before it a high degree of impartiality and independence."[46] For example, the court has held that "A hearing held by the Board should not be turned into a trial. The consequences that attach to these hearings are serious and the measure of procedural fairness must be commensurate. However, it does not reach the level of disclosure found in criminal law, for instance."[47]
  • Members should exercise their discretion with a spirit of justice and sensitivity. The Board states in its Guideline 8 that all persons appearing before the IRB need to be treated with sensitivity and respect.[48] Caselaw from the Federal Court also states that the member must at all times be attentive and sensitive to claimants.[49] The UNHCR Handbook is considered highly influential in how refugee adjudication should be approached, even if its clauses are not, in and of themselves, law in Canada.[50] The following comment about how the task of refugee status determination should be approached is instructive: "Since the examiner’s conclusion on the facts of the case and his personal impression of the applicant will lead to a decision that affects human lives, he must apply the criteria in a spirit of justice and understanding and his judgement should not, of course, be influenced by the personal consideration that the applicant may be an ‘undeserving case’."[51]
  • Claimants should be given the benefit of the doubt in appropriate circumstances.[52] The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status provides that the benefit of the doubt should be granted to the claimant in certain circumstances: "After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. As explained above (paragraph 196), it is hardly possible for a refugee to "prove" every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized. It is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt." However, as per the Supreme Court of Canada, it is not appropriate to apply the benefit of the doubt where the claimant's allegations run contrary to generally known facts, and the available evidence.[53] The UNHCR Handbook states: "The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant's general credibility. The applicant's statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts."[54]
  • The Board should have strong reasons before attributing dishonesty or malicious intent to a claimant. The Federal Court has held that "attributing dishonesty or malicious intent to an applicant is subject to a very high threshold".[55]
  • Parties can expect consistency and the Board should decide like cases in the same manner. For more details, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing#Decision-making should be consistent across the Board.

IRPA ss. 3(2) and 3(3): Interpretation principles as derived from the Act

This section will set out the objectives and application provisions in the Act and then provide commentary on some specific ones. In the words of Sharryn Aiken, et. al., one of the enduring features of Canadian immigration law since the 1976 Immigration Act has been "a complex and contradictory set of objectives".[56] Those objectives, in so far as they concern refugees, read as follows in the current IRPA:

Objectives — refugees
3...
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
(a) to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted;
(b) to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm Canada’s commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement;
(c) to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution;
(d) to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment;
(e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings;
(f) to support the self-sufficiency and the social and economic well-being of refugees by facilitating reunification with their family members in Canada;
(g) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society; and
(h) to promote international justice and security by denying access to Canadian territory to persons, including refugee claimants, who are security risks or serious criminals.

Application
(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
(a) furthers the domestic and international interests of Canada;
(b) promotes accountability and transparency by enhancing public awareness of immigration and refugee programs;
(c) facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations;
(d) ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination and of the equality of English and French as the official languages of Canada;
(e) supports the commitment of the Government of Canada to enhance the vitality of the English and French linguistic minority communities in Canada; and
(f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.

The above objectives can be compared to the section of the IRPA that sets out objectives for the immigration (as opposed to humanitarian or refugee) streams:

Objectives — immigration
3 (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are
(a) to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration;
(b) to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada;
(b.1) to support and assist the development of minority official languages communities in Canada;
(c) to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada;
(d) to see that families are reunited in Canada;
(e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society;
(f) to support, by means of consistent standards and prompt processing, the attainment of immigration goals established by the Government of Canada in consultation with the provinces;
(f.1) to maintain, through the establishment of fair and efficient procedures, the integrity of the Canadian immigration system;
(g) to facilitate the entry of visitors, students and temporary workers for purposes such as trade, commerce, tourism, international understanding and cultural, educational and scientific activities;
(h) to protect public health and safety and to maintain the security of Canadian society;
(i) to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks; and
(j) to work in cooperation with the provinces to secure better recognition of the foreign credentials of permanent residents and their more rapid integration into society.

There is a statutory interpretation convention to the effect that statements of objectives in legislation serve to constrain executive discretion in implementing the law. In the words of Sharryn Aiken, et. al., however, the objectives of the IRPA "are so plentiful and far-ranging that they arguably serve to support any potential discretionary implementation choice."[57] Shauna Labman writes that the twenty-five separate paragraphs addressing the objectives and application of the act add to the IRPA's "contradictions and confusions".[58]

IRPA Section 3(2)(a) - The refugee program is about saving lives and offering protection

Objectives — refugees
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
(a) to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted;

This has been a long-standing provision in the Act

This reflects one of the objectives that was inserted into the 1976 Immigration Act, which was “to fulfill Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted.”[59]

Section 3(2)(a) of the IRPA provides that the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are, inter alia, to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted. The protection envisaged is arguably not just protection from refoulement, but also the suite of affirmative rights enumerated in the Refugee Convention. The academic Alleweldt writes that the first and foremost objective of the 1951 Refugee Convention was to prevent refugees from becoming legal non-persons.[60] After the First World War, he states, the typical problem of refugees was the lack of any legal status in the State of refuge, which deprived them automatically of many rights and opportunities. Accordingly, the parties to the Refugee Convention envisaged, for humanitarian reasons as well as for practical reasons of cooperation, providing refugees with a status which would comprise a key set of their human rights and freedoms.

Objectives — refugees
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
(b) to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm Canada’s commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement;

This has been a long-standing provision in the Act

This reflects one of the objectives that was inserted into the 1976 Immigration Act, which was “to fulfill Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted.”[59]

Section 3(2)(b) of the Act specifies that the objectives of the IRPA with respect to refugees are, among other things, to fulfill Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees. There is a well-established presumption that, where possible, Canada’s domestic legislation should be interpreted to conform to international law.[61] The Supreme Court of Canada holds that the provisions of the IRPA "cannot be considered in isolation from the international norms which they reflect".[62] Section 3(2)(b) of the Act reinforces that, where possible, the provisions of the IRPA should be interpreted in a way that fulfills Canada's obligations pursuant to, inter alia, the Refugee Convention.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies public international law rules of treaty interpretation applicable to the interpretation of the Refugee Convention

The rules of treaty interpretation for discerning the content of Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees were codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:[63]

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention in turn provides that “recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”.[63]

This said, the Vienna Convention does not in and of itself apply to the Refugee Convention, given that the Vienna Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by states after the Vienna Convention entered into force on January 27, 1980 (per Article 4 of that Convention).[64] As such, the Vienna Convention does not in and of itself apply to the Refugee Convention of 1951 or the Protocol to the Convention of 1967. That said, as Hathaway notes,[65] the Vienna Convention approach has been recognized by the International Court of Justice as embodying customary norms of treaty interpretation.[66] Those rules are generally regarded as a codification of the public international law rules of treaty interpretation as a matter of general (or customary) international law.[67] As such, Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention constitute a general expression of the principles of customary international law relating to treaty interpretation.[68] In this way, the norms of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention are properly considered when interpreting the Refugee Convention, even if its articles do not sensu stricto apply to the Refugee Convention. For such reasons, in the context of the Refugee Convention, domestic courts in New Zealand,[69] the UK,[70] and Canada[71] have seen fit to apply Arts. 31 and 32 of the VCLT when interpreting the Refugee Convention.

Section 3(2)(b) of the Act specifies that the objectives of the IRPA with respect to refugees are, among other things, to fulfill Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees. These obligations must be interpreted in good faith.[72] This is consistent with Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention, supra, which states that "a treat shall be interpreted in good faith". It is also consistent with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, which requires States to perform their international treaty obligations in good faith. In international law, the concept of good faith, or bona fides, is taken to include duties of honesty, loyalty, and reasonableness.[73] That said, in Britain Lord Bingham has concluded that "there is no want of good faith if a state interprets a treaty as meaning what it says and declines to do anything significantly greater than or different from what it agreed to do."[74] Relatedly, Canada's Federal Court has held that "an unduly textual and restrictive interpretation [of the IRPA]" that "would impose a result that is inconsistent with and contrary to the objectives of the IRPA" must be avoided.[75]

The Refugee Convention should be interpreted in good faith in light of its object and purpose

Under Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”.[76] This raises the question of what the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention are. The principal answer that emerges in the jurisprudence relates to the Convention's humanitarian purposes. The UK House of Lords has held that a ‘good faith’ interpretation of the Refugee Convention is one that works to bolster the effectiveness of its protection purpose, and thus seeks a construction consistent with humanitarian aims and not simply a literal linguistic approach.[77] These humanitarian aims are underscored in the IRPA with the statement at s. 3(2)(d) that "the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution". The academic Michelle Foster writes that "one perspective is that the aim of the Refugee Convention is fundamentally to pursue a social and human rights inspired purpose, namely to provide for the international protection of those individuals falling within the refugee definition."[78] The Supreme Court of Canada has noted the human rights purpose of the Refugee Convention, for example remarking upon its "obvious human rights purpose" in Németh v. Canada.[79] Similarly, Ezokola v Canada refers to the "overarching and clear human rights object and purpose [of the Refugee Convention]".[80] This is articulated as follows by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward: the underlying objective of the 1951 Convention is "the international community's commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimination."[81]

That said, the following words of caution from the Australian courts are apposite: "the demands of language and context should not be departed from by invoking the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, without an appreciation of the limits placed by the Convention upon achievement of such objectives."[82] Indeed, Lord Bingham in the Uk has emphasized that the 1951 Convention was "a compromise between competing interests, in this case between the need to ensure humane treatment of the victims of oppression on the one hand and the wish of sovereign states to maintain control over those seeking entry to their territory on the other."[74] Foster suggests that it is possible to reconcile these two approaches by emphasizing that the 1951 Convention's focus is on "the need for co-operation in order adequately to deal with the humanitarian problem".[83] Drawing on Klabbers' view that if a treaty's substantive provisions deal with a particular topic, then it may be surmised that that topic is the treaty's object and purpose, Foster argues that the 1951 Convention's overwhelming purpose is a human rights one. In essence the treaty provides for refugees' rights and entitlements under international law.[83]

The Refugee Convention does not explicitly prescribe any particular Refugee Status Determination procedure

The objectives of this Act include fulfilling Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees. How does that relate to refugee procedure? Canada's refugee status determination process reflects Canada's international obligations, including those stemming from the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951. The challenge of refugee status determination is determining who is a “refugee” and, conversely, who is not. As to the process by which this task should be accomplished, neither the treaty nor the statute is of much direct assistance: there are 46 articles in the Refugee Convention and 22 paragraphs in the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, none of which address the issue of Refugee Status Determination (RSD).[84] In the words of the UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria, “the Convention does not indicate what type of procedures are to be adopted for the determination of refugee status.”[85]

The procedures used by Canada must ensure the effectiveness of the substantive provisions in the Refugee Convention

Section 3(2)(b) of the Act specifies that the objectives of the IRPA with respect to refugees include fulfilling Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees. In ratifying the Refugee Convention, Canada has made a number of commitments, the most important of which is arguably the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. How do such commitments relate to the procedures Canada selects for Refugee Status Determination? Hofmann and Löhr write that, with respect to the 1951 Convention, it might be stated that the Convention does not necessitate (or prohibit) any specific procedure as such, but obliges states not to introduce procedures which would result in applicants for asylum being returned or otherwise handed over - in violation of the principle of non-refoulement - to foreign authorities. This flows from the foundational principle of international law pacta sunt servanda, the rule that agreements must be kept,[86] in this case Canada's agreement to abide by the principle of non-refoulement. With respect to procedures, international courts have established the principle that a state's procedural rules must ensure the effectiveness of the substantive provisions of its international commitments. This has been held by, among others, the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) case, where it ruled that the duty incumbent on states to ensure that their international obligations be fully respected implies that domestic procedural law must be construed in such a way as to give full effect to the purposes for which the substantive rights accorded in an international treaty are intended.[87] If a state uses deficient procedures, which lead to prohibited refoulement, the introduction of such procedures constitutes per se a violation of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and its prohibition on non-refoulement.[88] This has implications for the procedures that a state selects; for example, UNHCR states that a consequence of a state’s non-refoulement obligation is a ‘duty of independent inquiry’.[89] Such a duty requires states to identify individuals in need of protection before returning or transferring them to a third country.[90]

All this said, in signing the Refugee Convention, Canada did not commit to granting asylum status to those who meet the refugee definition. Recognizing that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries,” the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, did not create a right of asylum for those seeking it, and the array of rights it enumerates pertain only to those refugees “lawfully in” or “lawfully staying in” the sheltering state.[91] Subsequent international efforts to articulate an individual right of asylum at international law have been unsuccessful - the 1967 UN General Assembly Declaration on Territorial Asylum is non-binding and a proposed Convention on Territorial Asylum never materialized.[92]

The Refugee Convention should be regarded as a living instrument that evolves to meet contemporary needs

The UK House of Lords has concluded that "It is clear that the signatory states intended that the Convention should afford continuing protection for refugees in the changing circumstances of the present and the future world. In our view the Convention has to be regarded as a living instrument."[93] The Canadian Supreme Court has stated that "international conventions must be interpreted in light of current conditions".[94] The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties delierately does not constrain the meaning of terms in a treat to their meaning at the time of the treaty's conclusion. A limitation to this effect was deleted from Art. 31, para. 3(c) on the basis that this could restrict the evolution of the law and that, in any event, the correct meaning of the provision would be derived from an 'interpretation of the term "in good faith"'.[95]

There can only be one true interpretation of the Refugee Convention

See below: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#The Act should be interpreted in a way that is coherent with interpretations by other states party to the Convention.

Section 3(2)(b) of the Act provides that the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include 1) fulfilling Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees, and 2) affirming Canada’s commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement. Resettlement falls into the second category, as opposed to the first, insofar as Canada does not have an international legal obligation to resettle refugees from abroad. When negotiating the Refugee Convention, the international community recognized the importance of burden sharing and prominently placed it in the preamble to the Convention, but burden sharing was not made into a binding legal obligation.[96] For more details on burden sharing, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#"Burden sharing" between states is a fundamental principle of the Refugee Convention.

IRPA Section 3(2)(c) - Fair consideration is to be granted to those who come to Canada claiming persecution

Objectives — refugees
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
(c) to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution;

The importance of Board procedures being fair to the public perception of the refugee program

In addition to ensuring overall fairness and facilitating the giving of evidence, procedural fairness is also about maintaining the integrity of the refugee determination process in the eyes of the public. For example, stakeholders may come to question the integrity of the system if they observe unfair, biased, stereotyped, arbitrary, or otherwise inappropriate processes that do not provide fair consideration to those who come to Canada and file a claim. As the legal philosopher Patricia Mindus argues, arbitrariness undermines legitimacy and erodes trust in the law in a deep way that is not easy to remedy.[97] Ensuring procedural fairness is in this way integral to maintaining the reliability of the hearing and refugee determination process and public support therefor.

This provision relates to the Canadian Bill of Rights

Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights states that no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to

abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to ... (e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.[98]

This provision relates to Canada's international obligations

Section 3(2)(c) of the IRPA provides that the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are to grant fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution. As to the scope of this concept of this "fair consideration", see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of procedures that will uphold Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings.

IRPA Section 3(2)(d) - Offering safe haven

Objectives — refugees
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
(d) to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment;

The objective of this Act is to offer safe haven to specified persons and this is an enduring commitment unless an asylee's status ceases

The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include offering safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment of punishment. This obligation, which partly tracks the criteria of the Refugee Convention, reflects the fact that the 1951 Convention can be viewed as a third party agreement; a treaty whereby the contracting States take on obligations towards each other for the benefit of refugees who are by the same token provided with refugee rights.[99]

The "safe haven" that is to be offered to refugees is independent of other types of immigration status in Canada such as permanent residence. An applicant’s asylum status is not affected because their permanent residence status was lost or because their application for permanent residence in the country of asylum was refused.[100] Even where a refugee moves onward from a state which has granted international protection, that state bears ongoing obligations towards the individual, unless their status has ceased.[101] Indeed, even those who are granted status as protected persons by the IRB may not meet the criteria to become permanent residents or citizens in Canada: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#Other grounds of inadmissibility in the IRPA do not render claimants ineligible for a refugee hearing, but may nonetheless have consequences even where a claim is accepted. That said, once a refugee obtains a durable solution such as citizenship in Canada then there 'refugeehood' can rightfully be regarded as having ceased. Until then, refugeehood is characterized by a temporal uncertainty; indeed, as Agier notes, that the word ‘refuge’ itself ‘denotes a temporary shelter, while waiting for something better.’[102]

IRPA Section 3(2)(e) - Fair and efficient procedures that maintain integrity and uphold human rights

Objectives — refugees
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
(e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings;

The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of efficient procedures

Section 3(2)(e) of the IRPA provides that the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of fair and efficient procedures. Section 162(2) of the IRPA provides that each Division shall deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit; for further discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Board Jurisdiction and Procedure#IRPA Section 162(2) - Obligation to proceed informally and expeditiously. The Federal Court of Appeal has stated that “there is compelling public interest, in Canada, in having refugee status determined as soon as is practically possible after a claim is made.”[103] As the Canadian Bar Association has submitted, a lack of expeditiousness "leads to legitimate claims languishing in the system and encourages the proliferation of unmeritorious claims."[104] These goals are reflected in the structures and procedures enshrined in the Act, including:

  • The control over proceedings that has been granted to decision makers: To increase the efficiency of hearings, procedures were amended following passage of the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (2010) and the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act (2012) to give decision makers greater control over refugee protection proceedings.[105]
  • Ways that duplicative processes have been excised from the Act: The Refugee Appeal Division, when considering issues of efficiency, has observed that an interpretation of the Act which would reduce duplication of work and having an additional, unnecessary, hearing is to be preferred.[106] This principle can be seen in the legislative history of section 97 of the Act. Section 97 was introduced with the transition from the Immigration Act to the IRPA, and in this way expanded the scope of asylum protection to include persons who are at risk of torture and to persons who are at risk of cruel and inhumane treatment upon deportation to their country of nationality or former habitual residence. Rebecca Hamlin writes that there is no evidence to suggest that Parliament considered the introduction of section 97 to be monumental when it discussed IRPA before voting on it in 2002. When the bill was being debated, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Elinor Caplan assured members of Parliament the IRPA "gives us the ability to streamline our procedures, so that those who are in genuine need of our protection will be welcomed in Canada more quickly and those who are not in need of protection will be able to be removed more quickly. That streamlining is extremely important." Immediately after IRPA went into force, the IRB Legal Services division produced a guide for decision-makers on how to make section 97 decisions; the guide states that these decisions were subsumed under the IRB mandate to avoid the "delays and inconsistencies" of the previous "fragmented" and "multilayered approach".

The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system

Section 3(2)(e) of the IRPA provides that the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system. As Harold Troper notes, a concern that the refugee program must seek to address is the worry that "many of the refugee claimants, including some who successfully made it through the determination process, were not really legitimate refugees but individuals looking for a way around tough Canadian immigration regulations."[107] When the IRB came into existence, the government programme delivery strategy stated that the removal of non-credible refugee claimants is the law’s "cornerstone".[108] This necessarily involves a balancing, one which Jennifer Bond and David Wiseman discuss when they write that the procedural framework governing Canada's asylum system contains a number of mechanisms aimed at enabling both flexibility and rigour.[109]

Fraudulent applications are said to have "plagued" a number of Canada's humanitarian, refugee, and resettlement programs.[110] For example, under the former source country class in the IRPA for resettlement, the ICRC indicated that individuals used fraudulent referrals allegedly from the ICRC at the Canadian embassy.[111] In 2004, a scheme was discovered by Colombian authorities in which substantial bribes were being paid to civil servants employed by the Colombian National Senate for documents identifying individuals as victims of death or abduction threats from either the guerrillas or the paramilitaries. The documents were reportedly used at the Canadian embassy in Bogota to achieve source country class resettlement for at least fifty people.[110]

The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees include the establishment of procedures that will uphold Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings

Section 3(2)(e) of the IRPA provides that the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees are to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings. This can be considered in conjunction with section 3(2)(c) of the IRPA, which provides that the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are to grant fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution. As to the scope of this concept of "fair consideration", it should be considered in conjunction with s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA, which provides that the Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory. When considering such human rights instruments, regard may properly be had of the provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that provides individuals with extensive rights relating to a fair trial in the determination of a person's "rights and obligations in a suit at law",[112] which, as Macharia-Mokobi argues, may fairly be held to cover refugee status determination procedures.[113] This also reflects the preamble to the Refugee Convention, which reads:

The High Contracting parties, ... considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination ... have agreed as follows: ...[114]

For more information on fair procedures for refugee status determination, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing.

IRPA Section 3(2)(g) - Protecting the health and safety of Canadians and maintaining the security of Canadian society

Objectives - refugees
(2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are ...
(g) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society; and

This is worded identically to s. 3(1)(h) of the Act

Section 3(1)(h) of the IRPA is worded identically, stating that "the objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are (h) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society". That provision was considered in Medovarski v Canada, in which the Supreme Court of Canada noted that "the objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an intent to prioritize security":

The objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an intent to prioritize security. This objective is given effect by preventing the entry of applicants with criminal records, by removing applicants with such records from Canada, and by emphasizing the obligation of permanent residents to behave lawfully while in Canada. This marks a change from the focus in the predecessor statute, which emphasized the successful integration of applicants more than security: e.g., see s. 3(1)(i) of the IRPA versus s. 3(j) of the former Act; s. 3(1)(e) of the IRPA versus s. 3(d) of the former Act; s. 3(1)(h) of the IRPA versus s. 3(i) of the former Act.  Viewed collectively, the objectives of the IRPA and its provisions concerning permanent residents, communicate a strong desire to treat criminals and security threats less leniently than under the former Act.[115]

This objective is implemented through the grounds of inadmissibility found in ss. 34-42 of the IRPA.[116]

IRPA Section 3(3)(b) - This Act is to be applied in a manner that promotes accountability and transparency by enhancing public awareness of immigration and refugee programs

Application
(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
(b) promotes accountability and transparency by enhancing public awareness of immigration and refugee programs;

It is important that the public perceive the determinations made under the Act as being legitimate

Section 3(3)(b) of the Act provides that that it is to be construed and applied in a manner that enhances public awareness of immigration and refugee programs. As the Court held in Rezaei, the Board's stakeholders "include not only the claimants who appear before the Board and its Divisions, but also the Canadian public at large, which is served by effective mechanisms for the application of immigration policy.”[117] Refugee lawyer David Matas speaks to a policy concern related to this when he states that if the public lacks confidence in the refugee determination system “people will eventually give up all hope in the system. ... [T]hose concerned with protecting refugees will adopt extra-legal rather than legal strategies - a Canadian sanctuary movement is possible”.[118]

IRPA Section 3(3)(c) - This Act is to be applied in a manner that facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations

Application
(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
(c) facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations;

Canada has an obligation to cooperate with the UNHCR and the IRPA should be construed and applied in a manner that facilitates and respects this obligation

Section 3(3)(c) of the Act provides that it is to be construed and applied in a manner that facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada and international organizations. This provision of the Act relates to Canada's international obligations. Opinions and interpretations by the UNHCR are of particular interest because of Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, which provides that member states have an obligation to facilitate the duty of UNHCR in supervising the application of the provisions of the Convention. Article 2(1) of the 1967 Protocol similarly stipulates that “[t]he States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [...] in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the present Protocol”.[119] Furthermore, the preamble to the Refugee Convention reads:

The High Contracting parties, ... noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner, ... have agreed as follows: ...[114]

That said, there are evident limits to the UNHCR's supervisory role which does not include a mandate to provide an authoritative interpretation of the Refugee Convention.[120] Accordingly, the UNHCR can only issue guidance on the 1951 Convention's interpretation. Similarly, while Executive Committee Conclusions may be instructive on interpretation and applying the 1951 Convention, they are not binding on States.[120] The Federal Court of Appeal recognized this in Jayasekara v Canada in which Justice Letourneau stated that "the [UNHCR] handbook cannot override the functions of the Court in determining the words of the Convention."[121]

"Burden sharing" between states is a fundamental principle of the Refugee Convention

Section 3(3)(c) of the Act provides that this statute is to be construed and applied in a manner that facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada and foreign states. This provision reflects the importance of "burden sharing" in the refugee regime. It is said that the Refugee Convention is based on two principles: non-refoulement, the rule that asylum seekers cannot be turned away or forced to return to their countries of origin; and responsibility-sharing, the idea that member nations should share the costs, labour, and risks of refugee aid.[122] While the first principle is explicitly outlined in the operative clauses of the Convention, the second is implicit in the preamble to the Refugee Convention, which reads:[123]

The High Contracting parties, ... considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation, ... have agreed as follows: ...[114]

James Hathaway writes in The Law of Refugee Status that burden sharing was historically one of the core motivations for the Refugee Convention:

... the majority of the states that drafted the Convention sought to create a rights regime conducive to the redistribution of the post-war refugee burden from European shoulders. The Europeans complained that they had been forced to cope with the bulk of the human displacement caused by the Second World War, and that the time had come for all members of the United Nations to contribute to the resettlement of both the remaining war refugees and the influx of refugees from the Soviet bloc. Refugees would be more inclined to move beyond Europe if there were guarantees that their traditional expectations in terms of rights and benefits would be respected abroad. The Convention, then, was designed to create secure conditions such as would facilitate the sharing of the European refugee burden.[124]

Today, most refugees reside not in Europe, but in low-income states; the world’s six richest countries host under 10% of the world’s refugee population, while 80% of the world’s refugee population live in countries neighbouring their own.[125] The majority of these countries are low-income ones, with significant resource and governance challenges of their own.[126] As an example, Canada has welcomed 1,088,015 refugees since 1980,[127] including through the resettlement (325,000) and in-Canada asylum processes.[128] This represents about 3% of the current Canadian population. In comparison, Jordan today hosts refugees equivalent to 9% of its current population and Lebanon hosts refugees equivalent to more than 20% of its current population, all with substantially fewer financial resources than Canada has.[129]

The principle of burden sharing has a number of implications. First, it is to this end that the UNHCR Executive Committee has encouraged states to continue to promote, where relevant, regional initiatives for refugee protection and durable solutions.[130] The Federal Court has noted that "in principle, international refugee law does not confer upon refugees the right to choose their country of asylum".[131] The Federal Court also notes that international refugee law "does not authorize their irregular movement between successive countries solely in order to benefit from more favourable conditions."[20] The Federal Court has also cited with approval the UNHCR document Guidance on Responding to Irregular Onward Movement of Refugees and Asylum-seekers (2019) which includes a related discussion.[20] One manifestation of this principle in the IRPA is through the responsibility-sharing arrangement between the "Five Eyes" countries established by s. 101(c.1) of the Act: Canadian Refugee Procedure/100-102 - Examination of Eligibility to Refer Claim. All this said, it should be noted that under international law refugees are under no obligation to apply for asylum in any particular state at any specific stage of their flight from danger.[132] Indeed, the 1951 Convention at the time of its adoption was seen as an instrument of burden sharing and binding obligations upon states were considered a requirement for effective international cooperation, as well as more equal commitments and sharing of responsibility with regard to refugee problems.[133] In this way, in-country asylum systems have come to be seen as durable methods of burden-sharing. Shauna Labman writes about the comparative "fragility and vulnerability" of state resettlement programs in contrast to asylum when she notes that such resettlement programs can simply disappear.[134] See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#Canada does not have a binding legal obligation to accept refugees from abroad for resettlement.

States should do everything in their power to prevent the problem of refugees from becoming a cause of tension between states

Section 3(3)(c) of the Act provides that it is to be construed and applied in a manner that facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada and foreign states. This provision reflects the preamble to the Refugee Convention, which reads:

The High Contracting parties, ... expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States, ... have agreed as follows: ...[114]

Relatedly, in 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on Territorial Asylum directed toward States. The Declaration states that granting asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act that cannot be regarded as unfriendly by any other State.[135]

The Act should be interpreted in a way that prevents the possibility of “refugees in orbit”

Section 3(3)(c) of the Act provides that this statute is to be construed and applied in a manner that facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada and foreign states. Canada’s Senate, in amending relevant bills, has been said to have tried to ensure that the safe third country provisions in the IRPA do not result in “refugees in orbit”, refugees forced to travel from country to country in search of protection.[136] A “refugee in orbit” situation is constituted when:

country A designates country B as a safe third country, thereby entitling country A to refuse to adjudicate the claim of an asylum seeker who arrived in country A via country B. However, in the absence of a readmission agreement, country B may refuse to re-admit the asylum seeker, and send the person to country C, who may in turn bounce the person concerned to country D, and so on.[137]

For more details, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Safe Third Countries, and in particular Article 3 of the Safe Third Country Agreement, which exists to prevent this.

The Act should be interpreted in a way that is coherent with interpretations by other states party to the Convention

Section 3(3)(c) of the Act provides that this statute is to be construed and applied in a manner that facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada and foreign states. In this way, the IRPA should be interpreted in a way that avoids fragmentary jurisprudence which undermines the coherence of the international protection system.[138] Courts in the UK have phrase this obligation thusly: "in principle there can only be one true interpretation of a treaty".[139] As such, decisions from the UK frequently stress that each State "must search, untrammelled by notions of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty".[139] For the same reason, decisions in Canada frequently canvass jurisprudence from other countries when interpreting the meaning of the Refugee Convention and the IRPA.[140] See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing#Decision-making should be predictable and consistent across the Board.

IRPA Section 3(3)(d) - The Act is to be applied in a manner that complies with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Application
(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
(d) ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination and of the equality of English and French as the official languages of Canada;

The fact that Charter rights are at play in Board proceedings means that the extent of procedural fairness owed to claimants is high

The court has stated that “The independence of the Board, its adjudicative procedure and functions, and the fact that its decisions affect the Charter rights of claimants, indicate that the content of the duty of fairness owed by the Board, including the duty of impartiality, falls at the high end of the continuum of procedural fairness.”[3]

Charter issues should generally be raised before the Division

Under most circumstances in the immigration context an applicant is required to raise Charter issues before the relevant administrative tribunal within the respective proceeding. In the present context, for example, the IRB is competent to address Charter issues. If unsuccessful, the claimant would then be able seek leave for judicial review of that decision before the Federal Court.[141] For further discussion on this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Notice of Constitutional Question.

Decisions taken under this Act are to be consistent with the principles of equality and freedom from discrimination

Section 3(3)(d) of the IRPA provides that the Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination. Indeed, this tracks the transformation that has been seen over the past century in the nature of international migration and its increasingly multiethnic and global character. When the 1951 Refugee Convention was being negotiated, it had a primarily European orientation, the prospect of refugees coming in significant numbers from further afield was thought to be nil; for example, in the words of the UK delegate to the conference of plenipotentiaries that negotiated the 1951 Convention, "[the risk of European states facing] a vast influx of Arab refugees was too small to be worth taking into account."[142] This thinking about the makeup and source of refugees seeking asylum has shifted dramatically to the point where today it is recognized that most refugees are in low income countries and individuals claim asylum in Canada against countries throughout the world. Board Members are to exercise their discretion without discrimination or reliance on stereotype, as doing so, in the words of the Federal Court, “reveals a level of ignorance and prejudice which is not only unusual in general, but is particularly astonishing on the part of a decision maker who is in a position to adjudicate sensitive claims.”[143] See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an unbiased decision-maker#Where a member pursues questioning with a discriminatory attitude.

Decisions taken under this Act are to be consistent with the equality of English and French as the official languages of Canada

Section 3(3)(d) of the Act states that it is to be construed and applied in a manner that ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Chart of Rights and Freedoms, including its principle of the equality of English ad French as the official languages of Canada. For a discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing#Language of proceedings.

IRPA Section 3(3)(f) - The Act is to be applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments Canada has signed

Application
(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
(f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.

In general, in Canada legislation should be presumed to conform to international law

Canada is what is referred to as a "dualist state" in that international law and municipal law are treated as separate spheres of law. As such, in order for international obligations undertaken by the state by way of treaty to form part of the national law, these international law rules have to be transformed into national law rules through the use of enabling legislation.[144] That said, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that legislation will be presumed to conform to international law.[145] The presumption of conformity is based on the rule of judicial policy that, as a matter of law, courts will strive to avoid constructions of domestic law pursuant to which the state would be in violation of its international obligations, unless the wording of the statute clearly compels that result.[146] The Supreme Court of Canada articulated this rule in Baker v. Canada when it adopted the following statement from Driedger on the Construction of Statutes:

[T]he legislature is presumed to respect the values and principles enshrined in international law, both customary and conventional.  These constitute a part of the legal context in which legislation is enacted and read.  In so far as possible, therefore, interpretations that reflect these values and principles are preferred.[147]

This provision was added to the IRPA and was not present in the former Immigration Act

Sharryn Aiken, et. al., write in Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary that there was considerable excitement in migrant advocacy circles regarding para 3(3)(f) of the IRPA stating that the Act is to be construed in a manner that "complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory." They note that this provision seemed to provide a potential shortcut for direct access to international human rights principles.[148] However, on the basis of the Federal Court of Appeal's decision de Guzman v. Canada those authors conclude that "The de Guzman decision ensured that para 3(3)(f) is understood to reflect existing Canadian law with respect to international obligations and therefore to be essentially meaningless window dressing that adds nothing new to the interpretive framework for Canadian immigration law."[149]

International human rights instruments are determinative of the meaning of IRPA, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary  

Section 3(3)(f) of the IRPA goes beyond the general principle of statutory interpretation described above. When interpreting any provision of IRPA, account must be had of Canada’s international human rights obligations and provisions should be interpreted in a manner consistent with Canada’s international obligations, where possible. In De Guzman v. Canada the court commented that the words “shall be construed and applied in a manner that complies with …” are mandatory and appear to direct courts to give the international human rights instruments in question more than persuasive or contextual significance in the interpretation of IRPA. By providing that IRPA “is to be” interpreted and applied in a manner that complies with the prescribed instruments, paragraph 3(3)(f), if interpreted literally, makes them determinative of the meaning of IRPA, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary.[150] As Bastarache J of the Canadian Supreme Court held in Pushpanathan, the "overarching and clear human rights object and purpose is the background against which interpretation of individual provisions must take place".[151] That said, unambiguous provisions of the IRPA must be given effect even if they are contrary to Canada’s international obligations or international law.[152]

Regard should be had to international human rights instruments that Canada has signed, whether or not Canada has ratified them

In de Guzman v. Canada the court commented that the sources of international law described in paragraph 3(3)(f) comprise some that are binding on Canada in international law, and some that are not. The paragraph applies to instruments to which Canada is signatory. An international instrument is not legally binding on a signatory State until it has also ratified it, unless the instrument provides that it is binding when signed. Signature normally evinces an intention to be bound in the future, although it may also impose an immediate obligation on the signatory not to take measures to undermine the agreement.[153]

What are the international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory?

As the Federal Court of Appeal has noted, the IRPA "does not list, let alone set out the text of, the measures to which paragraph 3(3)(f) applies."[154] It went on to note that the phrase "international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory" is "far from self-defining".[154] The Department of Justice provides the following list, International Human Rights Treaties to which Canada is a Party, which may serve as a starting-point for such an analysis:[155]

  • Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1952)
  • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1970)
  • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976)
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976)
    • Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (complaint mechanism) (1976)
    • Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (2005)
  • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1981)
    • Optional Protocol to CEDAW (complaint mechanism) (2002)
  • Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987)
  • Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1991)
    • Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in armed conflict (2000)
    • Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2005)
  • Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2010)
    • Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2018)

This provision does not apply to international humanitarian law instruments, purely regional instruments, and texts which are not signed

Section 3(3)(f) of the IRPA provides that it is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory. This arguably excludes a number of types of instruments, including:

  • Instruments that are not human rights instruments, but are instead humanitarian law instruments: The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), which at Art. 45, para. 4 prohibits transferring a protected person "to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.".[156] This instrument forms part of international humanitarian law, not international human rights law, and thus does not fall within the ambit of IRPA s. 3(3)(f).
  • Instruments that are not international instruments, but are instead regional ones: Canada is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, as a member of the Organization of American States, it is bound by the terms of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”).[157] This instrument specifies the fundamental rights to which each person is entitled, and which each member State of the Organization of American States (OAS), like Canada, is bound to uphold. The OAS Charter and the American Declaration provide the source of legal obligations applicable to Canada.[158] That said, this instrument is arguably not relevant to s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA given that it provides that the Act “is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory”, and the American Declaration, rather than being an international instrument is rather a regional one. Even so, such instruments would nonetheless be relevant to the interpretation of this statute pursuant to general rules of statutory interpretation which involve considering Canada's international legal obligations when conducting statutory interpretation.
  • Instruments that are not signed: For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, but instead a non-binding (yet aspirational) declaration that was voted upon by Member States of the United Nations. By its terms the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not designed to describe binging obligations by only a 'common standard of achievement', as stated in the preamble to the declaration.[159] As such, given that this document was not signed, and as such countries cannot be said to be signatories to this declaration, it should not be regarded as one of the instruments contemplated by s. 3(3)(f) of the IRPA.

The refugee system is inextricably linked with the concept of human rights

Section 3(3)(f) of the Act provides that it is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory. This should be read in conjunction with Section 3(2)(e) of the IRPA, which provides that the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees including upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings. These legislative provisions speak to the way that the plight of refugees is inextricably linked with human rights violations. As refugee lawyer David Matas writes, “the plight of refugees and human rights violations are not two problems, but different facets of the same problem. Human rights violations are at the root cause of mass exoduses.”[160]

There is a debate about whether the Refugee Convention itself should be considered a “human rights instrument”, within the meaning of s. 3(3)(f) of the Act. Prominent refugee law academics such as McAdam, author of the leading text The Refugee in International Law, argue that refugee law is a specialized area within human rights law.[161] UNHCR is said to have adopted this approach and has pronounced that “the human rights base of the Convention roots it quite directly in the broader framework of human rights instruments of which it is an integral part.”[162] The preamble to the Convention itself notes that "The High Contracting parties, considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms, ... have agreed as follows:".[114] Brennan CJ of the High Court of Australia relied on the Preamble when making the following comment about the Refugee Convention: "the preamble places the Convention among the international instruments that have as their object and purpose the protection of the equal enjoyment by every person of fundamental rights and freedoms."[163]

Given section 3(2)(b) of this legislation, which specifically provides that the objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are “to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees”, it has not been necessary to resolve the question of whether the Refugee Convention is one of the instruments contemplated by s. 3(3)(f) of the Act, since it is clear that the IRPA should be construed and applied in a manner that complies with the Refugee Convention whenever possible.

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  75. Mwano v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 792, para. 23 <https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/485650/index.do>.
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  77. Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] 1 AC 293.
  78. Michelle Foster, "A Human Rights Framework for Interpreting the Refugee Convention" in Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refugee from Deprivation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
  79. Németh v. Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56 (CanLII), [2010] 3 SCR 281, par. 33, <http://canlii.ca/t/2djll#par33>, retrieved on 2020-12-19.
  80. Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, para. 32.
  81. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689.
  82. Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Australia), 231 (Brennan CJ).
  83. 1 2 Foster, M., International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (2007), p. 44, as cited in Jane McAdam, ‘Interpretation of the 1951 Convention’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) at page 92.
  84. Jones, M., & Houle, F. (2008). Building a Better Refugee Status Determination System. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 25(2), 3-11. Retrieved from https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/26027, page 3.
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  86. Uçaryılmaz, Talya. (2020). The Principle of Good Faith in Public International Law (El principio de buena fe en el Derecho internacional público). Estudios de Deusto. 68.43.10.18543/ed-68(1)-2020pp43-59 <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7483935> (Accessed July 25, 2020), page 11 of the article.
  87. ICJ. LaGrand, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 497-498, paras. 89-91.
  88. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Edited by Andreas Zimmermann. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, £260 hb. ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, at p. 1100.
  89. UNHCR, UNHCR Intervention before the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the case between C, KMF, BF (Applicants) and Director of Immigration, Secretary for Security (Respondents) (31 January 2013) para 74 http://www.refworld.org/docid/510a74ce2.html accessed 6 January 2019.
  90. Azadeh Dastyari, Daniel Ghezelbash, Asylum at Sea: The Legality of Shipboard Refugee Status Determination Procedures, International Journal of Refugee Law, eez046, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eez046
  91. Volker Türk, The Common European Asylum System – a vision for the future, Conference on “The Common European Asylum System: Future Challenges and Opportunities”, Stockholm, 3 November 2009, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4af15b672.html> [accessed on 20 Sept. 2020].
  92. Adamu Umaru Shehu, Understanding the Legal Rights of Refugee, Migrants, and Asylum Seekers Under International Law, Journal of Conflict Resolution and Social Issues, Vol 1 No 2 (2021) <http://journal.fudutsinma.edu.ng/index.php/JCORSI/article/viewFile/1824/1275> (Accessed February 13, 2021), pages 40-41.
  93. Sepet (FC) and Another (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2003] UKHL 15, United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 20 March 2003, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_HL,3e92d4a44.html [accessed 26 December 2020].
  94. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 3 (Canada), para. 87.
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  96. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 5.
  97. Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712 at page 16.
  98. Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44, s 2, <http://canlii.ca/t/7vnh#sec2>, retrieved on 2020-12-22.
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  100. Gaspard v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 29, paras. 15-16.
  101. Paulos Teddla v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2020 FC 1109 (CanLII), par. 21, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc709#par21>, retrieved on 2020-12-21.
  102. Agier, Michel. 2008. On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  103. Seth v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 348 (C.A.).
  104. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 48.
  105. Neil Yeates, Report of the Independent Review of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Government of Canada, April 10, 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/irb-report-en.pdf> (Accessed April 27, 2020), page 13.
  106. X (Re), 2020 CanLII 101305 (CA IRB), par. 70, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc74v#par70>, retrieved on 2020-12-21.
  107. Troper, Harold,  "Immigration in Canada". In The Canadian Encyclopedia. Historica Canada. Article published April 22, 2013; Last Edited September 19, 2017. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/immigration
  108. David Matas, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, 1989, Summerhill Press, Toronto, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 143.
  109. Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, Imperfect Evidence and Uncertain Justice: An Exploratory Study of Access to Justice Issues in Canada's Asylum System, 53 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2020), page 19.
  110. 1 2 Oakland Ross, "Canada Is Conned into Taking Rebels; Colombians Given Refugee Status; Bogota Arrests 3 Civil Servants," Toronto Star (8 September 2004), A1, as cited in Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 139.
  111. Francisco Rico Martinez, "The Future of Colombian Refugees in Canada: Are We Being Equitable?" (2011), 35-36, online: Canadian Council for Refugees <http://ccrweb.ca/files/ccr_colombia_report_2011.pdf>.
  112. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 6 February 2021], Article 14.
  113. E Macharia-Mokobi, J Pfumorodze, Advancing refugee protection in Botswana through improved refugee status determination, African Human Rights Law Journal 13 (1), 01-26, <http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S1996-20962013000100008&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es> (Accessed February 5, 2021), page 162.
  114. 1 2 3 4 5 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Document dated December 2010 <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10> (Accessed August 30, 2020), at page 13 of the document.
  115. Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); Esteban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 539, par. 10, <http://canlii.ca/t/1lpk5#par10>, retrieved on 2020-12-25.
  116. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 408.
  117. Rezaei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 3 FC 421 (TD), para. 70.
  118. David Matas and Ilana Simon, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 146.
  119. United Nations General Assembly. (1967). “Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 606, Page 267.
  120. 1 2 Jane McAdam, ‘Interpretation of the 1951 Convention’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) at page 79.
  121. Jayasekara v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 404, at para. 39.
  122. Mai-Linh K. Hong (2020) Navigating the Global Refugee Regime: Law, Myth, Story, Amerasia Journal, DOI: 10.1080/00447471.2020.1776571, page 3.
  123. Srobana Bhattacharya, Bidisha Biswas, International Norms of Asylum and Burden-Sharing: A Case Study of Bangladesh and the Rohingya Refugee Population, Journal of Refugee Studies, 22 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa122 at page 3.
  124. James C Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Markham, Ont: Butterworths, 1991, at 6-11.
  125. Srobana Bhattacharya, Bidisha Biswas, International Norms of Asylum and Burden-Sharing: A Case Study of Bangladesh and the Rohingya Refugee Population, Journal of Refugee Studies, 22 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa122 at page 4.
  126. Srobana Bhattacharya, Bidisha Biswas, International Norms of Asylum and Burden-Sharing: A Case Study of Bangladesh and the Rohingya Refugee Population, Journal of Refugee Studies, 22 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa122 at page 2.
  127. UNHCR Canada, Refugees in Canada, Data to 2017 <https://www.unhcr.ca/in-canada/refugees-in-canada/> (Accessed December 26, 2020).
  128. Bryony Lau, Canada resettles more refugees than anyone, Ottawa Citizen, published: 2020-12-26, NP1 / FRONT.
  129. World Bank, Refugee population by country or territory of asylum, 2019 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG> (Accessed December 26, 2020).
  130. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion N° 81(k), 1997.
  131. Mohamed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 16302 (FC), 127 FTR 241 at 4.
  132. Idil Atak, Zainab Abu Alrob, Claire Ellis, Expanding refugee ineligibility: Canada’s response to secondary refugee movements, Journal of Refugee Studies, 14 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa103 at page 13.
  133. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Edited by Andreas Zimmermann. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, £260 hb. ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, at p. 40 (para. 1).
  134. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 46.
  135. UNHCR and Inter-Parliamentary Union, Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law, <https://www.academia.edu/36070452/REFUGEE_PROTECTION_A_Guide_to_International_Refugee_Law?email_work_card=view-paper> (Accessed December 13, 2020), page 15.
  136. David Matas with Ilana Simon, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 161.
  137. Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement” (2005) 36 Colum HRL Rev 365 at 373-74.
  138. Mathilde Crepin, The Notion of Persecution in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Relevance for the Protection Needs of Refugees in the 21st Century, Dissertation, King’s College London, 2019, <https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/> (Accessed August 1, 2020), at page 70 of document’s pagination.
  139. 1 2 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Adan [2001] 2 AC 477, 516 (Lord Steyn).
  140. See, e.g., Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 678, paras. 69-77, <http://canlii.ca/t/fzq5z#par69>, retrieved on 2020-12-19.
  141. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 86.
  142. Krause, U. Colonial roots of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its effects on the global refugee regime. J Int Relat Dev (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-020-00205-9 at page 17.
  143. Herrera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1233.
  144. Statement applies mutatis mutandis to Canada, and is derived from E Macharia-Mokobi, J Pfumorodze, Advancing refugee protection in Botswana through improved refugee status determination, African Human Rights Law Journal 13 (1), 01-26, <http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S1996-20962013000100008&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es> (Accessed February 5, 2021), page 166.
  145. R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26 (CanLII), [2007] 2 SCR 292, par. 53, <http://canlii.ca/t/1rq5n#par53>, retrieved on 2020-09-03.
  146. R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (4th ed. 2002), at p. 422.
  147. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817, par. 70, <http://canlii.ca/t/1fqlk#par70>, retrieved on 2020-12-22.
  148. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 307.
  149. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 309.
  150. De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 2119 at para. 75 (F.C.A.).
  151. Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 (Supreme Court of Canada).
  152. Németh v. Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 281 at para. 35.
  153. De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 2119 at para. 76 (F.C.A.).
  154. 1 2 de Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 436 (CanLII), [2006] 3 FCR 655, par. 58, <http://canlii.ca/t/1m8q8#par58>, retrieved on 2020-12-22.
  155. Government of Canada Department of Justice, International Human Rights Treaties to which Canada is a Party, Date modified: 2019-07-30, <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/icg-gci/ihrl-didp/tcp.html> (Accessed April 17, 2020).
  156. UNHCR, Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law, <https://www.academia.edu/36070452/REFUGEE_PROTECTION_A_Guide_to_International_Refugee_Law?email_work_card=view-paper> (Accessed December 13, 2020), page 14.
  157. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 320.
  158. IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989, "Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights," Ser. A No. 10, paras. 45-46.
  159. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Edited by Andreas Zimmermann. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Preamble 1951 Convention, by Alleweldt, at p. 232 (para. 28).
  160. David Matas with Ilana Simon, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 274.
  161. McAdam, J. 2010. Status anxiety: Complementary protection and the rights of non-convention refugees. University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, working paper 1, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
  162. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press,  2014. Print.
  163. Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (n 86) 231–232 (per Brennan CJ).

The Board's inquisitorial mandate

Refugee Status Determination is said to be among the most difficult forms of adjudication, involving as it does fact-finding in regard to foreign conditions, cross-cultural and interpreted examination of witnesses, ever-present evidentiary voids, and a duty to prognosticate potential risks rather than simply to declare the more plausible account of past events.[1] Within this context, the process for Refugee Status Determination adopted in Canada is one where the Board has an inquisitorial mandate. The following are some of the contours of that mandate.

The Refugee Protection Division has an inquisitorial mandate

The Board generally uses an inquisitorial, as opposed to adversarial, approach to decision-making. Rebecca Hamlin describes the contrast between these two decision-making approaches this way:

The adversarial style takes the shape of a triad: two disputants arguing their respective cases before a passive judge, who must resolve the dispute by deciding which case is more persuasive. In an adversarial process, justice is based on the premise that an impartial judge decides between competing versions of this story after hearing both sides argued forcefully. Unlike this courtroom-like setting, inquisitorial hearings are designed to be non-adversarial and non-legalistic, taking the form of a dyad between the person whose fate is to be decided and the person deciding it. The inquisitorial decision-maker is engaged in a conversation with the parties, and the facts must be discovered through a collaborative process of research and questioning. Justice is demonstrated through the decision-maker's commitment to an active investigatory process.[2]

The Refugee Protection Division has an inquisitorial mandate. The Board's Chairperson Guideline 7 describes a Member's inquisitorial mandate this way:

A member's role is different from the role of a judge. A judge's primary role is to consider the evidence and arguments that the opposing parties choose to present; it is not to tell parties how to present their cases. Case law has clearly established that the RPD has control of its own procedures. The RPD decides and gives directions as to how a hearing is to proceed. The members have to be actively involved to make the RPD's inquiry process work properly.[3]

A Member's role is inquisitorial since they not only hear whatever evidence comes before them, but, ultimately, must inform themselves sufficiently to "determine whether or not the [claimant] is a Convention refugee."[4]

Refugee Status Determination is declaratory, not constitutive

Recognizing someone as a refugee does not make the person a refugee. This is because refugee status determination is a declaratory, not constitutive act. As refugee lawyer David Matas writes, “a declaratory act recognizes someone to be what he is or always was. A constitutive act makes a person something he was not before. An asylum government cannot constitute someone to be a refugee, because he already is one.”[5] As the refugee law academic James Hathaway puts it, refugee status arises out of the refugee's predicament, rather than from a formal determination of status.[6] In this way, a decision-maker errs when they fail to recognize a genuine refugee as such, and a decision-maker also errs when they do the converse by wrongly recognizing someone who is not a refugee as such. While, in principle, a state may grant asylum to anyone that it may so choose, regardless of whether or not they meet the criteria enshrined in the Refugee Convention, or any other international treaty,[7] such a wide-ranging power has not been delegated to Immigration and Refugee Board Members, who are restricted to recognizing cases where the applicable criteria in either s. 96 or s. 97 of the IRPA have been met.

This modern conception of the refugee regime stands in contrast to pre-20th century views of asylum, where diplomatic and territorial asylum were considered to be constitutive acts such that it was the decision that made the person asking for asylum an asylee.[8] This move away from a constitutive view of asylum to a declaratory one reflects the emergence of a rights-based view of asylum. In Canada, this takes the form of the concrete legal obligation on the Canadian state to recognize as refugees those who meet the criteria in ss. 96 and 97 of the IRPA. Recognition of such is not a discretionary charitable act by Canada, but instead a personal right that individuals have pursuant to the IRPA. Shauna Labman writes about the significance of this conception of asylum:

The benefit of a rights-based stance in law is that it adds a concrete assertion of legal obligation and accountability to refugee protection. It is equality between the parties. Stuart Scheingold defines this as "the call of the law." He suggests that the assertion of a right implies a legitimate and dignified reciprocal relationship that is societal and not personal. The current alternative calls in refugee protection are for compassion, humanitarianism, and morality. Such claims lack reciprocity and are founded on personal need. As Catherine Dauvergne explains, "a claim for compassion does not effectively function as a right because rights are grounded in equality but compassion is grounded in generosity and inequality."[9]

A hearing becomes adversarial where the Minister is involved

While the Division's mandate is primarily conceived of as inquisitorial, in some cases the Minister intervenes in a claim and the process becomes an adversarial one. This properly constrains the Member's role. Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer observed in Rivas v. Canada that in some situations, such as where exclusion is at issue, “it may be problematic for the tribunal to proceed without the Minister since the Minister usually has the burden of proof. As the applicant argues, it is a situation that can force the member to [translation] ‘descend into the arena’.”[10] As Lorne Waldman states in his looseleaf: “… Since the burden of proof falls squarely on the Minister, it is certainly arguable that it is not appropriate for tribunal members themselves to engage in an investigation with respect to the exclusion matters. For the tribunal members to do so would result in their becoming prosecutors seeking to establish if the claimant falls within the exclusion clauses.”[11] Despite all of this, the jurisprudence recognizes that the Board may make a decision on the issue of exclusion without the Minister’s participation,[12] and indeed that it may have an obligation to do so even where the Minister does not participate in a case. But once the Minister becomes involved, the hearing is seen to become an adversarial process, with both the Minister’s Hearings Officer and the refugee claimant presenting evidence to establish or rebut the allegation of exclusion.[13] This may entail some limits on the Member's proper role, and this relates to the requirement in the RPD Rules that the hearing be suspended immediately upon notification to the Minister of possible exclusion (which see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility).

The Member has wide latitude to question claimants in an inquisitorial process

The text Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada provides that particular latitude will be given to tribunals to question where the matter is not adversarial, as with most refugee proceedings:

Extensive and "energetic" questioning alone by tribunal members will not in itself give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. And particular latitude is likely to be given to tribunals operating in a non-adversarial setting, such as refugee determination hearings, where there is no one appearing to oppose the claim.[14]

The nature of the mandate that decision-makers have in inquisitorial RSD processes is summarized by Rebecca Hamlin as follows:

The inquisitorial form requires much more active decision makers. Instead of placing the responsibility for the collection of evidence and the presentation of arguments on the disputing parties themselves, the inquisitorial process combines the role of investigator and decision-maker into one. RSD is inquisitorial if the asylum seeker goes before a decision maker who both researches and decides the claim.[15]

That said, there are limits on appropriate questioning where a Member approaches questioning with a discriminatory or hostile attitude: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an unbiased decision-maker#The tone and tenor of the decision-maker’s involvement in the hearing.

A Member should be adequately trained

A decision-maker should be adequately trained on issues of law and fact. While the training of Members of the Refugee Protection Division has generally be well regarded, in contrast, this has not always been seen to be the case with overseas visa officers deciding applications for resettlement from abroad. For example, in Ghirmatsion v. Canada, the Federal Court concluded that the visa officer's "lack of adequate training and support" were evident on cross-examination.[16]

A claimant has an onus to show that they meet the criteria to be recognized as a refugee

The Federal Court affirms that the burden of proof rests on a claimant to show that they meet the definition of a Convention Refugee or 'person in need of protection' in the Act.[17] The Irwin Law text Refugee Law notes that this burden flows from the general proposition in international law that an individual seeking admission to a state must justify their admission.[18] The UNHCR is of the view that this principle properly applies in the refugee context, stating that "the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant".[19] The burden of proof was previously allocated differently in Canadian refugee law, but in 1988 Canada's legislature modified the immigration legislation to shift the burden of proof for making a claim onto the asylum seeker.[20]

The UNHCR Handbook provides that those examining a refugee claim should "ensure that the applicant presents his case as fully as possible and with all available evidence."[19] This does not mean that the Board member is obliged to undertake a freestanding inquiry into a claim; the Refugee Appeal Division has held that the following principles apply in the refugee determination context: "a decision-maker [is] entitled to proper notice as to what exactly [is] being advanced. It is not up to the decision-maker to ferret out points which might possibly assist an applicant."[21] One of the reasons for this is about judicial economy; indeed, it is said that “states have a right to a fair and efficient asylum procedure”.[22]

Finally, in the Canadian system there exist legal issues where the burden of proof does not fall on the claimant, for example the Minister (or the Board, if the Minister is not participating in a hearing) bears the onus to establish a refugee claimant comes within one of the Convention's exclusion clauses.[23]

There is a shared duty of fact-finding in refugee matters

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees states in their handbook that there is a shared duty of fact-finding between a claimant and the examiner: "In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents. Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner."[24] States must consider persons exercising their right to asylum honestly and with due diligence so as to not violate their obligation of non-refoulement.[25]

One of the ways that this principle is implemented in practice is through packages of information that states compile on the countries of origin against which claimants are filing claims. It is an international norm that states ensure that precise and up-to-date information from various sources, such as the UNHCR and knowledgeable NGOs, is made available to the personnel responsible for examining applications and taking decisions.[26] This information will concern the general situation prevailing in the countries of origin against which applications of asylum are being made. That said, it is generally expected that a claimant will bring the passages that they are relying on to the attention of the decision maker; the Federal Court has held that the RPD "is not obliged to comb through every document listed in the National Document Package in the hope of finding passages that may support the claim and specifically address why they do not, in fact, support the claim".[27]

Another way that Canada fulfills this obligation is through claimant-specific research; the Board has committed to using the following process when engaging in such research pre-hearing: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a fair hearing#Disclosure rights and obligations for the Board. When it comes to whether the Board is obliged to do such research, or to reach out to a potential witness during a hearing, there is a split in the Federal Court jurisprudence about whether and in what circumstances the Board has any such obligation. One line of jurisprudence is represented by the Decision of Justice Russell in Paxi v Canada wherein he commented that "for the Board to take issue with the authenticity of the document yet make no further inquiries despite having the appropriate contact information to do so is a reviewable error."[28] This appears to place a higher onus on the Board to inquire into a claim and solicit independent evidence. A contrasting line of jurisprudence is exemplified by the decision of Mr. Justice Roy in Lutonadio v. Canada that endorsed the following statement:

I disagree that an administrative tribunal has an obligation to contact a witness to obtain information. This is not its role. The onus rests with the Applicant to bring forward evidence it intends to rely upon and in doing so, always to put the best foot forward. It is not up to the RPD to chase down evidence from a witness to be satisfied that the document is authentic and that a person exists who has sworn to the truth of its contents before someone authorized to confirm that fact. This onus rests with the Applicant who should provide the necessary information authenticating the author and the document.[29]

The Board must ensure that certain claimants are assisted to make their cases

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees states in their handbook that the scope of the shared duty of fact-finding between a claimant and the examiner will vary depending on the nature of the case: "While the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at [their] disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application."[24] What are those cases in which an examiner is to go to greater lengths to produce such evidence?

There is widespread recognition that certain types of claimants may be particularly prejudiced in presenting their cases and that in such circumstances this may affect the onus that is placed on the claimant to provide corroboration of their claim. Indeed, the Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members must take reasonable measures to accommodate all participants in a proceeding so that they may participate effectively."[30] The UNHCR stipulates that "procedures should be in place to identify and assist asylum seekers with specific needs."[31]

Minors and the mentally incompetent

One such category of claimants is those whose ability to appreciate the nature of the proceedings is severely impaired, either because they are incompetent or a minor. The failure to appoint a designated representative in a refugee protection proceeding, when one is required by the rules, is a violation of procedural fairness. As the court stated in Kurija v. Canada, “I place the proper representation of young immigrant claimants in refugee proceedings on the same plane as concerns over bias of a decision-maker. By this I mean that it is a ‘knock-out’ issue requiring the decision to be set aside, and furthermore an issue on which new evidence is admissible after the fact for the purpose of determining the partiality of the decision-maker, or in this case, the age of the claimant.”[32] For further discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Designated Representatives.

Furthermore, the UNHCR states that determining the claim of a minor "may call for a liberal application of the benefit-of-the-doubt principle".[33]

Claimants in detention

Another category of claimant which may require special assistance is those who are in detention at the time that they are preparing for, or attending, their refugee hearing. There are particular access to justice issues for claimants in detention, who have consistently been identified as being among those who have the greatest difficulty accessing legal counsel.[34] The UN Committee Against Torture, in its General Comment on non-refoulement, has listed this as one situation in which the burden of proof should reverse, and it should fall on the state to rebut the claimant's assertions where the author of the complaint has faced difficulties in obtaining evidence to substantiate their claim:[35]

[W]hen the complainant is in a situation where he/she cannot elaborate on his/her case, for instance, when the complainant has demonstrated that he/she has no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to his/her allegation of torture or is deprived of his/her liberty, the burden of proof is reversed and it is up to the State party concerned to investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the communication is based.[36]

For further discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Claimant or Protected Person in Custody.

Evidence is primarily presented in written form in the Canadian process

The purpose of an oral hearing before the Division is not for a claimant to repeat everything that is in their Basis of Claim form. The form is already to include "everything important for [their] claim" (as stated on the form) and as per the Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division, "questions that are answered by the claimant just repeating what is written in the BOC Form do not help the Member."[37] Instead, if the information on the form reliably establishes that the claimant meets the criteria to receive protection, then an oral hearing need not be held (See Rule 23: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Allowing a Claim Without a Hearing). The purpose of an oral hearing is to test the evidence presented, or lack thereof, where it is necessary to do so. This is in contrast to the practice in some other jurisdictions; for example, in Finland the practice is to have a portion of their asylum interviews in which the claimant is expected to state the grounds for claiming asylum and disclose evidence to support that claim through free narration.[38]

The Board should consider the most up-to-date country conditions evidence

Where a new National Documentation Package is released by the Board's research unit prior to a panel rendering a decision, the panel should consider it. In Zhao v. Canada, the court held that the Board should consider the most recent information on country conditions. The parties should have an opportunity to present submissions and evidence on the new documents if they include material new information.[39] As the Federal Court held in that case, "as a matter of procedural fairness, the [Board] simply had a duty to disclose the most recent NDP and to give the Applicants an opportunity to respond and make submissions on this matter."[40] That said, the RPD is not generally required to look for evidence on its own in these documents to support either the claimant's or Minister's arguments and propositions.[27] For an additional discussion of this issue, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#The panel should consider the most recent National Documentation Package.

References

  1. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: a report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, 01/12/1993 <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:1136> (Accessed April 14, 2020), page 6.
  2. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. By Hamlin, Rebecca. New York: Oxford University Press,  2014, p. 18.
  3. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division, Amended December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx#FailureA4> (Accessed January 26, 2020), section 2.2.
  4. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: a report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, 01/12/1993 <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:1136> (Accessed April 14, 2020), page 5.
  5. David Matas with Ilana Simon, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 196.
  6. JC Hathaway, The rights of refugees under international law (2005) 278.
  7. Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Aslyum in International Law, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 5, 1-34 (1994), <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1342&context=djcil>, page 4.
  8. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Regional Developments: Americas, written by Piovesan and Jubilut, at p. 213 (para. 29).
  9. Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program, 2019, UBC Press: Vancouver, page 117.
  10. Reyes Rivas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 317 (CanLII), para. 39.
  11. Immigration Law and Practice, Vol. 1, looseleaf (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1992), at paragraph 8.511.
  12. Reyes Rivas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 317 (CanLII), para. 40.
  13. Jennifer Bond, Nathan Benson, Jared Porter, Guilt by Association: Ezokola’s Unfinished Business in Canadian Refugee Law, Refugee Survey Quarterly, hdz019, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/rsq/hdz019, footnote 35.
  14. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (Brown and Evans, Toronto : Canvasback Publishing, 1998) at pages 11-31 and 11-32.
  15. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. By Hamlin, Rebecca. New York: Oxford University Press,  2014, p. 19.
  16. Ghirmatsion v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 773, para. 4.
  17. Lugunda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 467 (CanLII), par. 17, <http://canlii.ca/t/1k43l#par17>, retrieved on 2020-04-15.
  18. Lassa Oppenheim, Oppenheim's International Law, 7th ed by Hersch Lauterpacht (London: Longmans Green, 1952) at 616, as cited in Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 144.
  19. 1 2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb474b27.html [accessed 26 January 2020], page 45.
  20. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 49.
  21. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107938 (CA IRB), para. 28.
  22. Uçaryılmaz, Talya. (2020). The Principle of Good Faith in Public International Law (El principio de buena fe en el Derecho internacional público). Estudios de Deusto. 68.43.10.18543/ed-68(1)-2020pp43-59 <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7483935> (Accessed July 25, 2020), page 14 of the article.
  23. Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 8540 (FCA), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.).
  24. 1 2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 47 (1992).
  25. Kipras Adomaitis, The Right to Liberty in the Context of Migration, Masters Thesis, Mykolas Romeris Law School, <https://vb.mruni.eu/object/elaba:64888610/64888610.pdf> (Accessed July 19, 2020), page 21.
  26. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Introduction to Chapter V, written by Hofmann & Löhr, at p. 1119 (para. 101).
  27. 1 2 Giraldo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1052, para. 19.
  28. Paxi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 905 (CanLII).
  29. Lutonadio, Marcelina v. M.C.I., (FC, No. IMM-7709-19), Roy, January 6, 2021; 2021 FC 18.
  30. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 10.
  31. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate, 26 August 2020, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e870b254.html [accessed 5 September 2020], page 15.
  32. Kurija v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1158 (CanLII), par. 23, <http://canlii.ca/t/g1tm3#par23>, retrieved on 2020-03-15.
  33. UNHCR and Inter-Parliamentary Union, Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law, <https://www.academia.edu/36070452/REFUGEE_PROTECTION_A_Guide_to_International_Refugee_Law?email_work_card=view-paper> (Accessed December 13, 2020).
  34. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Refugee Reform Paper, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf>, page 3.
  35. Çalı, B., Costello, C., & Cunningham, S., Hard Protection through Soft Courts? Non-Refoulement before the United Nations Treaty Bodies, German Law Journal, 21(3) (2020), 355-384. doi:10.1017/glj.2020.28 (Accessed April 11, 2020), page 375.
  36. CAT, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, Paragraphs 15 and 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/4 (Sep. 4, 2018), at para. 38.
  37. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division, Amended December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx#FailureA4> (Accessed January 26, 2020), section 5.7.
  38. Eeva Puumala, Riitta Ylikomi & Hanna-Leena Ristimäki, Giving an account of persecution: The dynamic formation of asylum narratives, Journal of Refugee Studies 31(2), pp. 197-215 (2018) <https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/61879698/Refugee_Studies_Puumala__Ylikomi_and_Ristimaki_accepted_version.pdf> (Accessed February 10, 2020), at page 7.
  39. Zhao v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1593 (CanLII), par. 12, <http://canlii.ca/t/j48rf#par12>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
  40. Zhao v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1593 (CanLII), par. 31, <http://canlii.ca/t/j48rf#par31>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.

The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing

The Supreme Court of Canada states that the principle that the individual or individuals affected by a decision should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly underlies the duty of procedural fairness and is rooted in the right to be heard.[1] In short, parties are entitled to an oral hearing and such hearings must be conducted fairly. The fair hearing requirement means that the people affected are given a reasonable opportunity to present their point of view and to respond to facts presented by others, and that the decision-maker will genuinely consider what each person has told them when making the decision. There is also notice requirement which means that the people affected by a decision must be told about the important issues and be given enough information to be able to participate meaningfully in the decision-making process.[2] In considering whether a hearing was fair, the question is whether each party was able to fully and fairly present their case.[3] The following are some of the considerations that emerge in this respect.

The Board must provide the parties with the opportunity to be heard

Parties are entitled to the opportunity to attend an oral hearing

Section 170(e) of the Act states that the Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations. This provision relates to the right that parties have to be heard. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that fundamental justice requires an oral hearing when issues of credibility are being determined in the refugee context.[4] This hearing process must ensure that parties have an opportunity to present and respond to evidence and to make representations. This is consistent with guidance from the UNHCR that "applicants undergoing individual RSD procedures must have the opportunity to present their claims in person".[5]

Where, for example, the Board prevents a party from speaking on multiple occasions during a hearing,[6] denies a party a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a witness,[7] refuses to receive evidence,[8] or prevents a party from calling witnesses,[9] this may amount to a denial of the right to be heard and to a breach of natural justice. However, regard must be had to the relevant rules on, say, calling witnesses and submitting documents and the discretion that the Board has in certain circumstances to refuse such evidence. For more detail on fairness considerations related to the manner of conducting the hearing, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing#Fairness considerations related to the manner of conducting the hearing.

Furthermore, it must be recognized that the principles of procedural fairness do not provide an untrammeled right to be heard, but the right to a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where a party does not take advantage of that opportunity, or their actions or omissions result in them being unable to do so, procedural fairness does not automatically give them the right to another opportunity to be heard.[10]

A party is entitled to a hearing without unreasonable delay that causes serious prejudice

The UNHCR core standards for due process in Refugee Status Determination prescribe that "RSD applications must be processed in the most timely and efficient manner possible".[11] The uncertainty inherent in the asylum process is reported to be a source of significant stress and anxiety for many claimants.[12] Fundamental justice may be violated when there is an unreasonable delay that causes serious prejudice to the person concerned.[13] That said, asylum systems around the world are plagued by significant delays; for example, in the United States, on average, affirmative asylum seekers who receive asylum relief waited more than 1,000 days to be granted asylum.[14] Similarly, it usually takes several years for refugees in Malaysia to go through official status determination and be recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR.[15]

The Board must notify the Minister where the Board's rules require it and this protects the Minister's right to be heard

Rule 26(1) of the RPD Rules stipulate that "If the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim, the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister." Similarly, Rule 27(1) stipulates that "If the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that issues relating to the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system may arise from the claim ... the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister." The failure on the part of the RPD to inform the Minister results in an unfair hearing as the Minister has a right to be involved and as a result of the Minister’s involvement the outcome of the claim could have been different if an exclusion issue is fully canvassed.[16] See Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility for a more fulsome discussion of this issue.

Language of proceedings

A claimant has a right to proceedings in the official language of Canada of their choice

The IRB Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French provides that the language rights of parties are substantive rights that are distinct from their right to procedural fairness. Both the Official Languages Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establish official languages rights for parties as well as for individuals who are otherwise involved in IRB proceedings, such as witnesses and Counsel. Consequently, any issue or request concerning the use of either official language will be examined by the IRB independently of considerations of procedural fairness, although the language skills of the parties may nonetheless be considered when examining procedural fairness issues.[17] For more details about this right see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Claimants need not provide documents in the language of the proceeding, only in English or French.

A claimant has a right to interpretation where it is necessary

The right to an interpreter in a proceeding in another language is enshrined in section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and this right has been held to be generally applicable to a proceeding before the RPD. Interpretation should be continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous. For a discussion of this, see the commentary to RPD Rule 19: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Interpreters#Legal standard for interpretation. A failure to provide an interpreter at all, or to provide one that offers adequate interpretation, will mean that the process was not fair: Kovacs v. Canada.[18]

Providing information about the status determination process in a range of languages

Academics have observed that it is a best practice that state authorities widely disseminate information on eligibility criteria, the determination procedure, and the rights associated with recognition in a range of languages.[19] While this may be a best practice for states, to the knowledge of this author, it does not translate into a legal entitlement for claimants under Canadian law. For more details, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#The fact that a claimant lacks counsel does not, in and of itself, mean that their hearing is unfair.

Disclosure rights and obligations for the Claimant

The RPD is mandated by the common law and the IRPA to respect principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The right to be heard is a fundamental principle of natural justice. An essential component of the right to be heard is to be able to put relevant evidence before the decision-maker.[20] For more details on this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a hearing and the right to be heard#The Board must provide the parties with the opportunity to be heard.

The information that a claimant provides in their Basis of Claim form must be complete: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 6 - Basis of Claim Form. The documents that parties are obliged to provide to the Board are specified in rules 7 and 34: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What documents does a party need to provide when?.

Disclosure rights and obligations for the Minister

While the Minister has no obligation to become a party to a proceeding, once it does so its disclosure must be "complete" and cannot be selective. The documents that parties are obliged to provide to the Board are specified in rules 7 and 34: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What documents does a party need to provide when?.

Disclosure rights and obligations for the Board

Fundamental justice will require the the Board provide complete disclosure so as to allow parties to know and meet the case against themselves. In this way, the Board must provide disclosure of documents that it relies upon and provide parties with an opportunity to reply.[21] See Rule 33: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 33 - Disclosure and use of documents by the Division. The UNHCR affirms that a fair asylum system is one where parties will have access to the complete record that is before the decision-maker.[22]

Furthermore, in any research it conducts, the RPD is to follow the Instructions for Gathering and Disclosing Information for Refugee Protection Division Proceedings.[23] The Instructions note that while RPD members are responsible for identifying information needed for the adjudication of a claim and may gather information, the Research Directorate is primarily responsible for gathering information. The Instructions set out general principles related to the gathering and disclosing of information, as well as specific instructions.[24] These principles apply to how to Board has committed to collecting information regarding a claim, including that:

1. Responsibility to present supporting evidence rests with the parties. This responsibility remains even when the RPD decides to obtain information other than that provided by the parties.

2. To ensure a fair determination of a refugee claim, the assigned member requires all the relevant evidence whether such evidence may be favourable or prejudicial to any party.

3. The RPD will gather information through a transparent and standard process to ensure fairness in decision-making.

4. The assigned members will request claimant specific information and use such information only where they complete a risk assessment and are satisfied that there is no serious possibility that gathering the information would endanger the life, liberty or security of the claimant or any other person.

...

6. The information will be sought by the RPD only in instances where the information is deemed relevant to a determinative issue in the claim, can be obtained in a timely manner, and is likely to result in obtaining new or conclusive information. ...[23]

That said, not every situation where a decision-maker does their own research and fails to disclose it will be considered a breach of procedural fairness. In Dubow-Noor v. Canada, the court held that information obtained independently by the Board (a Google Maps search) was not extrinsic evidence because it was publicly available and not novel.[25]

To ensure that proceedings are accessible and comprehensible it is expected that a panel will identify the issues that are at stake in a claim and if the panel does not identify a particular issue as being at issue, the panel would err if it subsequently rejected the claim on that basis. As such, where a panel did not advise a claimant that state protection was at issue in a claim, and then rejected the claim on the basis that they had not rebutted the presumption of the availability of state protection, the panel acted unfairly.[26] Similarly, where a panel listed a series of issues that were of concern, but did not list the objective basis of the claim as of concern, the panel erred when it rejected the claim on the basis that the claimant had not established the objective basis of the claim.[27] An exception to this is that some issues are said to always be at issue in every claim, and need not be identified as a distinct issue, including credibility,[28] identity,[29] and the objective basis of the claim.[30] That said, the court nonetheless holds that where relevant, the claimant should be advised that identity is an issue, and of the need to provide specific documents or other corroborative evidence.[31]

Claimants should have a fair opportunity to respond to a panel's concerns

Procedural fairness entitles to those who are to be subjected to a decision affecting their rights, privileges, or interests to know the case against them.[32] This requires that they "know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made" affecting them and that they be given "a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them."[33] Parties should have a fair opportunity to respond to a panel's credibility concerns. Where a panel may reach an adverse credibility finding, a party should have notice and an opportunity to respond.[34] This rule was articulated as follows by the Federal Court of Appeal in 1989: The claimant should be given an opportunity at the hearing to clarify the evidence and to explain apparent contradictions in their testimony.[35] That said, there are limits to how far this proposition extends and a panel need not advert a claimant's attention to all possible credibility concerns, such as potential inconsistencies between their evidence and the objective country condition documents.

Parties should also have a fair opportunity to respond to other concerns that a panel has regarding issues other than credibility. For example, in Conde v. Canada, the claimant had been designated a vulnerable person by a previous panel of the Board. The claim was returned to the Board for redetermination after the original decision was overturned by the Federal Court. On redetermination, the Member de-designated the claimant as a vulnerable person. On judicial review, the court concluded that this had been done in a procedurally unfair manner as "there was no reason, given the previous psychological evidence and the acceptance of the [applicant] as a vulnerable person at previous hearings, to expect that he needed to provide more psychological evidence without notice".[36] In that case, the Federal Court concluded "clearly, this was procedurally unfair."[37]

Ministerial Notification rules ensure that a claimant will have advance notice of particular types of issues

Rule 26(1) of the RPD Rules stipulate that "If the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim, the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister." The obligation to inform the Minister in writing where there is a “possibility” of exclusion, integrity issues, or other other types of issues that require such notice not only ensures that the Minister is heard where they desire to intervene, but it also ensures that a claimant will have adequate notice of the issues at the hearing, including time to prepare for a hearing that may involve a new issue or that may have become more complicated. The court commented on this aspect of the notice requirement in Canada v. Louis, indicating that procedural unfairness that arises from the failure to provide such notice may be relied upon by either a claimant or the Minister: "Even though in [Kanya v. Canada] the breach of the rules of procedural fairness was relied on to the benefit of the refugee claimant, there is no reason that a breach of the obligations provided for in subsection 23(1) of the Rules cannot be relied on in the same way by the Minister who, according to the wording of this provision, is the true beneficiary of the said obligation."[38]

Similarly, a claimant is entitled to 10 days of advance notice where the Minister will be intervening in person and/or of the purpose of any Ministerial intervention: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Intervention by the Minister#Rule 29(2)(a) requirement that the notice state the purpose for which the Minister will intervene.

The Board is bound by its own undertakings where it indicates that something is not at issue or that particular evidence is unnecessary

The court has held that the Board is bound by its own undertakings and that, once an undertaking is given by a Board Member or a representation is made, failure to comply with it will constitute a breach of natural justice.[39] For example, in Isik v. Canada the Court concluded that the Board had acted unfairly where it indicated that it was not necessary to call a witness and then made adverse credibility findings on the point that the witness may have testified about:  

That said, the Court strongly believes that the RPD should refrain from taking a position on the necessity of presenting a witness unless it knows exactly what facts the witness will testify about and in what specific respect this evidence is meant to corroborate a claimant’s testimony or story. If a counsel simply inquires about the advisability of presenting a witness, the RPD can always refuse to take a position on the basis that it has yet to complete its evaluation of the evidence. If it chooses to take a stand, it must be fully aware that its decision will have consequences. In this particular case, the Court finds that the RPD ought to have known that its comment that the evidence was not necessary would clearly impact on the legal representatives acting in this case and it is clear that it did so without knowing the full extent of the facts on which the proposed witness was meant to testify.[40]

Similarly, in Okwagbe v. Canada the tribunal advised that its only concern was delay but then rejected the claim based on the availability of an IFA. The Court held that this conduct constituted a breach of natural justice.[41] That said, while the court has indicated that it is preferable to provide notice of issues as far in advance as possible,[42] so long as the tribunal provides an adequate opportunity to respond to the issue, procedural fairness is respected[43] - even if notice of an issue is provided at some point during the hearing, not at the start of, or prior to, the hearing.[44]

Section 170(e) of the Act states that the Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that fundamental justice requires an oral hearing when issues of credibility are being determined in the refugee context.[4] This hearing process must ensure that parties have an opportunity to present and respond to evidence and to make representations. Where, for example, the Board prevents a party from speaking on multiple occasions during a hearing,[6] denies a party a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine a witness,[7] refuses to receive evidence,[8] or prevents a party from calling witnesses,[9] this may amount to a denial of the right to be heard and to a breach of natural justice. However, regard must be had to the relevant rules on, say, calling witnesses and submitting documents and the discretion that the Board has in certain circumstances to refuse such evidence.

Claimants have a right to counsel

For considerations of the right to counsel and incompetence of counsel, see the commentary to s. 167 of the Act: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#IRPA s. 167 on the Right to Counsel.

Hearings shall normally be conducted privately

See the commentary on section 166 of the Act: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Proceedings must be held in the absence of the public.

The right to present evidence

Where a witness is interrupted while providing testimony, this may establish that their right to present oral testimony was interfered with

Where the Board prevents a party from speaking on multiple occasions during a hearing, this may amount to a denial of the right to be heard and to a breach of justice.[6] However, redirecting a witness is not in and of itself problematic; the court concluded in Wysozki v. Canada that seeking to have an applicant respond to the question asked rather than provide other irrelevant information is not a breach of procedural fairness.[45] That said, where a panel interrupts a witness' testimony in a manner that could be described as "constant interruptions or gross interference", this may establish that the process was not fair.[46]

Where a panel or opposing counsel acts in an intimidating way, this may establish that the right to present oral testimony was interfered with

The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members shall conduct hearings in a courteous and respectful manner while ensuring that the proceedings are fair, orderly and efficient."[47] Intrusive and intimidating interventions by a Board member may be found to interfere with an applicant's ability to present his case.[48] If the interruptions are made for the purpose of clarifying testimony or an issue, they will not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, even if the manner of questioning or interruption is "energetic".[49] However, there will be cases where conduct crosses the line. For example, in Kumar, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the decision-maker’s conduct of the hearing, which included statements such as [t]his is one of the most ridiculous cases I have ever heard in my life and, in response to a summary of the applicant’s political views, Who cares?, was intrusive and that the intimidating character of the interventions interfered significantly with the applicant’s presentation of his case by his counsel.[50] This concern is related to issues of bias and prejudgment of the evidence: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an unbiased decision-maker#Bias and the Member's Inquisitorial Role.

Evidence may only be admitted where it is credible and trustworthy

Just as the refusal to admit relevant evidence may breach procedural fairness, so can a decision to admit and rely on evidence which may not be reliable, credible, or trustworthy or, in the case of hearsay evidence, in circumstances where a party is unable to correct or contradict any statement prejudicial to its view, including by means of cross-examination.[51] For further discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/IRPA Section 170 - Proceedings#IRPA Section 170(h) - May receive evidence considered credible or trustworthy.

Members are expected to act honestly and in good faith and are precluded from "setting traps" for claimants

The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members are expected to act honestly and in good faith, in a professional and ethical manner."[52] Additionally, Parliament's objective with the IRPA is to fulfill Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees, including Canada's obligations pursuant to the Refugee Convention, obligations which must be interpreted and performed in good faith.[53] In international law, the concept of good faith, or bona fides, is taken to include duties of honesty, loyalty, and reasonableness.[54] As such, this requirement will preclude outright dishonesty, such as falsely indicating that a claimant made a statement that they did not make, something that has been an issue in other countries' refugee status determination systems.[55] This will also preclude more subtle actions that do not demonstrate good faith, such as "setting traps" for claimants.[56] By way of example, the Board must not mislead a claimant by putting a false premise to them. This has been held to be a "clear breach of procedural fairness".[57] In Yahaya v. Canada, the court concluded that the panel had breached procedural fairness as follows: "It is important because the RPD member’s questioning on this issue added to the confusion, as it resulted from the initial misinterpretation of the Applicant’s statement. At the hearing, the RPD member put a false premise to the Applicant, i.e., that the police visit took place on December 21, 2016, and then took note of how the Applicant reacted to what the Applicant had never understood as being a discrepancy. In effect, the Applicant was asked to explain away a discrepancy that never existed."[58] That conduct was held to have been procedurally unfair, and the matter was remitted to the IRB for redetermination. Similarly, in Reveron v. Canada the Federal Court noted that "The panel seems to have imposed a false premise on Mr. Chace Reveron and asked him to prove it" and concluded that this was a procedural fairness violation.[59]

A panel can establish principled rules regarding the manner in which a witness testifies

The right to make one’s case is subject to reasonable limitations, but those limitations, when they are the result of the exercise of discretion, are to be made and applied in a principled way.[60] For example, a Member of the Board does not normally err by asking a witness to put away notes before giving testimony. One option for a panel in such circumstances is to offer to the party that they may admit the notes in question as an exhibit, something that was offered in Wysozki v. Canada.[61] Another example of the right of a Board to establish principled limitations on the testimony that may be adduced in a proceeding was where a Member required a proposed overseas witness to attend at the Canadian embassy abroad for identification before the panel would hear their testimony by telephone, a limitation that was upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Witnesses#44(1)(f): If a party wants to call a witness, the party must provide information on whether the parts wants the witness to testify by means of live telecommunication.

A hearing should be conducted with sufficient inter-cultural understanding

Members should be taught the inter-cultural skills required to conduct interviews in a non-discriminatory and meaningful manner.[62] Furthermore, gender should be appropriately considered when assigning adjudicators to claims, as one academic has argued: "This will help to ensure respect for people whose culture does not allow for a woman to be seen alone with a man who is not her husband, and ensure that women are able to discuss their protection concerns freely with caseworkers."[63] The Federal Court has held that a Member's findings must be "duly sensitive to cultural differences".[64] Mary Crock, et. al., note that 'cultural competence' can range from understanding the impact that religious belief systems might have on behaviour to acknowledging the impact of the dissonance caused by cultural and social dislocation to understanding the expectations that a person might have of a government official in a position of authority and acknowledging the type of education and experiences that a person likely has (or has not) had.[65]

A hearing should be conducted in a trauma-informed manner

Refugee Status Determination processes can have negative psychological effects on asylum-seekers. For claimants who remain in the refugee status determination system for a lengthy period, what have been termed "the toxic effects of refugee determination, uncertainty of situation, producing documentary evidence, demonstrating past trauma, and refugee racism"[66] have all been identified contributors to a condition labelled Prolonged Asylum Seeker Syndrome, a condition characterized by powerlessness, depression, and identity crises.[67] A study conducted by Katrin Schock, an expert in clinical psychology, examined the psychological impact of asylum interviews. The participants were examined 10 days prior and 16 days after their asylum interview and the results clearly showed an “increase in post-traumatic intrusions and a significant decrease in post-traumatic avoidance and hyper-arousal symptoms,” meaning that the findings confirm the stressful impact asylum interviews have.[68] A fair hearing process is one that takes these concerns into account and seeks to minimize them. For additional discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an unbiased decision-maker#A passive or distant countenance is not required of Board members. This is especially the case for children, where care must be taken to ensure that questions are asked in a manner appropriate to the claimant's age, maturity, and level of understanding, as discussed in the relevant Chairperson's Guideline.

Videoconferencing is not per se unfair, but may be inappropriate in certain circumstances

Section 164 of the Act provides that the Board may conduct a hearing via live telecommunication. For a discussion of the fairness implications of such technology, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Presence of parties and use of telecommunications for hearings#IRPA Section 164.

The Board is not obliged to record hearings, but a lack of such a recording may constitute grounds for setting aside the decision

There is no statutory right to a recording or transcript of RPD proceedings. A lack of a recording is not by itself a ground for allowing an appeal of a decision. However, it could raise an issue of natural justice, and a reviewing body must consider whether the applicant has been deprived of his or her grounds of appeal given the absence of a recording of the impugned hearing. If the decision facing the RAD or Court could be made on the basis of evidence established through other means, the principles of natural justice would not be infringed. But if the appellant raises an issue that can only be determined through a record of what was said at the hearing, and the absence of, or gaps in, such a record prevents the appeal body from addressing the issue properly, this would normally constitute a ground for allowing the appeal (or review, in the case of a judicial review).[69]

Parties are entitled to timely decisions and reasons therefor

The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada stipulates that "Members are expected to render their reasons in accordance with any standards that may be established by the IRB regarding quality decision-making and timeliness."[70] Ordinarily, decisions are to be provided orally at the end of the hearing: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 10 - Order of questioning in hearings, oral representations, oral decisions, limiting questioning. See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a hearing and the right to be heard#A party is entitled to a hearing without unreasonable delay that causes serious prejudice.

Decision-making assigned to a Member must be done by the Member and shall not be delegated

The principle that delegata potestas non potest delegari applies to matters at the RPD. In short, no delegated powers can be further delegated. Alternatively, this administrative law principle can be stated delegatus non potest delegare ("one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power"). This is affirmed in the Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada which stipulates that "decision-making responsibility shall not be delegated."[71]

Each claim should be considered individually, while overall decision-making should be predictable and consistent

There are two fundamental principles that have some tension with one another: each claim should be considered individually, and yet, overall decision-making should be consistent. The following section explicates these principles.

Each claim should be considered individually

Every application should be considered individually and where multiple persons make a claim and the claims are joined, each claimant is entitled to have their unique circumstances considered in the decision that ultimately ensues. See Rule 55: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Rule 55.

This principle is in play where one RPD panel relies upon fact-finding conducted by another panel. Generally speaking, one panel of the RPD can rely on fact-finding conducted by another.[72] This usually occurs uncontroversially in the context of documentary evidence about conditions in the country in question. That said, the Federal Court has stated that this must be done "sparingly"[73] and cautions that a panel cannot “blindly” or “blithely” adopt another panel’s findings and that “reliance on the findings of another panel must be limited, careful and justified”.[74] For example, in Lopez v. Canada the RPD noted that the father’s claim was found not to be credible. The RPD recognized that it was not bound by the prior decision and had to arrive at a conclusion based on the evidence before it. However, given that Ms Rodriguez Lopez’s claim was based on the facts alleged by her father, the RPD found on a balance of probabilities that the credibility of her own claim had been undermined. The court held that this was unreasonable in the circumstances:

The RPD relied on credibility findings made by the panel in Ms Rodriguez Lopez’s father’s claim to draw conclusions about her own credibility. This was not a reasonable or fair use of the fact-finding of another panel. Ms Rodriguez Lopez was ill-placed to rehabilitate her father’s claim, not knowing what evidence might have overcome the panel’s concerns in his case. … There was little that Ms Rodriguez Lopez could do to sustain the veracity of her own claim once the RPD had determined, based on her father’s claim, that there had been no persecution by the ELN. Accordingly, having erred by applying the credibility findings of another panel to the claim before it, the RPD’s decision cannot stand.[75]

Decision-making should be predictable and consistent across the Board

While keeping in mind the principles that each claim should be considered individually, as the Federal Court of Appeal holds, one of Parliament's intentions with the IRPA was also to promote the consistency of decisions.[76] Persons affected by administrative decisions are entitled to expect that like cases will generally be treated alike, and that outcomes will not depend merely on the identity of the individual decision-maker.[77] The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members, in their decision-making, have a responsibility to support the institutional interest of the IRB in ensuring the consistency of its decisions, while recognizing that no improper influence may be brought to bear upon their adjudicative independence."[78] In short, in the context of this decision-making scheme, it is important that like cases be treated alike, and that this be seen to be done.[79] As Neil Yeates writes in his report on the Board‘s operations, "fairness is undermined when decision making is not perceived as consistent".[80] In the pithy words of the philosopher Patricia Mindus, "Arbitrariness is detrimental to the legitimacy of any rule in a deep and decisive way".[81] Furthermore, in the evocative words of refugee lawyer David Matas, consistency and accuracy in the system’s determinations is important, lest, “real refugees seeking protection in Canada [] evade authorities rather than submit themselves to a deadly game of Russian roulette.”[82]

Achieving consistency is a challenge for any judicial system; for example, in the context of the American asylum system, it has been said that “in many cases, the most important moment in an asylum case is the instant in which a clerk randomly assigns an application to a particular asylum officer or immigration judge”.[83] Scholarship from Europe notes a relationship where the number of xenophobic attacks in a region leads to lower recognition rates in the following year, suggesting that for case officers the “preferences and moods that prevail in their land guide their decisions.”[84] In Canada, academic studies point to variations in refugee claim approvals and rejections by individual decision-makers at the RPD for cases that have similar facts and relate to the same country of origin.[85] Professor Sean Rehaag states that there is an extent to which inconsistency is a necessary corollary of independence, writing that "while the independence of Board members offers important protections against inappropriate government interference in refugee adjudication, this independence sometimes makes it difficult for the IRB to achieve another key policy objective: consistency across refugee determinations made by different Board members".[85] Yet, that said, research by scholars focused on variation within RSD regimes confirms that the Canadian RSD regime has lower levels of variation by individual decision makers than other regimes.[86]

That said, the importance of consistency does not mean that the courts will intervene in the Board’s operations for this reason alone; the general rule is that unlike judges, tribunal members are free, as far as the law is concerned, not to follow previous decisions of their tribunal colleagues even if the previous decisions cannot be distinguished.[87] This was recognized in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1993 decision Domtar v. Québec, where it held that the fact that two tribunal decisions are in direct conflict with one another does not render either one of them necessarily reviewable by the courts.[88] That said, in order for their decision to be reasonable, it may be incumbent upon a Member to show that they have turned their mind to any other decisions that have been brought to their attention. As the Supreme Court of Canada articulated in Canada v. Vavilov, to promote “general consistency”, any administrative body that departs from its own past decisions typically “bears the justificatory burden of explaining that departure in its reasons”.[89] In choosing to follow, or distinguish, another decision, a Board Member may consider factors such as whether the decisions materially differ in the facts, a different question was asked in the other decision, the other decision is clearly wrong, or the application of the other decision would create an injustice.[90]

Parties are entitled to reasoned decisions

Parties are entitled to reasoned decisions on applications they make to the Board.[91] Whether or not those decisions must be in writing or may be provided orally is governed by specific provisions of the IRPA; see the commentary to section 169 of the Act: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Decisions and Reasons. The requirement to provide reasons when an application is made applies equally to refugee claims, applications by the Minister, as well as to preliminary matters that raised by either party. The requirement to provide reasons for a decision is a fundamental part of due process. It ensures that the inquiry processes is meaningful and assures the applicant that his representations have been given due consideration and a decision was taken on the factual and legal merits of their application.[92]

This principle was illustrated by Goodman v. Canada, in which Mr. Goodman asked that his PRRA application be held in abeyance pending the determination of his outstanding application for Ministerial relief. Counsel asked the Officer to respond to the request for a deferral and, if it was refused, to allow an additional 30 days from the date of the CIC’s response in order to provide updated submissions and materials. The Officer never responded to these requests and then went on to render a negative decision. The court held that this was an error and that a response to the application should have been provided.[93] Similarly, in Naeem v. Canada, the court concluded that the applicant was denied fairness by not receiving a decision in response to a deferral request.[94]

A panel must make a decision based on evidence on the record or evidence that is otherwise available to them

The Board must not ignore evidence that is validly before a panel

The Board has a duty to receive and consider evidence submitted by the parties at any time until a decision is rendered (Rule 43).[95] If the Board fails to do so, for example where evidence is submitted but does not reach the panel deciding the case, then the procedure cannot be said to have been fair. That said, a decision-maker is entitled to limit repetitive testimony and to not allow testimony that is not central to the claim.[96] Furthermore, while there may be valid grounds for a panel to refuse to admit evidence, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#The Board has jurisdiction to refuse to admit documents for reasons that are broader than the Rule 35 criteria, a panel cannot refuse to consider evidence without such valid grounds. Indeed, the Board Member must consider the entirety of the evidence in the record before making any determinations.[97] The Board Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings commits that "The RPD and RAD will consider the most recent NDP(s) in support of assessing forward-looking risk."[98] See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#The panel should consider the most recent National Documentation Package. That said, it is generally expected that a claimant will bring the passages that they are relying on to the attention of the decision maker; the Federal Court has held that the RPD "is not obliged to comb through every document listed in the National Document Package in the hope of finding passages that may support the claim and specifically address why they do not, in fact, support the claim". For more detail on this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate#There is a shared duty of fact-finding in refugee matters.

The Board's findings of fact should accurately reflect the evidence

Misapprehending evidence that may have impacted the outcome of a decision constitutes a reviewable error.[99] For an example of where this was not done, in Varga v. Canada the Federal Court concluded that "The RPD seriously misstates Ms. Varga’s evidence"[100] and overturned the decision on this basis as follows: "the RPD's serious misstatement of the evidence on a matter central to its Decision vitiates its whole credibility finding with regard to Ms. Varga".[101]

The Board must not rely on evidence that is not on the record or otherwise properly available to the Member

A panel of the Refugee Protection Division may only base a decision on evidence on the record, or evidence that is otherwise properly available to the Member, for example through their specialized knowledge, or because the evidence may be judicially noticed or is otherwise a generally recognized fact. Where a Member “fills in the gaps” in a refugee's account by making false assumptions, they err.[102] For a discussion of the rules and law related to specialized knowledge at the RPD, see the commentary to Rule 22: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Specialized Knowledge.

The Board's reasons should show that the panel meaningfully grappled with the key elements of the case

The Board should provide explicit findings and meaningful justifications of its decision regarding the central issues and concerns raised by the parties in a transparent and intelligible manner. See Gomes v. Canada for a discussion of this principle.[103] The Board Member must especially engage with evidence that, on its face, appears to contradict their key findings about the case.[104] In this way, the Board’s decision-makers do not generally have the freedom to be arbitrary but must provide reasons that are justified and intelligible. In the words of refugee lawyer David Matas, "reasons must be more than just stock phrases and conclusions. They should manifest reasoning. They should relate refugee law to the claim, deal with the substantial points raised, and relate the facts to the conclusion."[105]

Decisions must follow the law

Decisions must not be illegal.[106] For more detail, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#Principles about the manner in which the Board is to exercise its discretion.

Reasons should be sufficiently clear and provide a rational chain of reasoning

Reasons should be sufficiently clear on key points. For example, credibility determinations should be made in “clear and unmistakable terms”.[107] Furthermore, decisions must not be irrational.[108]

Decisions must be non-discriminatory

Decisions must not be discriminatory.[109] Section 3(3)(d) of the IRPA provides that the Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#IRPA Section 3(3)(d) - The Act is to be applied in a manner that complies with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For more detail, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution and Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#Principles about the manner in which the Board is to exercise its discretion.

References

  1. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 127.
  2. Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments, Natural justice and procedural fairness at OBSI, <https://www.obsi.ca/en/how-we-work/resources/Documents/Principles-of-Natural-Justice-in-Ombudsmanship.pdf> (Accessed April 27, 2020).
  3. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 127.
  4. 1 2 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 14 C.R.R. 13 (S.C.C.).
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  6. 1 2 3 Siba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1890, 229 F.T.R. 161 (F.C.T.D.).
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  25. Dubow-Noor v. Canada, 2017 FC 35, paras. 16-18.
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  33. Kane v Board of Governors of UBC, [1980] 1 SCR 1105 at 1114.
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  35. Gracielome v Canada (MEI), [1989] FCJ No. 463 (CA).
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  38. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Louis, 2009 FC 674 (CanLII), para. 23.
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  40. Isik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2011] F.C.J. No. 906, 2011 FC 718 (F.C.), paras. 14-15.
  41. Okwagbe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 816, 2012 FC 792 (F.C.).
  42. Figueroa c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2016 CF 521 au paragraphe 56.
  43. Ambroise c. Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2021 CF 62 (CanLII), par. 41, <https://canlii.ca/t/jcq6t#par41>, consulté le 2021-02-02.
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  45. Wysozki v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (F.C., No. IMM-4958-19), Strickland, March 31, 2020; 2020 FC 458, para. 38.
  46. Lawal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 861 at para 36.
  47. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 9.
  48. Kumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 2 F.C. 14.
  49. Ithibu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2001 FCT 288 (CanLII), [2001] F.C.J. No. 499.
  50. Kumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 2 F.C. 14, paras. 4 and 8.
  51. David J Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 3 as cited in Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 192.
  52. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 11.
  53. The terms of the Refugee Convention are to be interpreted pursuant to the principles set out at arts 31–32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Can TS 1980 No 37 as noted in Joshua Blum, When Law Forgets: Coherence and Memory in the Determination of Stateless Palestinian Refugee Claims in Canada, International Journal of Refugee Law, eeaa019, https://doi-org.peacepalace.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeaa019. For a discussion of the relationship between this Vienna Convention and the Refugee Convention, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies public international law rules of treaty interpretation applicable to the interpretation of the Refugee Convention.
  54. Uçaryılmaz, Talya. (2020). The Principle of Good Faith in Public International Law (El principio de buena fe en el Derecho internacional público). Estudios de Deusto. 68.43.10.18543/ed-68(1)-2020pp43-59 <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7483935> (Accessed July 25, 2020), page 15 of the article.
  55. Hankyoreh, S. Korean Justice Ministry offers 2nd chance to refugee applicants who were victims of false interview accounts, Apr. 21, 2020, <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/941396.html> (Accessed June 12, 2020).
  56. Sivaguru, [1992] 2 FC 374.
  57. Yahaya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1570 (CanLII), para. 37.
  58. Yahaya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1570 (CanLII), paras. 33-34.
  59. Chace Reveron v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1114 (CanLII), par. 34, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc7vh#par34>, retrieved on 2020-12-22.
  60. Kotelenets v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 209 at para 30.
  61. Wysozki v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (F.C., No. IMM-4958-19), Strickland, March 31, 2020; 2020 FC 458, para. 25.
  62. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Introduction to Chapter V, written by Hofmann & Löhr, at p. 1119 (para. 103).
  63. Momoh, S., van Eijken, H., & Ryngaert, C. (2020). Statelessness Determination Procedures. The Statelessness and Citizenship Review, 2(1), 86–111. Retrieved from https://statelessnessandcitizenshipreview.com/index.php/journal/article/view/137 at page 94.
  64. Rahal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319, para. 44.
  65. Mary Crock, Kate Bones, Daniel Ghezelbash, Jemma Hollonds and Mary Anne Kenny, Children and Young People in Asylum and Refugee Processes: Towards Best Practice, Published 18 May 2020, The Federation Press, ISBN 9781760022419, page 10.
  66. Morris, Julia (2020) "Refugee Extractivism: Law and the Mining of a Human Commodity in the Republic of Nauru," Saint Louis University Law Journal: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 5. Available at: <https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol64/iss1/5> (Accessed May 16, 2020), at page 84.
  67. Linda Hunt, Psychiatrists Identify ‘Asylum Seeker Syndrome’, WKLY. BULL. NO. 16 (Mental Health Council of Austl.), 2012, at 8, https://mhaustralia.org/sites/default/files/imported/+component/rsfiles/mhca-bulletin/2012/MHCA_Bulletin_16.pdf.
  68. Katrin Schock, Rita Rosner, and Christine Knaevelsrud, "Impact of Asylum Interviews on the Mental Health of Traumatized Asylum Seekers," European Journal of Psychotraumatology 6, no. 1 (2015).
  69. Jeon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1429 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/j3pd4>, retrieved on 2020-05-30
  70. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 35.
  71. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 33.
  72. Rodriguez Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 66 (CanLII), par. 10, <https://canlii.ca/t/jcq6v#par10>, retrieved on 2021-02-05.
  73. Rodriguez Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 66 (CanLII), par. 10, <https://canlii.ca/t/jcq6v#par10>, retrieved on 2021-02-05.
  74. Badal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 311 at para 25.
  75. Rodriguez Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 66 (CanLII), par. 11, <https://canlii.ca/t/jcq6v#par11>, retrieved on 2021-02-05.
  76. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 47, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par47>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.
  77. Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), 1993 CanLII 106 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756 at p. 800.
  78. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 22.
  79. John R Campbell, Examining Procedural Unfairness and Credibility Findings in the UK Asylum System, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 1, March 2020, Pages 56–75, https://doi-org.peacepalace.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/rsq/hdz017, page 73.
  80. Neil Yeates, Report of the Independent Review of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Government of Canada, April 10, 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/irb-report-en.pdf> (Accessed April 27, 2020), page 25.
  81. Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712
  82. David Matas, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 146.
  83. Former US Attorney General Robert Jackson during a speech in the US Congress in 1940, quoted in J. Ramji- Nogales, A. Schoenholtz, & P. G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stanford Law Review 295 (2007)
  84. Lisa Riedel & Gerald Schneider, “The Asylum Lottery: Recognition Rates Vary Strongly within Germany” (9 June 2017), online (blog): EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy <eumigrationlawblog.eu> [perma.cc/3UKQ-GW72].
  85. 1 2 Sean Rehaag of York University/Osgoode Hall writes on outcomes at the RPD and RAD suggesting divergent decision-making among individual decision makers. See, e.g., Rehaag, Sean. "Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication." Ottawa Law Review 39.2 (2008): 335-365.
  86. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 184.
  87. S. Ronald Ellis, The Corporate Responsibility of Tribunal Members, Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice, February 2009, 22 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 1, <http://www.ccat-ctac.org/CMFiles/Ron%20Ellis/21.TheCorporateResponsibilityofTribunalMembers.pdf#page15> (Accessed July 25, 2020), page 8.
  88. Domtar Inc. v. Québec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756 (S.C.C.) at para. 93.
  89. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), paras. 129-131, <http://canlii.ca/t/j46kb#par129>, retrieved on 2020-08-08.
  90. Alyafi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952 at para 45.
  91. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Introduction to Chapter V, written by Hofmann & Löhr, at p. 1120 (para. 108).
  92. E Macharia-Mokobi, J Pfumorodze, Advancing refugee protection in Botswana through improved refugee status determination, African Human Rights Law Journal 13 (1), 01-26, <http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S1996-20962013000100008&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es> (Accessed February 5, 2021), page 170.
  93. Goodman, Joseph John v. M.P.S.E.P. (F.C. nos. IMM-686-16, IMM-1508-18, IMM-1633-15, IMM-4246-16), Barnes, December 9, 2019; 2019 FC 1569.
  94. Naeem v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1073, ACWS (3d) 382.
  95. Mannan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 144 (CanLII), para. 45.
  96. Almoqaiad, Saosan Khalil I., v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-684-19), Favel, January 29, 2020; 2020 FC 160.
  97. Tung v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ No 292, 124 NR 388 (FCA).
  98. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings, Effective date: June 5, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/national-documentation-packages.aspx> (Accessed August 30, 2020).
  99. Tamayo Valencia v Canada, 2018 FC 1013.
  100. Varga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 102 (CanLII), par. 81, <http://canlii.ca/t/j4tz1#par81>, retrieved on 2020-12-22.
  101. Varga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 102 (CanLII), par. 82, <http://canlii.ca/t/j4tz1#par82>, retrieved on 2020-12-22.
  102. E. Dowd, J. Hunter, B. Liddell, J. McAdam, A. Nickerson & R. Bryant, “Filling Gaps and Verifying Facts: Assumptions and Credibility Assessment in the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 30(1), 2018, 71–103.
  103. Gomes, Eloi Biquer Silva Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2283-19), Pamel, April 9, 2020; 2020 FC 506.
  104. Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No 1425 (FC).
  105. David Matas, Fairness in Refugee Determination, 1989 18-1 Manitoba Law Journal 71, 1989 CanLIIDocs 150, <https://canlii.ca/t/spb3>, retrieved on 2021-01-22, page 80.
  106. This point draws on the work of Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712 at page 17.
  107. Hilo v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ No 228 (CA).
  108. This point draws on the work of Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712 at page 17.
  109. This point draws on the work of Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712 at page 17.

The right to an unbiased decision-maker

The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members shall comply with all procedural fairness and natural justice requirements. Members are expected to approach each case with an open mind and, at all times, must be, and must be seen to be, impartial and objective."[1] IRB members also take an oath of office publicly and formally undertake to carry out their duties impartially.[2] A tribunal’s decision is liable to be set aside for bias if a reasonable person, properly informed of the facts and having thought the matter through in a practical manner, would conclude on a balance of probabilities that the decision maker was not impartial.[3] Furthermore, Board Members are required to be alert to any situation in which there may be a reasonable apprehension of bias and must disqualify themselves from sitting on the case in those circumstances; as provided by the Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Members shall disqualify themselves from any proceeding where they know or reasonably should know that, in the making of the decision, they would be in a conflict of interest, or that their participation may create a reasonable apprehension of bias. In such a case, they shall immediately inform their manager and provide the reason for their self-disqualification."[4] The following are some of the ways that this principle has emerged in refugee decision-making in Canada.

Allegations of an apprehension of bias must be raised at the earliest opportunity

A person alleging an apprehension of bias on the part of the decision-maker must raise it at the earliest opportunity to allow the decision-maker to recuse themselves, if necessary.[5] Failure to do so will generally amount to an implied waiver of the right to invoke bias in subsequent proceedings, such as an appeal or an application for judicial review.[5]

The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias

Members are bound by the Code of Conduct for Members of the IRB which has a section on bias stipulating that "Members shall conduct themselves in a manner that will not cast doubt on their ability to perform their duties objectively."[6] Most cases concerning bias relate do not involve actual bias being demonstrated (or admitted) but are instead cases where a party alleges that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists on the facts. The test for determining reasonable apprehension of bias is whether an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through, would conclude that the decision-maker, either consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. This well-established test originates from the case Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada.[7] As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, “The test for apprehension of bias takes into account the presumption of impartiality. A real likelihood of bias must be demonstrated.”[8] The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Wewaykum v. Canada: “The standard refers to an apprehension of bias that rests on serious grounds, in light of the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.”[9] The burden of proof where an allegation of bias is made is on the party making the allegation and “the threshold to be met is high.”[10]

In applying this test and deciding whether a panel’s conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, a holistic view of the proceeding should be taken. As the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a decision on this issue, it is normally necessary to examine the record in its entirety in order to assess whether a decision-maker’s conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.[11] Factors to assess when considering the record include:

  • Any relationship, past or present, between the decision-maker and the party/parties or those who may benefit from the decision;[12]
  • Whether or not a full and fair opportunity is provided to present arguments and evidence;[13]
  • Whether there is a pattern of decisions that suggests influences other than the applicable law and available evidence;
  • Statements or conduct that might indicate a predisposition on the part of the decision-maker;[14]
  • The tone and tenor of the decision-maker’s involvement in the hearing;[15] and
  • The institutional arrangements that pertain to the freedom and independence of the decision-maker.

Additional comment on each of these factors follows.

Factors that are commonly assessed when determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists in a given case

Any relationship, past or present, between the decision-maker and the party/parties or those who may benefit from the decision

The fact that the decision-maker has (or has had) a relationship with one of the parties who may benefit from the decision can mean, in appropriate cases, that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias regarding them presiding over the case.[12] The Code of Conduct for Members of the IRB also provides that "Members shall not, during the course of a proceeding, have any social contact with a party, counsel, witness, interpreter or other non-IRB participant, if such social contact may create a reasonable apprehension of bias." Furthermore, it stipulates that Members may only take part in outside activities that are not inconsistent or incompatible with their official duties and responsibilities, or that do not cast doubt on their ability to perform their duties objectively.[6] Members are also bound by the terms of the Conflict of Interest Act.[16]

The predecessor to the RPD at the IRB, the Refugee Status Advisor Committee, used to include members included from the Department of Immigration and the Department of External Affairs. All were part time, while also maintaining regular departmental responsibilities. This arrangement was criticized, and a report was issued in 1982 recommending that those affiliated with a department sever ties therewith during their time serving on the committee. The Minister of Employment and Immigration announced in 1982 that departmental appointees would be required to serve full time and be free of departmental responsibilities during the term of their appointment.[17]

The fact that a member of the Board previously worked for a party, whether it be a law firm appearing before the Board, CBSA, or IRCC does not automatically mean that the Member should not sit on cases where that organization is a party. In Ahumada v. Canada the Federal Court of Appeal considered this question. Specifically, they considered the following certified question: "would a reasonable apprehension of bias be created by the fact that a member of the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board is an employee on leave of absence from a position as an immigration officer in the Enforcement Branch of CIC?" They held that such a member should not be restricted from sitting on cases where the Minister intervenes:

The Minister's role in the refugee determination process is primarily oriented towards detecting and opposing claims that the Minister or her officials believe should not be allowed. Accordingly, cases holding that an employment relationship between a member of an adjudicative tribunal and a party may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias were in principle relevant. The suggestion that an employee of CIC would only be disqualified from sitting on a CRDD panel when the Minister intervened would enable the Minister to ensure the exclusion of the employee from the panel by exercising the power to intervene. To enable the Minister to so influence the composition of a panel would clearly compromise the CRDD's independence from CIC in a manner inconsistent with the scheme of the Act.[18]

That said, the ultimate holding in that case was that a reasonable apprehension of bias was made out where an appeals officer on temporary leave from the Branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada that advises the Minister on whether an intervention is appropriate and represents the Minister when the Minister does intervene in IRB proceedings became an IRB member.[18] That employee was obliged to resign from their employment with CIC if they wished to continue working as a decision-maker at the IRB.

Exposure to political and bilateral relations considerations

Decision-makers in refugee matters must not be beholden to any political or bilateral relations considerations. As Neil Yeates writes in his report on the Board, “decision makers must be able to hear cases in an environment within which their decisions are not seen to be fettered by external considerations, such as the foreign policy positions of the government of the day.”[19] The importance of an independent mechanism for asylum adjudication is illustrated when considering other countries’ systems that are said to be subject to the vicissitudes of politics and hence to “[leave] people seeking protection promised by international treaty to the whims of a politically responsive enforcement agency”.[20] Refugee lawyer David Matas recounts the example of Belgian refugee policy in the 1980s, wherein government authorities apparently had a tacit policy that Zairois were not to be recognized as refugees. He writes about the apparent basis for this policy as follows: “for political and economic reasons, Belgium does not want to incur the anger of the present regime governing Zaire, a former a Belgian colony. There remain substantial economic ties between Belgium and Zaire. The countries are on friendly terms politically. [Hence,] UNHCR representatives in Belgium presumed that Zairois were not bona fiderefugees.”[21]

Whether or not a full and fair opportunity is provided to present arguments and evidence

Questions about impartiality tend to come into play where a reviewing body is persuaded that the decision-maker has mistakenly come to a conclusion without giving due regard to the possibility that a full consideration of the evidence might lead to a different result, for example where a matter is pre-judged. Where parties are not provided a full and fair opportunity to present arguments and evidence, this may point towards a conclusion that the matter was pre-judged, and hence that there is a reasonable apprehension that the decision-maker did not approach the case impartially. The opposite is also true - evidence which indicates that the parties had such a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and provide submissions tends to indicate that the matter was not pre-judged and that it is not reasonable to apprehend bias in the circumstances.[13] For example, where over-intrusive questioning by a Board member, including "constant interruptions", amounts to a “hijacking” of the case and grossly interferes with the orderly presentation of a claimant's case, the panel may have interfered with a claimant's right to be heard and it may be concluded that the panel did not approach the case impartially.[22] For further discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a hearing and the right to be heard#Where a witness is interrupted while providing testimony, this may establish that their right to present oral testimony was interfered with.

Whether there is a pattern of decisions that suggests influences other than the applicable law and available evidence

A pattern of decisions that suggests influence other than the applicable law and available evidence may serve to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias in a particular case. That said, this is but one factor that should be assessed along with the totality of the evidence and caution is appropriate in drawing any conclusions of this sort:

Deciding against a claimant on an interlocutory matter does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable apprehension of bias

Niyonkuru v. Canada was a case in which the panel provided notice to the Minister that the claimant was possibly excluded from refugee protection. The claimant argued that, by adjourning the hearing to allow the Minister to intervene and present arguments regarding the applicant's possible exclusion, the panel had demonstrated bias and loss of impartiality. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is well settled that the mere fact that in an earlier proceeding a decision-maker rendered judgment against the party does not compromise his or her ability to be impartial.[23]

Statistics about a member's past refusal rate do not in and of themselves establish a reasonable apprehension of bias

No claimant (or, indeed, Minister's representative) has succeeded on bias motions based on statistics alone.[24] Fenanir v. Canada was a case in which the claimant noted that the average number of refugee claim refusals by the member hearing his matter (99%) was higher than the average of 45% for all of the other members.[25] The claimant submitted that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on this basis. The court held that the data filed did not in itself support a finding of bias. It noted that the data can be "explained by a certain number of factors which are unrelated to any bias".[26] The comments of Justice Zinn in Turoczi v. Canada are illustrative of the judicial approach to such applications:

Although the statistical data presented by the applicants may raise an eyebrow for some, the informed reasonable person, thinking the matter through, would demand to know much more, including:

•                     Were all of the figures, including, importantly, the weighted country origin averages, properly compiled?

•                     Did the RPD randomly assign cases within each country of origin?  If not, how did the RPD assign cases?

•                     Can factors affecting the randomness of case assignment be reliably adjusted for statistically?

•                     If so, what are the adjusted statistics, and what is their significance?

•                     If the RPD did randomly assign cases, what is the statistical significance of the Member’s rejection rate?

•                     Beyond the Member’s relative performance within the RPD, is there anything objective impugning the Member’s decisions (i.e. that suggests they are wrongly decided)?

•                     Accounting for appropriate factors (if that is possible), are the Member’s decisions more frequently quashed on judicial review than would be expected?

•                     Has the Member made recurring errors of a certain type, e.g. on credibility, state protection, etc., that bear a semblance to the impugned decision?

In short, the informed reasonable person, thinking the matter through, would demand a statistical analysis of this data by an expert based upon and having taken into consideration all of the various factors and circumstances that are unique to and impact on determinations of refugee claims before he or she would think it more likely than not that the decision-maker would not render a fair decision.[27]

Statements or conduct that might indicate a predisposition on the part of the decision-maker

A Board member must approach each case impartially. The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members shall comply with all procedural fairness and natural justice requirements. Members are expected to approach each case with an open mind and, at all times, must be, and must be seen to be, impartial and objective."[28] Statements or conduct that might indicate a predisposition on the part of the decision-maker may point towards a conclusion that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in a particular case.[14] For example, in Hernandez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) the court held that the Member seemed to have "a preconceived idea of the outcome of the case, ... cutting Ms. Hernandez's explanations short." The court concluded that counsel had aggressively dismissed justified objections from counsel regarding the member's questions and errors in the translation.[29] Similarly, issues can arise where a decision-maker has previously expressed strong views regarding a matter on which they must decide.[30]

That said, the inquisitorial nature of refugee hearings must be considered when interpreting this type of requirement. The Board's procedures should not be restricted to the judicial paradigm.[31] Refugee hearings are not adversarial; instead, the generally involve a panel of the Board appropriately investigating a particular case. In an inquisitorial proceeding, it is the role of the Member to investigate and/or probe factual matters.[32] This means that a member of the Board will have a more active role in the hearing than is common in other judicial contexts. As the Federal Court held in Gebreyesus v. Canada, raising or renewing the consideration of a potential issue based on evidence that arises during a hearing, without more, is simply an indicator that a panel is performing this appointed function, not that the panel is biased.[33] For a more fulsome discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate.

A Member rendering an oral decision at the end of the hearing is not, in and of itself, indicative of bias

A Member should approach a case impartially and not with an open mind. This does not mean that the Member is required to reserve their decision after a hearing and consider the case for days afterwards. In fact, Rule 10(8) provides that a Division member must render an oral decision and reasons for the decision at the hearing unless it is not practicable to do so. In Pajarillo v. Canada, the claimant argued that the RPD was biased against her because the member made up her mind to reject the Applicant’s claim prior to hearing. The sole basis for making this allegation against the member was that the member returned after a lunch break and proceeded to render a lengthy oral decision. The court rejected this argument, noting that the claimant had failed to establish that the facts or issues in the case were so substantial or complex it was not reasonably practicable to comply with Rule 10(8) of the RPD Rules. The court stated: "The mere fact that the RPD was able to draft a decision and render it orally shortly 50 minutes after the conclusion of the hearing does not prove bias. A review of the transcript of the hearing discloses that the RPD member took into account the Applicant’s testimony and counsel’s arguments in reaching her decision."[34] For more details about this rule, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 10 - Order of questioning in hearings, oral representations, oral decisions, limiting questioning.

The tone and tenor of the decision-maker’s involvement in the hearing

The tone and tenor of the decision-maker’s involvement in the hearing may be considered as part of a holistic assessment of whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in any particular case. A starting point, as noted in the text Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, is that particular latitude is given to tribunals to question where the matter is not adversarial, as with most refugee proceedings:

Extensive and "energetic" questioning alone by tribunal members will not in itself give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. And particular latitude is likely to be given to tribunals operating in a non-adversarial setting, such as refugee determination hearings, where there is no one appearing to oppose the claim. Nor will an expression of momentary impatience or loss of equanimity by a tribunal member result in disqualification, particularly where it was merely an attempt to control the manner of proceeding. Similarly, a sarcastic comment when a party refused to give evidence, or an ill-chosen and insensitive phrase, will not, without more, lead to disqualification.[35]

A summary of the law on this point may be found in Mahmoud v Canada:

… intrusive and intimidating interventions by a Board member may be found to interfere with an applicant's ability to present his case. However, if the interruptions are made for the purpose of clarifying testimony or an issue, they will not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, even if the manner of questioning or interruption is "energetic".[36]

However, there are limits on this latitude, including in the types of circumstances that follow.

Where a member pursues questioning with a discriminatory attitude

The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members shall exercise their duties without discrimination."[37] The Federal Court affirms that a member may not pursue questioning derived from a discriminatory attitude.[38] Members must exhibit appropriate sensitivity and the Federal Court holds that the member must at all times be attentive and sensitive to claimants.[39] UNHCR writes in their document on Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination that "RSD applications must be processed on a non-discriminatory basis".[40] In Baker v. Canada, for example, an apprehension of bias was found to have arisen from the stereotypical assumptions about persons suffering from mental illness in the officer's notes.[41] Relatedly, the Federal Court holds that it is an error for IRB adjudicators to make inferences based on stereotypes.[42] For additional commentary on this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The objectives and purposes of the refugee regime and how they relate to refugee procedure#IRPA Section 2(c) - Fair consideration is to be granted to those who come to Canada claiming persecution.

Where a member pursues questioning with a hostile or antagonistic attitude, or where the member takes on the role of a prosecutor

The Refugee Appeal Division has held that "constant interruption" and "flagrant intervention in the presentation of a claimant’s case" can amount to procedural unfairness.[43] International standards recommend that state officials adopt a collaborative, non-adversarial approach in investigating a person’s claim.[44] The Federal Court has held that a member may not pursue questioning derived from a hostile attitude.[38] For example, as Waldman puts it in his text Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, if, during the course of the hearing, the tribunal “descends into the arena” to such an extent that the decision-maker assumes the role of a prosecutor, they risk of losing their impartiality.[15] Furthermore, where hearings are hostile or confrontational, claimants may be discouraged from providing information that may be crucial to their claim.[45] For additional detail about the appropriate limits of a Board member's questioning in this inquisitorial process, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate and also the following discussion of limits on questions that the Board may pose: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a fair hearing#Members are expected to act in good faith and are precluded from "setting traps" for claimants.

A passive or distant countenance is not required of Board members

It may be noted that it is common for government officials conducting asylum interviews to have a passive and distanced countenance during hearings. For example, in one empirical study of Finish asylum officers, the researchers noted that the officers did not detectably react to the claimants’ narrations of events. The researchers stated that although an officer may think that a passive and distanced attitude guarantees neutrality, from a claimant’s perspective it can be interpreted as negative feedback. They argue that:

Traumatised individuals are prone to feel threatened and perceive the other’s intentions as intimidating, unless they receive clear and constant messages of the safety of a situation. A successful narration of traumatic events, for instance, is known to require a safe atmosphere characterized by a feeling of being connected to another person. [citations omitted][46]

Indeed, the legal academic Hathaway has gone as far as to say that “the maintenance of 'judicial distance' is for some members a convenient way of concealing a tendency to cynicism and negativism.”[47] As such international guidelines, such as those from the EU, prescribe that asylum interviews should be marked by trust, respect, and empathy.[48] The Member may consider this advice in order to have an appropriately trauma-informed approach to hearings. Indeed, the Refugee Appeal Division has held that "insensitivity to the claimant’s particular situation and disinterest in the claim" can constitute procedural unfairness.[43] Conversely, the fact that a Member is engaged and may be encouraging a claimant's testimony should not be taken as the Member having accepted the credibility of that testimony, lest it leave Members with the impression that only a detached demeanour is permissible.

The institutional arrangements that pertain to the freedom and independence of the decision-maker

Institutional bias

Decisions are liable to be set aside for bias if a reasonable person would conclude, a balance of probabilities, that the decision-maker was not impartial.[49] Institutional bias is found if such a reasonable apprehension exists in a substantial number of cases.[50]

In Weerasinge v. Canada the Federal Court of Appeal considered whether Members of the Board having their reasons reviewed by a legal advisor created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court rejected this argument, commenting as follows:

The Refugee Division consists of such number of full and part-time members as the Governor in Council may decide. They are appointed for terms of up to seven years. A minimum of one-tenth are required to be barristers or advocates of at least five years' standing. It would be pure coincidence if either member of a panel hearing a particular claim were legally qualified.

The Refugee Division is a lay tribunal required to decide claims which, as I have observed, involve the life, liberty and security of the person. It must do so within the framework of extensive, confusing, and sometimes confused, jurisprudence. It is required to give written reasons for decision not favourable to claimants. The desirability of legal review of those reasons is manifest. Having come to a decision on what is essentially a question of fact: whether the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason that engages the Convention refugee definition, a tribunal does not, in my opinion, offend any tenet of natural justice by taking advice as to legal matters contained in its reasons.

While the reasons review process, both in the more limited format described in the memorandum and the full review format suggested, could be abused and result in the reviewing lawyers influencing the decisions to which the reasons relate, there is, in my opinion, simply no foundation for a conclusion that it has been, in fact, abused, either in the case before us or generally. Any consultation by a decision maker before publishing a decision, including consultation by a judge with a law clerk, could be abused. As to whether there is an appearance offensive to our notions of natural justice, it seems to me that the question to be asked is, as in dealing with an assertion of a reasonable apprehension of bias, namely, whether an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought it through, would think it more likely than not that the tribunal's decision that a claimant was, or was not, a Convention refugee had been influenced by the review of its reasons by its staff lawyers. In my opinion, that person would not think it likely.[51]

Furthermore, to the extent that members of the tribunal receive legal advice, legal advisors are not to attempt to influence the factual findings, but may have access to the facts and files of the claims in question and offer legal advice in relation to them: Bovbel v. Canada.[52] That said, the interpretation of these questions is fraught and the relevant principles are, in the mind of this author, far from clear. This is illustrated by the fact that in Bovbel v. Canada the Federal Court had initially found that the IRB process was problematic,[53] only for this conclusion to be overturned on appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal. For further discussion of legal review, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an independent decision-maker#Legal services review of decisions may discuss issues of fact in the reasons but should not attempt to influence factual findings.

References

  1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 29.
  2. Oath or Solemn Affirmation of Office Rules (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada), s. 1.
  3. Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at page 394.
  4. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 30.
  5. 1 2 Keita v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1115 at para 29, as cited in Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 196.
  6. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed April 22, 2020).
  7. Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369.
  8. Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, 1999 CanLII 641 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851 at para. 2.
  9. Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259 at para. 76.
  10. Alcina Rodriguez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC  995 (CanLII), para. 35.
  11. Hazelton Lanes Inc. v. 1707590 Ontario Limited, 2014 ONCA 793, 326 OAC 301.
  12. 1 2 Langstaff v. Marson, 2014 ONCA 510.
  13. 1 2 Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25.
  14. 1 2 Hughes, J., & Bryden, P. (2017). Implications of Case Management and Active Adjudication for Judicial Disqualification. Alberta Law Review, 54(4). https://doi.org/10.29173/alr780 at page 855.
  15. 1 2 Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law Practice (2018), page 59.
  16. Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2.
  17. David Matas, Fairness in Refugee Determination, 1989 18-1 Manitoba Law Journal 71, 1989 CanLIIDocs 150, <https://canlii.ca/t/spb3>, retrieved on 2021-01-24, page 95.
  18. 1 2 Ahumada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 97 (CanLII), [2001] 3 FC 605.
  19. Neil Yeates, Report of the Independent Review of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Government of Canada, April 10, 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/irb-report-en.pdf> (Accessed April 27, 2020), page 25.
  20. Sweeney, Maureen. (2019). “Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases.” Administrative Law Review, Volume 71, Issue 1, Page 127.
  21. David Matas with Ilana Simon, Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection, Summerhill Press Ltd., Toronto, 1989, ISBN 0-920197-81-7, page 246.
  22. Reginald v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 741, 22 Imm. L.R. (3d) 60 (F.C.T.D.).
  23. Niyonkuru v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 174 (CanLII), para. 19.
  24. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 927.
  25. Fenanir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 150 (CanLII), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/1mrgt#par9>, retrieved on 2020-02-08.
  26. Fenanir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 150 (CanLII), par. 17, <http://canlii.ca/t/1mrgt#par17>, retrieved on 2020-02-08.
  27. Turoczi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1423 (CanLII), par. 15, <http://canlii.ca/t/fvb4c#par15>, retrieved on 2020-12-19.
  28. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 29.
  29. Hernandez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 179, as cited in Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 197.
  30. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 198.
  31. Kozak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124 (CanLII), [2006] 4 FCR 377, para. 56.
  32. Cheon v Altern Properties Inc, 2015 SKQB 23, 468 Sask R 13 at para 31.
  33. Gebreyesus v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 966 (CanLII), paras. 22-23.
  34. Pajarillo, Donna Parcasio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3740-19), Lafreniere, December 20, 2019; 2019 FC 1654.
  35. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (Brown and Evans, Toronto : Canvasback Publishing, 1998) at pages 11-31 and 11-32.
  36. Mahmoud v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1308 at para 10.
  37. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 10.
  38. 1 2 Mahendran, (1991) 14 Imm. LR (2d) 30.
  39. Hernandez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 199, 2010 FC 179 (F.C.), para. 54.
  40. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate, 26 August 2020, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e870b254.html [accessed 5 September 2020], page 15.
  41. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 as cited in Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 196.
  42. Lekaj v Canada􏰬􏰏􏰏􏰉􏰖􏰍􏰋􏰅􏰉􏰁􏰂􏰣, 2006 FC 909 at para 17.
  43. 1 2 X (Re), 2020 CanLII 101262 (CA IRB), par. 17, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc75m#par17>, retrieved on 2020-12-21.
  44. Mariana Olaizola Rosenblat et al, Good Practices in Nationality Laws for the Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness: Handbook for Parliamentarians No 29 (Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNHCR 2018) 21.
  45. H. Crawley, “‘No One Gives You a Chance to Say What You Are Thinking’: Finding Space for Children’s Agency in the UK Asylum System”, Area, 42(2), 2010, 162–169.
  46. Eeva Puumala, Riitta Ylikomi & Hanna-Leena Ristimäki, Giving an account of persecution: The dynamic formation of asylum narratives, Journal of Refugee Studies 31(2), pp. 197-215 (2018) <https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/31/2/197/4158632> (Accessed February 10, 2020), at page 18.
  47. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: a report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, 01/12/1993 <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:1136> (Accessed April 14, 2020), page 20 of the printed report.
  48. Jessy Carton, Beyond Persecution: Exploring alternative refugee narratives in Jenny Erpenbeck, DiGeSt Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, Volume 7, Issue 1, <https://www.digest.ugent.be/article/download/16509/13986> (Accessed June 20, 2020), page 25.
  49. Restrepo Benitez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 461 at para 6.
  50. R v Lippé, 1990 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 114.
  51. Weerasinge v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 2996 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 330.
  52. Bovbel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1994 CanLII 3465 (FCA), [1994] 2 FC 563
  53. Bovbel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3016 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 340.

The right to an independent decision-maker

Parties are entitled to an independent decision maker.[1] A key concern with issues of independence is that a decision maker must approach and determine the matters in issue freely and in a sufficiently dispassionate and disinterested way. The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada stipulates that "Members shall not be influenced by extraneous or improper considerations in their decision-making. Members shall make their decisions free from the improper influence of other persons, institutions, interest groups or the political process."[2] Key issues related to independence include those following.

The right to an independent decision-maker

The requirement that decisions in refugee matters be made (or be reviewable) by an independent decision-maker arises from Canada’s international obligations; the UN Human Rights Committee has found, in Alzery v Sweden, that effective, independent review of the decision to expel prior to expulsion is necessitated by the nature of the non-refoulement obligation under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as read with the right to effective remedies under article 2 of that instrument.[3]

Decision-makers must be free of any reasonable apprehension of bias

For a discussion of the doctrine of bias, or a reasonable apprehension thereof, as it relates to any relationship, past or present, between the decision-maker and the party/parties or those who may benefit from the decision, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an unbiased decision-maker#Any relationship, past or present, between the decision-maker and the party/parties or those who may benefit from the decision.

Internal discussions between tribunal members on process, law, and policy are encouraged

A key issue that arises with respect to independence is the extent of permitted discussions amongst members of the tribunal about a case that is under consideration. The leading case on this subject is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in I.W.A. v. Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd.[4] The rules on this subject allow for a broad latitude for internal discussions, within an atmosphere that has been referred to as “assertive collegiality”, provided that the final decision-maker is unencumbered in freely making their own decision. The principles are well captured by this passage from the paper Consistency in Tribunal Decision Making from the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice:

This culture of ongoing discussion can be described as a system of “assertive collegiality”—where there can be vigorous debate internally within the complement of adjudicators, but once the discussion is complete, the person hearing the case is free to make their own decision. Discussions also occur regularly between tribunal Chairs and individual adjudicators at any stage in the hearing process. For example, particular types of cases which raise significant or novel issues may be flagged at the intake stage. Once identified, they are brought to the attention of the Chair who will then choose a particular adjudicator to deal with the case. The Chair may have a discussion with the adjudicator before the assignment is made in order to canvass the procedural, law and policy issues that might be presented in the case. During the course of the hearing, the adjudicator and the Chair may continue the discussion, so that the adjudicator understands the issues in the context of the tribunal’s institutional views. Once the hearing is completed, the Chair and the adjudicator may then continue their discussion throughout the decision writing process.[5]

It is entirely permissible, and even desirable for reasons of training and consistency, for members to be encouraged to distribute draft decisions amongst each other for comment: “Most tribunals schedule regular meetings for more formal discussions and it is not unusual where adjudicators are primarily full time and based in one location for there to be weekly or in some cases, daily meetings where drafts are exchanged and where issues of process, law and policy are discussed.”[5] In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, the “criteria for independence are not absence of influence but rather the freedom to decide according to one’s own conscience and opinions”[6]

Discussions of policy in the context of refugee adjudication may, and indeed should, cover consideration of country conditions. As the Federal Court of Appeal notes when distinguishing the type of factual findings at issue in Consolidated Bathurst, supra, factual issues in refugee adjudication can be of a "special nature to the extent that they go beyond the evidence specific to any particular claimant."[7] As the Federal Court noted in Barrantes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), “it would not do to have one panel member’s terrorist organization be characterized by another member as a benevolent non-government organization”.[8] As such, in the context of refugee adjudication, discussions between tribunal members on general issues of fact related to a country are not just permissible, but desirable.

Discussions cannot be imposed upon a Member

Consolidated-Bathurst involved discussions by members of an administrative tribunal after hearing cases but before reaching final decisions. For the majority, Gonthier J. okayed the practice, but imposed important limitations. In short, discussions could not be coercive and could not delve into the facts of particular cases.[9] The rules for such discussions are enumerated in the eponymous case.[10] The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this conclusion in Tremblay v. Quebec: “In my view, the mere fact that the president can of his own motion refer a matter for plenary discussion may in itself be a constraint on decision makers. In such circumstances, they may not feel free to refuse to submit a question to the "consensus table" when the president suggests this. Further, the statute clearly provides that it is the decision makers who must decide a matter. Accordingly, it is those decision makers who must retain the right to initiate consultation; imposing it on them amounts to an act of compulsion towards them and a denial of the choice expressly made by the legislature.”[11] As such, where a Member does not wish to consult, either with other members, a supervisor, or legal services, it must be truly free to do so (aside from during special circumstances such as during an initial probationary training period).

Gonthier J. of the Supreme Court of Canada made the following comment (in dissent) in Consolidated-Bathurst:

The determination and assessment of facts are delicate tasks which turn on the credibility of the witness and an overall evaluation of the relevancy of all the information presented as evidence. As a general rule, these tasks cannot be properly performed by persons who have not heard all the evidence and the rules of natural justice do not allow such persons to vote on the result. Their participation in discussions dealing with such factual issues is less problematic when there is no participation in the final decision. However, I am of the view that generally such discussions constitute a breach of the rules of natural justice because they allow persons other than the parties to make representations on factual issues when they have not heard the evidence [emphasis added][10]

The applicability of this comment to the refugee context was considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in Bovbel v. Canada. Specifically, in that case, the court considered whether having legal advisors have access to the files of refugee claimants when providing legal advice to Members, the above principle could be offended. The court rejected this concern as follows:

A fair reading of the documents on the record shows, in our view, that the legal advisors were not expected to discuss the findings of facts made by the members but merely, if there was a factual inconsistency in the reasons, to look at the file in order to determine, if possible, how the inconsistency could be resolved. True, there was always the possibility that the legal advisors might, since they were in possession of the file, exceed their mandate and try to influence the factual findings of the Board. However, as mentioned by Mahoney J.A. in Weerasinge, any policy is susceptible of abuse.[12]

As such, discussions, whether with the Board's legal services team, or otherwise, should not aim to influence the factual findings of Members, but need not eschew all discussion of facts, for example where a Member has made inconsistent factual findings in a decision and that concern should be resolved. Procedural fairness does not demand that Members of the Board never discuss the facts of a file. That said, it is plain that a mandatory policy of legal review in which legal services members attempted to influence or pressure Members to make certain factual findings regarding a hearing that they had never observed would offend principles of independence. Finally, there appears to be a real lack of clarity on exactly how to interpret the statements of Gonthier J. in Consolidated-Bathurst.[10] For example, David Mullan writes in his text Administrative Law that "on the mater of discussion of the evidence, the Court itself is not totally unequivocal even in the context of discussions with colleagues who have not heard the evidence. Where staff have been present at giving of the relevant testimony or where the evidence is written rather than given orally, the constraint on discussion may not have quite the same force."[13]

The IRB may use "soft law" instruments such as policy statements, guidelines, manual, and handbooks

The Federal Court of Appeal holds that administrative agencies do not require an express grant of statutory authority in order to use “soft law” such as policy statements, guidelines, manuals and handbooks to structure the exercise of their discretion.[14] The IRPA also provides an express grant of authority to the Chairperson to issue jurisprudential guides. See the discussion of this authority at the commentary on section 159 of the IRPA: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Duties of Chairperson.

A panel of the Board may not fetter its discretion

Attention paid exclusively to policy statements and other extraneous materials for the purpose of exercising one’s discretion may be an error. This sometimes is called “fettering discretion”.[15] The fettering of discretion doctrine has been used primarily to assess the validity of policy instruments such as guidelines.[16] The fact that a guideline is intended to establish how discretion will normally be exercised is not enough to make it an unlawful fetter, as long as it does not preclude the possibility that the decision maker may deviate from normal practice in the light of particular facts.[17]

A separate, but related, issue can arise where one RPD panel relies upon fact-finding conducted by another panel. Generally speaking, one panel of the RPD can rely on fact-finding conducted by another.[18] This usually occurs uncontroversially in the context of documentary evidence about conditions in the country in question. That said, the Federal Court cautions that a panel cannot “blindly” or “blithely” adopt another panel’s findings and that “reliance on the findings of another panel must be limited, careful and justified”.[19] For further discussion of this, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing#Each claim should be considered individually.

Informal discussions between Members are permissible so long as independence is maintained

A question can arise about the permissible limits of voluntary and informal discussions amongst Members of a tribunal about the issues raised in their files. As Mullan notes in his text, "the case law on the subject is surprisingly far from comprehensive".[13] The Ontario Court of Appeal held that there is no bar on a tribunal member consulting and being influenced by those internal consultations in Khan v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of Ontario:

The volume and complexity of modern decision-making all but necessitates resort to "outside" sources during the drafting process. Contemporary reason-writing is very much a consultive process during which the writer of the reasons resorts to many sources, including persons not charged with the responsibility of deciding the matter, in formulating his or her reasons. It is inevitable that the author of the reasons will be influenced by some of these sources. To hold that any "outside" influence vitiates the validity of the proceedings or the decision reached is to insist on a degree of isolation which is not only totally unrealistic, but also destructive of effective reason-writing.

This is reinforced in the IRB context by section 13 of the Code of Conduct for Members which provides that "Members have a responsibility to perform their duties in a manner that fosters collegiality among members and with staff and to treat them with courtesy and respect. Members are expected to assist their colleagues through the respectful exchange of views, information and opinions."[20] There is no doubt that the participation of "outsiders" in the decision-making process of an administrative tribunal may sometimes cause problems. The decisions of the tribunal must, indeed, be rendered by those on whom Parliament has conferred power to decide and their decisions must, unless the relevant legislation impliedly or expressly provides otherwise, meet the requirements of natural justice. However, the court has held that "when the practice followed by members of an administrative tribunal does not violate natural justice and does not infringe on their ability to decide according to their opinion, even though it may influence that opinion, it cannot be criticized."[12] As such, there is no issue with the Board, for example, hiring mentors for new members who may work with those new members in order to assist with preparing for hearings and then assist post-hearing with reaching factual findings about the evidence heard. There is indeed a body of literature on such mentoring for adjudicators and its permissibility so long as it is carried out in a way that maintains the mentee's independence.[21] As well, it is permissible for other tribunal members, even a member's superiors such as the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the tribunal, to comment on a member's draft reasons as noted by the Federal Court of Appeal: "While the Acting Deputy Chairperson reviewed drafts of the member’s decision, under the IRPA, the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson are also members of the RAD and paragraph 159(1)(h) does not prohibit them from suggesting changes to a draft at a deliberative stage."[22]

Members will be seized of a matter in certain circumstances

As RAD Member Edward Bosveld noted in X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76391 (CA IRB), the tribunal may remain seized of a matter.[23] The fact that the tribunal is seized of a matter means that it remains in consideration of the matter. Once a superior court of record has heard evidence, it is seized of the case and no other judge may decide it.[24] However, this principle does not apply to a tribunal like the IRB, which maintains more flexibility than a court to proceed in an informal and expeditious manner: Manalang v. Canada.[25]

Deliberative Secrecy

The principle of deliberative secrecy prevents disclosure of how and why adjudicative decision-makers make their decisions. The "how and why" of decision-making are kept secret to protect the decision-maker and the decision-making process.[26]

Access to information rights under the Privacy Act do not apply to a Board Member's notes

The issue of how the principle of deliberative secrecy intersects with access to information rights under the federal Privacy Act was considered in Tunian v. Chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Board.[27] The Tunian family were refused refugee status. They applied pursuant to section 41 of the Privacy Act to receive the draft reasons and notes prepared by the member of the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB who made the decision determining that they were not Convention refugees. Section 41 of the Privacy Act gives the Court the jurisdiction to review instances in which an individual has been refused access to personal information. The Privacy Act provides individuals with a right of access to information about them where it is either in a "personal information bank" or under the "control" of a government institution. Access to the Member's notes was refused in this case on the basis that notes made by quasi-judicial decision-makers in the course of carrying out an independent adjudicative function are not in the control of the administrative tribunal but, rather, are in the control of the member themself. In this case, the court affirmed the decision Privacy Commissioner v. Labour Relations Board and held that the principles discussed therein apply to the Immigration and Refugee Board, particularly:

It is the duty and role of courts to ensure that administrative tribunals make their decisions in accordance with the rules of natural justice. ... As such, courts are called upon to warrant the fairness of the process. To do so the Court must ensure that the tribunal possesses the freedom to decide matters independently, as it sees fit, without interference from anyone at any time. In my view, regulated and systematic intrusions by outsiders into the thought process of a decision maker as it stands to be revealed by the hearing notes would impact negatively on the integrity of the decision-making process.[28]

Board Members are neither competent nor compellable witnesses as a result of the principle of deliberative secrecy

The rule protecting deliberative secrecy is an exclusionary rule. The rule operates to prohibit compelled testimony from judges about their deliberations. It also provides that judges are not competent to testify about their deliberations. That is because the purpose of the rule is not to protect judges’ personal interests, but rather “to ensure public confidence in an impartial and independent judicial system”: Kosko c. Bijimine.[29] Gascon J. stated in Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval that “[j]udges cannot of course choose to lift deliberative secrecy to explain the reasoning behind their conclusions whenever it suits them to do so.”[30] Among the broader rationales that have been offered for expanding the operation of the rule in this way is to prevent judges themselves from subsequently augmenting or qualifying their reasons, which offends the need for finality in judicial decision-making and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice.[31]

The applicability of this rule to Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board was considered in Ermina v. Canada.[32] In that case, the applicant’s refugee status had been vacated by a panel of the Board. At the hearing before the Board, the applicant had sought to elicit testimony from the chair of the panel that had originally granted her that status. The Board refused to hear such testimony, relying on the rule protecting deliberative secrecy. The applicant then tried to adduce an affidavit sworn by the former chair and containing the same information. The Board refused to receive that as well. On the ensuing application for judicial review, Tremblay-Lamer J. upheld the Board’s decisions in that regard, finding that the former chair was neither a compellable nor a competent witness. In that decision, justice Tremblay-Lamer explained that “[d]ecisions must be final and subject only to review in the ordinary channels.” In reaching that conclusion, she relied heavily on Agnew v. Ontario Association of Architects,[33] in which the Court elaborated on the rationale for extending the rule to administrative decision-makers:

The authorities do not make it clear whether this general rule applies equally to members of administrative tribunals. In logic, there is no reason why it should not. The mischief of penetrating the decision process of a tribunal member is exactly the same as the mischief of penetrating the decision process of a judge.

Apart from the practical consideration that tribunal members and judges would spend more time testifying about their decisions than making them, their compellability would be inconsistent with any system of finality of decisions. No decision and a fortiori no record, would be really final until the judge or tribunal member had been cross-examined about his decision. Instead of review by appeal or extraordinary remedy, a system would grow up of review by cross-examination.

In the case of a specialized tribunal representing different interests the mischief would be even greater because the process of discussion and compromise among different points of view would not work if stripped of its confidentiality.

It is not necessary to catalogue all the different forms of mischief that might result from the compellability of judges and tribunal members to testify about their decisions. It is sufficient to say that there is no reason in logic to distinguish between a judge and a member of the statutory tribunal under consideration here.

Board management cannot read a Member's emails without good reason

The IRB has stated that it supports the principle that access to an employee's e-mail without consent is justified only in extreme situations, for example in situations involving a criminal or security infraction, and only after proper authorization from senior management. As a result, a Member's emails will ordinarily be private and not readable by managers or others in the organization, absent exceptional circumstances and good reason to do so. The federal Privacy Commissioner chastised the IRB when it departed from this standard in one case.[34]

References

  1. Bourbonnais v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1754, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 529 at paras. 49-57, 267 F.T.R. 169.
  2. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 34.
  3. UN doc CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (10 November 2006).
  4. I.W.A. v. Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282.
  5. 1 2 Whitaker, Kevin, Consistency in Tribunal Decision Making: What Really Goes On Behind Closed Doors..., Essays in Adminitrative and Justice (2001-2007) <https://ciaj-icaj.ca/wp-content/uploads/documents/2016/09/pub2007-8.pdf?id=7973&1577812348> (Accessed January 18, 2020).
  6. Iwa v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., 1990 CanLII 132 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 282, para. 84.
  7. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 75, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par75>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.
  8. Barrantes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 518.
  9. Daly, Paul, Judges Talking to other Judges: Judicious Consultation?, Administrative Law Matters Blog <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/05/22/judges-talking-to-other-judges-judicious-consultation/> (Accessed January 19, 2020).
  10. 1 2 3 Iwa v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., 1990 CanLII 132 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 282.
  11. Tremblay v. Quebec (Commission des affaires sociales), 1992 CanLII 1135 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 952
  12. 1 2 Bovbel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1994 CanLII 3465 (FCA), [1994] 2 FC 563
  13. 1 2 Mullan, David, Administrative Law (Irwin Law), page 301.
  14. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 45, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par45>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.
  15. Stemijon Investments Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 299.
  16. Houle, F. (2008). Thamotharem and Guideline 7 of the IRB: Rethinking the Scope of the Fettering of Discretion Doctrine. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 25(2), 103-118. Retrieved from https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/26034, page 105.
  17. Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 198 (CanLII), [2008] 1 FCR 385, par. 78, <http://canlii.ca/t/1rmr4#par78>, retrieved on 2020-12-23.
  18. Rodriguez Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 66 (CanLII), par. 10, <https://canlii.ca/t/jcq6v#par10>, retrieved on 2021-02-05.
  19. Badal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 311 at para 25.
  20. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 13.
  21. Mackenzie, Ian, Mentoring for Adjudicators: The Need for Guidelines, Slaw: Canada's online legal magazine, July 6, 2016, <http://www.slaw.ca/2016/07/06/mentoring-for-adjudicators-the-need-for-guidelines/> (accessed January 18, 2020).
  22. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 98, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par98>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.
  23. X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76391 (CA IRB), <https://canlii.ca/t/g23dh>, retrieved on 2021-02-20.
  24. Demirtas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 2425 (FCA), [1993] 1 F.C. 602 (C.A.).
  25. Manalang v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 1368 (CanLII), [2008] 4 FCR 440, <https://canlii.ca/t/1vbp6>, retrieved on 2021-02-20.
  26. Summitt Energy Management Inc. v. Ontario Energy Board, 2012 ONSC 2753 (CanLII), as discussed in Cass, Fred D,; Thoms, Zoe, Deliberative Secrecy in the Context of Decision-Making by Administrative Tribunals, Advocates' Quarterly 44 Advoc. Q. (2015) <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/aqrty44&i=177>, page 169 (Accessed January 18, 2020).
  27. Tunian v. Chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Board, 2004 FC 849 (CanLII).
  28. Canada (Privacy Commissioner v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) (2000), 257 N.R. 66 (F.C.A.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 617 (C.A.) (QL)).
  29. Kosko c. Bijimine, 2006 QCCA 671 at para. 40.
  30. Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval, 2016 SCC 8, at para. 64.
  31. West Moberly First Nations v British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 1835 (CanLII), para. 159.
  32. Ermina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 1998 CanLII 8969 (FC), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 764 (F.C.).
  33. Agnew v. Ontario Association of Architects (1987), 1987 CanLII 4030 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (2d) 8 (Div. Ct.) at 14.
  34. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Inappropriate monitoring of employees' e-mail accounts, Date modified: 2003-01-29, <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-federal-institutions/2001-02/pa_200102_05/> (Accessed August 16, 2020).

Appropriate decorum and propriety at a refugee hearing

Decorum is defined as "behavior in keeping with good taste and propriety." What is proper decorum in the context of Refugee Protection Division hearings? A number of issues arise:

The claimant should be received and introduced to the hearing room by a Board staff member

Claimants should be properly received at the beginning of the hearing. The IRB commissioned a report on its use of videoconference and the resultant report stated that "From a justice system perspective, it seems to me wrong that claimants attending a hearing in which their future is to be decided by an adjudicator in what is effectively a judicial proceeding, should not be received in the hearing room at the outset by a real person with official status, who can address the claimants by name, confirm that they are in the right place, introduce them to the equipment, explain what to expect, and so on."[1] That report, which is published on the Board's website, identifies this as an important step in the creation of a receptive and comfortable hearing environment.

Proceedings will be recorded

Audio of refugee proceedings before the Board will, as a matter of course, be recorded. Indeed, there is some legal risk where the Board does not record the hearing: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Print version#The Board is not obliged to record hearings, but a lack of such a recording may constitute grounds for setting aside the decision. International law regarding refugee determination provides that States may record a refugee claimant's oral statements, but the claimant should be given due notice that this may be required.[2] Such notice is a common way to begin proceedings at the RPD, where the member will, as part of an introductory spiel, inform the claimant that they are now "on the record".

Proceedings are a mix of formal and informal

Section 162(2) provides that each Division must deal with proceedings as informally and quickly as circumstances permit, taking into account the requirements of fairness and natural justice. This provision implies that the Division is not bound by formal rules of procedure that would apply in a court or more formal quasi-judicial tribunal.[3] The Irwin Law text Refugee Law notes that "despite the Board's own description of its hearing process as 'informal,' the reality for claimants is that it is decidedly formal."[4] Similarly, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, in its report The Determination of Refugee Status in Canada: A Review of the Procedure states that "Hearings are conducted...in a fairly formal atmosphere, in a quasi-judicial context which many claimants appeared to find intimidating. This formality flows from both the setting and the behaviour of the participants. The hearing room is laid out like a court room, with a raised desk and high-back chairs for Members. The style of proceedings is typical of that for a quasi-judicial tribunal."[5]

In operation, a refugee hearing is not dissimilar to any other administrative hearing: the parties are present, witnesses are examined, and submissions are made.[4] Some of the expectations for conduct at such hearings follow:

The parties should stand whenever the Board Member enters or leaves the hearing room

The parties should stand whenever the Board Member enters or leaves the hearing room.[6]

Witnesses will swear or affirm to tell the truth and should put away notes while testifying

Evidence is typically presented in viva voce form at the hearing. Witnesses are sworn or affirmed and then questioned.[7] It is expected that witnesses, including claimants, will not have notes, their BOC form, or other paperwork in front of them while testifying. Such an expectation has generally been held to be compatible with a fair procedure.[8]

Attire appropriate for a formal hearing

The Board states that "attire should be appropriate for a formal hearing and in keeping with the atmosphere of the hearing room."[9]

References

  1. S. Ronald Ellis, Q.C., Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Published by Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Date October 21, 2004 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/Video.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
  2. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Introduction to Chapter V, written by Hofmann & Löhr, at p. 1119 (para. 102).
  3. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 201 of the PDF.
  4. 1 2 Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 297.
  5. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: A Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, December 1993, page 73.
  6. University of Ottawa Refugee Assistance Project, UORAP Hearing Preparation Kit, Guide 3: Preparing Evidence for your Hearing <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/hearing_preparation_kit.pdf>, page 21.
  7. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 302.
  8. Wysozki v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (F.C., No. IMM-4958-19), Strickland, March 31, 2020; 2020 FC 458.
  9. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Interpreter Handbook, December 2012, Government of Canada, online: Immigration and Refugee Board <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/interpreters/Pages/Interpret.aspx> (Accessed May 30, 2020).

Annotated Refugee Protection Division Rules

Interpretation and Definitions (Rule 1)

Rule 1

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Interpretation

Definitions
1 The following definitions apply in these Rules.

Act means the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (Loi)

Basis of Claim Form means the form in which a claimant gives the information referred to in Schedule 1. (Formulaire de fondement de la demande d’asile)

contact information means, with respect to a person,
(a) the person’s name, postal address and telephone number, and their fax number and email address, if any; and
(b) in the case of counsel for a claimant or protected person, if the counsel is a person referred to in any of paragraphs 91(2)(a) to (c) of the Act, in addition to the information referred to in paragraph (a), the name of the body of which the counsel is a member and the membership identification number issued to the counsel. (coordonnées)

Division means the Refugee Protection Division. (Section)

officer means a person designated as an officer by the Minister under subsection 6(1) of the Act. (agent)

party means,
(a) in the case of a claim for refugee protection, the claimant and, if the Minister intervenes in the claim, the Minister; and
(b) in the case of an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection, the protected person and the Minister. (partie)

proceeding includes a conference, an application or a hearing. (procédure)

registry office means a business office of the Division. (greffe)

Regulations means the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. (Règlement)

vulnerable person means a person who has been identified as vulnerable under the Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB issued under paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Act. (personne vulnérable)

working day does not include Saturdays, Sundays or other days on which the Board offices are closed. (jour ouvrable)

This should be read in conjunction with the definitions section in the Act

See the definitions section in the IRPA: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions, objectives, and application of the IRPA#IRPA Section 2.

Commentary on the definition of "proceeding"

History of the definition

Under the previous version of the Rules, the word "proceeding" was defined to include "a conference, an application, a hearing and an interview".[1]

Definition includes the listed elements, but is not limited to them

The definition of a proceeding in Rule 1 "includes" the listed procedures ("proceeding includes a conference, an application or a hearing"), but does not indicate that it is limited to them. The RPD Rules are subordinate to the Act, which in s. 170 contemplates a broad and expansive conception of what a Refugee Protection Division "proceeding" is, including that a file-review decision made without any hearing being held is something that happens in a proceeding (s. 170(f)) and that the Board's provision of notice of the hearing to the Minister is also something that happens in a proceeding (s. 170(c)). Furthermore, the court has commented that "proceedings" as used in section 167 of the Act encompass more than the actual hearing before the RPD.[1] Thus, subsection 168(1) allows a division to determine that "a proceeding" before it has been abandoned for such pre-hearing matters as failing to provide a Basis of Claim form or otherwise failing to communicate with the division as required. In Cui v. Canada the Federal Court commented on the term "proceeding" as it is used in the IRPA as follows:

A “proceeding” has been considered by Justice Tremblay-Lamer of this Court in Gagné v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 711 at paragraphs 27 and 28 where she adopted, inter alia, the definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary that a “proceeding” contemplates “the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and entry of judgment.” Thus a “proceeding” as contemplated by paragraph 166(c) of IRPA is not just the hearing but all that which occurs from the institution of the matter until its final disposition.[2]

See also the following discussion of why a Notice to Intervene is a document provided by the Minister "in a proceeding": Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Meaning_of_"proceeding"_in_this_rule

References

  1. 1 2 Duale v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 150 (CanLII), par. 5, <http://canlii.ca/t/1gcff#par5>, retrieved on 2020-01-27
  2. Cui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 945 (CanLII), par. 6, <http://canlii.ca/t/1t1sc#par6>, retrieved on 2020-08-16.

Communicating with the Division (Rule 2)

The Rule

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Communicating with Division

2 All communication with the Division must be directed to the registry office specified by the Division.

Commentary

The registry offices are specified on the IRB website, including in the Board's Claimant's Guide. The only registries are in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal. While the IRB has offices in other cities, such as Ottawa, Winnipeg, and Calgary, these offices do not have registries and are not registry officers "specified by the Division" to receive communications within the meaning of this rule.[1]

References

  1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant's Guide, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/Pages/ClaDemGuide.aspx> (Accessed April 14, 2020).

Information and Documents to be Provided (Rules 3-13)

It is said that at its heart, the refugee process is about storytelling. Lawyer Tess Acton writes that "stories permeate the Canadian refugee determination system. At the port of entry a claimant tells their story to the border official, in preparation for a hearing a refugee claimant tells their story to their lawyer, and during the hearing the refugee claimant tells their story to a Board Member. After the hearing the claimant’s story is re-told in the form of a decision authored by the Board Member. These stories are the most important part of a refugee claim, as refugees often come with little else in the way of evidence of persecution."[1] The set of rules described herein regulate, at a high level, the process by which claimants provide these stories to the Board.

Rule 3(1)-(3) - Fixing date, time and location of hearing

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Information and Documents to Be Provided

Claims for Refugee Protection

Fixing date, time and location of hearing
3 (1) As soon as a claim for refugee protection is referred to the Division, or as soon as possible before it is deemed to be referred under subsection 100(3) of the Act, an officer must fix a date, time and location for the claimant to attend a hearing on the claim, within the time limits set out in the Regulations, from the dates, times and locations provided by the Division.

Date fixed by officer
(2) Subject to paragraph 3(b), the officer must select the date closest to the last day of the applicable time limit set out in the Regulations, unless the claimant agrees to an earlier date.

Factors
(3) In fixing the date, time and location for the hearing, the officer must consider
(a) the claimant’s preference of location; and
(b) counsel’s availability, if the claimant has retained counsel at the time of referral and the officer has been informed that counsel will be available to attend a hearing on one of the dates provided by the Division.

Roles of officers, parties, and Board in scheduling matters

Responsibility for scheduling hearings before the Refugee Protection Division is multifaceted. As indicated by this rule, initial scheduling decisions are to be made by the IRCC or CBSA officer referring the claim. The parties to a proceeding then have the ability to request that the date and time of a claim be changed (Rule 54). The Board also has the power to act on its own motion in scheduling matters.

Rule 3(1): Regulation on mandatory timelines for scheduling claims

For the text of this regulation, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Timelines.

Rule 3(4)-(6) - Information an officer must provide to the claimant

Providing information to claimant in writing
(4) The officer must
(a) notify the claimant in writing by way of a notice to appear
    (i) of the date, time and location of the hearing of the claim; and
    (ii) of the date, time and location of any special hearing on the abandonment of the claim under subrules 65(2) and (3);
(b) unless the claimant has provided a completed Basis of Claim Form to the officer in accordance with subsection 99(3.1) of the Act, provide to the claimant the Basis of Claim Form; and
(c) provide to the claimant information in writing
    (i) explaining how and when to provide a Basis of Claim Form and other documents to the Division and to the Minister,
    (ii) informing the claimant of the importance of obtaining relevant documentary evidence without delay,
    (iii) explaining how the hearing will proceed,
    (iv) informing the claimant of the obligation to notify the Division and the Minister of the claimant’s contact information and any changes to that information,
    (v) informing the claimant that they may, at their own expense, be represented by legal or other counsel, and
    (vi) informing the claimant that the claim may be declared abandoned without further notice if the claimant fails to provide the completed Basis of Claim Form or fails to appear at the hearing.

Providing information in writing and documents to Division
(5) After providing to the claimant the information set out in subrule (4), the officer must without delay provide to the Division
(a) a written statement indicating how and when the information set out in subrule (4) was provided to the claimant;
(b) the completed Basis of Claim Form for a claimant referred to in subsection 99(3.1) of the Act;
(c) a copy of each notice to appear provided to the claimant in accordance with paragraph (4)(a);
(d) the information set out in Schedule 2;
(e) a copy of any identity and travel documents of the claimant that have been seized by the officer;
(f) a copy of the notice of seizure of any seized documents referred to in paragraph (e); and
(g) a copy of any other relevant documents that are in the possession of the officer.

Providing copies to claimant
(6) The officer must provide to the claimant a copy of any documents or information that the officer has provided to the Division under paragraphs (5)(d) to (g).

Right to counsel

Rule 3(4) states that an officer must notify a claimant in writing that they may be represented "by legal or other counsel". For a discussion of the right to counsel, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record.

Rule 4 - Claimant's contact information

Claimant’s contact information
4 (1) The claimant must provide their contact information in writing to the Division and to the Minister.

Time limit
(2) The claimant’s contact information must be received by the Division and the Minister no later than 10 days after the day on which the claimant receives the information provided by the officer under subrule 3(4).

Change to contact information
(3) If the claimant’s contact information changes, the claimant must without delay provide the changes in writing to the Division and to the Minister.

Information concerning claimant’s counsel
(4) A claimant who is represented by counsel must without delay, on retaining counsel, provide the counsel’s contact information in writing to the Division and to the Minister and notify them of any limitations on the counsel’s retainer. If that information changes, the claimant must without delay provide the changes in writing to the Division and to the Minister.

Rule 4(3): If the claimant's contact information changes, the claimant must without delay provide the changes in writing to the Division

Rule 4(3) provides that if a claimant's contact information changes, the claimant must without delay provide the changes in writing to the Division and to the Minister. As a result of this requirement, the Federal Court has declined to find a breach of procedural fairness where an applicant’s opportunity to be heard was lost because they failed to advise the RPD of their updated address and consequently did not receive notice of the hearing.[2] This rule places the obligation on the claimant to advise where they can be contacted. The RPD has no positive obligation to conduct extensive investigations to locate a party, to the extent of engaging the enforcement powers of the Canada Border Services Agency that might be used to locate a person for apprehension.[3] Furthermore, leaving a voicemail with the RPD is not sufficient to discharge a claimant's obligations under this rule, which explicitly requires that the claimant must provide the new contact information in writing.[4] For additional discussion of principles relevant to this, see the discussion of principles related to whether the claimant has been diligent in keeping the Board up to date with their current and correct contact information at Canadian Refugee Procedure/Abandonment#Rule 65(4) - Factors to consider at an abandonment hearing.

Rule 5 - Declaration where counsel is not acting for consideration

Declaration — counsel not representing or advising for consideration
5 If a claimant retains counsel who is not a person referred to in any of paragraphs 91(2)(a) to (c) of the Act, both the claimant and their counsel must without delay provide the information and declarations set out in Schedule 3 to the Division in writing.

Counsel may be representatives without fee who are not lawyers, paralegals, or immigration consultants

The Federal Court has observed that "Counsel need not be legally qualified and many are not; they are frequently friends, relatives, clergymen or immigration consultants. The latter are not always competent."[5] Rule 5 applies where a claimant retains counsel who is not a person referred to in any of paragraphs 91(2)(a) to (c) of the Act. Those provisions read, in context:

Representation or advice for consideration
91 (1) Subject to this section, no person shall knowingly, directly or indirectly, represent or advise a person for consideration — or offer to do so — in connection with the submission of an expression of interest under subsection 10.1(3) or a proceeding or application under this Act.

Persons who may represent or advise
(2) A person does not contravene subsection (1) if they are
(a) a lawyer who is a member in good standing of a law society of a province or a notary who is a member in good standing of the Chambre des notaires du Québec;
(b) any other member in good standing of a law society of a province or the Chambre des notaires du Québec, including a paralegal; or
(c) a member in good standing of a body designated under subsection (5).

...

Designation by Minister
(5) The Minister may, by regulation, designate a body whose members in good standing may represent or advise a person for consideration — or offer to do so — in connection with the submission of an expression of interest under subsection 10.1(3) or a proceeding or application under this Act.

The Rule provides that in that situation, both the claimant and their counsel must without delay provide the information and declarations set out in Schedule 3 to the Division in writing. That schedule reads as follows:

SCHEDULE 3
(Rules 5 and 13)

Information and Declarations — Counsel Not Representing or Advising for Consideration

Item	Information
1	IRB Division and file number with respect to the claimant or protected person.
2	Name of counsel who is representing or advising the claimant or protected person and who is not receiving consideration for those services.
3	Name of counsel’s firm or organization, if applicable, and counsel’s postal address, telephone number, fax number and email address, if any.
4	If applicable, a declaration, signed by the interpreter, that includes the interpreter’s name, the language and dialect, if any, interpreted and a statement that the interpretation is accurate.
5	Declaration signed by the claimant or protected person that the counsel who is representing or advising them is not receiving consideration and the information provided in the form is complete, true and correct.
6	Declaration signed by counsel that they are not receiving consideration for representing or advising the claimant or protected person and that the information provided in the form is complete, true and correct.

The declaration includes a statement that the counsel is not receiving consideration. This is discussed in the Board's Basis of Claim form which states that "The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act makes it an offence for any person not authorized under the Act to knowingly, directly or indirectly, represent or advise a person for consideration – or offer to do so – in connection with a proceeding or application under that Act. (Consideration includes money, or any other form of compensation or reward.)"[6] The Federal Court has noted that "there is a duty incumbent upon the Board to verify that those individuals representing clients with whom it has dealings are authorized representatives pursuant to the Regulations, or that they are not receiving a fee for their services."[7] The court articulated the rationale for this duty as follows: "This duty envisions the protection of applicants and the preservation of the integrity of Canada’s immigration system". This Rule is one of the ways that the Board fulfills that obligation.

Rule 6 - Basis of Claim Form

Basis of Claim Form

Claimant’s declarations
6 (1) The claimant must complete a Basis of Claim Form and sign and date the declaration set out in the form stating that
(a) the information given by the claimant is complete, true and correct; and
(b) the claimant understands that the declaration is of the same force and effect as if made under oath.

Form completed without interpreter
(2) If the claimant completes the Basis of Claim Form without an interpreter’s assistance, the claimant must sign and date the declaration set out in the form stating that they can read the language of the form and understand what information is requested.

Interpreter’s declaration
(3) If the claimant completes the Basis of Claim Form with an interpreter’s assistance, the interpreter must sign and date the declaration in the form stating that
(a) they are proficient in the language and dialect, if any, used, and were able to communicate effectively with the claimant;
(b) the completed Basis of Claim Form and all attached documents were interpreted to the claimant; and
(c) the claimant indicated that the claimant understood what was interpreted.

Requirement that the information provided be "complete, true and correct"

The Rule 6(1)(a) obligation to provide information that is "complete" should be read in conjunction with the instructions in the BOC form that claimants are to include everything that is important to their claims therein, including dates, names and places. Where a fact that is a "significant and central part of a claim" is omitted from the Basis of Claim form, then the Board can consider that when determining whether it has been established that the alleged incident more likely than not occurred; the omission may properly point away from the claimant have established the allegation on a balance of probabilities.[8] See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate#Evidence is primarily presented in written form in the Canadian process.

The obligation to provide information that is "complete, true and correct" in Rule 6(1)(a) tracks the following conclusion from the UNHCR Handbook: "The applicant should...Tell the truth and assist the examiner to the full in establishing the facts of his case." Furthermore, the Handbook provides that an applicant should "Supply all pertinent information concerning himself and his past experience in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. He should be asked to give a coherent explanation of all the reasons invoked in support of his application for refugee status and he should answer any questions put to him."[9] In the words of the Law Reform Commission of Canada’ report on the refugee determination process, “There is no place in such a process for adversary tactics of surprise. If the process is to work effectively, there must be full and frank disclosure by all parties concerned and all documents must be available in time to allow them to be reviewed prior to commencement of any hearing.”[10]

Providing exemptions to illiterate claimants

When this Rule was being drafted, the Board received feedback that illiterate claimants should be given flexibility in those situations in which the BoC Form is not filled out and signed as requested. The Board stated that as discretion rests with the Member to provide an exemption from the requirements of a rule when necessary, and after proper notice to parties, this comment did not necessitate a change in the rules.[11]

Rule 7 - Providing BOC Form

Providing Basis of Claim Form — inland claim
7 (1) A claimant referred to in subsection 99(3.1) of the Act must provide the original and a copy of the completed Basis of Claim Form to the officer referred to in rule 3.

Providing Basis of Claim Form — port of entry claim
(2) A claimant other than a claimant referred to in subsection 99(3.1) of the Act must provide the original and a copy of the completed Basis of Claim Form to the Division.

Documents to be attached
(3) The claimant must attach to the original and to the copy of the completed Basis of Claim Form a copy of their identity and travel documents, genuine or not, and a copy of any other relevant documents in their possession. The claimant does not have to attach a copy of a document that has been seized by an officer or provided to the Division by an officer.

Documents obtained after providing Basis of Claim Form
(4) If the claimant obtains an identity or travel document after the Division has received the completed Basis of Claim Form, they must provide two copies of the document to the Division without delay.

Providing Basis of Claim Form — port of entry claim
(5) The Basis of Claim Form provided under subrule (2) must be
(a) received by the Division within the time limit set out in the Regulations, and
(b) provided in any of the following ways:
(i) by hand,
(ii) by courier,
(iii) by fax if the document is no more than 20 pages long, unless the Division consents to receiving more than 20 pages, or
(iv) by email or other electronic means if the Division allows.

Original Basis of Claim Form
(6) A claimant who provides the Basis of Claim Form by fax must provide the original to the Division at the beginning of the hearing.

When a claimant must provide their BOC form

  • Port of Entry claimants: As per Rule 7(5)(a), for a Port of Entry claimant, their BOC must be submitted to the RPD within 15 days after referral per s. 159.8(2) of the Regulation.[12] However, for the duration of the Covid-19 pandemic, the RPD is temporarily extending the time limit for claims made on or after August 29, 2020. In these cases, the BOC form will now be due 45 days after the day on which the claim was referred to the RPD.[13]
  • Inland claimants: For inland claimants, their BOC must be submitted to IRCC at determination of eligibility, per s. 159.8(1) of the Regulation.
  • Detained claimants: CBSA has taken the position that individuals who initiate claims after being arrested or detained inland are required to complete all the forms, including the Basis of Claim form, within three working days. The basis for this interpretation appears to be the combination of IRPR s. 159.8(1) which says that a person who makes a claim for refugee protection inside Canada other than at a port of entry must provide an officer with the documents and information referred to in s. 99(3.1) not later than the day on which the officer determines the eligibility of their claim under IRPA s. 100(1). The RPD Rule 7 specifies that the Basis of Claim must be provided to the officer referred to in IRPA s. 99(3.1).[14]

See Canadian Refugee Procedure/Time Limit for Providing Documents for the full text of the relevant regulations.

Documents attached to the BOC form need not be translated at the time that they are attached

Rule 7(3) requires a claimant to attach to their BOC Form a copy of their identity and travel documents, genuine or not, and a copy of any other relevant documents in their possession. In this way, Rule 7(3) functions as one of the main RPD Rules that oblige the disclosure of documents (in comparison, other rules regarding the disclosure of documents generally provide a claimant with discretion about what documents they will provide, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What documents does a party need to provide when?). Such documents need not be translated in order for them to be accepted by the Board. This is because the rule on the language of documents, Rule 32 (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 32 - Language of Documents), only applies to documents that a claimant chooses to use in the proceeding: "All documents used by a claimant or protected person in a proceeding must be in English or French or, if in another language, be provided together with an English or French translation and a declaration signed by the translator." In this way, Rule 7(3) requires a claimant to provide all relevant documents in their possession at the time that they file their claim, but if a claimant wants to "use" such documents in the proceeding, then they will need to provide a translation of those documents prior to the hearing. Otherwise, the documents will be retained for the purposes of the record, but in an untranslated form, and will likely therefore be assigned limited or no weight. On the other hand, some untranslated documents such as original ID documents from a country may be assigned significant weight, especially where they can be authenticated or compared to sample documents available to the Board in the National Documentation Package or other sources. If these rules were interpreted any other way, for example to limit the ability of a claimant to provide documents such as their non-genuine ID documents where those ID documents are not accompanied by a translation, then it would frustrate the purpose of this disclosure obligation, which is clearly to ensure that the claimant provides, en masse, relevant documents at the earliest time so that the Minister can assess those documents as part of any investigation into the claimant, their credibility, and their identity. If the claimant were only obliged to submit documents for which they had secured a translation, then it would either frustrate the broad mandatory language of the rule ("must attach") or else it could potentially impose significant translation costs on refugee claimants who may not have the resources to pay for, or the ability to procure translations of, the documents (especially in the four Canadian provinces that provide no legal aid to refugee claimants whatsoever: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#Refugee-related services provided by provincial legal aid programs).

Rule 8 - Application for an extension of time to provide BOC Form

Application for extension of time
8 (1) A claimant who makes an application for an extension of time to provide the completed Basis of Claim Form must make the application in accordance with rule 50, but the claimant is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.

Time limit
(2) The application must be received by the Division no later than three working days before the expiry of the time limit set out in the Regulations.

Application for medical reasons
(3) If a claimant makes the application for medical reasons, other than those related to their counsel, they must provide, together with the application, a legible, recently dated medical certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner whose name and address are printed or stamped on the certificate. A claimant who has provided a copy of the certificate to the Division must provide the original document to the Division without delay.

Content of certificate
(4) The medical certificate must set out the particulars of the medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevent the claimant from providing the completed Basis of Claim Form in the time limit referred to in paragraph 7(5)(a).

Failure to provide medical certificate
(5) If a claimant fails to provide a medical certificate in accordance with subrules (3) and (4), the claimant must include in their application
(a) particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence;
(b) particulars of the medical reasons for the application, supported by corroborating evidence; and
(c) an explanation of how the medical condition prevents them from providing the completed Basis of Claim Form in the time limit referred to in paragraph 7(5)(a).

Providing Basis of Claim Form after extension granted
(6) If an extension of time is granted, the claimant must provide the original and a copy of the completed Basis of Claim Form to the Division in accordance with subrules 7(2) and (3), no later than on the date indicated by the Division and by a means set out in paragraph 7(5)(b).

Extensions will only be granted if there is a justifiable reason for the delay

The Board's public commentary to the previous version of the RPD rules that "An extension [to provide this form] will only be granted if there is a justifiable reason for the delay" continues to apply to decisions made under the current Rule 8.[15] The legal standard that the Board is to apply in assessing an application for an extension of time to provide the Basis of Claim form is that set out in subsection 159.8(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, which provides that "If the documents and information cannot be provided within the time limit ... the Refugee Protection Division may, for reasons of fairness and natural justice, extend that time limit by the number of days that is necessary in the circumstances." As such, a claimant should demonstrate that the form "cannot be provided within the time limit", that their inability to provide it within the time limit raises "reasons of fairness and natural justice", and that the period that they are requesting as an extension is what is "necessary" in the circumstances.

One academic argues that as a principle, refugee claimants should have time to recover and be ready to disclose the reasons of their flight and the possible ill treatment they risk suffering in their country of origin in case of return prior to having to provide such information to the state.[16] It is frequently observed that there are gendered aspects to this short deadline, which is said to particularly penalize survivors of rape and sexual violence, since it is well-documented that these survivors often need time before they are ready to disclose their experiences, whether to a lawyer completing a form describing their experiences, or to decision-makers.[17]

This Rule applies to applications for an extension of time, but does not constrain the Board's ability to extend deadlines on its own motion

At times, the IRB has extended the deadline for filing a Basis of Claim form of its own accord. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board issued a Practice notice on the temporary extension of time limits for filing the basis of claim form. This practice notice provided a temporary extension for filing a Basis of Claim form, specifically stating: "If your time limit for filing the BOC Form with the RPD falls between February 15 and April 15, 2020 inclusive, the deadline is extended to May 30, 2020." The authority for this rule was cited as subsection 159.8(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations which provide that the RPD may extend the time for providing the BOC Form for port of entry claimants by the number of days necessary for reasons of fairness and natural justice. Furthermore, that practice directive noted that section 165 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides that the RPD may do whatever is necessary for a full and proper hearing.[18] The principle is that this rule does not constrain the Board from extending a deadline and only governs how the Board should exercise its discretion where a claimant applies to extend the deadline.

Applications for an extension of time must be received at least three working days before the expiry of the time limit for providing the form

As per Rule 8(2), the application for an extension of time to provide the BOC must be received by the Division no later than three working days before the expiry of the time limit set out in the Regulations. The 3 working day time period is counted backwards from the expiry date to provide the BOC. Day 1 is the first business day before the expiry date. The application must be received no later than the third business day before the expiry date to provide the BOC. This arises as a result of the definition of "working day" in RPD Rule 1.

Applications received after that date will be dealt with under the BOC abandonment rule, Rule 65(2): Canadian Refugee Procedure/Abandonment#Rule 65(2) - When the BOC Abandonment hearing must be scheduled. The interaction between this rule and the abandonment rule was discussed in the Board's commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules, which remains instructive:

An application for an extension of time received after the [time limit] will be considered at a special hearing held under [presently, subsection 65(2)] of the Rules. At that hearing, the claimant will be given a chance to explain the delay in filing the [Form]. The claimant should make every effort to provide a completed [Form] to the Division before or at the special hearing. If there is no justifiable reason for the delay, the Division may declare the claim to be abandoned (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, subsection 168(1)).[19]

Thus, for example, the Board has denied requests for an extension of time to file Basis of Claim forms where the claims had already been declared abandoned.[20] As such, the proper procedure in such cases is for the claimant to either participate in the abandonment process under Rule 65 or, if that has been completed, then to apply to reopen the claim pursuant to Rule 62.

Rule 9 - Changes to BOC Form

Changes or additions to Basis of Claim Form
9 (1) To make changes or add any information to the Basis of Claim Form, the claimant must
      (a) provide to the Division the original and a copy of each page of the form to which changes or additions have been made;
      (b) sign and date each new page and underline the changes or additions made; and
      (c) sign and date a declaration stating that
          (i)  the information given by the claimant in the Basis of Claim Form, together with the changes and additions, is complete, true         
               and correct, and
          (ii) the claimant understands that the declaration is of the same force and effect as if made under oath.

Time limit
(2) The documents referred to in subrule (1) must be provided to the Division without delay and must be received by it no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the hearing.

Claimants are under an ongoing obligation to amend their Basis of Claim form should additional information arise

Claimants are under an ongoing relationship to update their Basis of Claim form to ensure that it is complete. The process for making such changes is described by this rule, Rule 9. The obligation to provide such updates arises from the fact that claimants swear or affirm at the beginning of their hearing that their Basis of Claim form is "complete, true, and correct",[21] the instruction on the BOC form that "if your information changes or if you want to add information, you must inform the IRB",[22] the statements in the IRB's Claimant's Guide that "If you find a mistake on your BOC Form or realize that you forgot something important, or receive additional information, you must tell the RPD",[23] and caselaw that all the important facts of a claim for refugee protection must appear in the BOC Form.[24] As is summarized in the Irwin Law text Refugee Law, "the duty to provide a complete and accurate BOC Form has been interpreted as an ongoing one. A claimant must amend and update his BOC if circumstances change or new information comes to light; in the absence of such amendments, adverse inferences can be drawn."[25]

No explanation for BOC amendments necessary

It was previously the case that a draft of this rule required that an explanation of changes to the BOC form be provided. Following stakeholder feedback, that requirement was eliminated. The Board commented on this feedback as follows in its RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement:

Respondents commented that the rule which addresses changes or additions to the BoC Form was overly complicated in its wording. Several respondents expressed confusion regarding how the requested explanations for any additions or deletions were to be provided. A respondent also suggested that the IRB ensure that claimants, when providing amendments to their BoC Form, be required to state that the changes are "true to the best of the claimant's knowledge". In response to these comments, the IRB has: (1) simplified the language in this rule, (2) removed the requirement for an explanation of changes, and (3) included an additional requirement that claimants provide a declaration which states that the information given by the claimant in the BoC Form, together with the changes and additions, is complete, true and correct, which is consistent with the declaration in the BoC Form that claimants must initially sign.[26]

Rule 10 - Order of questioning in hearings, oral representations, oral decisions, limiting questioning

Conduct of a Hearing

Standard order of questioning
10 (1) In a hearing of a claim for refugee protection, if the Minister is not a party, any witness, including the claimant, will be questioned first by the Division and then by the claimant’s counsel.

Order of questioning — Minister’s intervention on exclusion issue
(2) In a hearing of a claim for refugee protection, if the Minister is a party and has intervened on an issue of exclusion under subrule 29(3), any witness, including the claimant, will be questioned first by the Minister’s counsel, then by the Division and then by the claimant’s counsel.

Order of questioning — Minister’s intervention not on exclusion issue
(3) In a hearing of a claim for refugee protection, if the Minister is a party but has not intervened on an issue of exclusion under subrule 29(3), any witness, including the claimant, will be questioned first by the Division, then by the Minister’s counsel and then by the claimant’s counsel.

Order of questioning — application to vacate or cease refugee protection
(4) In a hearing into an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection, any witness, including the protected person, is to be questioned first by the Minister’s counsel, then by the Division and then by the protected person’s counsel.

Variation of order of questioning
(5) The Division must not vary the order of questioning unless there are exceptional circumstances, including that the variation is required to accommodate a vulnerable person.

Limiting questioning of witnesses
(6) The Division may limit the questioning of witnesses, including a claimant or a protected person, taking into account the nature and complexity of the issues and the relevance of the questions.

Oral representations
(7) Representations must be made orally at the end of a hearing unless the Division orders otherwise.

Oral decision and reasons
(8) A Division member must render an oral decision and reasons for the decision at the hearing unless it is not practicable to do so.

The standard order of questioning is that any witness will be questioned first by the Division and this is a fair process

It used to be the case that hearings began with an introductory "examination in chief" by a claimant's counsel. This aspect of the refugee process was sharply criticized. The Law Reform Commission of Canada noted that while the process before the Division is supposed to be non-adversarial, "all of the details of the adversarial system are present in the examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination format".[27] The Board commissioned the noted refugee law academic James C. Hathaway to write a report on its processes in which he recommended "the present practice of an introductory 'examination in chief' by counsel should be dispensed with".[28] The Board subsequently acted on this advice and Thamotharem v Canada was a case which concluded that the resultant process is a fair one, especially given that Board Members may vary the order of questioning in exceptional circumstances.[29]

It is expected that counsel will provide oral submissions after the evidence has been heard

Rule 10(7) states that representations must be made orally at the end of a hearing unless the Division orders otherwise. The Chairperson’s Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division ) state that “in general, it is expected that counsel should be ready to give oral representations after the evidence has been heard.”[30] However, the Division has the discretion to order that written representations be provided instead of oral ones.[31]

A Member rendering an oral decision at the end of the hearing is not, in and of itself, indicative of bias

Rule 10(8) provides that a Division member must render an oral decision and reasons for the decision at the hearing unless it is not practicable to do so. In Pajarillo v. Canada, the claimant argues that the RPD was biased against her because the member made up her mind to reject the Applicant’s claim prior to hearing. The sole basis for making this allegation against the member was that the member returned after a lunch break and proceeded to render a lengthy oral decision. The court rejected this argument, noting that the claimant had failed to establish that the facts or issues in the case were so substantial or complex it was not reasonably practicable to comply with Rule 10(8) of the RPD Rules. The court stated: "The mere fact that the RPD was able to draft a decision and render it orally shortly 50 minutes after the conclusion of the hearing does not prove bias. A review of the transcript of the hearing discloses that the RPD member took into account the Applicant’s testimony and counsel’s arguments in reaching her decision."[32] For more detail, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to an unbiased decision-maker#Statements or conduct that might indicate a predisposition on the part of the decision-maker.

Rule 11 - Documents Establishing Identity and Other Elements of the Claim

Documents Establishing Identity and Other Elements of the Claim

Documents
11 The claimant must provide acceptable documents establishing their identity and other elements of the claim. A claimant who does not provide acceptable documents must explain why they did not provide the documents and what steps they took to obtain them.

Rule 11 should be read in conjunction with Section 106 of the Act

Section 106 of the IRPA states:

Claimant Without Identification

Credibility

106 The Refugee Protection Division must take into account, with respect to the credibility of a claimant, whether the claimant possesses acceptable documentation establishing identity, and if not, whether they have provided a reasonable explanation for the lack of documentation or have taken reasonable steps to obtain the documentation.

History of Rule 11 of the RPD Rules

Rule 7 of the previous RPD Rules is in nearly (but not) identical language to the current version of the rules:

7. The claimant must provide acceptable documents establishing identity and other elements of the claim. A claimant who does not provide acceptable documents must explain why they were not provided and what steps were taken to obtain them.

Rule 7 was introduced into the RPD rules with the onset of the IRPA building on a previous commentary and an accompanying Practice Notice that had been issued by the IRB in 1997. This Commentary on Undocumented and Improperly Documented Claimants was issued to provide guidance to CRDD members as to how to deal with claimants who lacked proper documentation.[33]

"Identity" as the term is used in the Act and the Rules refers to personal/national identity

The term "identity" can take on various meanings in the context of the IRPA and these rules. For example, the Board produced a public commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules, which commented on the meaning of identity as follows:

""Identity" most commonly refers to the name or names that a claimant uses or has used to identify himself or herself. "Identity" also includes indications of personal status such as country of nationality or former habitual residence, citizenship, race, ethnicity, linguistic background, and political, religious or social affiliation."[33]

That commentary is no longer in effect today. Thus, while it remains common to refer to an individual's “ethnic identity” or their “identity as Roma”, the Federal Court has held that these are not aspects of “identity” as that term is used in section 106 of the Act:

While ethnicity, like religion, sexuality, or other fundamental personal characteristics, may be considered part of one’s identity, I do not consider these characteristics to fall within the scope of “identity” in section 106. Rather, section 106 appears to refer to identity in the sense of personal/national identity[34]

It should be presumed that the way that the term "identity" is used in the Rules conforms to the way that the term is used in the Act.

A claimant is obliged to provide any relevant documents in their possession at the time that they provide their BOC form

As per Rule 7(3), the claimant must attach to the original and to the copy of the completed Basis of Claim Form a copy of their identity and travel documents, genuine or not, and a copy of any other relevant documents in their possession. This obligation is reproduced in the Basis of Claim form which instructs: "Attach two copies of any documents you have to support your claim, such as travel documents (including your passport) and identity, medical, psychological or police documents."[35] The Appendix to the BOC form discusses this in more detail: "Attach two copies of all documents (identity, travel or other documents) that you have with you now to support your claim for refugee protection, including documents that are not genuine, documents that you got in an irregular or illegal way or by giving information that is not true, and documents you used that do not really belong to you."[36] The requirement to provide copies of non-genuine identity documents is a reflection of the reality that roughly 60 percent of refugee claimants arrive either with false documents or without proper documentation.[37] The Board's commentary to the previous version of the rules may provide some guidance about the scope of this obligation: "These documents include not only those that were used but also those intended to be used for travelling or supporting the claim."[19] Rule 7(4) further provides that if the claimant obtains an identity or travel document after the Division has received the completed Basis of Claim Form, they must provide two copies of the document to the Division without delay.

A claimant has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to establish their identity and to corroborate their claim

Rule 11 provides that a claimant must provide acceptable documents establishing their identity and other elements of the claim. Subsection 100(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act requires the claimant to produce all documents and information as required by the rules of the Board. This obligation tracks the following statement from the UNHCR Handbook: "The applicant should...make an effort to support his statements by any available evidence and give a satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence. If necessary he must make an effort to procure additional evidence."[9] The Basis of Claim form emphasizes a claimant's obligation to make efforts to obtain such documents as follows:

If you do not have [identification] documents like this with you, you need to do everything you can to get them immediately. If you still cannot get these documents, you will need to explain the reason for this at your hearing and show that you did everything you could to get them.[36]

As explained in the Board's commentary to the previous version of these rules, "the claimant should keep a record of the steps taken, such as copies of letters sent, to obtain identity and other necessary documents."[38] In this way, as explained in the Board's commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules, a claimant who is unsuccessful in obtaining documents to establish his or her identity and other elements of the claim should not only be prepared to provide a reasonable explanation for the lack of documents and describe the diligent efforts they made to obtain such documents, but they should also be able to present proof of the steps that were taken.[38]

The types of documents a claimant should submit to establish their identity

As stated in the Board's commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules, "Section 106 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act imposes a duty on the claimant to provide acceptable documents establishing the claimant's identity, including documents the claimant does not possess but can reasonably obtain."[19] The commentary went on to state that "In assessing the claimant's credibility, the Division must consider the lack of such documents and any reasonable explanation given for not providing them, as well as the steps taken to obtain them. Documents that are not genuine, that have been altered, or that are otherwise improper are generally not acceptable proof of identity."[19] The Claimant's Kit from the Board highlights the claimant's responsibility to provide relevant documents and clarifies what types of documents might be considered acceptable:

You must show the RPD evidence of who you are by giving the RPD high-quality copies of official documents with your name and date of birth on them (“identity documents”). For example, you can give a passport, national identity card, birth certificate, school certificate, driver’s licence, military document, and professional or religious membership card. ... If you do not provide identity documents or other documents in support of your claim, you will have to explain at your hearing why you do not have them and show that you did everything to try to get them.[11]

The Board's commentary to the previous version of the rules also had the following commentary on the subject of "Other independent evidence to establish identity", which appears to continue to be of relevance:

The claimant who lacks documents or whose documents are not found acceptable should be prepared to present other independent evidence to establish his or her identity or other elements of the claim, if such evidence is available. Such evidence may include:

  • testimony of friends, relatives, community elders or other witnesses; and
  • affidavits of individuals who have personal knowledge of the claimant's identity or other elements of the claim.[33]

The types of documents a claimant should submit to establish "other elements of their claim"

The scope of Rule 11 is not limited to documents establishing identity and also applies to "other elements of the claim".[39] The Board has a document on its website entitled Important instructions for refugee claimants which states "You should obtain and submit whatever documents you can to support your claim, such as police reports, medical records, newspaper articles etc."[40] The Claimant's Kit highlights the claimant's responsibility to provide relevant documents and clarifies what type of documents might be considered acceptable:

Along with identity documents, you can submit other high-quality copies of original documents that you feel are relevant to your claim, including proof of membership in political organizations, medical or psychological reports, police documents, business records, news clippings, visas and travel documents (airplane, train or bus tickets). ... If you do not provide identity documents or other documents in support of your claim, you will have to explain at your hearing why you do not have them and show that you did everything to try to get them.[11]

Similarly, the instructions on the BOC form state: "Attach two copies of any documents you have to support your claim, such as travel documents (including your passport) and identity, medical, psychological or police documents.[35] Additionally, the caselaw has indicated that Roma claimants may be expected to have approached NGO and governmental sources for identity documents relating to their ethnicity.[41]

Inferences about credibility that may be made where a claimant does not supply documents

The starting-point when assessing credibility in the Canadian refugee determination system is the principle in the oft-cited case of Maldonado that “[w]hen an applicant swears to the truth of certain allegations, this creates a presumption that those allegations are true unless there be reason to doubt their truthfulness”.[42] Drawing on the Maldonado presumption, a line of cases flowing from the decision of Justice Teitelbaum in Ahortor has concluded that the absence of corroborative evidence is not, in and of itself, a basis to disbelieve a claimant’s allegations.[43] These principles, however, exist alongside section 106 of the IRPA and Rule 11 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256 [RPD Rules], which were introduced subsequent to the decisions in Maldonado and Ahortor.[44] As such, Canadian refugee law provides that it would be an error to make a credibility finding based on the absence of corroborative evidence alone, where there are no other reasons to doubt a claimant's credibility.[45] Specifically, an adverse credibility inference may only be drawn if a claimant fails to produce evidence that the decision-maker reasonably expects should be available in the claimant’s circumstances, and no reasonable explanation for failing to provide it is given, or there is already a valid reason to doubt the claimant’s credibility.[46]

The Division may instruct a claimant to provide specific documents

The Board's public comment to the previous version of the RPD Rules noted that "the Division may instruct the claimant to provide specific documents that have been identified by the Division in the claim-screening process as being necessary for considering the claim."[38] The Board retains the power to issue such instructions under its power to control its own process. Further, the Board's powers under the Inquiries Act authorize members to compel testimony and the production of evidence: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Powers of a Member.

A claimant must provide original documents at the hearing, or beforehand, on the request of the Division

As per Rule 42, a claimant is to present the originals of his or her documents at the beginning of the hearing of the claim. The Division may require the claimant to provide the originals earlier by notice in writing. See Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 42 - Original documents for further details, including the way that the Board has waived part of this rule during the Covid-19 period.

Rule 12 - Supplying contact information after an Application to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection

Application to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection

Contact information
12 If an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection is made, the protected person must without delay notify the Division and the Minister in writing of
(a) any change in their contact information; and
(b) their counsel’s contact information and any limitations on the counsel’s retainer, if represented by counsel, and any changes to that information.

Commentary

For a discussion of the principles applicable to this provision, see the commentary on Rule 4(3), the equivalent provision for refugee claimants: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 4 - Claimant's contact information.

Rule 13 - Declaration where counsel not representing or advising for consideration

Declaration — counsel not representing or advising for consideration
13 If a protected person retains counsel who is not a person referred to in any of paragraphs 91(2)(a) to (c) of the Act, both the protected person and their counsel must without delay provide the information and declarations set out in Schedule 3 to the Division in writing.

Commentary

In effect, Rule 13 requires that a protected person who is being represented by someone who is not a lawyer, paralegal, or registered immigration consultant to complete a form certifying that their counsel is not being paid. What is a protected person? Section 95(2) of the IRPA provides that "a protected person is a person on whom refugee protection is conferred [under subsection 95(1) of the Act], and whose claim or application has not subsequently been deemed to be rejected under subsection 108(3), 109(3) or 114(4)." In this way, Rule 13 is the analogue to RPD Rule 5 which imposes the same obligation on refugee claimants: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 5 - Declaration where counsel is not acting for consideration.

References

  1. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, page 37 (Accessed January 23, 2020).
  2. Mendoza Garcia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 924 at paras 8, 14.
  3. Perez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1171 (CanLII), par. 30, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc9b0#par30>, retrieved on 2021-01-14.
  4. Perez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1171 (CanLII), par. 34, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc9b0#par34>, retrieved on 2021-01-14.
  5. Weerasinge v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 2996 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 330.
  6. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, page 9.
  7. Domantay v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 755.
  8. Uwejeyah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 849 (CanLII), par. 13, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc7vl#par13>, retrieved on 2021-01-08.
  9. 1 2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb474b27.html [accessed 26 January 2020], page 45.
  10. Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Determination of Refugee Status in Canada: A Review of the Procedure (Draft Final Report) 128 (1992).
  11. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
  12. Berger, Max, Refugee Essentials, Canadian Bar Association Immigration Law Conference, Montreal, Quebec, May 2013, <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/pdf/imm13_paper_berger.pdf>, page 4.
  13. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Practice notice on the temporary extension of time limits for filing the Basis of Claim form, August 28, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/practice-notice-temporary-extension-boc-form.aspx> (Accessed August 31, 2020).
  14. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 33.
  15. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
  16. Mariagiulia Giuffré, ‘Access to Asylum at Sea? Non-Refoulement and a Comprehensive Approach to Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations’ in Violeta Moreno Lax and Efthymios Papastavridis (eds), Boat Refugees and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights (Brill Nijhoff 2017) 265.
  17. Canadian Council for Refugees, The challenge of fair and effective refugee determination, 23 July 2009 <https://ccrweb.ca/files/fairdetermination.pdf> (Accessed April 24, 2020), page 7.
  18. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Practice notice on the temporary extension of time limits for filing the basis of claim form, Signed March 15, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-covid19.aspx> (Accessed March 16, 2020).
  19. 1 2 3 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
  20. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 98260 (CA IRB), par. 8, <http://canlii.ca/t/gm0xt#par8>, retrieved on 2020-03-15.
  21. Community Legal Education Ontario (CLEO), Refugee Rights in Ontario: Answering questions at the hearing, Updated Jan 29, 2014, Accessed January 5, 2020, <https://refugee.cleo.on.ca/en/answering-questions-hearing>.
  22. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 version, Accessed January 5, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>.
  23. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant's Guide, Date modified: 2018-08-29, Accessed January 5, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/Pages/ClaDemGuide.aspx>.
  24. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 56636 (CA IRB), para. 43 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2015/2015canlii56636/2015canlii56636.html>.
  25. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 293.
  26. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
  27. Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Determination of Refugee Status in Canada: A Review of the Procedure (Draft Final Report), 16-17 (1992).
  28. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: A Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, December 1993, page 74.
  29. Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 198 (CanLII), [2008] 1 FCR 385.
  30. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx> (Accessed January 30, 2020), section 5.8.
  31. Dong v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 364, 14 Imm. L.R. (2d) 317 (F.C.T.D.).
  32. Pajarillo, Donna Parcasio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3740-19), Lafreniere, December 20, 2019; 2019 FC 1654.
  33. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection, January 31, 2004, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/Credib.aspx#n2452> (Accessed January 27, 2020), section 2.4.5.2.
  34. Pazmandi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1094 (CanLII), par. 23, <http://canlii.ca/t/jbv6m#par23>, retrieved on 2020-12-17.
  35. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, page 2.
  36. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, Appendix - page 1.
  37. Department of Justice, Immigration and Refugee Legal Aid Cost Drivers, 2002, <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/ir/rr03_la17-rr03_aj17/p37.html#a310> (Accessed August 23, 2020), at 3.10.
  38. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
  39. Kitenga Lunda, Zico c. M.C.I. (C.F., no. IMM-3727-19), Gascon, 18 juin 2020, 2020 CF 704.
  40. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Important instructions for refugee claimants (Print version), Date modified on website: 2018-12-11 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/Pages/ClaDemGuideInstruct.aspx> (Accessed January 27, 2020).
  41. Somyk v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1338 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/gvx8d>.
  42. Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302 (CA).
  43. Ahortor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 705 at paras 35–37, 45, 50.
  44. Ismaili v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 84 at paras 31–35.
  45. Triana Aguirre v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 571 at paragraph 15.
  46. Luo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 823 at paras 18–22.

Counsel of Record (Rules 14-16)

As Martin Jones and Sasha Baglay observe, “the representation of refugee claimants by qualified counsel is an important part of the Canadian refugee determination process. The availability and expertise of counsel bring significant benefits to both the claimants and the overall efficiency and legitimacy of the process. The representation of refugee claimants is also an expression of a fundamental constitutional and common law value: that individuals facing complicated legal proceedings with serious consequences should be allowed to be represented so as to ensure that there is a full and fair hearing.”[1] The following sections outline the contours, limits, and practicalities of this right.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:

Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides the following right to counsel:[2]

Arrest or Detention
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention ...
(b) to retail and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right ...

Both sections 7 and 10 of the Charter are relevant to the right to counsel in refugee proceedings

The court has found that section 7 Charter rights are involved in inland refugee proceedings and that they include “the right to be represented by competent and careful counsel”.[3] For a discussion of s. 10 of the Charter, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#The right to counsel does not apply where a person is not yet subject to proceedings before the Board and where the person is not detained.

Canadian Bill of Rights

Section 2(d) of the Canadian Bill of Rights concerns the right to counsel:[4]

Construction of law
2 Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is denied counsel, protection against self crimination or other constitutional safeguards;

IRPA s. 167 - Right to counsel

Right to counsel
167 (1) A person who is the subject of proceedings before any Division of the Board and the Minister may, at their own expense, be represented by legal or other counsel.

In what immigration contexts do claimants have a right to counsel?

The right to counsel applies from the time a person is subject to proceedings before the Board, not just at the hearing

Section 167(1) of the Act provides that a person who is the subject of proceedings before any Division of the Board may be represented by legal or other counsel. As such, this provision of the Act ties the right to counsel to whether or not the individual is the subject of proceedings before the Board. In Canada v. Gutierrez, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the applicants had a right to counsel at an interview conducted after their claim had been made, but a few weeks before their hearing before the Board was scheduled. In that situation, the claimants were considered to be the subject of proceedings before the Board, and as such, were entitled to be represented by counsel according to s. 167 of the Act.[5]

The right to counsel does not apply where a person is not yet subject to proceedings before the Board and where the person is not detained

A person is generally not entitled to counsel at interviews or pre-hearing proceedings where the person has not yet become the subject of proceedings at the Board, for example before a claim is referred to the Board: Canada v. Bermudez.[6] In Canada v. Barrios, the claimant's request to be represented by counsel during his initial encounter with a CBSA officer who was interviewing him at the border was denied. In subsequent proceedings before the RPD, the claimant requested that evidence arising from this interview be excluded because it was, he argued, obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The court held that the CBSA's conduct in interviewing the claimant in the absence of counsel did not violate any right to counsel, since the person concerned had no right to counsel in the circumstances because they were not, at the time they were being interviewed, subject to any proceedings before the Board.[7]

This conclusion will be different, however, where a person is detained and not free to leave at the time that they are being questioned: Chen v. Canada.[8] This is so on the basis that in such circumstances an individual's s. 10(b) right to counsel under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms will apply.

The right to counsel in Canadian law is not a right to state-funded counsel

Section 167(1) of the IRPA provides that an individual may be represented by counsel "at their own expense". In Canada, the courts have stated, "there is no general constitutional right to legal aid, but only a right arising in specific circumstances".[9] As such, no Canadian case has established that refugee claimants have a right to state-funded counsel. Instead, the Federal Court has held that "state-funded legal aid is only constitutionally mandated in some cases [and] the right to counsel is not absolute".[10] This is consistent with jurisprudence in similar jurisdictions and at international law. For example, the UK High Court states that international law does not require the provision of legal advice and assistance to asylum seekers.[11] US courts have not accepted a constitutional or statutory argument that appointed counsel is required for noncitizens to vindicate their right to a fair hearing in immigration court.[12] Similarly, Canadian courts have held that international law does not specifically call for legal counsel as part of the implementation of a fair refugee adjudication system.[11]

UNHCR has expressed the view that whether or not refugee claimants have a right to state-funded counsel in Canada should be thought of as an open question. Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms raises the possibility that an implied right to state-funded counsel for indigent claimants may, under certain circumstances, be included within its protection guarantees, given that protection claims involve grave issues related to a person’s security. Specifically, the notion of “fundamental justice” in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms involves both substantive and procedural fairness. As a consequence, a UNHCR report discussing the Canadian asylum process observes that representation is likely necessary when refugee claimants do not understand the procedures in order to ensure that the process is conducted in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.[13] The academics Sharry Aiken, et. al., also write that "there are strong arguments that s 7 guarantees refugee claimants a right to counsel at refugee hearings".[14]

Indeed, at the international level there are many statements about rights to legal counsel in asylum proceedings. The UN Human Rights Committee has concluded that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that ‘“asylum-seekers be properly informed and assured of their rights, including the right to apply for asylum, with access to free legal aid”.[15] Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has held that failure to provide access to legal aid for asylum seekers by Greece constituted a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights in particular circumstances.[16] As well, the Council of the European Union Procedures Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status provides that in the event of a negative decision, applicants in EU member states are in principle entitled to free legal assistance which Member States may, however, make contingent upon the fulfilment of further requirements such as that the appeal or review is likely to succeed.[17]

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights states that legal aid may be necessary when it is required in order to effectively vindicate a fundamental protected right under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man or the Constitution or laws of a particular country. This flows in large measure from the principle that rights must be implemented in ways that give them proper effect.[18] It also flows from the right to equal protection of - and before - the law. They state in a report on the Canadian refugee determination system that when deciding whether legal aid is necessary for a particular individual, one may properly consider the circumstances of the particular case, its significance, legal character, and the context in the particular legal system.[19]

In what contexts will a lack of counsel render a hearing unfair?

The fact that a claimant lacks counsel does not, in and of itself, mean that their hearing is unfair

The Federal Court states that "individuals are free to choose to represent themselves or to be represented by counsel".[20] As a matter of practice, the notices of hearing sent by the Board to claimants advise them of their right to be represented by counsel.[21] While about 90% of claimants attend their hearing with representation,[22] they may proceed with a claim and hearing without counsel. The Canadian jurisprudence is clear that where a claimant does not request a postponement on the basis of this lack of counsel, there is no obligation on the Board to canvass the issue of a postponement of the hearing simply because a claimant is unrepresented.[23] As Refugee Appeal Division Member Atam Uppal held in one case, the mere fact that a claimant was unrepresented and the Board denied the claim did not mean that the RPD denied procedural fairness or that the claimant was denied his right to a fair hearing.[24] Instead, the lack of representation by counsel results in a breach of procedural fairness only if, given the circumstances, it deprives the applicant of the opportunity to “participate meaningfully” in the hearing.[25]

A panel may be obliged to postpone a hearing to give a claimant an opportunity to obtain counsel upon request in certain circumstances

The court has stated that "the right to be represented by counsel is not an absolute right. It is predicated on all parties and counsel acting reasonably in all circumstances."[26] In certain circumstances, where a party has acted diligently and reasonably and has not been able to obtain counsel for the hearing, and requests a postponement of a hearing to obtain counsel, it may be unfair for a panel to deny that request and proceed with the hearing. The following principles can therefore be drawn from the case law: although the right to counsel is not absolute in an administrative proceeding, refusing an individual the possibility to retain counsel by not allowing a postponement is reviewable if the following factors are in play: the case is complex, the consequences of the decision are serious, the individual does not have the resources - whether in terms of intellect or legal knowledge - to properly represent his interests.[27] See Rule 54 on changing the date and time of a proceeding for further discussion of this and a discussion of the rules that a panel should consider when exercising its discretion: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding.

Where a claimant is unrepresented and is clearly not understanding what is occurring, the Board should inquire about whether they wish to have counsel

The general rule is that there is no stand-alone duty on a tribunal to advise a party about the availability of or right to legal aid in immigration proceedings.[28] That said, the court has noted that "applicants are often lost without counsel" and that counsel "can make a significant impact in the smooth progression of a proceeding".[29] Where it is clear that an unrepresented claimant is not understanding what is occurring, a panel may be obliged to enquire with the claimant about whether they wish to have counsel. In Alvarez v. Canada, the Court found a breach of natural justice in circumstances where the tribunal proceeded despite the fact that it was clear that the applicant was not understanding the proceedings.[30] The court reached this conclusion even though the claimant had not formally requested an adjournment at the time of the hearing. For additional discussion of this principle, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding#The Board's actions on its own motion (ex proprio motu).

The Board has a heightened duty of procedural fairness when dealing with self-represented claimants

Unrepresented claimants are comparatively rare in refugee proceedings; for example, in 2011–2012 Legal Aid Ontario provided services to 90% of all refugee claimants in Ontario.[31] The proportion of unrepresented claimants nationally remained relatively consistent at 12 to 13 percent from 2009 to 2012.[32] British Columbia has traditionally had significantly higher rates of unrepresented claimants than the rest of the country, with approximately a quarter of claimants unrepresented at their refugee hearings.[33] Caselaw establishes that the RPD owes unrepresented litigants a heightened duty of fairness.[34] However, the precise scope of this duty will depend on all of the circumstances of the case, including the sophistication of the applicant; where the applicant is clearly sophisticated, this may support the fairness of the procedural choices that were made.[35] The courts have commented positively on Members taking steps to inform self-represented claimants about RPD procedures and about the existence and application of the National Documentation Package.[36] The Board also commits in its Guideline 8 - Concerning Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada that it "will take extra care to ensure that self-represented vulnerable persons can participate as meaningfully as possible in their own hearings."[37]

In what contexts will counsel incompetence render a hearing unfair?

Normally, claimants with counsel are more likely to succeed with their claims

Statistically, claimants with counsel are far more likely to succeed with their refugee claims than are those who are unrepresented. Several studies have shown that there is a clear correlation between having legal advice and the recognition of refugee status.[38] A study of legal advisers in Cairo, Egypt, for example, found that refugees who had legal advice had nearly double the chance of having their refugee status recognized after a UNHCR interview than other, unrepresented, asylum seekers.[39] In the US, Schoenholtz and Jacobs found that asylum seekers who had legal assistance were four to six times more likely to be recognized as refugees compared to those who did not have assistance.[40] In this study, access to a legal adviser was found to improve the chance of recognition, regardless of the refugee’s origin, at every stage of the determination process studied. Studies of the Canadian refugee status determination system have also concluded that having a lawyer is associated with an increased chance of success in refugee proceedings: according to a study by academic Sean Rehaag, Canadian claimants with representation from a lawyer were approximately 75 percent more likely to succeed than those who were unrepresented.[41]

Deficiencies of counsel's conduct are properly attributed to their client

Generally, the courts have held clients liable for the misconduct of their counsel: “It is well recognized that a person has to accept the consequences of their choice of counsel.”[42] Sometimes counsel will adopt a theory of the case that does not succeed or will make tactical decisions in approaching a case where another lawyer would have decided differently. The Federal Court has held that the general rule is that you do not separate counsel's conduct from the client. Counsel is acting as agent for the client and, as harsh as it may be, the client must bear the consequences of having hired poor counsel.[43] This principle is reflected in the instructions in the Basis of Claim form that every claimant receives as part of the claimant process, which notes that "If you have counsel, you are responsible for making sure that your counsel meets the deadlines."[44] That said, this principle may be distinguishable in situations where counsel's conduct is incompetent to the point where it would be unfair to attribute deficiencies to the client, as discussed in the following section.

A hearing will be unfair where counsel incompetence results in a miscarriage of justice

The two-part test for setting aside a decision on the basis of counsel incompetency is that a party must establish 1) that counsel’s acts or omissions constituted incompetence, and 2) that a miscarriage of justice resulted:[45]

The core test for setting aside a decision due to counsel incompetence consists of two components: a performance component and a prejudice component. The burden is on the Applicant to prove both. The Applicant must prove that counsel performed incompetently. The incompetence must be specific and supported by evidence. The Applicant must also prove that the incompetence caused a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice may manifest in procedural unfairness, a compromise of trial fairness, or some other readily apparent form.[46]

1) Incompetence

In the words of the Federal Court of Appeal, the irreparable harm that can befall an individual upon deportation "obviously calls for the utmost vigilance from counsel representing claimants, and for the need on their part to act with the highest standard of professionalism and thoroughness."[47] There is a strong presumption that former counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.[48] As such, the test for concluding that counsel was incompetent is strict, and counsel incompetence will only be found to have caused procedural unfairness in extraordinary circumstances.[49] Notice must be given to former counsel[50] and the applicant has the burden of proof. For more details on the prerequisites for making such an argument before the RPD, see Rule 62(4): Canadian Refugee Procedure/Reopening a Claim or Application#Rule 62(4) - Allegations against counsel. Examples of inadequate representation, counsel incompetence, negligence, and other improper conduct follow:

  • Failure to comply with undertakings: In Shirwa v. Canada, counsel had made an undertaking to file written submissions on issues that were raised during the hearing and then failed to do so. The court held that this was a serious failure on the part of counsel.[51]
  • Failure to provide important evidence to the Board: In El Kaissi v. Canada the court concluded that counsel had acted incompetently where they failed to produce a piece of corroborating evidence which the applicant had provided to counsel.[52] In Mcintyre v. Canada, the court concluded that counsel had acted incompetently when they failed to file crucial evidence as to the country conditions that demonstrated how the applicant, a gay man, would be affected by removal.[53]
  • Failure to assist the claimant in the preparation of documents: In Galyas v. Canada, the court held that counsel had acted incompetently where the claimant had been "left to prepare [his BOC form] by himself, without guidance on what it should contain[,] and what the RPD would be looking for in such a narrative."[54] In El Kaissi v. Canada the court concluded that counsel had acted incompetently where they did not assist the claimant in the preparation of the Personal Information Form.[52]
  • Failure to meet with the claimant in advance of the hearing to prepare: In El Kaissi v. Canada the court concluded that counsel had acted incompetently where they did not meet with their clients until just prior to the hearing.[52]
  • Failure to advance an important argument before the Board as a result of ignorance: Counsel must have a sufficient knowledge of the fundamental issues or principles of law applicable to the particular work they have undertaken to enable them to perceive the need to ascertain the law on relevant points.[55] For example, in Satkunanathan v. Canada the applicant's former counsel appeared to be under the mistaken impression that it was not possible to advance a particular argument before the Board, when in fact it was. This was held by the court to have fallen below the standard of competence expected of counsel and to have resulted in an unfair hearing.[56]
  • Failure to notify the claimant of their hearing date.[57]
  • Failure to appear for a hearing date where they are counsel of record.[58]
  • Acting while having a conflict of interest.[59]
  • Cumulative grounds: Counsel have also been held incompetent because of the cumulative impact of many acts and omissions which alone would not amount to incompetence.[60] As the court stated in Fernandez v. Canada, "I do not have to find any one act of egregious conduct to find that former counsel was incompetent. I need to establish that the actions fell outside of the realm of reasonable judgment".[61]
2) Prejudice

Where counsel provides inadequate representation, including professional incompetence, negligence, and other improper conduct, this may support a finding that the proceeding was unfair.[62] In making this determination, there must be an assessment of whether counsel’s performance resulted in procedural unfairness, whether the reliability of the trial’s result may have been compromised, or whether the outcome might be affected.[63] With respect to whether the outcome might be affected, the court examines whether there is "a reasonable possibility that the original decision could have been different."[61]

Rule 14 - Becoming counsel of record

Counsel of Record

Becoming counsel of record
14 (1) Subject to subrule (2), as soon as counsel for a claimant or protected person agrees to a date for a proceeding, or as soon as a person becomes counsel after a date for a proceeding has been fixed, the counsel becomes counsel of record for the claimant or protected person.

Limitation on counsel’s retainer
(2) If a claimant or protected person has notified the Division of a limitation on their counsel’s retainer, counsel is counsel of record only to the extent of the services to be provided within the limited retainer. Counsel ceases to be counsel of record as soon as those services are completed.

Who may act as counsel in refugee proceedings before the Board?

An individual can pay fees to be represented by a person who is a lawyer, paralegal or immigration consultant. A person may also be represented by someone who is not one of those professionals. For the form that needs to be completed in such circumstances, see Rule 5 (which applies to refugee claimants - Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 5 - Declaration where counsel is not acting for consideration) and Rule 13 (which applies to persons who have already been conferred refugee status - Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 13 - Declaration where counsel not representing or advising for consideration).

Parties may be represented by multiple counsel (co-counsel) in a proceeding

Parties may be represented by more than one representative (counsel, immigration consultant, etc.) in a proceeding before the IRB. This was allowed for the Minister in Muhammad v Canada,[64] a case before the Immigration Division, and has been allowed for claimants appearing before the RPD as well.[65] Indeed, this is commonly done for the training for new representatives, as when articling students co-counsel with a more experienced lawyer.[66]

The Board has jurisdiction to control who can appear before it as counsel

Counsel has no substantive right to appear before the IRB.[67] In Yari v. Canada the Federal Court, in holding that the Immigration Appeal Division had the discretion to regulate its own procedure when its rules are silent, stated that “It clearly makes intuitive sense that a tribunal such as the IRB or any of its constituent divisions ought to be able to regulate its own procedure. It ought also to regulate the privilege of appearing before the tribunal to represent a claimant.”[68]

The Refugee Appeal Division has concluded that the law is that, in general, there is "no obligation of the RPD to inform claimants of the availability of Legal Aid".[69] That said, the Board publishes a Claimant's Kit, which is made available to all claimants, and includes a list of Canadian legal aid offices.[70] Six provinces - British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador - offer immigration and refugee legal aid services.[71] Some other provinces, such as Nova Scotia, used to provide legal aid, but cancelled the programs in the late 1990s during budgetary cuts.[72] The overwhelming majority of the work of the Refugee Protection Division is centered in the provinces that do have legal aid programs.[73]

In British Columbia, the Legal Services Society authorizes 16 hours for case preparation, with an additional 8 hours permitted if there is a second adult client, and a further four hours for any additional adult clients. Lawyers are also paid for their time at the RPD hearing. LSS will pay for up to 10 hours of interpretation services per adult client, with additional hours requiring authorization.[74] The BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre states that these hours rates are "so low they invariably require a subsidy in time and commitment from counsel who accept such retainers to ensure adequate representation."[75] In the 2013-2014 fiscal year, funding was approved for 82 percent of applications by refugee claimants (348 out of 424 applications).[76] The average total cost to BC's Legal Services Society of a refugee claim under the new system in the 2013-2014 fiscal year was $2,062, including disbursements.[77] The average of legal fees alone charged in private refugee cases in the Western Region in the same time period would appear to have been in the range of $4000.[78] Such limits on legal aid fees have been said to have resulted in "more experienced lawyers [stopping the practice of] asylum and immigration law" in other jurisdictions.[79]

In Manitoba, most of the case preparation work is done by two salaried paralegals working with the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council.[80] The legal aid tariff in that province provides far fewer hours for work on refugee claims than is allowed under the tariffs in British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta. As of 2019, the Manitoba tariff allows 13 hours for preparation and the first half-day of hearing.[81]

Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) provides (as of 2013) counsel with 5 hours to prepare a BOC form, 11 hours to prepare for a refugee hearing, plus the time of the hearing. LAO will pay up to 10 hours of interpretation services in case preparation, with authorization required for any additional time.[82] LAO pays 16 hours to prepare for a RAD hearing (plus an additional four hours and attendance time if the RAD proceeding involves an oral hearing), 15 hours for an application for leave for a judicial review, and 15 hours to prepare for a judicial review (the combination with preparation hours not to exceed 27 hours, plus attendance time).[83]

Quebec

While Quebec operates a legal aid program for refugee claimants, they have been criticized in the past for their failure to compensate counsel for preparatory and pre-hearing work.[84]

Rule 15 - Request to be removed as counsel of record

Request to be removed as counsel of record
15 (1) To be removed as counsel of record, counsel for a claimant or protected person must first provide to the person represented and to the Minister, if the Minister is a party, a copy of a written request to be removed and then provide the written request to the Division, no later than three working days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.

Oral request
(2) If it is not possible for counsel to make the request in accordance with subrule (1), counsel must appear on the date fixed for the proceeding and make the request to be removed orally before the time fixed for the proceeding.

Division’s permission required
(3) Counsel remains counsel of record unless the request to be removed is granted.

Board commentary on discretion to refuse requests for counsel to be removed as counsel of record

Lorne Waldman notes in his text that "the Rules do not specify how the Board is to deal with an application by counsel to be removed."[85] Some guidance on this issue comes from the drafting history for the current version of the rules and the Board's public commentary thereon. When this rule was being drafted and the IRB solicited feedback on it, three respondents provided comments concerning the process to follow to be removed as counsel of record. Specifically, respondents requested that the rule which stipulates that counsel of record remain counsel of record until the request is granted be changed to state that counsel are released as of the Division's receipt of the written notification. While the IRB has noted that it is unlikely to require counsel of record to continue to represent a claimant if a request has been made to the Division in a timely manner, the IRB maintains that it has discretion to deny the request in appropriate circumstances, such as where allowing it would impede the timely progress of a proceeding and cause an injustice. With this in mind, the rule retains its current form.[86]

Rule 16 - Removing counsel of record

Removing counsel of record
16 (1) To remove counsel as counsel of record, a claimant or protected person must first provide to counsel and to the Minister, if the Minister is a party, a copy of a written notice that counsel is no longer counsel for the claimant or protected person, as the case may be, and then provide the written notice to the Division.

Ceasing to be counsel of record
(2) Counsel ceases to be counsel of record as soon as the Division receives the notice.

References

  1. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 328.
  2. The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 10 <http://canlii.ca/t/ldsx#sec10> retrieved on 2020-05-02.
  3. Mathon v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 38 Admin LR 193 at 208 (TD), as cited in Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 314.
  4. Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44, s 2 <http://canlii.ca/t/j05x#sec2> retrieved on 2020-04-17.
  5. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Paramo de Gutierrez, 2016 FCA 211 at para 44.
  6. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Bermudez, 2016 FCA 131 at para 50.
  7. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Barrios (F.C., no. IMM-59-19), O’Reilly, January 10, 2020; 2020 FC 29.
  8. Chen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1163, 2006 FC 910 (F.C.).
  9. Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2020 BCCA 241 (CanLII), par. 95, <http://canlii.ca/t/j9c0x#par95>, retrieved on 2020-08-27.
  10. Austria v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 423 (CanLII), par. 6, <http://canlii.ca/t/1n2qx#par6>, retrieved on 2020-08-12.
  11. 1 2 Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2007 FC 1262 (CanLII), [2008] 3 FCR 606, par. 229, <http://canlii.ca/t/1tz0l#par229>, retrieved on 2020-03-22.
  12. C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2018).
  13. Barutciski, Michael, The Impact of the Lack of Legal Representation in the Canadian Asylum Process, UNHCR, 6 November 2012, <https://www.unhcr.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RPT-2012-06-legal_representation-e.pdf> (Accessed January 19, 2020), page 13.
  14. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 187.
  15. UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: France’, UN doc CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (31 July 2008).
  16. MSS v Belgium and Greece App No 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011).
  17. EC Directive 2005/85 of 1 December 2005, OJ 2005 L 326, 13, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:326:0013:0034:EN:PDF> (Accessed May 3, 2020).
  18. See generally, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 supra, at para. 30 (addressing the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies under the American Convention); UNHum.Rts.Committee, Currie v. Jamaica, Comm. Nº 377/1989, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/377/1989 (1994), at paras. 10, 13 (explaining that absence of legal aid where required to vindicate a right operates not only to excuse compliance with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, but also constitutes a violation of the right to a fair trial).
  19. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 127.
  20. Ait Elhocine v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1068 (CanLII), par. 15, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc063#par15>, retrieved on 2021-01-06.
  21. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 323.
  22. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Page 88.
  23. N.A.Y.T. v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 225 (CanLII).
  24. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 52143 (CA IRB), par. 32, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkrv6#par32>, retrieved on 2020-03-16.
  25. Li v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 927 at paragraph 37.
  26. Afrane v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 64 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.T.D.)
  27. Mervilus v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1206 at paragraph 25.
  28. Cyril v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1106 (CanLII), par. 15, <http://canlii.ca/t/gl9cx#par15>, retrieved on 2020-05-13.
  29. Cervenakova v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 525, at paras 64, 67.
  30. Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 1007, 2010 FC 792 (F.C.).
  31. Berger, Max, Immigration Essentials 2013 Presentation, Canadian Bar Association Immigration Conference Montreal Materials <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/pdf/imm13_paper_berger.pdf>, page 33.
  32. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 2015 <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 27.
  33. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 2015 <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 3.
  34. Nemeth v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 590 (CanLII), 233 FTR 301, [2003] FCJ No 776 (QL) at para 13
  35. Wysozki v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (F.C., No. IMM-4958-19), Strickland, March 31, 2020; 2020 FC 458, para. 38.
  36. Ait Elhocine v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1068 (CanLII), par. 25, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc063#par25>, retrieved on 2021-01-06.
  37. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guideline 8 - Concerning Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Amended: December 15, 2012, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir08.aspx> (Accessed February 9, 2020).
  38. Azadeh Dastyari, BA/LLB (Hons I) (Sydney), PhD (Monash), Daniel Ghezelbash, BA/LLB (Hons I), PhD (Sydney), Asylum at Sea: The Legality of Shipboard Refugee Status Determination Procedures, International Journal of Refugee Law, , eez046, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eez046
  39. Michael Kagan, ‘Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt’ (2006) 19 Journal of Refugee Studies 45, 54.
  40. Andrew Schoenholtz and Jonathan Jacobs, ‘The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change’ (2002) 16 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 739, 740.
  41. Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An Empirical Assessment,” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 71.
  42. Williams v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 74 FTR 34 (TD).
  43. Jouzichin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 52 ACWS (3d) 157, 1994 CarswellNat 1592.
  44. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, Appendix page 2.
  45. Hamdan v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 643.
  46. R v GDB, 2000 SCC 22 at para 27, as cited in Tapia Fernandez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 889.
  47. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 90, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par90>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.
  48. Satkunanathan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 470 (CanLII), par. 87, <http://canlii.ca/t/j65bj#par87>, retrieved on 2020-04-17.
  49. Yang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1189 at para 15.
  50. Mahadjir Djibrine v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1036 (CanLII), par. 18, <http://canlii.ca/t/jbhtg#par18>, retrieved on 2020-11-25.
  51. Shirwa v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1345, [1994] 2 F.C. 51 (F.C.T.D.).
  52. 1 2 3 El Kaissi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2011] F.C.J. No. 1518, 2011 FC 1234 (F.C.).
  53. Mcintyre v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2016] F.C.J. No. 1373, 2016 FC 1351 (F.C.).
  54. Galyas v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2013] F.C.J. No. 245, 2013 FC 250 (F.C.).
  55. Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147, 1986 CanLII 29 (SCC), at 208.
  56. Satkunanathan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 470 (CanLII), par. 90, <http://canlii.ca/t/j65bj#par90>, retrieved on 2020-04-17.
  57. Gulishvili v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 1200.
  58. N'Takpe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 978 (CanLII), par. 10, <http://canlii.ca/t/1j1vw#par10>, retrieved on 2020-09-06.
  59. N'Takpe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 978 (CanLII), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/1j1vw#par9>, retrieved on 2020-09-06.
  60. Memari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1196 at para 64.
  61. 1 2 Tapia Fernandez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 889, para. 43.
  62. Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1227 (CanLII), par. 8, <http://canlii.ca/t/26wwt#8>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
  63. Mahadjir Djibrine v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1036 (CanLII), par. 40, <http://canlii.ca/t/jbhtg#par40>, retrieved on 2020-11-25.
  64. Muhammad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 CanLII 96687 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/gfhm7>, retrieved on 2021-01-05.
  65. X (Re), 2010 CanLII 98036 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/frq60>, retrieved on 2021-01-05.
  66. X (Re), 2011 CanLII 100717 (CA IRB), par. 11, <http://canlii.ca/t/g7s02#par11>, retrieved on 2021-01-05.
  67. Rezaei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 3 FC 421 (TD), para. 49.
  68. Yari v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 652, at para. 46.
  69. Cyril v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1106 (CanLII), par. 16, <http://canlii.ca/t/gl9cx#par16>, retrieved on 2020-05-13.
  70. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant's Kit, Date modified: 2018-08-29 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/pages/ClaDemKitTro.aspx> (Accessed May 13, 2020).
  71. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, List of legal aid offices, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/legal-aid-office.aspx> (Accessed January 30, 2020).
  72. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 320.
  73. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 123.
  74. Legal Services Society, Immigration Tariff, December 2012, available online: Legal Services Society, <http://www.lss.bc.ca/assets/lawyers/tariffGuide/immigration/immigrationTariffDec2012.pdf> (Accessed January 15, 2020) at 1.
  75. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BC PIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, September 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 26.
  76. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BC PIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, September 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 28.
  77. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BC PIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, September 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 20.
  78. Canadian Lawyer “2014 Legal Fees Survey” (June, 2014), page 37.
  79. John R. Campbell, The role of lawyers, judges, country experts and officials in British asylum and immigration law, Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 March 2020, International Journal of Law in Context, DOI: https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1017/S1744552320000038 (Accessed April 4, 2020), at page 10.
  80. Government of Canada Department of Justice, Immigration and Refugee Legal Aid Cost Drivers Final Report, 2002 <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/ir/rr03_la17-rr03_aj17/p9.html#ftn116> (Accessed April 15, 2020).
  81. CBC, Legal Aid Manitoba wants non-lawyers empowered to argue refugee claims, Jan 02, 2019 <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/legal-aid-manitoba-advocates-refugee-claimants-1.4952641> (Accessed April 15, 2020).
  82. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, page 52 (Accessed January 23, 2020).
  83. Berger, Max, Immigration Essentials 2013 Presentation, Canadian Bar Association Immigration Conference Montreal Materials <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/pdf/imm13_paper_berger.pdf>, page 32.
  84. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: A Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, December 1993, page 76.
  85. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1725 of the PDF.
  86. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx> (Accessed January 3, 2020).

Language of Proceedings (Rules 17-18)

Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Sections 16 to 22 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concern language rights, the most probative provisions being:[1]

Official languages of Canada
16. (1) English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
...

Proceedings in courts established by Parliament	
19. (1) Either English or French may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by Parliament.

Communications by public with federal institutions
20. (1) Any member of the public in Canada has the right to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any head or central office of an institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in English or French, and has the same right with respect to any other office of any such institution where
(a) there is a significant demand for communications with and services from that office in such language; or
(b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that communications with and services from that office be available in both English and French.

The Board is considered to be a "court established by Parliament" for the purposes of Charter language rights

Section 19 of the Charter provides that "Either English or French may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by Parliament." Is this right applicable to proceedings before the IRB? It is. The expression “courts” includes quasi-judicial organizations. The test to be applied in determining whether a quasi-judicial body is to be considered a "court" for such purposes is stated as follows: it includes any federal institution whose organizing statute confers the power to decide matters affecting the rights or interests of the individual, by applying principles of law and not considerations of convenience or administrative policy.[2] The position that the government has taken before is that s. 19 of the Charter is applicable to proceedings before the Board: Taire v. Canada.[3]

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act Provisions

Section 3(3) of the IRPA provides that:

Application
s. 3(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that ...
(d) ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination and of the equality of English and French as the official languages of Canada;
(e) supports the commitment of the Government of Canada to enhance the vitality of the English and French linguistic minority communities in Canada; 

[emphasis added]

Rule 17 - Language of proceedings for a claim for refugee protection

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Language of Proceedings

Choice of language — claim for refugee protection
17 (1) A claimant must choose English or French as the language of the proceedings at the time of the referral of their claim for refugee protection to the Division.

Changing language
(2) A claimant may change the language of the proceedings that they chose under subrule (1) by notifying the Division and the Minister in writing. The notice must be received by the Division and the Minister no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.

Rule 18 - Language of proceedings for an application to vacate or cease refugee protection

Choice of language — application to vacate or cease refugee protection
18 (1) The language that is chosen under rule 17 is to be the language of the proceedings in any application made by the Minister to vacate or to cease refugee protection with respect to that claim.

Changing language
(2) A protected person may change the language of the proceedings by notifying the Division and the Minister in writing. The notice must be received by the Division and the Minister no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.

Commentary

Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French

The IRB has a Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French which provides that "Recognizing that provisions establishing language rights must generally be given a broad and liberal interpretation, the IRB will ensure respect for English and French as the official languages of Canada and ensure equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in the administration of justice, in communicating with or providing services to the public and in carrying out the Board’s work."[4]

Counsel may speak in a hearing in an official language different from the language of proceedings that a claimant has chosen

The IRB Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French provides that "All persons in the hearing room are free to speak the official language of their choice, including counsel for the subject of the proceeding. At the request of any party to the proceeding, the IRB will make arrangements to provide interpretation from one official language to the other, taking into consideration third language interpretation may also be required for the case."[4]

Board has the operational capacity to entertain requests to change the language of proceedings across the country

A question can arise about how often a participant begins proceedings in one official language and then wishes to change to proceed in the other official language. In 2009 the Board received 125 such requests. In 2010, they received 164 such requests to change language after a proceeding had commenced.[5]

The Board has capacity across the country to offer proceedings in either official language. An illustration of the linguistic capabilities of Members was offered in testimony before the House of Commons in 2010:

As of December 14, two days ago, the linguistic breakdown of our decision-makers was the following. In the eastern region, we have 54 members, of whom 44 are bilingual, seven are unilingual French, and three are unilingual English. In the central region, we have 111 members, of whom nine are bilingual and 102 are unilingual English. In the western region, we have 38 members, of whom six are bilingual and 32 are unilingual English.[6]

A claimant may impliedly waive their right to proceed in their language of choice

In Brahim v. Canada, the claimants allowed their counsel to deliver part of his oral arguments in English, given that counsel for the applicants’ notes were in English and he wished to communicate them in that language. On judicial review, the claimants argued that given that they had elected to proceed in French, their counsel's English-language submissions denied them this right. What had occurred during the hearing was that was the applicants’ counsel himself who switched to English of his own volition, preferring to speak English during oral argument because that was the language in which his notes had been written:

Perhaps I’ll move straight into the… just a few references in the documentation which is, my notes, in English.[7]

The court rejected this argument as follows:

As for the matter of the language at the hearing, the Court is of the view that, based on a detailed transcript of the hearing before the RPD, the applicants were not denied a hearing in French; rather, they themselves waived their right to an interpreter when they allowed their counsel to deliver part of his oral arguments in English, given that counsel for the applicants’ notes were in English and he wished to communicate them in that language. The RPD was under no obligation to ask the applicants whether they wanted an interpreter at the time or to get them to specifically waive their right to an interpreter. This Court has clearly ruled that a party can implicitly waive the language rights granted to it under the Official Languages Act.[8]

Rule regarding language of documents

See also Rule 32 regarding the language that parties must supply documents in, including the language that the Minister is to use where a claimant has elected for a particular official language: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 32 - Language of Documents

In what language or languages must the reasons for decisions be made available where they are publicly released?

See Canadian Refugee Procedure/Decisions#In what language or languages must the reasons for decisions be made available where they are publicly released?.

References

  1. The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 16 <http://canlii.ca/t/ldsx#sec16> retrieved on 2020-01-25
  2. Blaikie v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016, at pages 1017-18 and Société des Acadiens v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549) at paragraph 53.
  3. Taire v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 877 (CanLII), paras. 51 and 55, <http://canlii.ca/t/1g6pm#51>, retrieved on 2020-01-25
  4. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French, Date modified: 2018-07-03 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/pnnpollo.aspx> (Accessed January 22, 2020).
  5. Comments of Executive Director, Office of the Executive Director, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, House of Commons Hansard <https://openparliament.ca/committees/official-languages/40-3/39/simon-coakeley-31/> and <https://openparliament.ca/committees/official-languages/40-3/39/simon-coakeley-37/>.
  6. Testimony of Simon Coakeley Executive Director, Office of the Executive Director, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Official Languages Committee on Dec. 16th, 2010, House of Commons Hansard <https://openparliament.ca/committees/official-languages/40-3/39/simon-coakeley-1/>.
  7. Brahim v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 734 (CanLII), par. 10, <http://canlii.ca/t/g8tvj#10>, retrieved on 2020-01-25.
  8. Brahim v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 735 (CanLII), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/gjhl5#9>, retrieved on 2020-01-25.

Interpreters (Rule 19)

The Refugee Protection Division simply would not be able to exist in its current form without interpreters. They are key professionals involved in the refugee claim process and over 90% of IRB hearings require interpretation services, with the Board providing interpretation in over 260 languages in some 40,00-60,000 procedures a year.[1] It is said that Refugee Status Determination is not easy because it, by definition, involves determining the status of individuals from foreign countries, describing events elsewhere about which little is known, often speaking foreign languages, and with a range of different cultural beliefs and behaviours.[2] Most refugees have suffered significant trauma, if not before flight, then as a result of flight. The process of status determination requires perpetual sensitivity to the unique predicament of the refugee. What is the role of the interpreter in seeking to ensure communication in such circumstances? What follows is a discussion of the laws and rules regarding interpreters at the Refugee Protection Division.

Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:[3]

Interpreter 
14 A party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak the language in which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf has the right to the assistance of an interpreter.

The standard of interpretation required by section 14 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms varies between immigration and criminal proceedings.[4] The text Refugee Law notes that "although there is a substantial jurisprudence establishing a Charter right to accurate interpretation in the context of criminal proceedings, there has been a notable reluctance by the Federal Court to extend such a comprehensive protection to refugee claimants."[5] The authors note that "although the finding in R v Tran concerning the right to 'continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous' interpretation has been applied to refugee proceedings, the Federal Court has also frequently lowered the threshold for waiver of the right." For the standard required in proceedings before the IRB, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Interpreters#Legal standard for interpretation below.

Canadian Bill of Rights

Section 2(g) of the Canadian Bill of Rights concerns the right to interpretation:[6]

2 Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to ... 
(g) deprive a person of the right to the assistance of an interpreter in any proceedings in which he is involved or in which he is a party or a witness, before a court, commission, board or other tribunal, if he does not understand or speak the language in which such proceedings are conducted.

Rule 19 - Interpreters

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Interpreters

Need for interpreter — claimant
19 (1) If a claimant needs an interpreter for the proceedings, the claimant must notify an officer at the time of the referral of the claim to the Division and specify the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted.

Changing language of interpretation
(2) A claimant may change the language and dialect, if any, that they specified under subrule (1), or if they had not indicated that an interpreter was needed, they may indicate that they need an interpreter, by notifying the Division in writing and indicating the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. The notice must be received by the Division no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.

Need for interpreter — protected person
(3) If a protected person needs an interpreter for the proceedings, the protected person must notify the Division in writing and specify the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. The notice must be received by the Division no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.

Need for interpreter — witness
(4) If any party’s witness needs an interpreter for the proceedings, the party must notify the Division in writing and specify the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. The notice must be received by the Division no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.

Interpreter’s oath
(5) The interpreter must take an oath or make a solemn affirmation to interpret accurately.

The right to an interpreter in a proceeding in another language is enshrined in section 14 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and this right has been held to be generally applicable to a proceeding before the RPD.[7] Interpretation should be continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous.[8] This is defined by the Board as follows:

  • Interpretation should be continuous, without breaks and complete.
  • Interpretation should be precise, as close as can be to word-for-word and without summaries or changes in grammar and syntax; it should be in the first person. This should include the verbatim interpretation of legal jargon used by a Board Member.
  • Interpretation should be impartial; the interpreter is not a witness.
  • Interpretation should be competent; the interpreter must take an oath and should his or her competence be in doubt, an inquiry into competence should be made.
  • Interpretation should be contemporaneous, consecutive, rather than simultaneous.[1]

To put it another way, persons who do not speak and understand one of the official languages must be able to tell their story, and the interpretation must be of such quality that they are not impeached in their ability to make their case.[9] The Board's Interpreter Handbook states that "The role of an interpreter ... is to provide a clear channel of communication. ... Whatever is said in one language should be interpreted faithfully and accurately into the other language using the exact equivalent meaning and structure."[10] The underlying principle is that of linguistic understanding. The principle implies that those testifying through an interpreter should have the same opportunity to understand and be understood as if the person were conversant in English or French. In this way, the purpose of providing interpretation is to provide a level and fair playing field.[11] As the Supreme Court said in Tran, interpretation must be of a high enough quality to ensure that justice is done and seen to be done.[12]

The Federal Court has stated that "an interpreter auditing a hearing recording can always find instances of interpretation that are not perfect."[13] This will not suffice to show that the interpretation fell below the standard expected. Although the standard of interpretation is high, it need not be so high as to be perfect. What is important is whether the claimant understood the interpretation and was able to adequately express themself through the interpreter.[14] If a breach of this standard is shown, it is not necessary to show actual prejudice.[15] As Mr. Justice J.D. Denis Pelletier has observed, “requiring proof of prejudice as a condition of obtaining a remedy for infringement of a constitutionally protected right undermines the constitutional protection”.[16] However, the errors alleged must be material to the claim.[17] Where a panel of the Board makes a general finding that a claimant lacked credibility, then reviewing bodies have had little difficulty concluding that pervasive interpretation challenges were material.[18] As such, the fact that an interpreter added some words that were not said, mistranslated some of the Board’s questions, and frequently intermingled used English words in interpreting to the claimant in another language does not necessarily mean that the interpretation falls below the standard required, and it did not in Sherpa v. Canada.[19]

A claimant is entitled to an interpreter which provides linguistic understanding, not their language or dialect of choice

The requirement to provide an interpreter who provides linguistic understanding cannot be relaxed when there is difficulty in finding an interpreter who can interpret in the language that the applicant understands.[20] That said, a claimant is entitled to an interpreter which provides linguistic understanding, not their language or dialect of choice. In Bykov v. Canada, the IRB had been unable to provide a Tchouvache interpreter, but had supplied a Russian interpreter. Mr. Bykov understood Russian and had had ten years of Russian education. Mr. Justice Teitelbaum held that the applicant understood Russian well enough for the purposes of the hearing and that the IRB was not obligated "to provide an interpreter with the exact dialect of the applicant."[21]

Furthermore, the Board must be alert to circumstances where an interpreter speaks a different dialect of a language and this will impede linguistic understanding. Rule 19(1) instructs a claimant to provide notice of the language and dialect that they require interpretation in. At times, issues have arisen about just what a dialect is. For example, is the difference between Arabic as spoken in Libya and Arabic as spoken in Iraq a matter of dialect or accent? The RAD has noted that it is a best practice for the panel to confirm with the interpreter whether they have provided interpretation services for someone who speaks the dialect in question in the past.[22] That said, the mere fact that the claimant and interpreter are from different localities and have different accents does not mean that the interpretation is not sufficiently precise and competent to convey the claimant’s words on the material points of concern; in Sherpa v. Canada the interpreter acknowledged during the hearing that the claimant was having difficulty understanding her because they were from different localities and had different accents, but the court nonetheless accepted that the interpretation provided met the applicable standards.[19]

There are independent rules about official languages in Canada and the ability to proceed in French or English

Rule 19 of the RPD Rules concerns languages other than English and French. For commentary on English and French, including the potential need for interpreters in and between those languages, see the commentary to Rules 17 and 18: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Language of Proceedings.

Parties are obliged to raise concerns about interpretation issues at the earliest reasonable opportunity

Parties are obliged to raise any issues about the quality of interpretation at the earliest reasonable opportunity.[23] Failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to object to the interpretation on judicial review, and by analogy also on appeal to the RAD.[24] The fact that a party must raise issues about the quality of interpretation at the earliest reasonable opportunity does not necessarily mean that they need to be raised immediately during the hearing. Whether or not such issues should be raised during the hearing will be dependent on the circumstances, including:

  • the language(s) that the claimant speaks;[25]
  • whether the claimant was asked to acknowledge at the start of the hearing that they understood the interpreter;[26]
  • whether the claimant was represented by counsel or unrepresented;[27]
  • the language(s) that counsel speaks;
  • whether the claimant had an observer present at the hearing who was fluent in both languages and able to assess the quality of interpretation;[28]
  • whether the claimant had difficulty understanding the interpreter during the hearing;[29] and
  • whether the issue only became apparent subsequent to the hearing upon an audit or closer examination of the proceedings.

For example, RAD Member Richard Jackson noted that in one case before him "the Appellant does not speak English well, while his counsel before the RPD did not speak Tamil, and therefore neither could reasonably be expected to have been aware of the interpretation issues, until subsequent to the rejection of his refugee claim, and the RAD therefore finds that the Appellant has not waived his right to object to the interpretation on appeal."[24] In contrast, in another case where counsel did speak the language in question, and had raised issues about several small interpretation issues that were addressed on the spot, the failure to raise other issues at the hearing was held to constitute a waiver of the right to object to the quality of interpretation at the hearing:

I agree with counsel for the Respondent that Mr. Dhaliwal waived his right to object to the quality of interpretation at his hearing. ... The Applicant was represented by a Punjabi speaking counsel, who took no issue with the calibre of interpretation at the IAD hearing. During Mr. Dhaliwal’s five hour IAD hearing, counsel raised concerns six times about possible misinterpretations or words that may not have been clear or heard. Each concern was addressed by the interpreter or the IAD member, who asked the Applicant on multiple occasions to slow down, to repeat inaudible answers and to answer in segments to allow for accurate and complete interpretation. The member took every step to ensure that the interpretation was accurate, and counsel appeared to be satisfied that her concerns had been addressed. Never did she complain about the quality of interpretation at the hearing, in her lengthy written submissions to the IAD after the hearing or in her reply.[30]

As explained by the Federal Court, "there is a powerful argument in favour of [the requirement that claimants raise concerns with interpretation at the first opportunity] arising from judicial economy. If applicants are permitted to obtain judicial review of adverse decisions by remaining silent in the face of known problems of interpretation, they will remain silent. This will result in a duplication of hearings. It seems a better policy to provide an incentive to make the original hearing as fair as possible and to avoid repetitious proceedings. Applicants should be required to complain at the first opportunity when it is reasonable to expect them to do so."[31]

Evidence tainted by inadequate or faulty interpretation should be set aside

If the evidence has been tainted by inadequate or faulty interpretation, then it should be set aside and should not be placed on the record.[32]

Requests for an interpreter who is not from a particular community or who is of a particular gender

The Board's gender guidelines quote with approval a paper that states that decision-makers should be sensitive to the fact that "if a claimant's culture dictates that she should suffer battering silently, the use of an interpreter from her community may also intimidate her."[33] Furthermore, the Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB state that the Board has a broad discretion to tailor procedures to meet the particular needs of a vulnerable person, and, where appropriate and permitted by law, the IRB may accommodate a person's vulnerability by various means, including by providing a panel and interpreter of a particular gender.[34]

Such requests should be made at the earliest available opportunity. The IRB Interpreter Handbook notes that "Interpreters are scheduled on an on-call basis and may be booked for a hearing up to three weeks in advance."[35] It is a best practice to make any specific requests for the interpreter prior to this point.

The Board is bound by the Canadian Human Rights Act. This act prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered."[36] As such, the Board should not make distinctions on these grounds (for example, entertaining a request from a claimant not to have an interpreter who is "from" a particular country) without good reason. That said, research on the role of interpreters in legal proceedings discusses the way that characteristics such as sex, age, ethnic identity, and appearance can both generate or diminish trust, so such "protected grounds" may be important occupational requirements in the refugee context.[37] James C. Hathaway notes, for example, that "claimants may have difficulty trusting an interpreter who comes from their own country because, rationally or irrationally, the interpreter may be suspected of being associated with the alleged agent of persecution."[38]

Conflicts of interest for interpreters

The Board's Standard Interpretation Service Contractor Clauses and Conditions includes a detailed section regarding potential conflicts of interest. It requires that "INTERPRETER SERVICE CONTRACTORS shall avoid, and where it arises, shall, without delay, disclose to the case management officer, clerk or BOARD official directing the proceeding, as the case may be, any real, potential, or apparent conflict of interest in relation to any matter for which they provide services to the BOARD."[39]

Evidence expected to demonstrate that interpretation was inadequate

There will be cases where the interpretation provided does not meet the legal standard described above. Indeed, when the Board first introduced an accreditation test in 1991, 40% of interpreters who were already working for the IRB failed.[40] Evidence used to demonstrate that interpretation was inadequate will usually take the following form:

  • A statement from a certified interpreter: When a claimant wishes to demonstrate that interpretation has not met the above standard, it is usual for them to go to a certified interpreter to obtain a transcript of the hearing. Interpreters that have been certified by the IRB and that have provided interpretation services in past RPD hearings will, of course, meet this standard.[41] In contrast, where a claimant submits a statement from someone who is not a certified interpreter but merely suggests that they know both languages, less weight should be accorded to the statement. For example, Member Leonard Favreau commented in one case that "the RAD finds that it can give little weight to this affidavit in establishing that the interpretation was flawed. Although the affiant claims to be a “professional interpreter” the RAD notes that he has not provided any evidence that he has been certified by any organization as an interpreter."[42]
  • A transcript which highlights errors: The certified interpreter will usually then set out in an affidavit any errors that they identify in the transcript that can be attributed to interpretation problems caused by the interpreter at the hearing. For example, this was the type of evidence placed before the RAD in X (Re), 2017 CanLII 143144 (CA IRB), a decision concerning the (in)adequacy of interpretation at the Refugee Protection Division.[43] In contrast, the mere assertion of errors without this type of side-by-side comparison has been held to be insufficient evidence to establish that the above standard was not met, e.g. Member Leonard Favreau of the RAD commented in one case: "Although the Appellant has submitted that it was flawed interpretation that resulted in the RPD attributing statements to him that he did not make, he has not submitted adequate evidence to establish that there actually were any interpretation errors. In light of the allegation of flawed interpretation, it is reasonable to expect that the Appellant could provide a side by side comparison of the interpretation conducted by the board certified interpreter and the Appellant’s certified interpreter, to demonstrate the specific interpretation errors that were made, rather than just relying on his own unsupported declaration."[44]

A party can also request that the Board's interpreter unit conduct an audit. The Board will generally do spot audits of a portion of the hearing. The way the conclusions of such audits are often framed is typified by the following excerpt from a RAD decision: "according to the IRB audit, 'Problems and discrepancies were not serious in general; however some serious inaccuracies occurred.'” The IRB audit also noted “Some of the (in)-accuracies resulted in creating confusion on both sides.”"[45] Where the Board orders such an audit, it must disclose it to the parties for comment, as it would with any other evidence it receives and wishes to place on the record: Vakulenko v. Canada.[46]

What is the scope of the interpreter's role before the Board?

Can an interpreter be asked to translate documents?

Yes, short ones. The Board's Interpreter Handbook informers the Board's contractors that "in some cases, [you will be asked to translate] short documents submitted before, during, or after IRB proceedings."[10] The Interpreter Handbook includes the following details on the scope of what is called "sight translation" that the Board may expect of an interpreter: "As an IRB interpreter, you may be asked to translate aloud a variety of documents for the tribunal. The most common of these documents are identification documents such as passports, drivers' licenses, national identification cards and birth certificates. You may also be asked to sight translate handwritten personal letters, newspaper articles, police or medical reports and other legal documents. In order to give as accurate and precise a translation as possible, and depending on the size and complexity of the document, it is better to request a brief amount of time to review the document ahead of time in order to prepare a rough written translation and/or solve some translation problems beforehand."[10]

In what ways is an interpreter expected to provide cultural, not just linguistic, interpretation?

The Board's Interpreter Handbook has a section on "What is the role of an interpreter at the IRB?" It states that an interpreter is to "provide a clear channel of communication between decision-makers and the individuals appearing before the IRB with culturally, linguistically diverse backgrounds." As such, through these statements the Board is indicating that issues of cultural difference are likely to arise in some cases and that an interpreter's role is to provide a clear channel of communication in order to overcome both linguistic and cultural differences. What are examples of how an interpreter should do this? The most straightforward examples of when an interpreter is expected to do this are where it overlaps with their role to interpret a claimant's utterances. In the words of the academics Jennifer Bond and David Wiseman, "it is essential that interpretation ... take into account nuances of social and cultural idiom and contextual background."[47] Other examples of the interpreter's role in overcoming cultural difference go beyond the strictly linguistic. For example, the IRB's Handbook states that an interpreter may use a calendar to convert dates from other countries, something expected where the other country uses a different calendar system.[10] Finally, as discussed in the following section of this page, where an evident misunderstanding has arisen between a panel and/or one or more parties as a result of differing cultural inferences, the interpreter may properly note this for the record.

That said, the interpreter's role in providing cultural interpretation is properly quite limited. The terms of their contract with the Board provide that interpreters are not to provide any "explanation":

INTERPRETER SERVICE CONTRACTORS shall take all reasonable care to faithfully and accurately interpret or translate what is stated in the source language into the target language, having regard primarily to meaning and secondarily to style, without any paraphrasing, embellishment, omission, explanation, or expression of opinion, using the same person as in the source language and the closest natural equivalent of the source language. [emphasis added][39]

Some commentators have called for Board interpreters to take on more of this cultural interpretation role. For example, Barsky provides examples of cases where potential pitfalls in the refugee's claim were 'saved' when an interpreter offered a cultural explanation, such as a comment on the relative cost of items, different concepts of time, or the different meaning of words in different cultures.[48] Generally, it would appear that, where an interpreter comments on such issues, they are going beyond their appropriate role and treading into prohibited "explanation" or the "expression of opinion". The reason to be cautious with allowing interpreters to take on a cultural authority role is 1) that it risks treading onto the role of counsel, or the Member, and their respective choices when making, or investigating, a case; 2) such interventions could be perceived as favouring one party or another in a proceeding, thereby compromising the neutral role of the interpreter; and 3) as the academic Ahmad observes, "allowing interpreters to act as cultural brokers risks essentializing the [claimant's] cultural background, and this is further complicated because their information is influenced by their own subjective experiences."[49] Interpreters are evaluated by the Board for their linguistic proficiency, not their cultural or country conditions expertise, and they should not necessary be accepted as experts on such. Specifically, the IRB accreditation process is comprised of three tests (a hearing simulation, a sight translation, and an official language test); candidates must get a mark of 70% on all tests to be successful.[50] Furthermore, the Board's Interpreter Handbook notes that in "exceptional circumstances" where the claimant speaks a very rare language or dialect, non-accredited interpreters may be used.[35]

When is an interpreter expected to speak out, ask a question, or point some matter out to the Member?

The Board's Interpreter Handbook has a section on the role of an interpreter at the IRB. It notes that "in addition to overcoming the barrier of language between IRB decision-makers and IRB clients, the interpreter plays a key role in helping the IRB perform its core mandate: making well-reasoned decisions on immigration and refugee matters, efficiently, fairly and in accordance with the law." As such, through these comments the Board is signalling that the role of the interpreter extends to playing a role in ensuring that proceedings are fair and that decisions are well-reasoned. The starting-point is described by Acton as "the expectation that interpreters will primarily interpret the meaning of one language to another, imparting as little personal intervention on the interpreted meaning as possible. However, recognizing that interpretation is not a straightforward process, if interpreters must step outside this primary role, they should make it clear where their subjectivity begins."[51]

The appropriate scope of this role can be illustrated or informed by industry codes of conduct about the proper role of interpreters. For example, the Chartered Institute of Linguists, an international organization that offers interpreter accreditation and professional development, has a Code of Conduct that sets clear standards for member interpreters. It notes that interpreters are permitted to intervene to ask for clarifications; point out misunderstandings, including cultural inferences; and signal conditions that may impair interpretation, such as inadequate breaks or seating arrangements.[52] The following provides some comment on these tasks:

  • Ask for clarification: As a best practice (even if not a legal requirement) an interpreter should ask a speaker for clarification or reformulation if a question is overly complicated.[50] In doing so, the interpreter should put on the record in both languages what they are doing and ask for permission from the Member, if relevant.
  • Point out misunderstandings, including cultural inferences: For example, where an evident misunderstanding has arisen between a panel and/or one or more parties, the interpreter may properly observe and note this.
  • Signal conditions that may impair interpretation, such as inadequate breaks or seating arrangements.
  • Make corrections: The IRB Interpreter Handbook advises interpreters to correct themselves immediately if they realize that they have made a mistake or if a mistake is pointed out.[10]

To what extent may an interpreter discuss and explain their interpretation during the hearing in response to questions from the Member or challenges from a party?

This is within the proper scope of an interpreter's role during the proceeding when the Member provides permission to do so. The Board Interpreter Handbook states that "if your interpretation is challenged by counsel or by the person who is the subject of the proceedings, you should be able to explain your choice of words if requested."[10] However, absent a specific invitation from the Member to explain their interpretation, the interpreter should refrain from doing so, as per the terms of their contract which prohibit "explanation":

INTERPRETER SERVICE CONTRACTORS shall take all reasonable care to faithfully and accurately interpret or translate what is stated in the source language into the target language, having regard primarily to meaning and secondarily to style, without any paraphrasing, embellishment, omission, explanation, or expression of opinion, using the same person as in the source language and the closest natural equivalent of the source language. [emphasis added][39]

To what extent is an interpreter expected to reflect the tone, register, and demeanour of the person testifying?

The Board Interpreter Handbook instructs interpreters to "try to use the same tone and level of language as the person speaking."[35] Robert Gibb and Anthony Good state that this can be a complex task, as a competent interpreter is required to balance the obligation to translate an applicant's answers honestly, while exercising independent judgment on a range of matters, including "how to negotiate different registers of speech without potentially damaging the perceived credibility of an applicant's ... narrative" (register being the level of formality in language that is determined by the context in which it is spoken or written).[53]

In hearings with videoconferencing, the interpreter should normally be located with the claimant, not the Member

Interpreters may be present in person, on the phone, or may appear at a hearing by videoconference.[54] The Board policy is that in hearings that take place via videoconferencing, "as a usual practice, the interpreter is located in the hearing room with the claimant". This practice emerged from a recommendation included in an independent review the Board commissioned of the use of videoconferencing in refugee proceedings, which recommended:

Make it the usual practice to locate the interpreters in the claimant's room with the claimant. Exceptions could be made where an interpreter in the required language is not available close to the location of the claimant's room. It is apparent from the survey evidence that it is not impossible to have reasonable interpretation services with the interpreter in the member's room, but the advantages in terms of putting claimants at ease, and facilitating the efficiency of the translation are sufficiently clear that having the interpreters with the claimant as a regular rule is clearly desirable.[55]

Board management accepted this response, while reserving for itself the discretion to depart from this practice, as follows: "The Board will adopt this recommendation and ensure that, as a usual practice, the interpreter is located in the hearing room with the claimant. However, as the choice to use videoconferencing always requires a balancing of fairness and efficiency, the Board retains a discretion to depart from the norm of locating the interpreter with the claimant when it is not practical to do so (for example, for reasons of interpreter availability or cost)."[56]

Best practices for a Board Member

  • Instruct the claimant to alert the panel of any communication difficulties: As the RAD has noted, it is customary for a panel of the Board to communicate to a claimant that they have an obligation to stop the proceeding and alert the RPD panel and their counsel if they either did not understand the interpreter’s statements or had reason to believe that the interpretation was in some way incorrect.[57]
  • Ensure that all conversations between the claimant and the interpreter are interpreted back into the language of the proceeding, French or English: At times an interpreter will converse with a claimant in order to ask clarifying questions. The fact that an interpreter is doing this should be put on the record and the content of the conversations should be interpreted. The Board should insist that this be done. Where it is not, it is an error, as noted by the RAD with this example from one case: "In his affidavit Mr. XXXX further states that “there were many conversations between Mr. XXXX (the appellant) and Mr. XXXX (the interpreter at the first hearing) that were not translated back to English.” This evidence further establishes that the interpretation provided for the appellant at his first RPD hearing was flawed."[58] They should be done, equally, where it is a witness or claimant who is initiating such conversations. In a Masters Thesis on the topic of interpretation in refugee hearings, one interviewee notes that "good interpreters will let the lawyers and Board Members know if the client is trying to have side conversations with an interpreter in a hearing".[50]
  • Record the hearing: In the case of Toussaint v. Canada the refugee claimant’s testimony was not contained in the transcript of the hearing presumably because the recording equipment was not turned on after an early off-the-record discussion. The missing testimony representing most of the hearing. The Federal Court noted that a failure by the Board to produce a transcript of the evidence taken before it may constitute a denial of natural justice if a reviewing court is unable to properly dispose of the issues raised. This is particularly applicable where there is a subsequent challenge to the interpretation provided. For example, in one case the RAD remitted a matter where interpretation issues were raised on appeal based on the following reasoning: "In the case at hand, the RAD is unable to fully assess the issue of interpretation since a good portion of the principal Appellant’s testimony, whose claim it is that he did not understand the interpreters at the hearing, is missing from the recording of the hearing. The RAD is unable to fully consider the RPD’s observation that the principal Appellant freely answered questions from both interpreters and it did not appear that he did not understand since the RPD’s questioning of the principal Appellant is missing from the recording of the hearing."[59]
  • Note the confidentiality of the proceeding for the benefit of the claimant: Interpreters are under a duty of confidentiality. This is emphasized in the contract that each interpreter signs before commencing work at the Board, which states "[Interpreters] shall keep confidential all information gained in the course of providing services to the [Board]. More specifically, [Interpreters] shall not, either within or outside the [Board] premises, discuss, report on, or give an opinion concerning any matter for which they provide services to the [Board]."[39] The UNHCR Handbook emphasizes the importance of confidentiality in creating an atmosphere of trust in the refugee status determination process: "It will be necessary for the examiner to gain the confidence of the applicant in order to assist the latter in putting forward his case and in fully explaining his opinions and feelings. In creating such a climate of confidence it is, of course, of the utmost importance that the applicant’s statements will be treated as confidential and that he be so informed."[60] For this reason, it may be advisable to underscore to the claimant that the proceedings are confidential.
  • Ensure that substantive exchanges between the Member and counsel are interpreted: Substantive exchanges between a Member and counsel should be interpreted, but it is not necessary for purely logistical exchanges to be completely translated. In Dhaliwal v. Canada, the Applicant complained that some exchanges between the member and counsel were not interpreted at all. The court rejected this argument, noting that "those conversations were purely about administrative matters, and the Supreme Court said in Tran that 'where a lack of or lapse in interpretation occurs in respect of some purely administrative or logistical matter which does not involve the vital interests of the accused, such as scheduling or agreeing to a recess, this will not be a violation of s. 14 of the Charter.'”[61]
  • Provide a claimant with the opportunity to make submissions on interpretation issues in post-hearing submissions: In some cases, a claimant or counsel will note at the hearing that there were some interpretation issues. A good practice in such circumstances was exemplified in Khatun v. Canada where the Member indicated that counsel could obtain a recording of the hearing and provide evidence of any translation issues in post-hearing submissions. None were provided. As such, where the claimant subsequently attempted to make arguments on judicial review about inadequate interpretation, the argument was dismissed on the basis that it should have been made before the original panel.[62]
  • Speak in short segments when working with interpreters: For most interpreters, an altered manner of speaking is required when working with them, as one counsel describes in a report on point:

Speaking through an interpreter is not intuitive, so I think it’s something I’ve picked up. It’s being able to speak in a way that can be interpreted, and the big thing is stopping every, like I’m doing now, stopping every two sentences.[63]

References

  1. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Complaints Concerning Interpretation, June 2006 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/InterpretComPla.aspx> (Accessed January 25, 2020).
  2. Jones, M., & Houle, F. (2008). Building a Better Refugee Status Determination System. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 25(2), 3-11. Retrieved from https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/26027, page 6.
  3. The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 14 <http://canlii.ca/t/ldsx#sec14> retrieved on 2020-01-25.
  4. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf>, page 125 (Accessed January 25, 2020).
  5. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 303.
  6. Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44, s 2 <http://canlii.ca/t/j05x#sec2> retrieved on 2020-04-16.
  7. Mohammadian v. Canada (MCI), 2001 FCA 191 (CanLII), [2001] 4 F.C. 85.
  8. Mohammadian v. Canada (MCI), 2001 FCA 191 (CanLII), [2001] 4 F.C. 85, para. 4.
  9. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 143144 (CA IRB), para. 11 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2017/2017canlii143144/2017canlii143144.html>.
  10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Interpreter Handbook, December 2012, Government of Canada, online: Immigration and Refugee Board <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/interpreters/Pages/Interpret.aspx> (Accessed May 30, 2020).
  11. Dalirani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 258 (CanLII), par. 22, <http://canlii.ca/t/j59ds#par22>, retrieved on 2020-04-22.
  12. R. v Tran, 1994 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 951, at page 988.
  13. Boyal v. Canada (MCI), 2000 CanLII 14755 (FC), [2000] FCJ no 72, 95 ACWS (3d) 139 (FC).
  14. Lawal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 861 (CanLII), at para 26.
  15. Sohal v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1097 (CanLII), para. 18, citing R v Tran, 1994 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 951.
  16. Mohammadian v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 17118 (FC), [2000] FCJ No 309 (QL) at paragraph 12, [2000] 3 FCR 371, aff’d Mohammadian (FCA) at paragraph 4
  17. Singh Dhaliwal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1097 (CanLII), para. 18.
  18. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 141791 (CA IRB), para. 22.
  19. 1 2 Sherpa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] FCJ No. 665.
  20. Faiva v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1983] F.C.J. No. 41, [1983] 2 F.C. 3 (F.C.A.)
  21. Bykov v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1459 (T.D.) (QL).
  22. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 141791 (CA IRB), para. 14.
  23. Aldarwish, Noora Abd Al-Mu v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-268-19), Annis, October 18, 2019; 2019 FC 1265 <https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/423128/index.do>.
  24. 1 2 X (Re), 2019 CanLII 116761 (CA IRB), para. 11.
  25. Khalit v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 928, 2007 FC 684 (F.C.), which held that in that case it was unreasonable to impose on the claimant the duty to testify and be verifier of the interpretation at the same time.
  26. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 102686 (CA IRB), para. 23.
  27. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 61547 (CA IRB), para. 21.
  28. University of Ottawa Refugee Assistance Project, UORAP Hearing Preparation Kit, Guide 3: Preparing Evidence for your Hearing<https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/hearing_preparation_kit.pdf>, page 20.
  29. Sohal v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1175 (CanLII), para. 19.
  30. Singh Dhaliwal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1097 (CanLII), paras. 15-16.
  31. Mohammadian v Canada (MCI), 2000 CanLII 17118 (FC), [2000] 3 FC 371, para 25.
  32. Upadhaya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2003] F.C.J. No. 817, 28 Imm. L.R. (3d) 288 (F.C.T.D.)
  33. F. Stairs & L. Pope, "No Place Like Home: Assaulted Migrant Women's Claims to Refugee Status" (1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy 148, at p. 202
  34. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB, Amended: December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir08.aspx>.
  35. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Interpreter Handbook, October 2017, Accessed January 7, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/interpreters/Pages/Interpret.aspx>.
  36. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s. 3(1).
  37. Roxanna Rycroft, “Communicative Barriers in the Asylum Account”, in P Shah, ed, The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (London: Cavendish, 2005) [Rycroft] at 239.
  38. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: A Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, December 1993, page 22.
  39. 1 2 3 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Standard Interpretation Service Contractor Clauses and Conditions, Date modified: 2018-06-27 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/interpreters/pages/SiscccCtcesi.aspx#AppB> (Accessed January 23, 2020).
  40. Robert F Barsky, "The Interpreter and the Canadian Convention Refugee Hearing: Crossing the Potentially Life-Threatening Boundaries Between 'Coccode-e-h,' 'Cluck-cluck,' and 'Cot-cot-cot'" (1993) 6:2 Traduction, Terminologie, Redaction 131 at 146
  41. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 141791 (CA IRB), para. 13.
  42. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 102686 (CA IRB), para. 29.
  43. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 143144 (CA IRB) <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2017/2017canlii143144/2017canlii143144.html>.
  44. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 102686 (CA IRB), para. 30.
  45. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 145834 (CA IRB), para. 20.
  46. Vakulenko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] F.C.J. No. 719, 2014 FC 667 (F.C.).
  47. Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, Imperfect Evidence and Uncertain Justice: An Exploratory Study of Access to Justice Issues in Canada's Asylum System, 53 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2020), page 46.
  48. Robert F Barsky, Constructing a Productive Other: Discourse Theory and the Convention Refugee Hearing (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1986) at 152.
  49. Muneer Ahmad, “Interpreting Communities” (2007) 54 UCLA L Rev 999 [Ahmad] at 1057.
  50. 1 2 3 Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y> (Accessed January 23, 2020).
  51. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, page 117 (Accessed January 23, 2020).
  52. Chartered Institute of Linguists, Code of Conduct, [CIOL Code of Conduct] Annex II, article 6.4, available online: Chartered Institute of Linguists, www.ciol.org.uk/images/Membership/CPC.pdf.
  53. Robert Gibb & Anthony Good, "Interpretation, Translation and Intercultural Communication in Refugee Status Determination Procedures in the UK and France" (2014) 14:3 Language & Intercultural Communication 385 at 389, citingJoan Colin Ruth Morris, Interpreters and the LegalProcess (Winchester: Waterside Press, 1996) at 17, as cited and quoted in Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, Imperfect Evidence and Uncertain Justice: An Exploratory Study of Access to Justice Issues in Canada's Asylum System, 53 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2020), page 46.
  54. Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, Imperfect Evidence and Uncertain Justice: An Exploratory Study of Access to Justice Issues in Canada's Asylum System, 53 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2020), page 7.
  55. S. Ronald Ellis, Q.C., Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Published by Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Date October 21, 2004 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/Video.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
  56. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board Response to the Report on Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Date modified listed on webpage: 2018-06-26, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/VideoRespRep.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
  57. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 141791 (CA IRB), para. 15.
  58. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 141791 (CA IRB), para. 18.
  59. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 108763 (CA IRB), para. 20.
  60. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb474b27.html [accessed 26 January 2020], para. 200.
  61. Dhaliwal v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 157 (CanLII), para. 69.
  62. Khatun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 169, 2012 FC 159 (F.C.).
  63. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf>, page 85 (Accessed January 23, 2020).

Designated Representatives (Rule 20)

The RPD Rules regarding the appointment of representatives for minors and for those who are unable to appreciate the nature of their proceedings are of significant and enduring importance to proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division. Globally, children below 18 years of age constitute about half of the world's refugee population.[1] Most children who file a refugee claim in Canada have a familial representative appointed for them for their proceedings before the IRB. A smaller number of claimants are considered to be unaccompanied; approximately 300 separated children arrive in Canada each year and claim refugee protection.[2] This number of unaccompanied children seeking asylum had considerably augmented in the past decades.[3]

A167(2): Board's responsibility to designate a representative

Subsection 167(2) of the IRPA states:

Representation
167(2) If a person who is the subject of proceedings is under 18 years of age or unable, in the opinion of the applicable Division, to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, the Division shall designate a person to represent the person.

The Board must designate a representative for minors and incompetent persons

The categories of persons who the Board must designate a representative for are minors and incompetent persons, as noted in the Board's public commentary on the analogous provision in the Immigration Division Rules:

A representative must be designated for any person who is the subject of an admissibility hearing or a detention review if this person is under the age of 18 years (a "minor") or is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings (an "incompetent person") (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, subsection 167(2)).[4]

The Board's duty to designate a representative for minors reflects Canada's international law obligations. The IRPA states that "this Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory" (IRPA s. 3). The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides, in Article 22(1), that:

State Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law procedures, shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties.[5]

Article 22 of the CRC obliges states to ‘take appropriate measures’ to ensure the child receives ‘appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance’, thus imposing a positive obligation on the state to ensure that adequate procedures are put in place to protect the child as appropriate.[6]

How the provisions regarding designated representatives interact with the Board guidelines on vulnerable persons

The Board also has a Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. A designated representative will only be appointed if the person is either under eighteen years of age or unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, a standard which is considerably narrower than the criteria for recognition as a vulnerable person, which usually occurs where a claimant’s ability to present their case is severely impaired.[7] In a number of cases, the Board has refused to appoint a designated representative but has gone on to recognize that the person was vulnerable and allowed procedural accommodations.[8] As the academic Janet Cleveland observes, if an adult’s ability to understand the proceedings is so impaired as to warrant the appointment of a designated representative, she is necessarily also severely impaired in her ability to present her case and should automatically be considered vulnerable.[9]

The Board must not delay a proceeding until a minor has turned 18 as an alternative to designating a representative

The Federal Court of Appeal in Stumf v. Canada stated that the obligation to designate a representative for a minor arises at the earliest point at which the Board becomes aware of the facts that entail such designation.[10] The following public commentary from the IRB on the previous version of the rules continues to apply: "The Division will not delay a proceeding until the minor has reached 18 merely to avoid having to designate a representative."[11] In fact, pursuant to the Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, certain categories of children such as unaccompanied children are to be given given scheduling and processing priority.[12] Furthermore, given that a designated representative is to assist a minor claimant with preparing their Basis of Claim form, gathering evidence, and instructing counsel (and not just at the hearing itself) a minor may be prejudiced where they did not have such assistance in preparing their claim and the lack of such assistance may properly vitiate any proceedings before the RPD, as was the case in Duale v. Canada.[13]

The absolute nature of the requirement to appoint a designated representative for minors in the Canadian system may be contrasted with the European approach which allows Member States to 'refrain from appointing a representative where the unaccompanied minor is 16 years old or older, unless he/she is unable to pursue his/her application without a representative'.[14] This European practice has been severely criticized by academic commentators.[15]

Rule 20(1)-(3) - Duty of counsel or officer to notify the Division of relevant circumstances

The text of the relevant rule reads:

Designated Representatives

Duty of counsel or officer to notify
20 (1) If counsel for a party or if an officer believes that the Division should designate a representative for the claimant or protected person because the claimant or protected person is under 18 years of age or is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, counsel or the officer must without delay notify the Division in writing.

Exception
(2) Subrule (1) does not apply in the case of a claimant under 18 years of age whose claim is joined with the claim of their parent or legal guardian if the parent or legal guardian is 18 years of age or older.

Content of notice
(3) The notice must include the following information:
(a) whether counsel or the officer is aware of a person in Canada who meets the requirements to be designated as a representative and, if so, the person’s contact information;
(b) a copy of any available supporting documents; and
(c) the reasons why counsel or the officer believes that a representative should be designated.

Rule 20(3)(a): the notice from counsel or the officer should indicate whether they are aware of a person in Canada who meets the requirements to be designated as a representative

As per Rule 20(1), if counsel for a party or if an officer believes that the Division should designate a representative for the claimant or protected person because the claimant or protected person is under 18 years of age or is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, counsel or the officer must without delay notify the Division in writing. As per Rule 20(3)(a), the notice must indicate whether counsel or the officer is aware of a person in Canada who meets the requirements to be designated as a representative and, if so, the person’s contact information. Rule 20(3)(b) also indicates that the notice should include a copy of any available supporting documents. In practice, these two requirements will often work together in that a notice from counsel advising that a DR is appropriate will often include a medical report which comments on who may be an appropriate representative. This was illustrated in Singh v Canada, a decision from the Immigration Appeal Division interpreting its similar rule, wherein the panel wrote:

In his letter to the Immigration Appeal Division (the “IAD”), dated October 30, 2012 the appellant’s counsel advised that the appellant is unable to appreciate the nature of proceedings of his appeal due to his medical condition. The appellant’s counsel requested the appellant’s sister Mandeep Kaur be designated as his representative.... In considering to appoint the appellant’s sister Mandeep Kaur as his representative I have taken into account the conclusion in the psychological assessment report dated October 4, 2012. The report was based on the interviews conducted by the clinical psychologist, Dr. Lydia Kwa with the appellant and his immediate family members. In her report, Dr. Kwa stated as following: "Given Gurpreet’s cognitive limits and his anxiety, he is not able to represent himself competently. He would be best served by having a member of his family assume responsibility as legal representative to act in his best interests....His sister Mandeep seems to be a good choice at this time to assume that role as his legal representative."[16]

Rule 20(3)(b): the notice from counsel or the officer should include a copy of any available supporting documents

As noted in the Board's public commentary on the previous version of the rules, it is expected that counsel will provide evidence of the claimant's age or mental condition: "When notifying the Division, counsel should provide copies of all available supporting documents such as birth certificates and medical or psychological reports".[11]

Can a designated representative from one province act as a representative in a proceeding or for an individual in another province?

Yes. This is emphasised by the notice provision in Rule 20(3) which instructs the person providing the notice to indicate if they are aware of any "person in Canada who meets the requirements to be designated as a representative [emphasis added]". Generally speaking, a DR is not acting as a lawyer, so even where a designated representative is a lawyer regulated by a provincial or territorial law society, the rules on such counsel acting inter-provincially should not apply, though this may depend on the exact way in which the provisions, including what the practice of law is and when inter-provincial practice is allowed, are framed in the relevant statutes.

Justification for the requirement that counsel or an officer notify the Board of any perceived need for a DR

Rule 20(1) provides that the referring officer who does the intake of the refugee claim and any counsel for the claimant (or protected person, as the case may be) are to advise the IRB in writing "without delay" if they believe that a claimant requires an independent designated representative. The rationale for this is manifold, including:

  • The time inherent in appointing an independent DR and the importance of avoiding adjournments: Where an independent designated representative will need to be appointed by the Board, this will take time and may require a postponement of a proceeding. Appointing a representative at the earliest opportunity based on notice from an officer or counsel obviates the need for such postponements. Such scheduling realities have commonly been noted by panels of the Board, such as with the following comment from a panel of the Immigration Appeal Division when interpreting its analogous rule: "It was clear from the outset that should the panel’s opinion be that a designated representative was required, and that the appellant’s sister was not an appropriate candidate, the matter would have to be adjourned to a future date pending appointment of a new designated representative."[17]
  • The value of an early appointment given the role of the designated representative in preparing for the hearing: Appointing a representative at the earliest stage allows them to be involved in case preparation. This is commonly emphasized by panels of the Board, e.g. "The panel prefers to proceed with caution by having a designated representative involved and available to play whatever role is required in preparing for and participating at the hearing. [emphasis added]"[18] The instructions to designated representatives in the Board's guide for DRs instructs them that "You must meet the minor or the person who is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings as early as possible in the process to explain your role and responsibilities and to begin to assist them with their case."[19]
  • The fact that needs may only become apparent over time, and thus may not be evident to the Board: There will be cases where the need for a designated representative only becomes apparent over time. This was well illustrated by a decision of Immigration Appeal Division Member D. Collison wherein the panel noted that "Appellant’s counsel also explained that it was only in meeting with the appellant on a number of occasions over an extended period of time, mostly after the March 2008 admissibility hearing, that it became apparent she did not understand the nature of the proceedings and required a designated representative."[20] In this way, placing the duty on counsel to notify the Board avoids a situation where a DR is necessary but would not be appointed on the Board’s own initiative because it is not immediately apparent on the face of a file or upon initially interacting with a claimant that such a representative is necessary.
  • The fact that claimants may be reluctant to self-identify as having a disability: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities committee has noted that migrants with disabilities ‘are often hesitant to disclose their disabilities to authorities for fear of affecting their asylum applications’.[21] Academic research suggests that asylum seekers will often resist identifying as persons with disabilities, with children less likely again than adults to volunteer information on impairments that are not immediately apparent.[22] As such, this type of rule may promote greater disclosure of needs to the IRB to ensure that appropriate assistance is put in place.

Criticisms of automatically making a parent the designated representative for an accompanying minor claimant

UNICEF has been critical of the fact that Rule 20(2) automatically grants designated representative status to a parent or guardian without first consulting the child whose application is at stake. In this way, they argues that "Canada’s immigration and refugee policy does not sufficiently provide for children’s right to be heard."[23] However, this presumption that a child's parent or guardian should be their designated representative in the refugee determination process is endorsed by the UNHCR Handbook: "A child – and for that matter, an adolescent – not being legally independent should, if appropriate, have a guardian appointed whose task it would be to promote a decision that will be in the minor’s best interests. In the absence of parents or of a legally appointed guardian, it is for the authorities to ensure that the interests of an applicant for refugee status who is a minor are fully safeguarded."[24]

Rule 20(4) - Requirements for being designated

Requirements for being designated
(4) To be designated as a representative, a person must
(a) be 18 years of age or older;
(b) understand the nature of the proceedings;
(c) be willing and able to act in the best interests of the claimant or protected person; and
(d) not have interests that conflict with those of the claimant or protected person.

Criteria to consider when appointing a representative for a child

As per the Board's guidelines on Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, when determining whether to designate a particular person as the representative for a child claimant, the Member shall determine whether the proposed DR satisfies all of the mandatory criteria in RPD Rule 20(4) and should also consider the linguistic and cultural background, age, gender and other personal characteristics of the proposed DR and that of the child claimant.

Rule 20(4)(b): When will a proposed designated representative be found not to understand the nature of the proceedings?

It should be noted that this is a distinct test from that in Rule 20(5) which focuses on a claimant’s (or protected person’s) ability to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, whereas this rule focuses on whether the proposed person does in fact understand them. The tribunal must advise the designated representative of its role in the proceeding.[25] The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has commented on the obligations that representatives should have towards unaccompanied children, including knowledge of country conditions in the country of origin.[26]

Rule 20(4)(c): When will a designated representative be found not to be willing and able to act in the best interests of the claimant or protected person?

As per Rule 20(4)(c), to be designated as a representative, a person must be willing and able to act in the best interests of the claimant or protected person. When has it been found that a potential representative was not willing and able to act in the best interests of the claimant or protected person?

  • When the claimant does not trust the proposed representative: Even if the proposed representative is willing to act in the best interests of the claimant or protected person, their ability to do so may be stymied where the claimant in question does not trust the proposed representative. This appeared to be the case in one matter before the Immigration Appeal Division, which observed that "There is evidence, from the appellant’s side, that she has a very tense relationship with her family, particularly her sister [the proposed DR], and that she feels her sister does not have her best interests in mind." On this basis, the panel concluded that the proposed DR was not appropriate.[27]
  • When the proposed representative does not appreciate their role: In Black v. Canada the Court set aside a decision on the basis that the designated representative was not “able” to act in the individuals' best interests because the representative did not fully appreciate the implications of her role as designated representative. That was a decision interpreting the analogous rule of the Immigration Appeal Division, which, like the RPD rules, requires that the person appointed must understand the nature of the proceedings and that they be “willing and able to act in the best interests of the person to be represented.” In that case, "The [panel] asked the Applicant’s mother to act as a designated representative. Even though she had no appreciation of the significance of this role or how to best represent the interests of the Applicant, she willingly stepped into the breach to help her son. The Applicant’s mother was obviously appointed as an expedient. She just happened to be in the room to support her son and, being a mother, she naturally stepped forward." In that case, "The Applicant’s mother insist[ed] in an affidavit filed in the[] proceedings that she was not informed of the duties of a designated representative. She also did not know that part of a designated representative’s responsibility is to arrange for counsel. Nothing was explained to her at the hearing."[28] The court concluded that "In my view, the ability to act in the Applicant’s best interests requires more than a sympathetic and supportive relative, and the [Board] and counsel will need to satisfy themselves that anyone who does assume the role is appointed in a timely manner and has the necessary understanding to act in the Applicant’s best interests."[29] The court specifically noted the importance of the designated representative understanding their obligations with respect to obtaining counsel, having an appreciation for what evidence needs to be called, and the substantive issues and facts at issue in the case.

Separate considerations apply to terminating the appointment of a designated representative once their behaviour indicates that they are not properly assuming their role, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Designated Representatives#Circumstances in which a designated representative ceases to be appropriate.

    Rule 20(4)(d): When will a designated representative be found to have interests that conflict with those of the claimant or protected person?

    As per Rule 20(4)(d), to be designated as a representative, the person must not have interests that conflict with those of the claimant or protected person. When have such conflicts been found?

    • When the proposed representative will also act as a witness in the proceeding: In interpreting its analogous rule, the Immigration Appeal Division has held that where a proposed designated representative is to be called as a witness, this will conflict with their role as designated representative and lessen the weight which could be accorded their testimony as they would be present throughout the hearing in their role as designated representative and hear all of the testimony before testifying themselves: "Further, as Ms. Jangbahadur is expected to be called as a witness, her role, as the designated representative, who will be present throughout the appellant’s testimony, could well lessen the weight the panel may be able to attribute to her own testimony."[30] This is distinct from situations in which the DR provides testimony on behalf of the claimant but is not themselves an independent witness being called to testify about their direct personal knowledge of facts at issue.
    • When the representative refrains from providing relevant evidence as a result of their personal interests or concerns: As an example, Refugee Appeal Division Member Rena Dhir presided over a case in which the Designated Representative did not disclose relevant information as a result of fears of disclosing details related to her immediate family: "the [DR] feared the Chinese authorities and feared for her own self and family if they came to know about her involvement in the appellant’s refugee claim in Canada" and as a result "failed to provide information which may have addressed the RPD’s credibility concerns and further substantiated the risk the appellant faces in China", such as be contacting the family members to ask that they provide evidence.[31] In that case, the RAD concluded that "it is clear that because of the conflicts of the designated representative with the appellant’s interest, she did not meet the ‘mandatory criteria’ and also did not fulfill all ‘duties’ that are required for a designated representative, such as acting in the best interests of the appellant."[31]

    Rule 20(5) - Factors for determining whether a claimant or protected person is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings

    Factors
    (5) When determining whether a claimant or protected person is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
    (a) whether the person can understand the reason for the proceeding and can instruct counsel;
    (b) the person’s statements and behaviour at the proceeding;
    (c) expert evidence, if any, on the person’s intellectual or physical faculties, age or mental condition; and
    (d) whether the person has had a representative designated for a proceeding in another division of the Board.

    Rule 20(5)(a): Whether the person can understand the reason for the proceeding and can instruct counsel

    The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division rule states that a person is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings vis-a-vis this criterion where "the person cannot understand the reason for the hearing or why it is important or cannot give meaningful instructions to counsel about his or her case."[4]

    Rule 20(5)(b): Assessing a person's statements and behaviour at the hearing

    When determining whether a claimant is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, a panel of the Board is to consider the person's statements and behaviour at the proceeding. An example of this comes from the case Ryvina v. Canada, where the claimant was described as having difficulty answering simple questions and where the claimant indicated that as a result of her nervousness she was unable to answer questions related to the core of the claim, such as threats that she received in her country.[32] The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division rule states that "an opinion regarding competency may be based on the person's own admission [of incompetency]".[4] Similarly, in M. v. Canada, the court stated that "it is obvious from the transcript that the claimant was not rational throughout the course of the hearing" and that it was "apparent that he was unable to give coherent testimony about the issues raised by his claim for refugee status and protection". The court held that the Member "should have stopped the hearing at that point and considered alternative procedures to determine the claim".[33]

    Rule 20(6) - What proceedings the designation applies to

    Designation applies to all proceedings
    (6) The designation of a representative for a person who is under 18 years of age or who is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings applies to all subsequent proceedings in the Division with respect to that person unless the Division orders otherwise.

    What proceedings does the designation of the representative apply to?

    As per Rule 20(6), the designation applies to all subsequent proceedings in the Division unless the Division orders otherwise. "Proceeding" is a defined term in the Rules, and it is defined as including a conference, an application, or a hearing (Rule 1). The Federal Court holds that the need for a designated representative applies to the entirety of the proceedings and not just the hearing itself.[29] This allows the representative to, for example, retain and instruct counsel and to assist in gathering evidence pre-hearing (as detailed in Rule 20(10) below).

    Rule 20(7) - Ending a designation where a person reaches 18 years of age

    End of designation — person reaches 18 years of age
    (7) The designation of a representative for a person who is under 18 years of age ends when the person reaches 18 years of age unless that representative has also been designated because the person is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings.

    A designation ends automatically by operation of law when a person reaches 18 years of age and no explicit steps need be taken by the Board

    The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division Rules states that "A designation is ended automatically by operation of law when the person who is the subject of the [proceeding] reaches 18 years of age."[4]

    Rule 20(8) - Termination of designation

    Termination of designation
    (8) The Division may terminate a designation if the Division is of the opinion that the representative is no longer required or suitable and may designate a new representative if required.

    Circumstances in which a designated representative ceases to be appropriate

    The Division may (but need not) terminate a designation if the Division of the opinion that the representative is no longer required or suitable. Situations where a representative is no longer suitable have included:

    • When the proposed representative does not carry out their obligations: The Board's Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues note that "There may be situations where the person who was designated to be the representative ceases to be an appropriate representative of the child. For example, the person may prove unwilling or unable to make themselves available for pre-hearing conferences. In these situations, the CRDD should remove the person as designated representative and designate another appropriate representative."[12]

    The Division may terminate a designation, but it is not always obliged to do so

    Rule 20(8) provides that the Division may terminate a designation if the Division is of the opinion that the representative is no longer required or suitable. It does not require that such a designation be terminated, particularly where it is ambiguous whether or not such a representative is any longer required (as in a case where there is a factual dispute as to whether a claimant is a minor or not). The courts have encouraged panels of the Board to exercise their discretion when deciding whether or not to terminate a designation in a given case. For example, in Kurija v. Canada there was a factual dispute about whether the claimant was a minor or not: "At the hearing on May 11, 2012, counsel informed the Board member that Mr Kurija was under 18 and had difficulty understanding English (although an interpreter had not been requested). However, the Board member made a finding that Mr Kurija spoke adequate English and a finding that he was of age based on his passport documents and other evidence, and ordered the designated representative to leave the proceedings."[34] The court concluded that this had been procedurally unfair, and in so doing encouraged panels of the Board to consider allowing a representative, who is already present at the hearing, to remain in such circumstances: "In this instance the Designated Representative was present and was in a position to assist the applicant and the Board. Rather than making an adverse credibility finding to the effect that the applicant had provided a false birth certificate, a finding which colours all of the Board’s decision and which appears to be incorrect in light of the additional evidence, why should the Board not exercise its discretion liberally and permit the social worker to remain and assist the claimant?"[35]

    Rule 20(9) - What the panel must do before designating the person as a representative

    Designation criteria
    (9) Before designating a person as a representative, the Division must
    (a) assess the person’s ability to fulfil the responsibilities of a designated representative; and
    (b) ensure that the person has been informed of the responsibilities of a designated representative.

    Common categories of persons who are designated as representatives

    The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division Rules states that "The member presiding at a proceeding will decide whether to designate a representative and who that representative will be. The member will usually, but not always, designate a parent, another relative, or legal guardian to be the representative, if that person meets the specified requirements."[4] A trusted friend who appears capable of assisting and protecting the best interests of the claimant or protected person is also a common category of person to appoint. An individual is not barred from acting as a designated representative simply because she is also a refugee claimant.[36] Should no representative be available or deemed suitable who is related to or otherwise known to the claimant, the RPD will select a representative using a regional list of lawyers and social services (or non-governmental) support agencies.

    The Board will generally designate a representative prior to the outset of the hearing via a paper-based process

    The normal processes in which a designated representative is appointed is a paper-based process. For a co-claimant, such as a parent, the Board will, as a matter of course, send a letter to the proposed representative naming them to the role and describing their duties as a representative. The Board's form letter states that the individual can "refuse to assume this role if [they] contact the Refugee Protection Division within ten days of receiving the letter".[37] For an independent designated representative, the Board will send the potential representative a Confirmation of Acceptance to Act as a Designated Representative form. The proposed representative can then sign a declaration on the form that they are willing and able to fulfil the designated representative's responsibilities and that they understand the responsibilities of such a representative. A Member of the Board will then review the paperwork and designate the proposed representative by signing the Board's standard form for this purpose. The requirement in Rule 9(a) that the panel assess the person's ability to fulfil the responsibilities of a designated representative and ensure that the person has been informed of the responsibility of a designated representative prior to so designating the person can in this way be done on paper.

    The Board stated in its commentary on the previous RPD Rules that, "generally, the member who presides at a proceeding designates the representative at the outset of the proceeding." That commentary allowed that, "if required, any member of the Division may designate a representative before a proceeding begins".[11] That is no longer the usual process. The Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues state that a designated representative for an unaccompanied child should be appointed as soon as possible following the assignment of the panel to the claim. Even in cases where a child is accompanied, that should be done as soon as possible after the claim is referred to the Board: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Designated Representatives#The Board must not delay a proceeding until a minor has turned 18 as an alternative to designating a representative. The Chairperson Guideline 3 notes that the designation of a representative will usually occur at a pre-hearing conference, but it may be done earlier.[12] That guideline dates from 1996 and has not been updated since, and that statement of the usual practice is arguably no longer current, as a paper-based designation process is the norm instead of it being done at a pre-hearing conference.

    A question has at times arisen about whether a designated representative was appointed or not in a given case. Even where the appointment is not mentioned on the record or in the panel's reasons, the proposed representative will be taken to have assumed the role for their co-claimant child where they attend the hearing after having received one of the letters described above, as the court stated in Plancher v. Canada: "There is nothing in the file indicating that this letter was never received by the principal applicant and her counsel. Since no evidence is presented indicating the principal applicant’s refusal, I must conclude that she accepted to act as the minor applicant’s designated representative."[37]

    The Rules do not require a designated representative to be appointed for an eligibility interview

    Rule 20(9) provides that it is the IRB that designates a person as a representative and it sets out what the Division must do prior to designating a representative. As such, under the RPD Rules a representative cannot be designated by an officer prior to a claim being referred to the Board since designating a representative is something that only the Board itself can do. This is consistent with policy statements from the Board, including in the Chairperson's Guidelines on Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues which state that "a representative will be designated as soon as possible after the claim of an "unaccompanied" minor is referred to the Division [emphasis added]."[12] A separate question may arise about the reliability of statements made by minors or those who are incompetent to an officer at the border, but that will generally be a matter of the weight that should be ascribed to the statements in question.

    When feedback was solicited by the Board as this rule was being drafted, several respondents made comments regarding the rules which pertain to designated representatives. One respondent indicated that they would prefer to see the rules amended so a representative can be designated by the officer at the eligibility interview rather than only the Division. The IRB stated that it agrees that a designated representative should be designated as early as possible in the process, but noted that the IRB is of the view that it lacks the jurisdiction to designate a representative prior to the referral of a claim, and that the officer lacks the authority to do so at the eligibility interview.[38] As such, the rule was not changed as a result of that feedback during the comment period of these rules.

    The RPD rules place a number of obligations on different actors in the refugee claim process, including the Minister, counsel for claimants, and in Rule 3, the officers who assess and refer claims. The Rules impose a number of obligations on officers prior to the referral of a claim, including specifying actions they must take (e.g. fixing a date for the hearing, Rule 3(1)), how the officer is to exercise their discretion when carrying out such actions (e.g. rules about what hearing date they must choose, Rule 3(2)), and questions they must ask a claimant (e.g. the claimant's preference of location, Rue 3(3)), and so it is unclear why the Board took the position that as a matter of jurisdiction the Board could not further qualify how an officer is to carry out such duties where a would-be claimant has a disability, is a minor, etc. Regardless, examining Rule 20 as drafted, the rule arguably does not impose such a duty. The RPD Rules do require the referring officer to inform the RPD whether the claimant may need a designated representative and to provide the contact information for any proposed designated representative (Rule 20(1) above), however they are clear in Rule 20(9) that it is the Division that must take steps prior to designating a person as a representative. It would thus be impossible for an officer to do so, and as such, the rules do not, in and of themselves, oblige a referring officer to designate a representative for a minor or other claimant at an eligibility interview. In short, as the court observed in Stumf v. Canada, Section 167(2) of IRPA “imposes on the Board an obligation to designate a representative for any refugee claimant who meets the statutory criteria, and that the obligation arises at the earliest point at which the Board becomes aware of those facts. [emphasis added]”.[39]

    Rule 20(10) - Responsibilities of the representative

    Responsibilities of representative
    (10) The responsibilities of a designated representative include
    (a) deciding whether to retain counsel and, if counsel is retained, instructing counsel or assisting the represented person in instructing counsel;
    (b) making decisions regarding the claim or application or assisting the represented person in making those decisions;
    (c) informing the represented person about the various stages and procedures in the processing of their case;
    (d) assisting in gathering evidence to support the represented person’s case and in providing evidence and, if necessary, being a witness at the hearing;
    (e) protecting the interests of the represented person and putting forward the best possible case to the Division;
    (f) informing and consulting the represented person to the extent possible when making decisions about the case; and
    (g) filing and perfecting an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division, if required.

    History of this rule

    The wording of Rule 20(10) is identical to the wording of Rule 15(3) in the previous version of the rules from 2002.[40]

    A designated representative is akin to a litigation guardian

    In A.N. v. Canada, the court described a minor’s designated representative as being "akin to a litigation guardian in the context of civil proceedings." They noted that "the representative must act in the minor’s best interest at all times during the proceedings and must not let any extraneous or outside concerns or interests impair his or her ability to protect the minor’s interests and to put forward to the RPD the best possible case on the minor’s behalf."[41] The Board's guide for designated representatives notes that "a designated representative is not the same as counsel" and that "the Division must appoint a representative even when the minor or the person who is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings has legal or other counsel."[19] That said, the Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division Rules states that "where appropriate, a designated representative may act as counsel."[4]

    A designated representative does not, however, have an unlimited obligation to assist a refugee claimant with all aspects of their introduction to Canadian society. Persons seeking protection often have a range of different needs, including health welfare, education, employment, financial , and legal needs.[42] The designated representative does not have an obligation to act as a social worker to attend to all such needs of the represented person. This is notable because such a role is recommended in the UNHCR Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum:

    The guardian or adviser should have the necessary expertise in the field of childcaring, so as to ensure that the interests of the child are safeguarded, and that the child’s legal, social, medical and psychological needs are appropriately covered during the refugee status determination procedures and until a durable solution for the child has been identified and implemented. To this end, the guardian or adviser would act as a link between the child and existing specialist agencies/individuals who would provide the continuum of care required by the child.[43]

    While it is still incumbent upon the Canadian state to ensure that the above needs of a child are attended to, this is outside of the scope of the responsibilities of a designated representative as appointed by the Board.

    Remuneration for independent designated representatives

    For an RPD hearing which is concluded on its merits, an independent designated representative is paid $550. Where there are interlocutory or other preliminary proceedings attended by the DR, they will receive an additional $100 per attendance.[44]

    Even once a designated representative has been appointed, the claimant will often continue to have a role in the claim process

    As the court noted in A.N. v. Canada, "The designated representative is not the minor, nor vice versa."[41] The significance of this is that even where represented by a designated representative, the procedural interests of the claimant themselves do not become irrelevant. This has been reflected in proceedings in a number of ways, including:

    • Using (a) language the claimant understands: The court commented approvingly on a panel's decision to continue proceedings in the language that the claimant spoke, even where a representative was designated for them and the representative, counsel, and the panel would have otherwise been able to proceed in English: "The Board Member ensured that the applicant [the claimant in the proceeding] remained involved in the events by rejecting her counsel’s suggestion that the proceedings be conducted in English, or that she should not sit beside her son [who served as the designated representative] while he testified. The applicant understood that she was there to advise her son as he testified. During the course of the testimony when her son could not answer a question, she provided the answer indicating she was engaged and understanding the proceedings."[45]
    • Allowing the claimant to remain in the hearing room: The person who has a representative designated for them continues to have a right to observe and, where possible, understand the hearing. Even where the claimant will not be able to understand the hearing room, a Member may err where they refuse to allow the claimant to remain in the room during the hearing. For example, in one case where a Board Member refused to proceed with the hearing with children present, the Board found that in so doing (and in the way that they went about making the decision not to proceed) they had breached the Code of Conduct for Members of the IRB.[46]
    • Allowing the claimant to testify, where appropriate: The person who has a representative designated for them may still testify, as appropriate. The Federal Court commented approvingly on this practice in one case: "The [claimant] understood that she was there to advise her [designated representative] as he testified. During the course of the testimony when her [DR] could not answer a question, [the claimant] provided the answer indicating she was engaged and understanding the proceedings."[45] This also reflects a children's rights approach. This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory, per s. 3 of the IRPA; the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that children have a right to be heard, should be allowed to express their views in all matters affecting them, and should be given the opportunity to participate in any decision about their lives (Article 12 CRC), subject to the principle of evolving capacities (Article 5 CRC).[47]

    The role of the designated representative can be limited to some of the above tasks

    In Ryvina v. Canada, the claimant's son was appointed as her designated representative at the hearing after the claimant had trouble testifying. The Federal Court concluded that the designated representative took on some of the above roles, but that it was not necessary for the hearing to be adjouned for the designated representative to repeat all the tasks specified in Rule 20(10) de novo:

    In this matter, where the applicant was represented by counsel, the issue only arose once the applicant attempted to testify and was experiencing difficulty in doing so. Accordingly, most of the matters discussed in Rule 20 have no application. This would include the requirements such as deciding whether to retain counsel and instructing counsel [Rule 20(10)(a)], making or assisting in making decisions regarding the claim or application [Rule 20(10)(b)], informing the represented person about the various stages and procedures in the processing of their case [Rule 20(10)(c)], assisting in gathering evidence to support the represented person’s case [Rule 20(10)(d)], informing and consulting the represented person when making decisions about the case [Rule 20(10)(f)], and in filing and perfecting an appeal [Rule 20(10)(g)]. In this particular case, the applicant son’s role as a representative was limited to providing evidence, and if necessary, being a witness at the hearing [Rule 20(10)(d)], and also protecting the interests of the represented person in putting forward the best possible case [Rule 20(10)(e)].[48]

    This is consistent with international standards that where special needs become apparent at a later stage in the asylum procedure, states will ensure that the need for special procedural accommodations is addressed without necessarily restarting the procedure.[49]

    Rule 20(10)(a) deciding whether to retain counsel and, if counsel is retained, instructing counsel or assisting the represented person in instructing counsel

    RPD Rule 20(10)(a) provides that the responsibilities of a designated representative include deciding whether to retain counsel and, if counsel is retained, instructing counsel or assisting the represented person in instructing counsel.

    • Principles about whether to retain counsel: The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has specified that pursuant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, all children, including those in parental care, should be appointed a legal representative to provide representation at all stages in the proceedings and with whom they can communicate freely.[50] The recent Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration also confirms that migrants should be provided with ‘gender-responsive, child-sensitive, accessible and comprehensive information and legal guidance on their rights and obligations’.[51]
    • Principles about how to instruct counsel: How is a designated representative to decide whether to simply instruct counsel based on what they think is in the represented person's best interests or whether they should instead assist the represented person in instruction counsel? When considering ambiguous terms about the obligations of the designated representative, such as "instructing counsel or assisting the represented person in instructing counsel", s. 3(3)(f) of the Act may properly be considered. This provision provides that "This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory." Relevant international human rights instruments include the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes the right of the child to express his or her views freely and for those views to be given due weight according to the age and maturity of the child.[52] Similarly, Art. 3(a) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities emphasizes the right to autonomy.[53] Accordingly, to the extent possible, this provision should be interpreted in a way where the designated representative respects this right, including by soliciting the child's views and giving them due weight.

    Rule 20(10)(b) making decisions regarding the claim or application or assisting the represented person in making those decisions

    RPD Rule 20(10)(b) provides that the responsibilities of a designated representative include making decisions regarding the claim or application or assisting the represented person in making those decisions. This provision should be interpreted in light of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which provides that such persons have a right to legal capacity and supported rather than substitute decision-making.[54]

    Rule 20(10)(c) informing the represented person about the various stages and procedures in the processing of their case

    Rule 20(10)(c) provides that the responsibilities of a designated representative include informing the represented person about the various stages and procedures in the processing of their case. In the case of children, this obligation tracks a child’s right to information in Article 17 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which specifies that "states ... shall ensure that the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health".[5] Furthermore, the right to information has close connections with the right to be heard in Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which recognizes the right of the child to express his or her views freely and for those views to be given due weight according to the age and maturity of the child.[52] The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child states that the right to information is essential in this regard, "because it is the precondition of the child’s clarified decisions" and that "children should be provided with full accessible, diversity-sensitive and age-appropriate information about their right to express their views feely".[55] A designated representative should provide information in a manner that is understandable and suitable to the person concerned, considering their age, development, education, cultural and linguistic background, and individual needs.[56]

    Rule 20(10)(d) assisting in gathering evidence to support the represented person’s case and in providing evidence and, if necessary, being a witness at the hearing

    Where a representative is appointed late in the process, whether it will be necessary to adjourn the case or not in such circumstances will be dependent on the facts at issue. For example, in Singh v. Canada the court concluded that the failure to designate a representative for the minor claimant until just before the hearing did not vitiate the decision in question for the following reasons:

    In the case at bar, I do not think the RPD's decision is vitiated, in view of the following facts:

    -  The applicant was 17 years and 10 months at the time of the hearing, 16 years and 5 months at the time he completed his PIF, and he was at all times able to understand the proceedings that were in progress;

    -  A representative was assigned to him before the hearing and he was allowed to meet with a social worker on the eve of the hearing;

    -  The improbabilities in his story are too numerous and significant to conclude that the RPD decision is vitiated because he had not yet reached the age of 18.[57]

    Rule 20(10)(e) protecting the interests of the represented person and putting forward the best possible case to the Division

    The UNHCR states that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in deciding whether and how to have a child testify.[58] At the core of the best interests principle is the notion that children require protection and guidance because of their lack of maturity, experience or understanding.[59] The principle is most directly expressed in Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states:

    In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.[5]

    The best interests principle is an interpretative principle and procedural guarantee, as well as a substantive right.[60]

    Rule 20(10)(f) informing and consulting the represented person to the extent possible when making decisions about the case

    As the legal philosopher Patricia Mindus states, frequent exposure to rules perceived to be unintelligible, arbitrary or simply unwarranted results in signs of distress and mistrust of organizations and institutional staff in authoritative positions.[61] The designated representative exists to help guard against this during the refugee claim process to the extent possible

    The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division Rules states that "As much as possible, the designated representative should inform and consult the minor or incompetent person when making decisions about the case. [emphasis added]".[4] Similarly, the Board's guide for designated representatives states that "your role as a designated representative may vary" depending on the person’s capacity to participate in the decision-making process:

    The designated representative should inform and consult the minor or the person who is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings when making decisions about their case. However, the role of the designated representative may vary, depending on the level of understanding of the minor or the person who is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings. Minors will vary in their ability to participate in making decisions, depending on the type of decision that has to be made, their age and their maturity. Persons who are unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings may also have some ability to participate in making decisions, depending on the type of decision that has to be made and the nature and severity of their impairment.[19]

    In the case of children, this will involve communicating in a language and in a manner they understand. The relevant UNHCR guidelines provide that children need to be informed of the decision in their case in person, in the presence of their guardian, legal representative, and/or other support person, in a supportive and non-threatening environment. If the decision is negative, particular care will need to be taken in delivering the message to the child and explaining what next steps may be taken in order to avoid or reduce psychological stress or harm.[62]

    Rule 20(10)(g) filing and perfecting an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division, if required

    RPD Rule 20(10)(g) provides that the responsibilities of a designated representative include filing and perfecting an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division, if required.

    References

    1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/> (Accessed 15 March 2020).
    2. Thomas Waldock, A Question of Commitment: The Status of Children in Canada, second edition, Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, Apr. 9, 2020, <https://books.google.ca/books?id=q1raDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT108&ots=Va_a3dRnFN&lr&pg=PT111#v=onepage&q&f=true> (Accessed April 11, 2020), Chapter 7: Assessing the Rights and Realities of War-Affected Refugee Children in Canada, written by Myriam Denov and Maya Fennig.
    3. UNHCR, Global Trends, Forced Displacement 2016, 19 June 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-my/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-2016.html>, at 47.
    4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Immigration Division Rules, Date modified listed on webpage: 2018-06-23, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/CommentIdSi.aspx> (Accessed January 27, 2020).
    5. 1 2 3 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [accessed 28 June 2020]
    6. Ruth Brittle, A Hostile Environment for Children? The Rights and Best Interests of the Refugee Child in the United Kingdom’s Asylum Law, Human Rights Law Review, Published: 26 January 2020, ngz028, doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngz028
    7. Sharma c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), [2008] CF 908.
    8. C.H.F. (Re), [2007] RPDD 9 (QL) and X (Re), [2007] CanLII 47772 (IRB).
    9. Cleveland, J. (2008). The Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: A Critical Overview. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 25(2), 119-131. Retrieved from https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/26035, page 121.
    10. Stumf v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 148, para. 6.
    11. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
    12. 1 2 3 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, Effective date: September 30, 1996 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir03.aspx> (Accessed January 29, 2020).
    13. Duale v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 150 (CanLII).
    14. EC Directive 2005/85 of 1 December 2005, OJ 2005 L 326, 13, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:326:0013:0034:EN:PDF> (Accessed May 3, 2020), Article 17(3).
    15. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, at p. 1106 (para. 61).
    16. Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 CanLII 101871 (CA IRB), paras. 5-6.
    17. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), para. 8.
    18. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), para. 20.
    19. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Designated Representative's Guide, Revised December 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/designated-representant/Pages/index.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
    20. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), para. 14.
    21. Joint Statement by the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW), and the CRPD Committee, ‘Addressing Disabilities in Large-Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants’ (12 April 2017), page 2.
    22. M Crock, L Smith-Khan, B Saul and RC McCallum, The Legal Protection of Refugees with Disabilities: Forgotten and Invisible? (Elgar Publishing, 2017), Ch. 4.
    23. UNICEF Canada, Children's Rights in the Context of Migration: A UNICEF Canada Submission to the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship <http://www.unicef.ca/sites/default/files/2016-09/Immigration%20and%20Refugee%20Consultation%20Brief_UNICEF%20Canada.pdf> (Accessed January 19, 2020), page 8.
    24. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb474b27.html [accessed 26 January 2020], para. 214.
    25. Espinoza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 385, [1999] 3 F.C. 73 (F.C.T.D.).
    26. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, ¶¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005) (requiring guardians and all officials working with unaccompanied migrant children to have specialized training for their particular role and containing common elements such as cultural sensitivity, interview techniques and knowledge of origin country).
    27. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), para. 21.
    28. Black v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 703 (CanLII), para. 35.
    29. 1 2 Black v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 703 (CanLII), para. 58.
    30. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), paras. 5, 22.
    31. 1 2 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 149059 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/j2dn5>, retrieved on 2020-09-06.
    32. Ryvina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 764 (CanLII), para. 32.
    33. M.(F.A.) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2013] F.C.J. No. 604, 2013 FC 574 (F.C.), para. 16.
    34. Kurija v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1158 (CanLII), par. 6, <http://canlii.ca/t/g1tm3#par6>, retrieved on 2020-03-15.
    35. Kurija v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1158 (CanLII), par. 28, <http://canlii.ca/t/g1tm3#par28>, retrieved on 2020-03-15.
    36. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 295.
    37. 1 2 Plancher v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1283 (CanLII), para. 14.
    38. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
    39. Stumf v. Canada, 2002 FCA 148, para. 6 .
    40. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228.
    41. 1 2 A.N. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 549 (CanLII), para. 28.
    42. Mary Crock, Kate Bones, Daniel Ghezelbash, Jemma Hollonds and Mary Anne Kenny, Children and Young People in Asylum and Refugee Processes: Towards Best Practice, Published 18 May 2020, The Federation Press, ISBN 9781760022419, page 11.
    43. UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum, February 1997, <https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d4f91cf4/guidelines-policies-procedures-dealing-unaccompanied-children-seeking-asylum.html> (Accessed December 13, 2020), at 5.7.
    44. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Revised Remuneration Schedule for Designated Representatives, April 1, 2015, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/news/2016/Pages/DesRepRem.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
    45. 1 2 Ryvina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 764 (CanLII), para. 34.
    46. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Report to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (CIMM): Status of Complaints against IRB Members Brought in the First Year under the New Procedures, Date modified: 2019-11-28, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/member-conduct/Pages/report-cimm-complaint-status.aspx>.
    47. Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3.
    48. Ryvina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 764 (CanLII), para. 37.
    49. Conte, C. (2020). "Disability in EU asylum law". In Research Handbook on EU Disability Law. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. doi: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788976428.00028 at page 372.
    50. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 23 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination and return, 16 November 2017b, CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/23.
    51. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, intergovernmentally negotiated and agreed outcome, 13 July 2018.
    52. 1 2 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts 4,42 and 44, para 6), 27 November 2003, at para 12.
    53. Motz, S. (2020). The Refugee Status of Persons with Disabilities. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff. doi: https://doi-org.peacepalace.idm.oclc.org/10.1163/9789004427303 at page 9.
    54. Motz, S. (2020). The Refugee Status of Persons with Disabilities. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff. doi: https://doi-org.peacepalace.idm.oclc.org/10.1163/9789004427303 at page 10.
    55. Rap, S..E. (2020). The Right to Information of (Un)Accompanied Refugee Children, The International Journal of Children's Rights, 28(2), 322-351. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/15718182-02802003, at page 326.
    56. Mary Crock, Kate Bones, Daniel Ghezelbash, Jemma Hollonds and Mary Anne Kenny, Children and Young People in Asylum and Refugee Processes: Towards Best Practice, Published 18 May 2020, The Federation Press, ISBN 9781760022419, page 17.
    57. Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 134, para. 34.
    58. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate, 26 August 2020, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e870b254.html [accessed 5 September 2020], page 15.
    59. Woolf, ‘Coming of Age? The Principle of ‘the Best Interests of the Child’ (2003) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 205 at 208–9.
    60. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 14.
    61. Mindus, P. (2020). Towards a Theory of Arbitrary Law-making in Migration Policy. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 14(2), 9-33. https://doi.org/10.5324.eip.v14i2.3712 at page 16.
    62. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 22 December 2009, HCR/GIP/09/08, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b2f4f6d2.html [accessed 29 June 2020].

    Disclosure of Personal Information (Rule 21)

    Rule 21

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Disclosure of Personal Information
    
    Disclosure of information from another claim
    21 (1) Subject to subrule (5), the Division may disclose to a claimant personal and other information that it wants to use from any other claim if the claims involve similar questions of fact or if the information is otherwise relevant to the determination of their claim.
    
    Notice to another claimant
    (2) If the personal or other information of another claimant has not been made public, the Division must make reasonable efforts to notify the other claimant in writing that
    (a) it intends to disclose the information to a claimant; and
    (b) the other claimant may object to that disclosure.
    
    Request for disclosure
    (3) In order to decide whether to object to the disclosure, the other claimant may make a written request to the Division for personal and other information relating to the claimant. Subject to subrule (5), the Division may disclose only information that is necessary to permit the other claimant to make an informed decision.
    
    Notice to claimant
    (4) If the personal or other information of the claimant has not been made public, the Division must make reasonable efforts to notify the claimant in writing that
    (a) it intends to disclose the information to the other claimant; and
    (b) the claimant may object to that disclosure.
    
    Information not to be disclosed
    (5) The Division must not disclose personal or other information unless it is satisfied that
    (a) there is not a serious possibility that disclosing the information will endanger the life, liberty or security of any person; or
    (b) disclosing the information is not likely to cause an injustice.
    
    Information from joined claims
    (6) Personal or other information from a joined claim is not subject to this rule. If claims were once joined but were later separated, only personal or other information that was provided before the separation is not subject to this rule.

    The process specified in this rule does not apply if the information has been made public

    Rule 21(2) provides that the Board must make reasonable efforts to notify a claimant whose information it intends to disclose in another claim if their information has not been made public. If the information has been made public, this rule does not apply, as discussed in the Board's public commentary to the previous version of these rules: "This rule does not apply ... where the information is already a matter of public record. Information may become public when a claim is the subject of a judicial review application before the Federal Court, and the court does not make an order for confidentiality, or when the Division decides to have a proceeding conducted in public".[1]

    The process specified in this rule does not apply to evidence disclosed by the Minister

    Rule 21 only applies to disclosure by the Division. It does not apply to disclosure by the Minister. Where the Minister discloses information from one claim to another claim themselves, for example disclosing a Basis of Claim form from one claim on another claim, Rule 21 does not per se apply. However, pursuant to s.166 of the IRPA, the Board has the jurisdiction to enquire into the source of information provided to it that originates from another claim and to order that particular measures be taken to ensure the confidentiality of any information.

    The Board may disclose information about a claim to other organizations for the purposes of administering and enforcing the Act and Rule 21 does not apply to such disclosures

    The instructions on the Basis of Claim form that all claimants receive states: "The personal information you provide on this form is collected under the authority of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for the purpose of determination of your claim for refugee protection by the IRB. Your personal information may be shared with other organizations including the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and law enforcement agencies, for the purpose of administration and enforcement of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act."[2] That said, the CBSA cannot disclose personal information about a person’s refugee claim to the country of persecution at any point, whether before or after the person has been found to be a Convention refugee: Canada v. Lin.[3]  

    The Division may partially redact information disclosed under this rule

    Rule 21(1) provides that "the Division may disclose to a claimant personal and other information that it wants to use from any other claim if the claims involve similar questions of fact or if the information is otherwise relevant to the determination of their claim." As was stated in the Board's commentaries on the previous version of these rules, "Normally the information to be disclosed will include the source claimant's Personal Information Form in its entirety. However, specific information will be removed from the Personal Information Form where the Division decides that disclosure of that information would give rise to an unacceptable risk or injustice."[1] Notwithstanding the transition from the PIF form to the BOC, the principle that the Board may disclose information in whole, or in part, under this rule persists.

    Rule 21(1): The Division must determine that evidence is relevant to the other claim before disclosing it under this rule, but it need not assess its probative value

    Rule 21(1) provides that "the Division may disclose to a claimant personal and other information that it wants to use from any other claim if the claims involve similar questions of fact or if the information is otherwise relevant to the determination of their claim." As such, the Division may only act under Rule 21 where the two claims involve similar questions of fact or if the information in question is "otherwise relevant to the determination" of the other claim. If the information to be disclosed were not relevant, the Board would err if it disclosed it. That said, so long as the information is relevant, the Board need not assess how probative it is to the claim; that assessment is best left to the individual Member hearing the other matter. This was explained in the Board's commentary to the previous version of these rules as follows: "The decision to transfer information as potential evidence from one claim to another is not a decision as to the probative value of that information. The parties and the refugee protection officer will have an opportunity to address that issue at the hearing of the claim."[1]

    Rule 21(4): Notifying the claimant that they may object to the disclosure of their information

    Rule 21(4) provides that the Division must make reasonable efforts to notify a claimant in writing that it intends to disclose private information to the other claimant and that the claimant may object to that disclosure. Where a claimant consents to the disclosure, then the Board should proceed to do the Rule 21(5) risk assessment. Where a claimant objects to the disclosure, then the Board should assess whether it is permissible to disclose the information under the federal Privacy Act, as described by the Federal Court in AB v. Canada.[4] For more discussion of the implications of the Privacy Act see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Once claims are joined, information on one claim is properly available to the other joined claimants.

    Rule 21(5): The risk assessment the Board must conduct before disclosing personal or other information under this rule

    The Board's commentary regarding the previous version of the RPD Rules commented on the risk assessment that the Board is to undertake prior to disclosing information pursuant to this rule thusly: "Whether or not the source claimant objects, the Division will assess the risk to satisfy itself that the disclosure of the source claimant's information would not give rise to an unacceptable risk or injustice. The source claimant's information will be disclosed to the parties only after the Division has assessed the risk and authorized the use and disclosure of that information. The same considerations apply when information about the receiving claimant is provided to the source claimant."[1] Lorne Waldman writes that "Generally speaking, the policy that has evolved is that the Board will provide notice to the claimant if possible and, if the claimant does not object to this information being disclosed, it is disclosed."[5]

    References

    1. 1 2 3 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
    2. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, Appendix, page 2.
    3. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) v. Lin, [2011] F.C.J. No. 543 (F.C.).
    4. AB v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 471 (CanLII), [2003] 1 FC 3, <http://canlii.ca/t/krn>, retrieved on 2020-04-13.
    5. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1749 of the PDF.

    Specialized Knowledge (Rule 22)

    IRPA Section 170(i)

    This section of the Act provides that:

    170(i) The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it,...may take notice of any facts that may be judicially noticed, any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge.

    The IRPA provisions for noticing facts are different for refugee proceedings when compared to immigration proceedings

    Section 170(i) of the Act is the provision that applies to the RPD. There is a similar provision for the RAD, s. 171(b).[1] That said, the IRPA does not have similar provisions for the Immigration Division or the Immigration Appeal Division, as Waldman notes in the text Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law Practice:

    Both the Immigration Division and the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board may base their decision only on evidence proven before them during the course of the hearing. These two Divisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board have no power to take notice of facts that form part of their expertise, and they err if they attempt to take notice of facts not before them. This contrasts with the procedure at a hearing held before the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, where, pursuant to s. 170 of IRPA, the Division may take notice of any facts that may be judicially noted, and any other generally recognized facts, information or opinions that are within its specialized knowledge.[2]

    What is the difference between a fact that may be judicially noticed, a generally recognized fact, and information or opinion that is specialized knowledge?

    • Judicial notice: Judicial notice concerns facts that are considered to be "common knowledge"[3] or are "generally known, reasonably unquestionable, or easily verifiable."[4] The definition provided by Waldman in Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law Practice is that "judicial notice refers to facts that may be noticed by the court without proof thereof, that are either so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable people, or facts that are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resorting to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy."[5] The book goes on to explain that "notorious facts include local conditions and matters, geographical facts, human behaviour and business trade and practices. For example, the fact that Toronto is situated in Ontario or that the rain makes roads slippery would not have to be proven to the court. In simpler terms, the court may and should notice without proof facts that everybody knows."[5] An example more germane to the context of refugee adjudication is that the fact that university education is conducted in the language of the country in which it is located has been cited as an appropriate matter for judicial notice.[6] In contrast, whether or not there is a wide sentencing range in Canada for the crime of robbery is not something that is appropriately the subject of judicial notice.[7]
    • Generally recognized facts: The category of "generally recognized facts" is a broader one than the category of facts that may be judicially noticed. As the Board states in its legal paper on Weighing Evidence, the term "generally recognized facts" could include facts which are usually accepted without question by scholars, by government and United Nations officials, and by people who resided in an area, but which are not necessarily commonly known by the general public.[8] It includes information that may be gleaned from an encyclopedia[9] and information in the Board's National Documentation Package.[10] It cannot be said that all information in the NDP is of "indisputable accuracy", and hence appropriate for judicial notice, but information in the NDP from reputable sources such as well-regarded human rights groups and academics is nonetheless appropriately accepted by the Board as being "generally recognized".
    • Specialized knowledge: In contrast, specialized knowledge is information that a panel has gleaned from other claims in the manner detailed below, even if it would not be generally recognized. See: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Specialized Knowledge#What is "specialized knowledge"?.

    Generally recognized facts are not a type of specialized knowledge

    A question can arise about the above typology: per s. 170(i) of the Act, are "generally recognized facts" a category of specialized knowledge or an independent type of fact that the Board may notice? In his text, Waldman notes that:

    Section 170(i) also refers to “any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within [the Division’s] specialized knowledge”. This would give the Division a broad discretion to rely on its knowledge gained from other claims once proper notice had been provided.[11]

    This should not be taken as implying that "generally recognized facts" are a subset or type of specialized knowledge. Instead, they are best thought of as an independent type of fact that the Division can recognize, akin to facts that may be judicially noticed. This interpretation of s. 170(i) of the Act is to be preferred for several reasons:

    1. The RPD Rule on specialized knowledge makes no mention of generally recognized facts. Rule 22 only speaks of "information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge" and omits any mention of "generally recognized facts", which implies that the later are not a type of specialized knowledge and thereby subject to the rules thereon.
    2. The courts readily distinguish between "generally recognized facts" and "specialized knowledge". For example, in Aguirre v. Canada, the court's comments indicate that generally recognized facts are distinct from the category of specialized knowledge: "Applicant's counsel says the information given by Mr. Burke was not specialized knowledge within the meaning of subsection 68(4) and I am inclined to agree with her. However, I would think that for purposes of the subsection, Mr. Burke must have thought it was at least a generally recognized fact that it is common to see big cars in Mexico."[12] Ditto the court's comment in Magonza v. Canada, which affirms the distinction between generally recognized facts and specialized knowledge: "the NDP is better viewed as containing generally recognized facts or specialized knowledge."[10] Similarly, when the Federal Court of Appeal considered this provision of the Act, they punctuated it with a comma after "generally recognized facts" as follows, implying that there are three separate categories: "facts which may be judicially noticed, generally recognized facts, and information or opinion that is within the board's specialized knowledge".[13]
    3. The type of knowledge that has been regarded as a "generally recognized fact" does not meet the criteria to be considered specialized knowledge. The type of knowledge that is considered to be a "generally recognized fact" is something that, for instance, the Board gleaned from an encyclopedia (in Hussain v. Canada), which is distinct from "specialized knowledge" that a panel has learned by virtue of their role as a Member of the Board hearing claims.[9]

    When must a panel provide notice of "generally recognized facts" before relying upon them?

    The previous Immigration Act applied the special notice provisions now enshrined in Rule 22 to generally recognized facts. The relevant provisions of that Act read:

    68(4) The Refugee Division may, in any proceedings before it, take notice of any facts that may be judicially noticed and, subject to subsection (5), of any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge. (5) Before the Refugee Division takes notice of any facts, information or opinion, other than facts that may be judicially noticed, in any proceedings, the Division shall notify the Minister, if present at the proceedings, and the person who is the subject of the proceedings of its intention and afford them a reasonable opportunity to make representations with respect thereto.

    As such, it was clear from the construction of the then-section 68(4) of the Act that the Board had to provide notice of generally recognized facts that did not meet the test for being judicially noticed, prior to relying upon them. This provision changed with the advent of the IRPA and now the ordinarily procedural fairness concepts regarding notice will apply. Official notice of facts cannot be a basis for fact-finding without disclosure to the parties of the information which the decision-maker intends to rely, allowing them an opportunity to respond.[14] In short, there remains a duty of disclosure where the information to be relied upon is potentially contestable.[15]

    Rule 22

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Specialized Knowledge
    
    Notice to parties
    
    22 Before using any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge, the Division must notify the claimant or protected person and, if the Minister is present at the hearing, the Minister, and give them an opportunity to
    (a) make representations on the reliability and use of the information or opinion; and
    (b) provide evidence in support of their representations.

    Comparison to previous version of the Rules

    The predecessor to Rule 22 in the previous version of the Rules was Rule 18,[16] which bore a very similar wording to the current Rule 22:[17]

    18. Before using any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge, the Division must notify the claimant or protected person, and the Minister if the Minister is present at the hearing, and give them a chance to
    (a) make representations on the reliability and use of the information or opinion; and
    (b) give evidence in support of their representations.

    What is "specialized knowledge"?

    Essentially, specialized knowledge is information that a panel has gleaned from its role as a Member of the Board. As RAD Member Patricia O’Connor stated, "The very basis of specialized knowledge involves information which would not necessarily be known to the parties in a particular claim, especially when the knowledge is based on information stemming from other cases before [a panel]."[18] There are any number of examples of what constitutes specialized knowledge, e.g.:

    • In I.P.P. v. Canada the court accepted the following as being examples of specialized knowledge: the statement that Mexican media gives a great deal of coverage to gangs and their activities and the observation that claimants are often able to present medical reports for treatment obtained in Mexico.[19]
    • In Habiboglu v. Canada, the court accepted that the Board had specialized knowledge of the procedures employed by the Canadian Border Security Service to analyse Iraqi documents.[20]
    • In Tariq v. Canada, the court accepted that Board findings about the clothing worn by women in Karachi were an example of the panel relying on specialized knowledge.[21]

    However, not just any knowledge that a Member has gleaned from other claims may properly count as specialized knowledge:

    • The knowledge must be quantifiable and verifiable: Specialized knowledge, to count as such, must be "quantifiable and verifiable". Unverifiable personal knowledge does not qualify as specialized knowledge.[22] The court considered this issue in Cortes v. Canada, where the panel had noted that there have been "refugee protection claimants who have filed complaints with the Mexican authorities without necessarily being injured or on their deathbed." The court commented as follows: "In my opinion, the 'specialized knowledge' relied on in this case was mischaracterized. Here, the decision maker drew on the specialized and general knowledge it had acquired over the years to point out to the applicant that this was the first time it had heard such an argument and that its professional knowledge and experience in cases from Mexico demonstrated the contrary. The 'knowledge' relied on in this case was neither quantifiable nor verifiable, which meant that Rule 18 did not apply."[23] Similarly, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that "it is not only normal but inevitable that in performing their role, panel members will be influenced by the experience they may have acquired in the exercise of their duties. On the other hand, as long as the members rely only on their experience and not on specific information, [the specialized knowledge provisions do] not apply."[24]
    • The knowledge cannot be based on stereotypes: As the court stated in Vodics v. Canada, "the use of specialized knowledge in the decision-making process, which is, in fact, the use of acquired personal knowledge on the part of the decision-maker, is acceptable, but with a very important limit when it comes to the use of stereotypes."[25] The court in that case goes on to note that a "stereotype" is a preconceived, standardized, and oversimplified impression of the characteristics which typify a person or situation. The danger in applying a stereotype is that the person who is the exception to the oversimplified impression is not protected from the erroneous application of the impression. The court concludes that a number of the panel's findings in that case were made in error because the specialized knowledge was incomplete and based on stereotypes, for example:

      The CRDD makes the finding that the Applicant's mother's maiden name is not typically Romany, and draws on its specialized knowledge to do so. Therefore, this finding is significant in that it can be taken to be some evidence used to rebut the Applicant's sworn evidence that he is a Roma. However, in my opinion, before the finding can be considered evidence to be used in this way, the CRDD must be satisfied that its specialized knowledge is complete. The CRDD admits that it has specialized knowledge of "some specific Roma names", and, accordingly, I find it is reasonable to conclude that it does not have specific knowledge of all Romany names, if such a task is even possible to reach. The CRDD's statement that the Applicant's mother's maiden name is not typically Romany, is not relevant to the determination of the Applicant's ethnicity. It is conjecture used as evidence. As such, the CRDD should not have used it in forming its negative credibility finding.[26]

    The Member must provide sufficient information so that the specialized knowledge can be tested by the parties

    Rule 22 provides that before using any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge, the Division must notify the parties and give them a chance to make representations and give evidence in response. This is a requirement of the rules, and procedural fairness, and the courts have held that the effect of Rule 22 is to "codify the common law which requires that parties be notified where information not already on the record may be relied on."[27] Rule 22 provides that the Division must notify the parties (technically the Minister need only be notified if they are present at the hearing, not if they are only intervening in writing) and give them an opportunity to make representations on the reliability and use of the information or opinion. Mr. Justice Campbell commented on what a panel must do so that a party may be said to have had a meaningful opportunity to make representations on the reliability and use of the knowledge in Isakova v Canada: "in order for [the Rule] to be effective, the RPD member who declares specialized knowledge must place on the record sufficient detail of the knowledge so as to allow it to be tested. That is, the knowledge must be quantifiable and verifiable."[28] The legal requirement that specialized knowledge be "quantifiable and verifiable" is thus an aspect of procedural fairness in that the purpose of the notice requirement enshrined in Rule 22 is that a party be able to make meaningful representations on the reliability and use of the information or opinion and this right would be rendered meaningless if the information offered were insufficiently specific for a party to be able to do so.

    Does the Member need to specifically use the words "specialized knowledge" or refer to this rule by number prior to relying on specialized knowledge?

    Arguably not, as the purpose of the Rule is satisfied where a claimant has notice of the specialized knowledge being relied upon, and an adequate opportunity to reply, regardless of whether or not the particular words "specialized knowledge" are uttered by the panel member. The principle enshrined in Rule 22 is that prior to relying on any specialized knowledge, a panel of the Board must "advise the claimant of the actual information it will be relying on and give the claimant an opportunity to challenge the evidence."[5]

    Member Jolyane Lefebvre of the Refugee Appeal Division considered this issue in a 2019 decision. It involved a case where the RPD found that the answers provided by the male appellant concerning why the appellants had failed to seek asylum in Chile or the United States diminished and undermined their credibility. The RPD was of the opinion that it was reasonable to expect that the appellants would have obtained information on these options, considering their statements that they feared returning to their country. The principal appellant testified that he did not have the right to apply for asylum in the United States because of his “parole” status. The Member stated during the hearing that “that there are several types of parole.” The RAD Member held in the reasons that "I am of the opinion that the member misspoke and should have told the appellants that his specialized knowledge led him to determine that there are several types of 'parole.' As Rule 22 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules sets out, the member must notify the parties and give them an opportunity to make representations or provide evidence in support of their representations at the time of the hearing. I would agree that this was not done because the member failed to specifically mention that he had specialized knowledge in this area."[29]

    Does specialized knowledge only arise from a Member's personal hearings or is what a Member learns of their colleague's hearings also properly considered specialized knowledge?

    Specialized knowledge is information that a panel has gleaned in its role as a Member of the Board. It need not arise from hearings that the Member in question presided over personally. Thus, for example, the Federal Court has held that the Board may take notice of an expert opinion in a "lead case" and consider it in a subsequent case, as an exercise of its authority to take notice of information and opinions within its specialized knowledge, provided it gives proper notice.[30] Relatedly, the RPD may where a Member has knowledge of similar claims, details of such knowledge are part of their specialized knowledge, and that knowledge may be placed on the record provided that the notice requirements set out in the Refugee Protection Division Rules are followed.[31] Additionally, specialized knowledge need not arise from a hearing at all: the Board states in the legal services paper on its website that "specialized knowledge" may arise from a panel's knowledge of documents in the Board's Documentation Centre, for example.[8]

    References

    1. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 171 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec171> retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    2. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 218 of the PDF.
    3. El-Bahisi v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 2 at para 6 (TD).
    4. Cheng v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 1036 at para 6 (TD) as cited in Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 305.
    5. 1 2 3 Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1759 of the PDF.
    6. Hassan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] FCJ No 250 at para 3 (TD), as cited in Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 305.
    7. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Clerjeau, 2020 FC 1120 (CanLII), par. 27, <https://canlii.ca/t/jc22h#par27>, retrieved on 2021-02-04.
    8. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Weighing Evidence - Chapter 6: Application to Specific Situations, Date of Paper: December 31, 2003 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/EvidPreu06.aspx#614> (Accessed April 2, 2020).
    9. 1 2 Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 15956 (FC), par. 22, <http://canlii.ca/t/43fw#par22>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    10. 1 2 Magonza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 14 (CanLII), par. 81, <http://canlii.ca/t/hwz13#par81>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    11. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1760 of the PDF.
    12. Aguirre v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 7791 (FC), par. 7, <http://canlii.ca/t/4bws#par7>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    13. Lawal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (C.A.), 1991 CanLII 8193 (FCA), [1991] 2 FC 404, par. 15, <http://canlii.ca/t/gcxxd#par15>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    14. Donald JM Brown & John M Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (Toronto: Canvasback, 2011) (loose-leaf) at para 10.8320 as cited in Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 194.
    15. Galindo, [1981] 2 FC 781.
    16. Toma v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 121 (CanLII), par. 29, <http://canlii.ca/t/g2xfx#par29>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    17. Hernandez Cortes v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 583 (CanLII), par. 34, <http://canlii.ca/t/29nmk#par34>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    18. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 140810 (CA IRB), par. 29, <http://canlii.ca/t/j040z#par29>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    19. I.P.P. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 123 (CanLII), par. 189, <http://canlii.ca/t/hrjrg#par189>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    20. Habiboglu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1664 (CanLII), para. 11.
    21. Tariq v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 404 (CanLII), par. 24, <http://canlii.ca/t/1k0v0#par24>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    22. Mama v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1515.
    23. Hernandez Cortes v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 583 (CanLII), par. 36, <http://canlii.ca/t/29nmk#par36>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    24. Djeziri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 7965 (FC), par. 5, <http://canlii.ca/t/4bm4#par5>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    25. Vodics v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 783 (CanLII), par. 15, <http://canlii.ca/t/1kx4w#par15>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    26. Vodics v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 783 (CanLII), par. 39, <http://canlii.ca/t/1kx4w#par39>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    27. Razburgaj v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 151 (CanLII), par. 18, <http://canlii.ca/t/g34tl#par18>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    28. Isakova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
    29. X (Re), 2019 CanLII 116770 (CA IRB), par. 30, <http://canlii.ca/t/j3v79#par30>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    30. Horvath, Ferenc v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. MM-2203-00), Blanchard, June 4, 2001.
    31. Thillaiyampalam, Sangarasivam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-429-94), Gibson, November 24, 1994. See also Cadet, Marie v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-939-92), Dub, October 18, 1993; and Comes, Norman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3575-98) Rouleau, May 28, 1999.

    Allowing a Claim Without a Hearing (Rule 23)

    IRPA Section 170

    The relevant portions of s. 170 of the Act read:

    Proceedings
    170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
    (b) must hold a hearing; ...
    (e) must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations; ...
    (f) may, despite paragraph (b), allow a claim for refugee protection without a hearing, if the Minister has not notified the Division, within the period set out in the rules of the Board, of the Minister’s intention to intervene;

    Rule 23 - Allowing a Claim Without a Hearing

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Allowing a Claim Without a Hearing
    
    Claim allowed without hearing
    23 For the purpose of paragraph 170(f) of the Act, the period during which the Minister must notify the Division of the Minister’s intention to intervene is no later than 10 days after the day on which the Minister receives the Basis of Claim Form.

    Commentary

    What is the history of the Board's processes to accept claims without a hearing?

    This has been a long-standing part of the Board's processes; in the early 1990s, Refugee Hearing Officers (RHS) were instructed to direct a claim to a member for positive determination without a hearing if, after screening and a preliminary conference, the RHO was of the opinion that a panel would almost certainly find the claimant to be a Convention refugee.[1] Then, prior to the 2012 refugee reforms, a claimant was interviewed by IRB staff, such as a Tribunal Officer, under what was then called the Board's “expedited process”.[2] Currently, there is no interview, and the determination about whether or not to accept a claim this way is made based on a review of the paper record submitted to the Board.

    When may a Member decide a claim without having held a hearing?

    Paragraph 170(b) of the Act specifies that "The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, must hold a hearing". However, paragraph 170(f) serves as an exception to this rule, providing that the Board "may, despite paragraph (b), allow a claim for refugee protection without a hearing, if the Minister has not notified the Division, within the period set out in the rules of the Board, of the Minister’s intention to intervene". The relevant IRB policy is the Instructions governing the streaming of less complex claims at the Refugee Protection Division. It states, as a matter of policy, what the Board should do before accepting a claim without a hearing and the substantive nature of the claims that are appropriate for being accepted this way.

    First, the Minister has a legitimate expectation that it will receive notice and an opportunity to object prior to any claim being accepted under the file-review process based on the Board's public statements in this document: "Parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Therefore, because a Notice to Appear is not provided when a claim is accepted without a hearing, the Minister will be given notice where a claim is chosen for the file-review process."[3] This relates to the requirement in s. 170(e) of the Act that The Refugee Protection Division must give the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations.

    Furthermore, the instructions state that the RPD will not decide any claim without a hearing in the following circumstances:

    • confirmation of front-end security screening has not been received;
    • the Minister has filed a Notice of Intervention to intervene in person;
    • A Notice has been sent under the RPD Rules notifying the Minister of a possible exclusion, inadmissibility or integrity issue;
    • there are issues related to the claimant’s identity which require further examination;
    • there are serious credibility issues that arise from the documents in the file;
    • the claim is inconsistent with country information; or
    • there are complex legal or factual issues that require a hearing to resolve.

    Were the IRB to decide a claim that did not meet these criteria, it would err. Canada v. Mukasi is an example of such a case. In that case, a panel of the Board granted the claim without holding a hearing. The Board concluded that Mr. Mukasi had established his identity, did not present any issues that might exclude him from refugee protection, and had shown that his account of events was consistent with documentary evidence on the conditions in Burundi. The Minister applied for judicial review, arguing that the Board erred when it failed to refer the claim for a hearing and by granting his claim in the face of reliable contradictory evidence. The court accepted this argument, noting that there was evidence on the record that the claimant was associated with violence. As the court stated, "This should have alerted the Board to the possibility that Mr. Mukasi might be excluded from the definition of a Convention refugee based on Article 1(F) of the Convention. That provision states, among other things, that the Convention does not apply to persons who have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations."[4]

    In principle, how should the Board decide whether to allow a claim under the file-review process?

    As stated in the Board's commentary to the previous version of these rules, "The purpose of the expedited process is to identify cases that appear to be manifestly well founded, based on the factors set out in subsection 19(4) of the Rules." What were those factors? They are the following factors which appeared in the previous version of the rules and are now included in the list of considerations in the Instructions (supra):

    Allowing a claim without a hearing

    (4) If the refugee protection officer recommends that the claim be allowed without a hearing, the Division may allow the claim if

    (a) there are no issues that should be brought to the attention of the Minister;

    (b) the claimant’s identity is sufficiently established;

    (c) there are no serious credibility issues; and

    (d) the information given by the claimant is consistent with information about conditions in their country of nationality or, if they have no country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, and establishes that the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.[5]

    The general principle in asylum adjudication was well summarized by the European Court of Human Rights when they stated that "a rigorous scrutiny must necessarily be conducted of an individual's claim that his or her deportation to a third country will expose that individual to treatment prohibited by Article 3 [of that European human rights instrument]".[6] The use of the file-review process is consistent with this principle in that it is only manifestly well-founded cases that will be accepted under this process.

    Applications to separate claims so that some claimants may be eligible for the file-review process

    As stated in the Board's commentary to the previous version of these rules, "Members of the same family will normally be treated as a unit and their claims processed jointly."[7] At times claimants will apply to separate the claims of some family members so that others will be eligible for this file-review process. For example, parents with US-born children would not meet the criteria to have the US-born child's claim accepted under this policy. For the considerations that apply to such applications to separate the claims of family members, see the commentary to Rules 55 and 56: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Application of factors in Rule 56(5).

    Counsel may apply to have a claim considered under the file-review process

    As stated in the Board's commentary to the previous version of these rules, "Counsel may suggest that a claim be dealt with under the expedited process, but the decision to select suitable claims rests solely with the Division."[7]

    Allowing a claim is the same as accepting a claim

    The fact that allowing a claim for refugee protection is a synonym for accepting the claim was stated in the Board's commentary to the previous version of these rules: "Subsection 170(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides that the Division may allow (i.e., accept) a claim for refugee protection without a hearing, unless the Minister has notified the Division of the Minister's intention to intervene."[7]

    How often does the Board use this file-review process?

    According to a 2019 Auditor General audit of Board processes, it expedited only a quarter of eligible claims. The other three quarters proceeded to regular hearings, and 87% of them received positive decisions.[8]

    References

    1. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: A Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, December 1993, page 17.
    2. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], page 15 of the print report.
    3. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Instructions governing the streaming of less complex claims at the Refugee Protection Division, Dated January 29, 2019 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/instructions-less-complex-claims.aspx> (Accessed January 19, 2020).
    4. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mukasi, 2008 FC 347 (CanLII), para. 8.
    5. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, Rule 19(4).
    6. ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, RJD 2000-VIII, pp. 149-163, 159 (para. 39).
    7. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
    8. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Processing of Asylum Claims, Spring 2019 <https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201905_02_e_43339.html> (Accessed January 19, 2020).

    Conferences (Rule 24)

    Rule 24 - Conferences

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Conferences
    
    Requirement to participate at conference
    24 (1) The Division may require the parties to participate at a conference to fix a date for a proceeding or to discuss issues, relevant facts and any other matter to make the proceedings fairer and more efficient.
    
    Information or documents
    (2) The Division may require the parties to give any information or provide any document, at or before the conference.
    
    Written record
    (3) The Division must make a written record of any decisions and agreements made at the conference.

    Conferences may be held in the absence of the claimant

    A claimant need not be present for any conferences. The Board's Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division discusses this and provides guidance on this point. The guidelines state that a conference should be held only where it would be more practical or efficient to consider issues before the actual hearing or where it may be more appropriate to discuss certain sensitive issues without the presence of the claimant. For example, where there are complex legal issues to be discussed, a conference may be held to go over matters related to procedure or for questions relate to the evidence to be settled. One example of this is where the Board schedules a telephone conference prior to a hearing date in order to discuss issues of scheduling or procedural orders that parties are requesting the Board make.

    A particular type of pre-hearing conference is one held, in the words of the Chairperson's Guideline 7, "just before the hearing". The guidelines state that a brief conference with the parties will be held in this way only where it would help make the proceedings fairer and more efficient. An example of such a conference discussed in the guideline is where the refugee claimant has been identified as vulnerable and counsel and the claimant will meet, without the claimant being present, in order to discuss appropriate procedures for the hearing in light of the claimant's vulnerability. The guidelines go on to note that "when the claimant is represented, the member and counsel will participate, but the claimant will not usually be present." However, they go on to note that "a represented claimant may be present if the member decides it would be useful."[1] The better practice is likely for Members to ordinarily have claimants in the room during such pre-hearing conferences, with simultaneous interpretation provided as necessary. The discussions occurring relate, after all, to their claim. That said, this is a matter of the Member's discretion and at times excluding a claimant will be appropriate.

    Members should both provide an oral summary and make a written record of any decisions and agreements made at pre-hearing conferences

    As per Rule 24(3), "The Division must make a written record of any decisions and agreements made at the conference." If the claimant was not present at a pre-hearing conference, then, before the hearing starts, the Board's Chairperson Guidelines 7 state that the Member will summarize for the claimant what was discussed and what instructions the Member gave at the conference.[1] The Member will also make a written record of any decisions and agreements made at the conference. As such, the oral summary at the hearing is something that Members are expected to provide in addition to, not instead of, the requirement in Rule 24(3) that a written record of decisions and agreements be made (often this can be practically accomplished by commenting on the pre-hearing conference in the reasons for decision, but in other cases it will be more practical to provide this written record as a set of interim reasons). This provision requiring an oral summary in the Chairperson Guidelines is just that, a guideline, and not a legal requirement. It appears to be a good practice where a pre-hearing conference from which the claimant was excluded occurs just before the hearing and consequently counsel may not have had an opportunity to go over the decisions made at the pre-hearing conference with the claimant. In contrast, the guideline would appear not to apply to, say, a telephone pre-hearing conference held weeks prior to the hearing commencing and where the decisions made at the pre-hearing conference have already been reduced to writing and received by the parties.

    References

    1. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division, Amended December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx#FailureA4> (Accessed January 26, 2020), section 4.6.

    Notice to Appear (Rule 25)

    Rule 25

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Notice to Appear
    
    Notice to appear
    25 (1) The Division must notify the claimant or protected person and the Minister in writing of the date, time and location of the proceeding.
    
    Notice to appear for hearing
    (2) In the case of a hearing on a refugee claim, the notice may be provided by an officer under paragraph 3(4)(a).
    
    Date fixed for hearing
    (3) The date fixed for a hearing of a claim or an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection must not be earlier than 20 days after the day on which the parties receive the notice referred to in subrule (1) or (2) unless
    (a) the hearing has been adjourned or postponed from an earlier date; or
    (b) the parties consent to an earlier date.

    Children under 12 who are accompanied by an adult in Canada are not ordinarily expected to attend the hearing. During COVID this applies to all accompanied children.

    Accompanied children who are under the age of 12 on the date of the hearing are not required to appear before the RPD unless the presiding member requires their attendance.[1] Children 12 years of age or older are still required to attend the hearing. However, during the COVID period, as a temporary measure, this is extended to all children: accompanied children under the age of 18 on the date of the hearing are not required to appear before the RPD unless the presiding member requires their attendance.[2] As outlined in Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, accompanied children include:

    • Children who arrive in Canada at the same time as their parents or some time thereafter. In most cases, the parents also seek refugee status, and
    • Children who arrive in Canada with, or are being looked after in Canada by, persons who the RPD is satisfied are related to the child, then the child should be considered an accompanied child.

    How long is a normal hearing?

    Unless otherwise specified, for example if the hearing notice states that the hearing will be a full day or a short hearing of only 2 hours, parties should expect that a hearing will usually be about 3.5 hours.[3] That said, hearing length can vary, usually within a range of 1–4 hours.[4] Parties can make an application pursuant to Rule 50 to request a different hearing duration, for example that a full-day hearing be scheduled.

    Conduct and process at the hearing

    For details about how parties should comport themselves in the context of a hearing, see the section of this book on decorum: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Decorum.

    References

    1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Practice notice: Presence of children at Refugee Protection Division hearings, Practice notice signed on March 11, 2019 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/children-RPD-hearings.aspx>.
    2. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, June 23, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx#toc42> (Accessed August 1, 2020).
    3. Kinbrace Community Society, Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants, 2019 Version, <https://refugeeclaim.ca/wp-content/themes/refugeeclaim/library/guide/rhpg-vancouver-en.pdf>, page 33 (accessed January 17, 2020).
    4. Nicholas Alexander Rymal Fraser, Shared Heuristics: How Organizational Culture Shapes Asylum Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto (Canada), ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2020, <https://search.proquest.com/openview/f925dea72da7d94141f0f559633da65a/1> (Accessed August 1, 2020), at page 80 of PDF.

    Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility (Rules 26-28)

    The Board is required, in accordance with the following three rules, to notify the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP) or the Minister for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) that intervention in an RPD case, wherein neither organization had originally intervened, may be warranted. This mechanism is referred to as a “red letter,” and will often result in the postponement of a hearing.

    Heading to this portion of the Rules: Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility

    Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility

    Division of responsibility between CBSA and IRCC

    Rules 26-28 use the term "the Minister", but responsibility for responding to these notifications is split between two such Ministers (and Ministries): that related to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (specifically its sub-entity, the CBSA or Canada Border Services Agency) and that related to IRCC (technically, still CIC or Citizenship and Immigration Canada). With the introduction of the IRCC Ministerial Reviews and Interventions pilot project in October 2012, senior immigration officers are delegated to effect reviews and interventions at the IRB. IRCC ministerial interventions are restricted to cases involving program integrity and credibility as well as cases where exclusion pursuant to article 1E of the Refugee Convention arises.

    CBSA intervenes in cases involving serious criminality, security concerns, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. CBSA is also responsible for hybrid cases (i.e., where there are combined program integrity/credibility issues and criminality or security concerns). Where the case is determined to be a hybrid case and, due to various circumstances, where CBSA elects not to pursue the case on the grounds of criminality or security, CBSA has made a commitment to IRCC to go forward on credibility or program integrity grounds where warranted. The CBSA also has responsibility for detention cases, all arguments under the Charter of the United Nations, and designated foreign nationals.[1]

    How frequently are these notification provisions used?

    The number of such red letters has increased steadily in recent years. In most cases where the Board provides such notification, the Minister declines to intervene:[2]

    Year Total Red Letters (#) CBSA Intervention in Red Letter Cases (%) IRCC Intervention in Red Letter Cases (%) No Intervention in Red Letter Cases (%)
    2013 634 21.6 9.0 69.4
    2014 725 32.4 11.6 56.0
    2015 758 30.5 12.0 57.5
    2016 1031 19.2 9.5 71.3
    2017 1627 12.1 11.6 76.3
    Total 4775 23.2 10.7 66.1

    The CBSA approach to interventions varies markedly across the country. For example, in Central region, due to the volume of “red letters” and its current staffing level, the CBSA team assigned to the Refugee Protection Division focuses on assessing the cases referred by the IRB red letter process, while not working on cases referred through the CBSA triage process. Central Region maintains the lowest level of intervention in red letter cases, relative to other IRB regions, largely because it has much lower staffing levels when compared to the other regions:[2]

    Ratio of IRB Members to CBSA/IRCC Hearings Officers RPD
    IRB Members CBSA/IRCC Hearings Officers
    Eastern Region (Atlantic, Quebec, Northern Ontario) 5.3 1
    Central Region (GTA, Southern Ontario) 11.8 1
    Western Region (Prairie, Pacific) 2.6 1

    How often does the Minister participate in proceedings at the Board?

    In the early 90s, the Minister intervened in fewer than three percent of the refugee cases which came before the Board. The academic Hathaway was sharply critical of this low intervention rate, writing “This ministerial lethargy is destructive of the intended non-adversarial role of refugee hearing officers, who are too frequently tempted to "fill the shoes" of the absent Minister's representative in pursuit of matters which are important, but which have no bearing on their protection mandate.”[3] As of the late 1990s, this percentage had not shifted and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was represented in approximately 2% of the cases heard, usually in relation to an allegation of criminality.[4]

    Rule 26 - Possible Exclusion

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Notice to Minister of possible exclusion before hearing
    26 (1) If the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim, the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister.
    
    Notice to Minister of possible exclusion during hearing
    (2) If the Division believes, after a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim and the Division is of the opinion that the Minister’s participation may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim, the Division must adjourn the hearing and without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister.
    
    Disclosure to claimant
    (3) The Division must provide to the claimant a copy of any notice or information that the Division provides to the Minister.
    
    Resumption of hearing
    (4) The Division must fix a date for the resumption of the hearing that is as soon as practicable,
    (a) if the Minister responds to the notice referred to in subrule (2), after receipt of the response from the Minister; or
    (b) if the Minister does not respond to that notice, no earlier than 14 days after receipt of the notice by the Minister.

    History of this rule

    This rule is essentially identical, except for Rule 26(4), to Rule 23 in the previous version of the Refugee Protection Division Rules from 2002.[5]

    What are sections E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention?

    The schedule to the IRPA includes the full text of these articles of the Refugee Convention:

    Sections E and F of Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
    
    E This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.
    
    F The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
    (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
    (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
    (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

    These grounds for denying protection have been directly incorporated into Canadian law through section 98 of IRPA.[6]

    When will there be a "possibility" of exclusion?

    The standard used in Rule 26(1) is that "if the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim, the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister." This provision turns on the Division believing that there is a "possibility" of the claimant being excluded. The RAD has held that the term "possibility" suggests a "low threshold that need only be met in order to prompt the RPD to notify the Minister that exclusion may apply in the claim".[7] Generally speaking, this threshold will be met in the following types of cases:

    • Where it is evident that the Member believed that there was a possibility of exclusion: As the RAD notes, "Rule 26 of the RPD Rules specifically refers to the belief of the RPD member."[8] As such, where it is clear from a Member's conduct that they believed, before a hearing began, that there was a possibility of exclusion, then notification should have been provided. For example:
      • Where a panel identifies exclusion as an issue at the hearing: Where the panel identifies exclusion as an issue at the beginning of, or at any point during the hearing, then there is such a possibility and formal notification should ensue. For example, in Kanya v. Canada, the Member stated at the beginning of the hearing that "The issues in this claim ... from what I can figure out from the narrative, it might be an issue [of] exclusion on 1F(b)." Justice Rouleau of the Federal Court held in that case that "the Board has a duty to notify the Minister if there is a "possibility" that Article 1(F)(b) should apply to a refugee claimant. The Board clearly indicated from the outset of the proceedings that there was a "possibility" that 1(F)(b) would apply to the applicant. The hearing should have been adjourned from the outset; the Minister should have been notified and the applicant should have been given time to prepare for an exclusion determination."[9]
      • Where the panel asks questions about the issue: The court commented in Canada v. Louis that the Board erred by questioning a claimant about exclusion issues without having previously notified the Minister of the possibility of exclusion. The fact that the panel asked the claimant questions about their possible exclusion was a sufficient basis on which to conclude that there was a “possibility” of it.[10] That said, the fact that a panel asks questions about an issue that could relate to exclusion does not always mean that the "possibility" threshold has been met, especially when the questions could equally relate to other issues such as the claimant's general credibility. For example, in one case the RAD noted that "The RPD member [] told the respondent at the beginning of his RPD hearing that she will have questions about his role with the army. I note that the RPD member did question the respondent about why he joined the army, how long he was in the army, what his duties were in the army, and where he was stationed while in the army." The Minister had appealed the RPD's positive determination on the basis that the Member should have notified the Minister that there was a possibility of exclusion in the case as, in their view, the panel "simply overlooked the evidence of his service in the Afghan National Army and did no analysis of whether his service and responsibilities amount to complicity in war crimes or crimes against humanity." The RAD rejected this argument noting that "there was no evidence that was before the RPD [that] could have alerted the RPD member to the possibility of exclusion being a live issue for the RPD hearing" and that the fact that the Member asked questions that could relate to such issues did not, without more, trigger the obligation to notify the Minister.[8]
      • Where the Board makes a factual finding relating to the issue in its reasons: In Canada v. Oladapo, the court considered a case in which the Minister sought judicial review on the basis that "the Board did not notify the Minister upon becoming aware that section 1E of the Convention...possibly applied to the claim". The Minister stated that the Board was clearly aware there was a possibility [Article 1E] applied since it took the time to review the evidence and make a finding. The Minister argued that had it had the chance to participate in the proceedings, it could have provided evidence on the respondent’s status in Spain and other questions relevant to whether or not the respondent had status substantially similar to that of Spain’s nationals. The court concurred: "the Board considered and then rejected exclusion. The Board made a factual finding relating to the respondent’s status in Spain. This reaches the threshold of 'possibility' as used in [then-]Rule 23 and therefore requires notice to the Minister."[11] In such circumstances where a Member considers exclusion in their reasons, unless it can be said that the issue only arose after the hearing began, then it should be concluded there was a possibility of exclusion in the case and that the possibility existed prior to the hearing commencing.
    • When there is evidence on the record that should have alerted the panel to the issue: Even where it is clear that the Member did not subjectively believe that there was a possibility of exclusion, if the Member's failure to form that belief is unexplained or unreasonable in light of the evidence that was before them, then reviewing bodies have been quite willing to conclude that there was a possibility of exclusion and that the Minister should have been so notified. Examples of cases where the RAD and courts have reached this conclusion follow.
      • The claimant admits to having committed a serious crime: For example, in one case a claimant had stated in his Basis of Claim form that the state wanted him to pay back 3 billion Soums he stole and that he had left Uzbekistan because he did not have the money. The RAD held that with that information in front of it, the RPD had erred in not notifying the Minister of possible exclusion for serious criminality, notwithstanding the fact that the RPD had ultimately rejected the claim in question.[12]
      • Information in the NDP establishes that the claimant was involved with a problematic group:
        • Examples of where notification was appropriate: For example, in one case a claimant indicated that he was involved with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Information in the National Documentation Package was that the SPLM or factions of the SPLM were involved in excessive acts of violence and the targeting of civilians. The group was also accused of recruiting child soldiers. Even where there was no explicit evidence in the record that the claimant was actively and personally involved in activities that would lead to exclusion, there was evidence in the record which established that the group with which he admitted he was a highly active member was involved in such activities. The RAD concluded that this gave rise to the possibility that exclusion may apply to the claim and thus the obligation to notify the Minister.[13] Similarly, in Canada v. Mukasi there was evidence before the Board that the claimant was associated with violence, particularly that the claimant "led a faction of UPRONA that was opposed to the peace process in Burundi. He was arrested for his stance. UPRONA was associated with a violent militant group." In the view of the court, this evidence "should have alerted the Board to the possibility that Mr. Mukasi might be excluded from the definition of a Convention refugee based on Article 1(F) of the Convention."[14]
        • Examples of where notification was unnecessary: That said, the Minister need not be notified where the possibility of exclusion is purely speculative. For example, RAD Member Rena Dhir considered a case in which the Minister appealed a positive determination from the RPD regarding an Afghan national. In that case, the claimant had a record of service with the Afghan National Army. The Minister argued that issues of exclusion should have been canvassed, and notification provided, on the basis that there have been documented human rights abuses in Afghanistan on the pro-government side attributed to pro-government armed militias, who operate outside of government control, but may at times have some contact with the army, and on the basis of the Army's own past activities. The RAD held that this was an insufficient basis on which to conclude that any such notice needed to be provided, noting that "there is no evidence, from my review, that indicates that the ANA was complicit in war crimes regarding the issue of Exclusion as it relates to Article 1(F)(a) when the respondent was part of this organization" and that the organization's more tangential links to armed militias were also insufficient to trigger this rule.[15]

    What does it mean that the Division must notify the Minister "without delay"?

    The standard used in Rule 26(1) is that "if the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim, the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister [emphasis added]." What does "without delay" mean in this context? The Federal Court commented on this in Kanya v. Canada, noting that where the Board determines that there is a possibility of exclusion, the hearing should be adjourned immediately:

    The Board clearly indicated from the outset of the proceedings that there was a "possibility" that 1(F)(b) would apply to the applicant. The hearing should have been adjourned from the outset; the Minister should have been notified and the applicant should have been given time to prepare for an exclusion determination.

    In that case, the court held that the Board erred when it asked a series of questions related to the narrative and the possibility of exclusion before, mid-way through the hearing, "formally" raising the possibility of 1F(b) exclusion, notifying the Minister, and ultimately setting a future date for the hearing to resume. This was held to be procedurally unfair to the claimant who had not had the requisite pre-hearing notice of this issue that is entailed by the Ministerial notification requirement. The court reaffirmed that the rule requires that the claim be suspended "immediately" and does not permit a panel to ask any additional questions prior to notifying the Minister in Oyejobi v. Canada:

    My review of the transcript shows that the RPD member actually did not invoke Rule 27(1) immediately because he was trying to “give the client a chance.” As the RPD member himself stated, he wanted to see if he could find the Applicant credible (specifically with regard to her sexual orientation) – in spite of the perceived integrity issue – such that he might grant the claim. While the RPD approach is laudable in that it was likely motivated by a desire to give the Applicant the benefit of the doubt, the RPD member did not do what Rule 27 requires him to do[.][16]

    In similar fashion, the court commented in Canada v. Louis, another case in which a panel proceeded to question a claimant about possible exclusion without having previously notified the Minister, that the "the Board [set] aside the issues of exclusion following an examination of their merits. The fundamental problem [with the Board's conduct was] the fact that the Board indeed continued with this examination without having previously notified the Minister."[10] As such, where the Board examines the merits of an issue on which it is supposed to provide notice, without having previously provided the notice in question, it errs.

    The phrase "without delay" is used not just in the Refugee Protection Rules, but across the scheme and regulations of the IRPA more broadly. For example, in the IRCC manual on port of entry procedures, it notes that a person who is arrested must be informed of their right to counsel "without delay": "For the purpose of an Immigration Secondary examination, a person is not entitled to counsel unless formally arrested or detained. A person who is arrested or detained must be informed without delay of their right to counsel and granted the opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. [emphasis added]"[17] It is easy to appreciate in the criminal context the importance of affording the right to counsel without delay, and without first asking a claimant a series of questions about the matter that they are being arrested in relation to. The fact that the same language is used in the context of this Ministerial notification obligation may be instructive.

    That said, a party may choose to waive its rights and proceed even where such notification has not been provided. With respect to potential prejudice to the claimant from a lack of sufficient notice regarding the exclusion issue that the claimant is to be questioned on, it is open to the claimant to waive such notice rights and elect to proceed with the hearing. This would leave the panel to reserve their decision post-hearing and provide the Ministerial notification at that point. This may be a practical approach given that the Minister declines to intervene in about 3/4 of all cases in which a notification is provided (see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#How frequently are these notification provisions used?) and that when a claimant makes this election to proceed with the hearing they will usually be represented by counsel and thereby making an informed choice. Proceeding with questioning in this way may be advantageous to a claimant where it avoids an unnecessary resumption, with its attendant costs, delays, and stresses. That said, even if unusual, it is possible that the Minister could object that they were prejudiced by not being able to question first, a right provided to them under these Rules, and insist upon a de novo hearing on that basis.

    How should a panel decide whether "the Minister’s participation may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim"?

    Rule 26(2) provides a panel with discretion about whether or not to notify the Minister. Per Rule 26(1), where an issue is identified before the hearing, the panel must notify the Minister. Where, instead, the panel only forms this opinion about there being a potential issue "after a hearing begins", per Rule 26(2) the Ministerial notification requirement only applies where the Division is of the view that the Minister's participation "may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim". This discretionary aspect to Rule 26(2) means that even where the panel forms an opinion that there is a "possibility" that the claimant is excluded, the panel nonetheless retains discretion about whether or not to adjourn the hearing. How should the Division exercise this discretion? As Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer observed in Rivas v. Canada, when an issue of exclusion is raised during the hearing, this rule "allows a certain discretion for the RPD to determine whether the Minister’s participation will help it deal with the issue of the applicant’s exclusion".[18] The court provided some guidance on this question in Oyejobi v. Canada, as follows:

    In my view, the RPD member ignored the provisions of Rule 27. The RPD member claims to have not invoked the Rule 27(1) because he was not of the opinion that the Minister could provide “meaningful assistance” when he was preparing for the hearing, and then invoked Rule 27(2) once he determined that the allegedly copied passages “would need to be addressed after all.” This explanation is simply repeated in the Decision without further analysis. I find this to be problematic for at least three reasons. First, the standard for notifying the Minister is not when there is a belief that the Minister may provide “meaningful assistance;” rather, it is triggered as soon as the RPD is of the opinion that the Minister’s participation “may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim” (emphasis added). As such, the standard is much lower than the one employed by the RPD member.[19]

    When should a panel form the belief that there is a possibility of exclusion prior to a hearing, as opposed to forming such a belief after the hearing begins?

    Rule 26(1) is entitled "Notice to Minister of possible exclusion before hearing". In contrast, Rule 26(2) is entitled "Notice to Minister of possible exclusion during hearing". Rule 26(1) applies where "the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim". In contrast, Rule 26(2) only applies where "the Division believes, after a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention applies to the claim."

    How do these two provisions interact? The pre-hearing notification procedure is mandatory. A panel does not have the discretion to ignore it. In contrast, Rule 26(2), about notice of possible exclusion during the hearing, gives some discretion to the panel about whether or not to notify. The court commented on how these two rules interact in Oyejobi v. Canada, noting that where issues exist on the record prior to the hearing, notification will be called for, and that the types of issues where Rule 26(2) applies are ones where a panel should be able to identify some particular new evidence on the record that caused the panel to come to its newfound belief about the possibility of exclusion:

    I am unable to identify the precise testimony from the Applicant that caused the RPD member to change his mind and decide that the Minister’s assistance would, after all, be necessary to ensure a full and proper hearing. I find this to be particularly troubling, considering that the integrity issue was discovered prior to the hearing and involved the copying of BOC narratives. In my view, it is not clear from the RPD reasons how such an integrity concern would be resolved (positively or negatively) through the Applicant’s oral testimony. In other words, and contrary to the assertion of the RPD, the copying of BOC narratives would present a significant integrity issue whether or not this Applicant is believed to be bisexual.[20]

    It should be noted that Oyejobi v. Canada concerned Rule 27 of the RPD Rules, but the point applies equally to Rule 26, mutatis mutandis.

    Can a panel of the Board decline to provide such notice so long as it does not accept the claim?

    No. Where the provisions in the above rules are met, notification is mandatory. The notification provisions above operate not only to the benefit of the Minister, but also ensure that a claimant has adequate notice of a potential exclusion issue and time to prepare for it. For a discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a hearing and the right to be heard#The Board must notify the Minister where the Board's rules require it and this protects the Minister's right to be heard.

    Rule 27 - Possible Integrity Issues

    Notice to Minister of possible integrity issues before hearing
    27 (1) If the Division believes, before a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that issues relating to the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system may arise from the claim and the Division is of the opinion that the Minister’s participation may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim, the Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister.
    
    Notice to Minister of possible integrity issues during hearing
    (2) If the Division believes, after a hearing begins, that there is a possibility that issues relating to the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system may arise from the claim and the Division is of the opinion that the Minister’s participation may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim, the Division must adjourn the hearing and without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide any relevant information to the Minister.
    
    Integrity issues
    (3) For the purpose of this rule, claims in which the possibility that issues relating to the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system may arise include those in which there is
    (a) information that the claim may have been made under a false identity in whole or in part;
    (b) a substantial change to the basis of the claim from that indicated in the Basis of Claim Form first provided to the Division;
    (c) information that, in support of the claim, the claimant submitted documents that may be fraudulent; or
    (d) other information that the claimant may be directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter.
    
    Disclosure to claimant
    (4) The Division must provide to the claimant a copy of any notice or information that the Division provides to the Minister.
    
    Resumption of hearing
    (5) The Division must fix a date for the resumption of the hearing that is as soon as practicable,
    (a) if the Minister responds to the notice referred to in subrule (2), after receipt of the response from the Minister; or
    (b) if the Minister does not respond to that notice, no earlier than 14 days after receipt of the notice by the Minister.

    What are "issues relating to the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system"?

    Rule 27 is triggered where the Division believes that there is a possibility that issues relating to the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system may arise from the claim. What so qualifies? Those categories listed in Rule 26(3) provide guidance when it states that such issues include those in which there is:

    (a) information that the claim may have been made under a false identity in whole or in part.

    (b) a substantial change to the basis of the claim from that indicated in the Basis of Claim Form first provided to the Division.

    (c) information that, in support of the claim, the claimant submitted documents that may be fraudulent.

    (d) other information that the claimant may be directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter. The court provided some guidance on this question in Oyejobi v. Canada, noting that a situation in which a panel suspects that a BOC narrative has been copied from another claimant is one which raises issues relating to the integrity of the system.[20]

    When should the Division be of the opinion that the Minister’s participation may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim?

    It is clear from the focus of Rule 27 that even where such issues arise in relation to a claim, for example there is an indication that the BOC narrative was copied from another claim, the clear wording of the Rule also requires that the panel believe that the Minister’s participation may help in the hearing of the specific claim before the Member, not simply in investigating a possibility of broader integrity issues involving the other (suspiciously similar) claim. For a broader discussion of this question, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#How should a panel decide whether "the Minister’s participation may help in the full and proper hearing of the claim"? above.

    Rule 28 - Possible Inadmissibility or Ineligibility

    Notice of possible inadmissibility or ineligibility
    28 (1) The Division must without delay notify the Minister in writing and provide the Minister with any relevant information if the Division believes that
    (a) a claimant may be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality;
    (b) there is an outstanding charge against the claimant for an offence under an Act of Parliament that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or
    (c) the claimant’s claim may be ineligible to be referred under section 101 or paragraph 104(1)(c) or (d) of the Act.
    
    Disclosure to claimant
    (2) The Division must provide to the claimant a copy of any notice or information that the Division provides to the Minister.
    
    Continuation of proceeding
    (3) If, within 20 days after receipt of the notice referred to in subrule (1), the Minister does not notify the Division that the proceedings are suspended under paragraph 103(1)(a) or (b) of the Act or that the pending proceedings respecting the claim are terminated under section 104 of the Act, the Division may continue with the proceedings.

    What process does the Minister follow in order to determine ineligibility?

    Under the Act, the burden of proving that a claim is eligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division rests solely with the refugee protection claimant, and it is not for an immigration officer to show that the claim is ineligible.[21] Prior to declaring that a claimant is ineligible, the Minister will generally send out what is referred to as a procedural fairness letter. The letter will invite the claimant to provide evidence/submissions/materials regarding their eligibility by providing a written response to the letter. An officer will make a final decision after the deadline for providing submissions. If the claimant does not respond by the stated date, an officer will make a decision with the information on file. An appointment will generally be set up shortly thereafter to discuss the matter with the claimant in a CBSA office. If the final decision is that their claim is ineligible for referral to the Refugee Protection Division, the claimant will face removal from Canada. If, and when, the CBSA commences removal arrangements, the claimant's eligibility to apply for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) will be assessed.

    What does it mean that the Division must notify the Minister "without delay"?

    Rule 28(1) provides that the Division must without delay notify the Minister if it believes that one of the listed issues may arise in the claim (regarding inadmissibility, criminality, and ineligibility). The Rule 28(3) then provides the circumstances under which the Board may continue with the proceedings. The rationale for this scheduling policy has been articulated by the Federal Court, which has observed that "there is no point in conducting a hearing if eligibility could be an issue".[22] Furthermore, the Minister argues that one of the purposes of this provision is to "avoid the need to nullify an RPD decision on a claim that is later found to be ineligible."[23] That said, these issues of admissibility and eligibility are not determined by the Board. As with the notice provisions considered above (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#What does it mean that the Division must notify the Minister "without delay"?), the claimant will generally have a right to have the proceedings halt when the Board determines that such notification is necessary, but the claimant may waive this right and elect to continue with the questioning (with the Board's decision suspended during the 20-day notice period above) for reasons of the claimant's choice, efficiency, and other considerations.

    Rule 28(1)(c): When is a claim ineligible to be referred under section 101 of the Act?

    Section 101 of the Act reads:

    Ineligibility
    101 (1) A claim is ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division if
    (a) refugee protection has been conferred on the claimant under this Act;
    (b) a claim for refugee protection by the claimant has been rejected by the Board;
    (c) a prior claim by the claimant was determined to be ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division, or to have been withdrawn or abandoned;
    (c.1) the claimant has, before making a claim for refugee protection in Canada, made a claim for refugee protection to a country other than Canada, and the fact of its having been made has been confirmed in accordance with an agreement or arrangement entered into by Canada and that country for the purpose of facilitating information sharing to assist in the administration and enforcement of their immigration and citizenship laws;
    (d) the claimant has been recognized as a Convention refugee by a country other than Canada and can be sent or returned to that country;
    (e) the claimant came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country designated by the regulations, other than a country of their nationality or their former habitual residence; or
    (f) the claimant has been determined to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality, except for persons who are inadmissible solely on the grounds of paragraph 35(1)(c).
    
    Serious criminality
    (2) A claim is not ineligible by reason of serious criminality under paragraph (1)(f) unless
    (a) in the case of inadmissibility by reason of a conviction in Canada, the conviction is for an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or
    (b) in the case of inadmissibility by reason of a conviction outside Canada, the conviction is for an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.

    Section 101(1)(c.1): What evidence the Minister considers regarding refugee claims made to another country

    Section 101(1)(c.1) of the Act provides that "A claim is ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division if the claimant has, before making a claim for refugee protection in Canada, made a claim for refugee protection to a country other than Canada, and the fact of its having been made has been confirmed in accordance with an agreement or arrangement entered into by Canada and that country for the purpose of facilitating information sharing to assist in the administration and enforcement of their immigration and citizenship laws." There are several components to this provision:

    • the claim must have been made before the claim for refugee protection was made in Canada: Importantly, the ineligibility ground applies regardless of whether a decision was ever made on a previous claim.[24] The Minister will often cite in its procedural fairness letters that the claimant was in possession of paperwork pertaining to the claim when the claimant entered Canada.
    • the claim must have been made after this provision came into force: This provision applies to all claims made after June 21, 2019. For claims made between April 8, 2019 and June 21, 2019, the provision does not apply if substantive evidence was heard by the RPD or the RPD allowed the claim without a hearing prior to June 21, 2019. This transitional provision arises from s. 309(b) of the Budget Implementation Act, 2019 (Bill C-97) which provides that paragraph 101(1)(c.1) of the IRPA applies to claims for refugee protection made during the period beginning on the day on which the Bill is introduced [April 8, 2019] and ending on the day on which it receives royal assent [June 21, 2019], unless, as of the day on which it receives royal assent [June 21, 2019] substantive evidence has been heard by the Refugee Protection Division in respect of the claim or that Division has allowed the claim without a hearing.
    • the claim must have been made to a country (not, say, UNHCR itself); and
    • the fact of its having been made must be confirmed through the type of information-sharing arrangement specified: Canada has information-sharing agreements or arrangements with the US, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. A 2009 Data-Sharing Protocol allows these countries to conduct ‘immigration checks’ through biometric data exchanges.[24] The Minister will often cite in its procedural fairness letters that the claimant's biometrics were matched to their immigration record in the other country.

    Section 101(1)(d): the claimant has been recognized as a Convention refugee by a country other than Canada and can be sent or returned to that country

    When considering whether a claimant "can be sent or returned to that country", the question is whether they can "physically and legally be re-admitted" to the country in question.[25] In Jekula v. Canada (a decision affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, without reasons) the court held that the words can be returned did not require an immigration officer to determine whether the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution in the country that has already granted asylum.[26] A key reason for this is the history of the statutory provision in question. In Kaberuka v. Canada, the Federal Court noted that An Act to amend the Immigration Act and other Acts in consequence thereof, S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 36(1) repealed the previous version of s. 46.01(2) of the Immigration Act, which had permitted those with Convention refugee status elsewhere to make Convention refugee claims against their countries of asylum. The Court concluded that this indicated Parliament had chosen to exclude persons recognized as Convention refugees by another country from claiming to have a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of asylum.[27] One of the rationales for this, as noted by the court in Farah v. Canada is the presence of other provisions in the IRPA designed to address such circumstances, including s. 115 of the Act (quoted below), and the availability of relief through processes including a stay of removal and a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment:[28]

    115(1) A protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by another country to which the person may be returned shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

    As such, the Federal Court holds that it is sufficient for an immigration officer determining the eligibility of a claim for refugee protection in Canada to ensure that a person already recognized as a Convention refugee by another country will, if required, be able to obtain the necessary travel documents in order to be returned to the country of asylum (unless the person, when ready to be returned, tells the CBSA enforcement officer that they prefer to be returned to their country of nationality rather than the country of asylum).[29]

    Other grounds of inadmissibility in the IRPA do not render claimants ineligible for a refugee hearing, but may nonetheless have consequences even where a claim is accepted

    A number of grounds of inadmissibility are listed in the provision above. There are a number of others in the Act that are not listed above. As Jennifer Bond, et. al., observe, those other grounds of inadmissibility, such as health or financial criteria (ss. 38–39 of IRPA), misrepresentation (s. 40(1)(a) of IRPA), or criminality falling below the threshold described above will not make them ineligible for a refugee hearing; however, if their claim is successful and they become a “protected person”, some of these grounds of inadmissibility could prevent them from acquiring permanent resident status.[30] These include health grounds if their condition poses a danger to the public (s. 38(1)(a)–(b) of IRPA) or “serious criminality” in the absence of a conviction (s. 36(1)(c) of IRPA) or for a crime that does not carry a 10-year maximum sentence (IRPA, s. 99(4) and s. 21(2)). Such persons could not be refouled from Canada, by virtue of s. 115(1) of IRPA, but would be subject to a range of negative consequences due to their lack of permanent status.[31] This has been a part of Canadian immigration law for some time; even under the previous Immigration Act, where a claimant applying for permanent residence did not have sufficient identity documents, or he/she or a dependent included in the application was inadmissible for criminal or security reasons, it was possible that “landing” would not be granted.[32]

    References

    1. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ENF 24 Ministerial interventions Policy, dated 2016-03-18 <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf24-eng.pdf>, page 6.
    2. 1 2 Canada Border Services Agency, Evaluation of the CBSA Hearings Program, Publication dated December 2018, Accessed January 6, 2020, <https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2018/imp-pa-eng.html>
    3. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: a report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, 01/12/1993 <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:1136> (Accessed April 14, 2020), page 30.
    4. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 46.
    5. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, Rule 23.
    6. As summarized in Jennifer Bond, Nathan Benson, Jared Porter, Guilt by Association: Ezokola’s Unfinished Business in Canadian Refugee Law, Refugee Survey Quarterly, , hdz019, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/rsq/hdz019.
    7. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 40799 (CA IRB), para. 25.
    8. 1 2 X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107938 (CA IRB), para. 23, <http://canlii.ca/t/hqh9q#23>, retrieved on 2020-01-31.
    9. Kanya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1677 (CanLII), para. 21.
    10. 1 2 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Louis, 2009 FC 674 (CanLII), para. 24.
    11. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Oladapo, 2013 FC 1195 (CanLII), para. 27.
    12. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 96668 (CA IRB), paras. 23-28.
    13. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 40799 (CA IRB), para. 27.
    14. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mukasi, 2008 FC 347 (CanLII), paras. 7-8.
    15. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107938 (CA IRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/hqh9q#1>, retrieved on 2020-01-31.
    16. Oyejobi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 107 (CanLII), para. 21.
    17. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ENF 4: Port of entry examinations, Dated 2019-08-15 <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf04-eng.pdf>, page 36 (Accessed January 25, 2020).
    18. Reyes Rivas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 317 (CanLII), para. 37.
    19. Oyejobi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 107 (CanLII), paras. 18-19.
    20. 1 2 Oyejobi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 107 (CanLII), para. 20.
    21. Hermes Ablahad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1315 at paras 25–26.
    22. Alhaqli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 728 (CanLII), para. 64.
    23. Alhaqli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 728 (CanLII), para. 39.
    24. 1 2 Idil Atak, Zainab Abu Alrob, Claire Ellis, Expanding refugee ineligibility: Canada’s response to secondary refugee movements, Journal of Refugee Studies, December 14, 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa103 at page 2.
    25. Farah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 292 (CanLII), [2018] 1 FCR 473, para. 14, <http://canlii.ca/t/h2svb#14>, retrieved on 2020-01-25.
    26. Jekula v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9099 (FC), [1999] 1 FC 266 (affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, without reasons, at [2000] FCJ No. 1956).
    27. Kaberuka v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1995 CanLII 3519 (FCA), [1995] 3 FC 252, at pages 269-270.
    28. Farah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 292 (CanLII), [2018] 1 FCR 473, para. 27, <http://canlii.ca/t/h2svb#27>, retrieved on 2020-01-25.
    29. Paulos Teddla v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2020 FC 1109 (CanLII), par. 22, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc709#par22>, retrieved on 2020-12-21.
    30. Jennifer Bond, Nathan Benson, Jared Porter, Guilt by Association: Ezokola’s Unfinished Business in Canadian Refugee Law, Refugee Survey Quarterly, hdz019, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/rsq/hdz019, footnote 37.
    31. J. Bond, Unwanted but Unremovable: Canada’s Treatment of ‘Criminal’ Migrants Who Cannot be Removed, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 36(1), 2017, 168–186.
    32. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 51.

    Intervention by the Minister (Rule 29)

    Relevant IRPA Provision

    The relevant provision in the Act is s. 170(e), which reads:

    Proceedings
    
    170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it,
    (e) must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations;

    The Minister rarely intervenes in Refugee Protection Division hearings

    During the 1990s, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was represented in approximately 2% of the cases heard, usually in relation to an allegation of criminality.[1] For further details, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#How often does the Minister participate in proceedings at the Board?.

    Rule 29

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Intervention by the Minister
    
    Notice of intention to intervene
    
    29 (1) To intervene in a claim, the Minister must provide
    (a) to the claimant, a copy of a notice of the Minister’s intention to intervene; and
    (b) to the Division, the original of the notice, together with a written statement indicating how and when a copy was provided to the claimant.
    
    Contents of notice
    (2) In the notice, the Minister must state
    (a) the purpose for which the Minister will intervene;
    (b) whether the Minister will intervene in writing only, in person, or both; and
    (c) the Minister’s counsel’s contact information.
    
    Intervention — exclusion clauses
    (3) If the Minister believes that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention may apply to the claim, the Minister must also state in the notice the facts and law on which the Minister relies.
    
    Time limit
    (4) Documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than 10 days before the date fixed for a hearing.

    History of this Rule

    The equivalent rule in the previous 2002 version of the Rules read:

    INTERVENTION BY THE MINISTER
    
    Notice of intention to intervene
    25. (1) To intervene in a claim, the Minister must provide
    (a) to the claimant, a copy of a written notice of the Minister’s intention to intervene; and
    (b) to the Division, the original of that notice and a written statement of how and when a copy was provided to the claimant.
    
    Contents of notice
    (2) In the notice, the Minister must state how the Minister will intervene and give the Minister’s counsel’s contact information.
    
    Intervention — exclusion clauses
    (3) If the Minister believes that section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention may apply to the claim, the Minister must also state in the notice the facts and law on which the Minister relies.
    
    Time limit
    (4) Documents provided under this rule must be received by the Division and the claimant no later than 20 days before the hearing.

    Comparing this version of the rule to the current version of the rule, one can see that the current version of the rules introduced changes to the requirements for the contents of the notice (the former Rule 25(2)) and also changed the timeline provided for in the former Rule 25(4).

    Rule 29(2)(a) requires that the Minister provide a notice stating the purpose for which it will intervene

    Rule 29(2)(a) provides that in order for the Minister to intervene in a claim and thus become a party to the proceedings, the Minister must provide a Notice of Intervention, and this Notice must state the purpose for which they are intervening in the claim. The Notice of Intervention should go beyond identifying what the Minister wishes to do at the hearing and should state why they want to do it, e.g. what determinative issues are at play in the hearing. For example, in one case the Minister provided a notice of intervention which identified their purposes as “appearing through Minister’s counsel at the proceedings to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations.” The Division held that this notice did not actually identify any purpose for the intervention and thus did not meet the requirements imposed by the rules:

    They are merely listing what they intend to do at the hearing as opposed to why they are doing it. The Minister has not stated what their purpose is for filing their intervention; they have simply recited the obvious role Minister’s counsel will play at the hearing when they appear in person once they become a party. The statement in the notice made by Minister’s counsel that is defined as their “purpose” are descriptions of actions and not the reasons behind those actions, and therefore do not constitute a statement of purpose at all.[2]

    In that case, the Board declined to allow the Minister's intervention on the basis that the intervention notice was insufficiently specific. The rationale for this decision is strengthened by comparing the current version of the rules to its predecessor reproduced above. Whereas the previous version of the rules only required that the Minister state "how" they would intervene, this was modified to require that the Minister identity the "purpose" of their intervention in the current version of the rules. As discussed in the reasons above, the Board identified in its public commentary at the time of this change that this modification was made in order to ensure that claimants had better notice of the reasons why the Minister would be intervening in the upcoming proceeding.

    The Board has noted that "the level of detail required in the Notice is fact driven and may vary from case to case".[2] A description of the issues the Minister will raise at the hearing or identifying the specific facts and issues of the intervention are not necessarily required. It is common that such notices simply indicate that the Minister is intervening on an issue such as "credibility" or that it indicates that the Minister is intervening "in all aspects of the claim". What a claimant can expect from such statements is exemplified by the following passage from a University of Ottawa guide for refugee claimant which describes the process: "If [IRCC] has sent a Minister’s Counsel to your hearing, you will have already been informed of the reason why (for example [IRCC] suspects you are misrepresenting your identity) and the Minister’s Counsel will ask questions relating to those concerns."[3]

    Where the Notice of Intervention is deficient in this respect, the Division should generally decline to allow the Minister's intervention, while inviting them to submit a notice of intervention that complies with the requirements of the rules. See the reasons of Member Davidson of the Refugee Protection Division for an example of this approach.[2] However, where there would not be enough time to allow the Minister to do this prior to the hearing date, then see the following commentary.

    Rule 29(4) provides that a claimant is entitled to 10 days of notice of the purpose of any Ministerial intervention

    Under Rule 29(4), claimants are entitled to notice of the purpose of any Ministerial intervention under this Rule at least 10 days before the hearing. This mirrors the requirement that the Board provide advance notification to the Minister that certain issues may arise in a claim and the way that that is a substantive right that the claimant is entitled to: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a fair hearing#Rules creating an obligation to notify the Minister ensure that a claimant will have advance notice of particular types of issues. Where this notice requirement has not been complied with, what should a panel of the Board do?

    • The Board may waive this notice requirement, including pursuant to Rule 71: Canadian Refugee Procedure/General Provisions#Effect of Rule 71 where the Division has not explicitly changed the requirement of a rule. This may properly be done where there is no prejudice to the claimant as a result of the lack of notice or any potential prejudice can be ameliorated through post-hearing submissions. For example, in El Haddad c. Canada the Minister intervened on the issue of exclusion. At the hearing, the Minister stated that they would not be pursuing the exclusion matter, but wished to provide submissions on the claimant's credibility. On judicial review, the claimant challenged their ability to do so on the basis that they had not provided the advance notice required by Rule 29 that they would be intervening for that purpose. The court held that the Board had not erred in allowing the Minister to provide submissions on credibility in these circumstances given that the Minister did not question the claimant but only provided legal submissions at the close of the hearing, and given that the issue they provided submissions on, credibility, is one that is always at issue in hearings.[4]
    • The Board may postpone the commencement of proceedings so that the claimant receives the requisite amount of notice.
    • The Board may err if it proceeds with the hearing and denies the Minister the ability to participate. Section 170(e) of the IRPA provides the Minister with a right to participate in the hearing: "The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ... must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations". In Canada v. Atabaki the Minister's notice of intervention indicated that they would intervene related to exclusion, but did not indicate that they would intervene on issues of credibility. The Member accordingly denied the Minister the ability to question the claimant regarding issues of credibility. The court held that this approach was in error and remitted the matter to be redetermined by the Board.[5] That said, it should be noted that this case concerned the previous version of the RPD Rules, which had a different requirement for Ministerial notice, and so that may affect the decision's ongoing applicability.

    Rule 29(2)(b) provides that a claimant is entitled to advance notice where the Minister will be intervening in person

    Rule 29(2)(b) provides that the Minister's notice of intervention must state whether the Minister will intervene in writing only, in person, or both. Member McSweeney of the Refugee Appeal Division has considered the effect of a violation of this rule in a published decision. In that case, the Minister's intervention notice had not indicated whether or not the Minister would be intervening in person. When the Minister's delegate appeared at the hearing and sought to question the claimant, counsel for the claimant objected to the Minister being able to do so because of the lack of notice as required by the rules. The claimant and their counsel did not have an opportunity to prepare for questioning by the Minister given the lack of notice before the second sitting. The Refugee Appeal Division held that it was wrong to have allowed the questioning to proceed in such circumstances, this rendered the proceeding unfair, and a new hearing was consequently ordered by the RAD.[6]

    A Minister's Notice of Intention to Intervene must be in the language of the proceeding

    Any documents that the Minister provides in a proceeding, including the Notice of Intention to Intervene, must be in the language of the proceedings: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#The language the Minister must use in oral and written pleadings. Thus, for example, where a claimant elects to proceed with their case in French and the Minister provides a Notice of Intention to Intervene in English, a claimant will be right to object that they have not received proper notice as required by Rule 29.

    References

    1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers Within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev. (2000), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceedc72.html [accessed 18 August 2020], para. 46.
    2. 1 2 3 X (Re), 2016 CanLII 62221 (CA IRB), <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii62221/2016canlii62221.html>.
    3. University of Ottawa Refugee Assistance Project, UORAP Hearing Preparation Kit, Guide 3: Preparing Evidence for your Hearing <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/hearing_preparation_kit.pdf>, page 22 (Accessed January 17, 2020).
    4. El Haddad c. Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2020 CF 487 (CanLII), par. 24, <http://canlii.ca/t/j6fqr#par24>, consulté le 2020-04-20.
    5. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Atabaki, 2007 FC 1170 (CanLII), par. 30, <http://canlii.ca/t/1tprf#par30>, retrieved on 2020-04-13.
    6. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 90905 (CA IRB), para. 18 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2014/2014canlii90905/2014canlii90905.html>.

    Claimant or Protected Person in Custody (Rule 30)

    Rule 30 - Claimant or Protected Person in Custody

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Claimant or Protected Person in Custody
    
    Custody
    30 The Division may order a person who holds a claimant or protected person in custody to bring the claimant or protected person to a proceeding at a location specified by the Division.

    A large majority of refugee claimants who are detained are detained on grounds of identity or being a flight risk

    One study found that the vast majority (93 percent) of refugee claimants detained in 2015 were detained on grounds of identity or of their being flight risks, without allegations that they represented a danger to the public or a security risk.[1]

    Access to Justice issues for persons in custody

    There are particular access to justice issues for persons in custody: claimants in detention have consistently been identified as those who have had the greatest difficulty accessing legal counsel.[2] The UN Committee Against Torture, in its General Comment on non-refoulement, has listed this as one situation in which the burden of proof should reverse, and it should fall on the state to rebut the claimant's assertions where a detained persons faces difficulties in obtaining evidence to substantiate their claim:[3]

    [W]hen the complainant is in a situation where he/she cannot elaborate on his/her case, for instance, when the complainant has demonstrated that he/she has no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to his/her allegation of torture or is deprived of his/her liberty, the burden of proof is reversed and it is up to the State party concerned to investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the communication is based.[4]

    For more details on this, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate#The Board must ensure that certain claimants are assisted to make their cases.

    References

    1. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Refugee Law After 9/11: Sanctuary and Security in Canada and the United States, UBC Press 2020, Law and Society Series, ISBN 9780774861465, page 74.
    2. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Refugee Reform Paper, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf>, page 3.
    3. Çalı, B., Costello, C., & Cunningham, S., Hard Protection through Soft Courts? Non-Refoulement before the United Nations Treaty Bodies, German Law Journal, 21(3) (2020), 355-384. doi:10.1017/glj.2020.28 (Accessed April 11, 2020), page 375.
    4. CAT, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, Paragraphs 15 and 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/4 (Sep. 4, 2018), at para. 38.

    Documents (Rules 31-43)

    Rules 31-43 are in a section of the rules entitled "documents" and they concern how to provide documents, the language(s) that documents may be in, the process that the Division should follow when it itself wants to provide documents, the criteria that the Division shall use to determine whether to accept documents, how the Division should decide whether or not to accept documents that have been submitted late, how documents may be provided both to the Division and to other parties, the requirement to provide original documents at the hearing, and the process for providing additional documents as evidence after a hearing. In short, these rules 31-43 concern the process by which a claimant is to submit a document to the Board. For a discussion of what documents a claimant is obliged to submit to the Board, see Rules 3-12 and the summary of those obligations at Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What documents does a party need to provide when?

    Rule 31 - How to provide documents

    The text of the relevant rules reads:

    Documents
    
    Form and Language of Documents
    
    Documents prepared by party
    31 (1) A document prepared for use by a party in a proceeding must be typewritten, in a type not smaller than 12 point, on one or both sides of 216 mm by 279 mm (8 1⁄2 inches x 11 inches) paper.
    
    Photocopies
    (2) Any photocopy provided by a party must be a clear copy of the document photocopied and be on one or both sides of 216 mm by 279 mm (8 1⁄2 inches x 11 inches) paper.
    
    List of documents
    (3) If more than one document is provided, the party must provide a list identifying each of the documents.
    
    Consecutively numbered pages
    (4) A party must consecutively number each page of all the documents provided as if they were one document.

    What is a "document" as the term is used in these rules?

    The term "document" is not explicitly defined in these rules. No definition, for instance, is provided in the definitions section of the rules at Rule 1 (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions). As with any exercise of statutory interpretation in Canada, the proper scope and meaning of the term "document" in these rules will thus emerge by applying Driedger’s modern approach to such interpretation, namely that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament".[1] Doing so, the following principles emerge:

    • The term "documents" is defined broadly and is not confined to paper documents: When the current version of the RPD Rules were drafted in 2012, they were drafted against the background of the wording of the prior Rule 27 under the 2002 Refugee Protection Division Rules and the caselaw that had interpreted that version of the rules. One such case was Cortes v. Canada, which, when interpreting the previous version of this rule in the 2002 RPD Rules,[2] had endorsed the following broad conception of what a document is within the meaning of the RPD Rules: "The Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules provide that “document” includes “any correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, diagram, picture or graphic work, photograph, film, microform, sound recording, videotape, machine‑readable record, and any other documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, and any copy of those documents”".[3] This interpretation continues to be persuasive, notwithstanding that the Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules are no longer made available by the Board. The caselaw applying to the previous rule would therefore appear to continue to be applicable to the updated one, as there was no indication that the 2012 amendments to the rules intended to depart from a previous interpretation or practice. Indeed, decisions under the new rules continue to construe the term "document" broadly, as with the following 2017 Refugee Appeal Division decision which concludes that "documents" include “electronic documents”, as that term is defined in section 31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act ("electronic document means data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer system or other similar device and that can be read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other similar device. It includes a display, printout or other output of that data.").[4]
    • The term "document" as used in these rules is not limited to documents provided for evidentiary purposes, but also includes other types of documents: Where the term "document" is used in these rules without any qualification, it should apply to all documents, whether or not those documents are evidentiary ones or other types of documents such as written submissions. The term "documents" as used in these rules includes documents prepared by a party as per Rule 31(1), which sets out the format required for any "document prepared for use by a party in a proceeding". Rule 37 specifies that a "document", as the term is used in these rules, includes "a notice or request in writing". Some of the RPD rules apply only to documents used as evidence (for example Rule 43 applies only where "a party wants to provide a document as evidence", which the courts have held excludes situations where documents are provided for non-evidentiary purposes, such as written submissions (Yared Belay v. Canada, paras. 41-42[5]) and caselaw (Petrovic v. Canada, para. 11[6])). By necessary implication, the fact that other rules do not include this type of limitation on the term "documents" means that the rule applies to all documents submitted (notices, requests, submissions, caselaw, etc.), not simply evidentiary ones.

    What is a "proceeding" as the term is used in these rules?

    Many of these rules relate to documents used in "a proceeding", for example Rule 31(1) specifies that "a document prepared for use by a party in a proceeding" must meet the specifications set out therein. Are all documents submitted to the Refugee Board by a claimant or protected person (where there is an application to vacate or cease their protection, say) ones that are being used in a proceeding? Generally speaking, that is the case, as discussed in the following commentary below: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Meaning of "proceeding" in this rule.

    Rule 32 - Language of Documents

    Language of documents — claimant or protected person
    32 (1) All documents used by a claimant or protected person in a proceeding must be in English or French or, if in another language, be provided together with an English or French translation and a declaration signed by the translator.
    
    Language of Minister’s documents
    (2) All documents used by the Minister in a proceeding must be in the language of the proceeding or be provided together with a translation in the language of the proceeding and a declaration signed by the translator.
    
    Translator’s declaration
    (3) A translator’s declaration must include translator’s name, the language and dialect, if any, translated and a statement that the translation is accurate.

    Commentary

    The following commentary applies to Rules 32(1)-(3) collectively. It is then followed by more specific commentary pertaining to each of the specific subsections of Rule 32.

    Where evidence has not been translated in accordance with the rules, the Board may decline to accept it or may assign it low weight

    Declining to accept untranslated documents

    The proper procedure to follow where a claimant attempts to admit documents that are untranslated is ordinarily that followed by RAD Member Normand Leduc when he wrote as follows: "Exhibit P-3 is not translated into English or French and, consequently, I cannot accept it as evidence."[7] This is so as the language of this rule is described as "mandatory", including through its use of the word "must",[8] and that countervailing considerations such as cost[9] and time constraints[10] are not generally valid reasons for non-compliance with the rule that documents be translated.

    Declining to accept a document that has only been translated in part

    The above logic applies equally where only a portion of the document has been translated. Member Edward Bosveld of the Refugee Appeal Division concluded that generally, a translation of a document should be complete, not only a selective translation of isolated words in a document on which a party wishes to rely:

    Here, the Minister has not provided a translation of the Albanian-language wording on the Facebook pages, and yet seeks to rely upon that wording to establish that the Respondent’s father is employed as a XXXX XXXX XXXX, which the Minister argues is not consistent with self-confinement at home. The Respondent disputes this contention, noting that the Minister has only translated selective words, and he disagrees that the words relate to his father’s employment. The Minister has not complied with the requirement to provide a signed translator’s declaration along with the translation of the Albanian words on the Facebook posts. Further, even if such a declaration had been provided, the RAD would still have some difficulty because only a partial translation has been provided. The translation provided does not comply with the Rules, is not complete, and the RAD cannot determine whether it is accurate. The RAD therefore declines to admit the Google translations into evidence.[11]

    Accepting untranslated evidence into evidence, but weighing it based on the fact that it is untranslated

    The Board also has the power to admit such evidence into the record, while assigning it little or no weight, through its power to vary the rules per Rule 70 of the RPD Rules. For example, in interpreting its analogous rule, the Immigration Appeal Division commented:

    The appellant provided approximately 72 pages of documents as evidence. The majority of the documents were in the German language. Minister’s counsel objected to admission of those documents on the basis that they did not comply with Immigration Appeal Division Rule 29(1). The German language documents were not translated into either official language. The appellant explained that the purpose of the documents was to show the extent of his dental treatment. The documents were allowed into evidence but the appellant was advised little or no weight could be attached to them since they were not translated into one of Canada’s official languages.[12]

    The logic and practicality of admitting such untranslated documents was illustrated by the Immigration Appeal Division, when interpreting its analogous rule, as follows:

    The appellant provided copies of chat messages for a select period. For the most part, those messages are in a foreign language. Counsel for the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration submitted that the messages should not have been admitted as evidence because they do not conform to IAD Rule 29(1). The age of smartphones, internet communications and social media creates a dilemma. If a couple is regularly communicating by text, chat messages, Facebook or similar instant messaging, disclosure of all their messages would bog down hearings with mountains of paper. The cost of translation would be prohibitive. On the other hand, providing the messages without translation limits their probative value. Providing only a sample may lead to the inference that the remaining messages contain evidence adverse to the appellant’s case. There is no easy solution. The appellant has attempted to overcome the problem by providing a statutory declaration explaining the evidence. That is of some assistance. I give the evidence some weight, but the weight I give is reduced by the fact that the messages are in a foreign language.[13]

    This translation requirement applies to video and audio evidence submitted to the Board, which must also be transcribed

    Claimants regularly submit audio and video evidence to the Board. It must be transcribed and that transcription should then be translated into English or French. The Federal Court confirmed this in Cortes v. Canada when interpreting the previous version of this rule:

    Rule 28 provides that “[a]ll documents used at a proceeding must be in English or French or, if in another language, be provided with an English or French translation and a translator’s declaration”. Moreover, the Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules provide that “document” includes “any correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, diagram, picture or graphic work, photograph, film, microform, sound recording, videotape, machine‑readable record, and any other documentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, and any copy of those documents”. Here, the DVD is a “document” that was not translated as required by the Rules. The panel was therefore entitled to attach no probative value to it.[3]

    The Refugee Protection Division has confirmed that the same reasoning applies to audiovisual and other evidence submitted under the current version of the RPD Rules.[14] The guidebook Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants from refugeeclaim.ca under the question "Do videos, websites, or other electronic documents need to be translated?" states that "Yes! All evidence that you obtain must be translated into English or French. Videos must be transcribed." This reflects the best, and usual, practice.

    Rule 32(1) - Language of claimant or protected person's documents

    Language of documents — claimant or protected person
    32 (1) All documents used by a claimant or protected person in a proceeding must be in English or French or, if in another language, be provided together with an English or French translation and a declaration signed by the translator.

    This rule applies to documents used by a claimant or protected person in a proceeding, not to all documents provided

    Claimants are obliged to provide all relevant documents in their possession at the time that they provide their BOC Form. These documents need not be translated: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Documents attached to the BOC form need not be translated at the time that they are attached. In contrast, documents provided at a later time must be translated since the only reason for their provision is that the claimant intends to rely upon them at the hearing, and hence they are to be "used" within the meaning of Rule 32(1).

    Claimants need not provide documents in the language of the proceeding, only in English or French

    Claimants elect a language for their proceeding, either English or French. That said, per Rule 32(1), they are not limited to submitting documents in that language. Unlike the Rule for the Minister at 32(2), claimants are solely required to provide their documents in English or French (or, for documents in another language, with a translation into either English or French), regardless of what the language of the proceeding is. RAD Member Douglas Fortney commented on this issue as follows:

    In this case where the RPD member could not understand a document provided in French, the correct procedure would have been to have accepted the document into evidence and if necessary obtain an English language translation. Alternatively, it could have been considered to have obtained the services of a French – English interpreter who could have assisted in understanding the contents of the document at the RPD hearing.[15]

    This is reinforced by the IRB Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French, which states that "All persons in the hearing room are free to speak the official language of their choice, including counsel for the subject of the proceeding. At the request of any party to the proceeding, the IRB will make arrangements to provide interpretation from one official language to the other, taking into consideration third language interpretation may also be required for the case."[16] This has legislative support in section 14 of the Official Languages Act, which provides:

    Official languages of federal courts
    14) English and French are the official languages of the federal courts, and either of those languages may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any federal court.[17]

    The Board is considered to be a "federal court" based on the way that term is defined in the Official Languages Act and is thus bound by this provision: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Decisions#In what language or languages must the reasons for decisions be made available where they are publicly released? As such, a claimant may provide documents (be they letters, correspondence, submissions, notices, or other evidentiary or non-evidentiary documents - see the broad definition of what is considered to be a "document" above Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 31 - How to provide documents) provided that they meet the Rule 32 requirements regarding language.

    What should a claimant do if they cannot afford to translate all of their documents?

    Claimants are responsible for absorbing the cost of translating all written materials into either French or English.[18] At times, claimants cannot afford to translate all of their documents. This may come up where a claimant is unrepresented (and thus does not have access to a translation budget from Legal Aid), where a claimant has sufficient means to afford private counsel but nonetheless is not able to afford having all of their documents translated because the documents are particularly voluminous, and where a claimant is entitled to legal aid but the translation budget provided by legal aid has been insufficient in the context of the case. In such a situation the claimant should advise the Division of the situation and be able to show that they took all reasonable steps to have the documents translated:

    • Advise the Division in writing of the existence of the additional documents and the cost issue preventing them from being translated: The guidebook Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants from refugeeclaim.ca recommends that a claimant "Tell the [RPD] in writing that you have other documents that you could not afford to translate."[19]
    • Seek out a friend, volunteer, family member, etc. to translate the documents: The claimant should be prepared to show that they made reasonable efforts to have the documents translated. The rules do not require that the translation be done by a professional: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#The translator need not supply an affidavit, be accredited, be fluent in both languages, or be completely independent.
    • Apply to legal aid (for additional funds for translation): For example, the BC Legal Services Society pre-authorizes translation costs of up to $361 (1,900 words) for each immigration representation contract.[20] Counsel may apply for authorization to translate additional documents in particular cases. Similarly, in Ontario, lawyers with RPD certificates from Legal Aid can bill Legal Aid online for translation of up to 3500 words. For documents longer than 3500 words, lawyers can submit a request for additional disbursements for translation.[21]

    Furthermore, the claimant should consider alternative ways to put the information in question in front of the Member:

    • Translate the most important documents: Instructions to claimants in public documents such as the guidebook Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants from refugeeclaim.ca are that "Translation can be very expensive. If you can’t afford to translate everything, choose the most important documents."[22]
    • Have only portions of the documents translated: As a half-way measure, the claimant may attempt to have the most important or relevant portions of the documents translated. But see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Declining to accept evidence that has only been translated in part regarding the Division's discretion to decline to admit such evidence where, for instance, the partial translation properly reduces the weight that can be attached to the document.
    • Make the untranslated documents available at the hearing, including for spot translation: The guidebook Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants from refugeeclaim.ca recommends that a claimant "Take [the untranslated documents] to the hearing and explain to the Presiding Member what the documents show."[22] The Member would then have the discretion to ask the interpreter to spot-translate portions of the documents: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Interpreters#Can an interpreter be asked to translate documents?
    • Provide a statutory declaration or testimony under oath about the contents of the untranslated documents: The Board has the power to waive the rules and admit the untranslated documents into evidence for the purposes of the record (albeit potentially assigning them less weight because of the lack of a translation). For example, the Immigration Appeal Division did just this when interpreting its analogous rule, commenting as follows:

    The appellant provided copies of chat messages for a select period. For the most part, those messages are in a foreign language. Counsel for the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration submitted that the messages should not have been admitted as evidence because they do not conform to IAD Rule 29(1). The age of smartphones, internet communications and social media creates a dilemma. If a couple is regularly communicating by text, chat messages, Facebook or similar instant messaging, disclosure of all their messages would bog down hearings with mountains of paper. The cost of translation would be prohibitive. On the other hand, providing the messages without translation limits their probative value. Providing only a sample may lead to the inference that the remaining messages contain evidence adverse to the appellant’s case. There is no easy solution. The appellant has attempted to overcome the problem by providing a statutory declaration explaining the evidence. That is of some assistance. I give the evidence some weight, but the weight I give is reduced by the fact that the messages are in a foreign language.[13]

    Finally, the claimant should consider that except for documents that were in their possession at the time that they completed their BOC form, and documents travel and identity documents that they acquire after that time, the rules do not strictly require the claimant to submit all relevant documents in their possession. Instead, the claimant need only submit the documents on which they wish to rely in order to make their case and the claimant must take all reasonable steps to corroborate their claim in the circumstances; see commentary to Rule 34: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What documents does a party need to provide when?. As such, if the rules do not require the evidence in question to be submitted to the tribunal, then the claimant may consider whether they wish to rely on the information and whether the same information may be adduced in another way, such as through witness testimony.

    The Board is not obliged to pay for the translation of documents where a claimant cannot afford to do so

    The instructions on the Basis of Claim form are "Include certified translations in English or French for all documents in a language other than English or French. You must pay for these translations yourself."[23] The Refugee Appeal Division has held that "the responsibility to provide translations for documents in a foreign language rests with the party using the documents, in this case, the claimant." They went on to note that "the fact that the Board can and sometimes does translate documents that the Board intends to use as evidence is not relevant to the decision of the RPD. The RPD Rules clearly require the “user” (claimant in this case) to provide translations of foreign language documents. The claimant (the Appellant) failed to do so and therefore failed to comply with the rules."[24]

    Procedural fairness considerations where a claimant's untranslated documents are not accepted

    The above list of possible actions by a claimant concerns circumstances where the claimant has made reasonable efforts to have documents translated and has been unable to do so because of cost. There are other reasons why a claimant may appear at a hearing with untranslated documents, including where they state that they did not know that the documents needed to be translated. Where a claimant's untranslated documents are not accepted, panels of the Division have attempted to accommodate persons, particularly unrepresented claimants, in a number of ways, including by allowing the party to testify to the matters discussed in the documents as an alternative way of adducing the evidence in question (see Huang v Canada)[25] and by allowing the party to submit proper translations of the documents in question post-hearing (though the court has held that the Board need not do so as a matter of procedural fairness, even where a claimant is unrepresented, though this conclusion will likely depend on the probative value of the document in question, see Soares v. Canada).[26]

    Rule 32(2) - Language of Minister's documents

    Language of Minister’s documents
    (2) All documents used by the Minister in a proceeding must be in the language of the proceeding or be provided together with a translation in the language of the proceeding and a declaration signed by the translator.

    The Minister must use the language of the proceeding in oral and written pleadings

    As per Rule 32(2), all documents used by the Minister in a proceeding must be in the language of the proceeding (or be provided together with a translation). A question may arise about the proper scope of the terms "documents" and "proceeding" in the above rule. For example, if a Minister provides a notice of intervention, is it a "document" being used in a "proceeding"?

    Meaning of "documents" in this rule

    One argument that has been advanced is that the term "documents" as used in this rule only includes documents as evidence, not notices from the Minister. This argument is best rejected based on the observations and citations provided in the section on the definition of "document" above: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#What is a "document" as the term is used in these rules?.

    Meaning of "proceeding" in this rule

    As per Rule 32(2), all documents used by the Minister in a proceeding must be in the language of the proceeding (or be provided together with a translation). At times, the argument has been advanced that documents such as a notice of intervention are not being used in a proceeding at the time that they are supplied since "proceeding" is defined in Rule 1 as follows: "proceeding includes a conference, an application or a hearing". Instead, rather than being supplied for use in any one of those listed proceedings, the argument is that it is being supplied for notification purposes. Such semantic quibbling is best avoided and this argument should be rejected for the following reasons:

    • As the Board states in its Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French, "language rights must generally be given a broad and liberal interpretation".[16]
    • The definition of a proceeding in Rule 1 "includes" the listed procedures, but does not indicate that it is limited to them. The RPD Rules are subordinate to the Act, which in s. 170 contemplates a broad and expansive conception of what a Refugee Protection Division "proceeding" is, including that a file-review decision made without any hearing being held is something that happens within a proceeding (s. 170(f)) and that the Board's provision of notice of the hearing to the Minister is also something that happens in a proceeding (s. 170(c)). If notifying the Minister of the hearing is something that happens "in a[] proceeding", then it is hard to see why the Minister's notifications should not similarly be considered to have been provided for use "in a proceeding".[27] Furthermore, in Duale v. Canada the court commented that "proceedings" as used in section 167 of the Act encompass more than the actual hearing before the RPD. Thus, subsection 168(1) allows a division to determine that "a proceeding" before it has been abandoned for such pre-hearing matters as failing to provide required information or failing to communicate with the division as required.[28] See the discussion of the interpretation of the term "proceeding" in the Act at: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions#Commentary on the definition of "proceeding".
    • Furthermore, Ministerial intervention notices must include the details required by Rule 29, and where they do not, the proper remedy is that the notice of intervention will not be accepted.[29] It is clear that the Minister provides a notice of intervention so that it can rely on it at the hearing as proof that it has complied with the rules requiring such notification.
    • Finally, the purpose of such notices has been described as follows: "[Rule 29(2)(a)] exists to compel the Minister to provide notice to the claimant why they have decided to intervene in his or her claim. It is to provide the claimant with fore-knowledge of the concerns the Minister has with the claim, so as to allow the claimant to prepare a response to these concerns. It is an issue of procedural fairness."[30] If this notice were not provided in the language of the proceedings, then the purpose of providing this specific advance information to the claimant about the Minister's concerns could be frustrated.

    Ministerial obligations pursuant to Official Languages Act

    Finally, the better view of this question is that the Minister is under a legal obligation to provide all documents, including pleadings and other procedural documents, in the language of the proceeding and that this obligation stems from the Official Languages Act, which is considered a quasi-constitutional statute.[31] The Official Languages Act provides that where a federal institution is a party to civil proceedings is shall use the language chosen by the other parties in any oral or written pleadings, except in narrow exceptional circumstances:

    Language of civil proceedings where Her Majesty is a party

    18 Where Her Majesty in right of Canada or a federal institution is a party to civil proceedings before a federal court,

    (a) Her Majesty or the institution concerned shall use, in any oral or written pleadings in the proceedings, the official language chosen by the other parties unless it is established by Her Majesty or the institution that reasonable notice of the language chosen has not been given; and

    (b) if the other parties fail to choose or agree on the official language to be used in those pleadings, Her Majesty or the institution concerned shall use such official language as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances.[32]

    While there does not appear to be judicial consideration on point, it is arguable that this provision applies to delegates of the Minister from IRCC and PSEP where they intervene in matters before the Board. Such proceedings are "before a federal court", which is defined in s. 3(2) of the Official Languages Act as "any court, tribunal or other body that carries out adjudicative functions and is established by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament." The Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the IRB meets this definition in Devinat v. Canada.[33] Furthermore, the participation of the Minister's delegates in Board proceedings would appear to constitute a circumstance in which a "federal institution" has become party to proceedings. A "federal institution" is defined broadly in the Official Languages Act, it not only includes the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (based on the definitions of "federal institution" and "department" in s. 3 of the Act), but it also includes "any other body that is specified by an Act of Parliament to be an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada or to be subject to the direction of the Governor in Council or a minister of the Crown", which would presumably include a Minister's delegate under the IRPA whose powers are derived from s. 6 of the Act which provides, inter alia, that "The Minister may designate any persons or class of persons as officers to carry out any purpose of any provision of this Act, and shall specify the powers and duties of the officers so designated".[34]

    If the claimant switches languages from French to English, or vice versa, the Minister must provide translations of their documents they intend to use

    Practice under the previous version of the RPD rules was that such documents did not need to be translated

    Under the previous 2002 version of the rules, the wording of the predecessor rule to Rule 32(2) was interpreted as not requiring the Minister to provide translations of documents where the claimant subsequently switched the language of proceedings. For example, if the claimant elected to proceed in French and the Minister gave the claimant a document in French, and the claimant then subsequently decided that they instead preferred to proceed in English, the Minister was not obliged to provide a new translation of the document into English, but could instead rely on the previously disclosed document. The key question was whether the document was provided to the claimant in the language of proceedings at the time that it was sent.

    This question was dealt with by the Federal Court in Blanco v. Canada, a case that concerned the previous version of the rules at the Immigration Division, which tracked the wording in the RPD Rule. In that case, the person concerned commenced his proceedings in English. The claimant then secured new, French-speaking, counsel. The Board then approved the claimant's application to change the language of the proceedings to French. At the same time, both the panel and the Minister refused to provide French translations of the documents that the Minister had previously sent to the applicant's former counsel in English. The claimant argued at the hearing that the panel could not legally enter into evidence documents that were in English and had not been translated into French prior to the hearing. The Federal Court rejected this argument on the basis that "It is clear that when the documents in question were provided by the respondents, the language of the proceedings was English, precluding the need for a French translation."[35] This interpretation appears to turn on the then-extant Immigration Division rule which stipulated that "If the Minister provides a document that is not in the language of the proceedings, the Minister must provide a translation and a translator’s declaration. [emphasis added]" On the basis that the rule in question provided that the trigger for translation is the language of proceedings at the time that the document is provided, the court concluded that the documents could properly be entered as evidence in the hearing.

    Changes to this provision in the 2012 RPD Rules now require that the document be in the language of proceedings at the time of its use

    The Board's practice that was highlighted in the Blanco decision (above) was stridently criticized by members of the House of Commons Official Languages Committee.[36] The Official Languages Commissioner subsequently requested that the Board make changes to the RPD Rules regarding the rules about the language of RPD proceedings. One of the goals for the new RPD Rules, as identified by the Board, was to "address [these] recommendations of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (OCOL)".[37] The wording of the new (and current) Rule 32(2) requires that "all documents used by the Minister in a proceeding must be in the language of the proceeding or be provided together with a translation in the language of the proceeding and a declaration signed by the translator [emphasis added]". This is a departure from the previous wording of this Rule under the 2002 version of these rules, which read: "If the Minister provides a document that is not in the language of the proceedings, the Minister must provide a translation in that language and a translator’s declaration."[38] The fact that the rule focuses on the use of the documents appears to indicate that under the new rules, the circumstances in Blanco v. Canada would not recur because the Minister would be obliged to provide translations of any documents that they had previously provided should they want to continue to rely on them.

    Rule 32(3) - Language of documents - Requirement for a translator's declaration

    Translator’s declaration
    (3) A translator’s declaration must include translator’s name, the language and dialect, if any, translated and a statement that the translation is accurate.

    What are the requirements for the translator's declaration for documents?

    Translated document should meet the following requirements:

    • A copy of the original-language document should be provided in addition to the translation: Rules 32(1), 32(2), and 32(3), read conjointly, require that a copy of the original document in the original language be submitted as well as a translation of it.
    • The translator's declaration must meet each of the requirements enumerated in Rule 32(3): The translator's declaration should be in the following form: "A translator’s declaration must include the translator’s name, the language and dialect, if any, translated and a statement that the translation is accurate."
    • The translator's declaration should be signed: The instructions in the Basis of Claim form regarding document translation are that a claimant is to "Include certified translations in English or French for all documents in a language other than English or French."[23] As explained on the Basis of Claim form, this requirement that the translations be "certified" will be met where any documents provided are accompanied by a translator's declaration that meets the requirements of Rule 32(3) ("A translator’s declaration must include translator’s name, the language and dialect, if any, translated and a statement that the translation is accurate") plus the statement is signed by the translator.[39]
    • Translator should have some independence from the claimant: The translator is to have a certain degree of independence from the claimant.
      • Counsel should not act as the translator: Counsel themselves should not act as the translator because, should any issues arise as to the accuracy of the translation in question, then they could be called as a witness. While that can occur (e.g. cases in other legal contexts have held that "while it is highly undesirable for counsel to wear the cloak of both advocate and witness, the client has the right to have his counsel testify as a witness"[40]) it raises questions about potential conflicts of interest and logistical hurdles. However, as the court accepted in Grandmont v. Canada, a person working in-house at the law firm the claimant has selected may be considered acceptable to translate documents.[41]
      • The claimant themselves, and close family members thereto, should not act as the translator: When interpreting its similar rule, the Immigration Appeal Division has rejected documents in on the basis of its concern that, inter alia, the documents were "not fully translated by an independent translator".[42] The basis for this independence requirement in the rules appears to be somewhat scant, but arguably arises as a matter of the weight that the Board should attach to the evidence - particularly if any other credibility issues regarding the person doing the translating were to emerge at the hearing. This aspect of independence is also emphasized by public explanations of the refugee claim process, including Kinbrace Community Society's Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants which notes that it is best that the translator not be a relative: "Certified translators are best, but not required. If you cannot pay for a professional translator, you can have someone else you trust (preferably not a relative) translate your documents for you."[22]

    Where the document does not contain a translator's declaration in the appropriate form, it should generally not be admitted

    Where the requirement for a translator's declaration has not been complied with, the proper process is generally that the document should not be admitted. For example, the RAD has commented as follows:

    Although there is an English translation of these documents, there is no [translator's declaration] attached to them, as is required.... The RAD, therefore, cannot ascertain that these documents have been properly translated from Chinese into English. The RAD therefore cannot accept these documents[.][43]

    Parties sometimes attempt to adduce evidence that has been translated through automated systems such as Google Translate. It should generally not be admitted into evidence on the basis that no Rule 32(3) translator's declaration has been provided for such evidence. On the basis that "The Board cannot determine whether it is accurate", the Refugee Appeal Division has declined to admit such Google translations into evidence, including when provided by the Minister.[44] The Refugee Protection Division specifically has issued a practice notice on this point entitled Refugee Protection Division Practice Notice: Compliance with Refugee Protection Division Rules which comments on Google translations as follows:

    The RPD frequently receives documents that have not been translated, or have been translated but are not accompanied by a translator’s declaration. Sometimes these documents have been translated by a web-based tool, such as Google Translate. Such translations do not comply with RPD Rule 32, cause delays to the proceedings and may not be accepted by the presiding member.[45]

    The translator need not supply an affidavit, be accredited, be fluent in both languages, or be completely independent

    Provided that this is done, a translator's declaration need not comply with other requirements that are not found in the rules:

    • Statement from translator need not be an affidavit: For example, the translator's statement need not be in the form of an affidavit; the Immigration Appeal Division reached this conclusion when interpreting its similar rule: "The panel does not share the respondent’s concern with the Certificate of Translation that accompanied the disclosure. While not in the form of an affidavit, the Rule does not require one".[46]
    • Translator need not be "accredited": There are many bodies that accredit translators and interpreters, from the Board itself to professional organizations like the Society of Translators and Interpreters of British Columbia.[47] While using an accredited translator may be a good idea, it is not a requirement of the rules. The Immigration Appeal Division reached this conclusion when interpreting its similar rule: "The Minister’s counsel submitted that the translations ... do not constitute credible evidence because they were not done by accredited translators.... The panel is of the opinion that the documents submitted by the appellant showing the exchanges between the parties ... can be taken into account by the panel, even though they were not written by accredited translators".[41]
    • The translator need not be fluent in both languages: The requirement in the rules is solely that the translator provide a "statement that the translation is accurate," nothing more. The University of Ottawa Refugee Assistance Project has a Hearing Preparation Kit which discusses the level of proficiency the translator must have in the languages in question. That kit includes sample translator's declarations, both where the translator is fully fluent in both languages, and one for where the translator is not. They indicate that an acceptable declaration to be used where the translator is not fully fluent in both languages is as follows: "I, ____(name_______, of the City of ____(location)_____, hereby certify that I have translated this Marriage Certificate from ____(original language)___ to English, and that I am partially competent to render such translation, being partially fluent in the ____(original language)___ and English languages. A fully competent translator was not available."[48]
    • Translator need not be completely independent from the claimant: As discussed above, the translator is to have a certain degree of independence from the claimant, but the degree of independence required is not high. This aspect of independence is also emphasized by public explanations of the process, including Kinbrace Community Society's Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants which notes that it is best that the translator not be a relative: "Certified translators are best, but not required. If you cannot pay for a professional translator, you can have someone else you trust (preferably not a relative) translate your documents for you. This person must sign a translator’s declaration."[22] As the court accepted in Grandmont v. Canada, a person working in-house at the law firm the claimant has selected may be considered acceptable to perform this task.[41]

    Rule 33 - Disclosure and use of documents by the Division

    Disclosure and Use of Documents
    
    Disclosure of documents by Division
    33 (1) Subject to subrule (2), if the Division wants to use a document in a hearing, the Division must provide a copy of the document to each party.
    
    Disclosure of country documentation by Division
    (2) The Division may disclose country documentation by providing to the parties a list of those documents or providing information as to where a list of those documents can be found on the Board’s website.

    The RPD has an obligation to provide documents and information required by the Rules to the Minister upon request

    Subsection 170(d) of the Act requires the Division to provide the Minister, on request, with the documents and information referred to in subsection 100(4) of the Act, which are the documents and information required by the rules of the Board:

    100(4) A person who makes a claim for refugee protection inside Canada at a port of entry and whose claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division must provide the Division, within the time limits provided for in the regulations, with the documents and information — including in respect of the basis for the claim — required by the rules of the Board, in accordance with those rules.

    The Division has the power to provide post-hearing documents prior to rendering a decision

    Rule 33 concerns circumstances in which the Division provides a copy of a document that it wants to use in a hearing. What about where the Division wants to provide a document to parties following a hearing? The Division may do so and, while it must invite comment from the parties on any such post-hearing disclosure, it need not resume the hearing afterwards. The Division's power to provide such post-hearing documents was emphasized in the Board's public commentary on the previous version of the RPD Rules, which read "The Division may provide a document to the claimant (and to the Minister if the Minister has intervened) after a hearing if the Division considers its use would assist in ensuring a full and proper determination of a claim for refugee protection. The claimant will be given an opportunity to make submissions on that document."[49]

    The panel should consider the most recent National Documentation Package

    The Board Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings which is dated June 2019 commits that "The RPD and RAD will consider the most recent NDP(s) in support of assessing forward-looking risk."[50] A panel of the Board should comply with this policy. In Zhao v. Canada the court held that "as a matter of procedural fairness, the [Board] had a duty to disclose the most recent NDP and to give the Applicants an opportunity to respond and make submissions on this matter."[51] Similarly, in Oymali v. Canada the court held that "the latest NDP should be considered in assessing risks".[52]

    The obligation to consider the latest NDP extends to matters where a new NDP is released while a claim is under reserve. However, there are some limits to this principle:

    • It does not apply to documents other than those in an NDP: In Tambwe-Lubemba the court considered whether a panel of the Board must consider updated country documents received by the Board post-hearing that are not explicitly placed on the file. The applicants in that case submitted that the panel hearing their claim should have considered information received by the Refugee Division's document centre after the hearing, but before the decision had been rendered. What the Court held was that the panel was under no obligation to consider information that the members had not seen and that was not tendered by the claimants.[53]
    • It does not apply where the new information would make no difference to the decision: In Worku v. Canada, the Federal Court held that the Board was not bound to consider the newest NDP information when there was no indication that the information was a significant departure from the information which was considered by the RPD.[54] As such, the Board Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings is that "The RAD will disclose to the parties new NDP documents only when they wish to rely upon them".[50]

    The fact that the panel should consider the most recent National Documentation Package does not mean that a panel needs to scour through every document in it for any possible statement that could support or hinder the claimant; for a discussion of this, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate#There is a shared duty of fact-finding in refugee matters.

    Rule 34 - Obligation, process, and timeline for a party to disclose documents they want to use in a hearing

    Disclosure of documents by party
    34 (1) If a party wants to use a document in a hearing, the party must provide a copy of the document to the other party, if any, and to the Division.
    
    Proof that document was provided
    (2) The copy of the document provided to the Division must be accompanied by a written statement indicating how and when a copy of that document was provided to the other party, if any.
    
    Time limit
    (3) Documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than
    (a) 10 days before the date fixed for the hearing; or
    (b) five days before the date fixed for the hearing if the document is provided to respond to another document provided by a party or the Division.

    What documents does a party need to provide when?

    Rule 34(1) concerns documents that a party "wants" to use in a hearing. The rule provides that such documents must be received by their recipients no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the hearing (except, per Rule 34(3)(b) where they are provided in response to documents provided by other party, in which case the deadline is five days prior to the hearing). This discretionary rule allows, but does not require, a claimant to submit documents. It can be contrasted with Rule 7(3) which obliges claimants to provide certain types of documents. Specifically, Rule 7(3) provides that a claimant "must" attach all "relevant documents in their possession" to their Basis of Claim form, including identity and travel documents (whether genuine or not). The only exception to this is for documents that were seized by an officer or provided to the Division by an officer. In short, the disclosure deadlines established by the RPD rules appear to be the following:

    Stage in Claim Document Type Disclosure Obligation Deadline Rule
    When BOC Form Provided All relevant documents in the claimant's possession Mandatory Disclosure Must be attached to BOC Form Rule 7(3)
    After BOC Form Provided Claimant's identity or travel documents Mandatory Disclosure Must be provided "without delay" after the claimant obtains Rule 7(4)
    After BOC Form Provided Any other documents "a party wants to use" Discretionary/optional 10 days before the hearing (or 5, if in response) Rule 34

    As such, the rules appear to establish a regime in which a claimant is obliged to provide all relevant documents that are in their possession at the time that they provide their BOC form. For documents that come into a claimant's possession after that point, other than identity or travel documents, the claimant has discretion about whether or not to submit them and need only do so if they want to use them in the proceeding. A qualification to this principle is that:

    The above timelines for providing documents are reiterated in the Basis of Claim form that all claimants receive: "If you get more identity or travel documents that support your claim after you have provided your BOC Form, give two copies to the IRB without delay. If you get more documents, other than identity or travel documents, that support your claim after you have provided your BOC Form, give one copy to the IRB and a copy to the Minister, if the Minister is a party, at least 10 days before your hearing." The BOC Form also states on its cover page: "you are responsible for obtaining and providing to the IRB any documents that may support your claim."

    The above documentary disclosure obligations specified in the Rules are also distinct from the separate matter of the Division's ability to draw an adverse inference as to credibility in circumstances in which documents are not provided. Even if it is not mandatory for the claimant to have submitted a particular document above as per the Rules, where a claimant does not do so, the Division may conclude that a claimant's failure to provide a document is indicative of a fear to provide the evidence to the Board, allowing the Board to draw an adverse inference about the credibility of the fact that the document would have otherwise served to establish or corroborate. Of course, this type of adverse inference may only be drawn where the claimant is given a reasonable opportunity to adduce the evidence once the Division identifies its concern, or where the evidence was otherwise mandatory for the claimant to produce, and furthermore the Federal Court has held that "a panel cannot draw a negative inference from the mere fact that a party failed to produce any extrinsic documents corroborating his or her allegations, except when the applicant’s credibility is at issue".[56] See the discussion of Rule 11 for more detail: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 11 - Documents Establishing Identity and Other Elements of the Claim.

    The Board must consider its discretion to provide relief where a claimant submits a document later than the time limit in Rule 34(3)

    The time limit in Rule 34(3) for providing documents must be read in conjunction with section 170 of the IRPA, and specifically the following subsections of that provision:

    Subsections 170 (e), (g) and (h) of the IRPA however indicate that in any proceeding before the RPD it:
    (e)  must give the person . . . a reasonable opportunity to present evidence . . .;
    (g)  is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence;
    (h)  may receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances.

    In Trboljevac v. Canada, the court commented that "While the Panel Member was aware of the ten-day time period in Rule 34(3) for disclosing documents, the failure of the Member to acknowledge or apparently be aware of the IRPA provisions allowing them to nonetheless accept the documents had the effect of preventing the Applicant from substantiating his claim. ... the Panel Member should have addressed why they declined to exercise the discretion provided to them in section 170 of the IRPA. Failure to exercise that discretion was a breach of natural justice in this matter."[57] The Board's discretion to admit late-filed documents is guided by Rule 36, below.

    Does the 10 day deadline for submitting documents reset when a hearing has multiple sittings?

    A question can arise about the interpretation of the phrase "days before the date fixed for the hearing" in Rule 34. As per Rule 34(3), documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the hearing. If a resumption of a hearing is scheduled more than 10 days after the first sitting of the hearing, does this mean that any documents submitted 10 or more days prior to the next sitting are, in the words of RPD Rule 34(3), being submitted at least "10 days before the date fixed for the hearing"? To the mind of this author, this question has not been definitively resolved in the published jurisprudence. This this is likely because panels are permissive about accepting documents submitted prior to a resumption given their obligation to give any person before them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence (s. 170(e) of the Act).

    Rule 35 - Documents relevant and not duplicate

    Documents relevant and not duplicate
    
    35 Each document provided by a party for use at a proceeding must
    (a) be relevant to the particular proceeding; and
    (b) not duplicate other documents provided by a party or by the Division.

    The use of the National Documentation Package does not preclude the disclosure of additional Country of origin information

    The Board Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings states that:

    Relevant NDP(s) are disclosed to the parties in every refugee claim before the RPD as the standard source of COI evidence in refugee determination. As per RPD Rule 33(2), the RPD provides the parties with information as to where the NDP can be found on the Board's website, and it is the parties' responsibility to check the IRB website for the newest version of the relevant NDP(s) prior to their hearing. ... The use of NDPs does not preclude the disclosure of additional COI not contained in an NDP by the Division or a party to a proceeding. Such information must be disclosed on a case-by-case basis, subject to the legal and procedural requirements of each Division.

    Practice notice on voluminous country conditions evidence

    The Board’s Notice to parties and counsel appearing before the Refugee Protection Division – voluminous country conditions evidence specifies procedures regarding voluminous disclosure of country conditions evidence filed at the Refugee Protection Division. As per the practice notice, parties must make a formal application to submit country conditions evidence that exceeds 100 pages per country of reference.[58] Disclosure of country conditions evidence over the specified page limit must be accompanied by an application made in accordance with RPD Rule 50. That said, during the Covid-19 pandemic, this practice notice has been suspended, so it is no longer in effect.[59]

    How does one know whether documents are country conditions evidence or not?

    As the practice notice states, evidence presented before the RPD generally falls into two broad categories: documents personal to the parties (e.g. identity documents, police reports, etc.) and evidence regarding country conditions (e.g. human rights reports, research on the situation in the country, etc.). This Practice Notice applies only to country conditions evidence. Documents which speak to the claimant's personal risk and are specific to their claim, for example those that are by or about the claimant themselves, will be considered personal. In contrast, country conditions documents are evidence relating to human rights conditions in a claimant's country. The question in each case is whether the primary purpose of a particular document is to substantiate the claimant's personal profile or to speak to human rights or other facts and conditions regarding a claimant's country. The guidebook Refugee Hearing Preparation: A Guide for Refugee Claimants from refugeelcaim.ca provides examples of each type of document. With regards to personal documents, they list:

    • Are there photographs, letters, videos, emails, or other documents that show the problems you had? Get them!
    • Did you go to the police or another government agency for help? Get a copy of the police report or other proof of your visit.
    • Did you get medical help? Get your hospital or doctor’s records.
    • Are there news articles about people who are connected to your case? Get them!
    • Are there people who witnessed what happened to you? Ask them to write what happened and send it to you. If possible, ask this person to swear (declare) their statement is true in front of a lawyer or notary.
    • Are there people who have experienced problems that are similar to yours? Ask them to describe their experiences in writing. If possible, ask this person to swear their statement is true in front of a lawyer or notary.
    • Is your claim based on your religious identity or membership in a political party or other group? Get documents that show your membership.
    • Has your mental health suffered because of what happened to you? Get a report from a doctor or psychologist in Canada which documents your health problems.
    • You will also need identity documents to prove your citizenship.[22]

    With regards to country conditions documents, they list:

    • This type of evidence includes reports from well-respected sources that document human rights abuses, political events, and other news that relate to your claim.
    • Recent reports from human rights organizations (e.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch), United Nations reports, U.S. State Department Country Reports, news articles, or videos showing human rights abuses in your country.
    • Articles and reports from newspapers and human rights organizations in your country.

    Similarly, documents about an organization that the claimant may have been involved with (even in Canada) will fit into this category of evidence that relates to human rights conditions in a claimant's country, so long as they do not mention the claimant by name or otherwise depict or refer to the claimant. Thus, for example, where the Minister seeks to intervene to argue that a claimant is excluded pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Convention, if the Minister wishes to provide more than 100 pages to demonstrate that an organization in question committed crimes during a specific historical period, pursuant to this practice notice, they must bring an application for permission to file voluminous disclosure. Additional discussion of the difference between these two types of documents is found in the IRB Instructions for Gathering and Disclosing Information for Refugee Protection Division Proceedings which distinguishes between country-of-origin research—which is generally-available information and does not include “information gathered by the IRB that is specific to a particular claimant”—and claimant-specific research.[60] Furthermore, the Board Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings provides the following definition of Country of origin information (COI): "Information about the situation in a country that is relevant to the refugee determination process and obtained from publicly available sources that are viewed as, whenever possible, reliable and objective."[50]

    What is the Board's jurisdiction to limit voluminous country conditions disclosure?

    As is clear from Rule 35, the only conditions imposed by the Rules on which documents may be admitted are that they must be relevant to the proceeding and not duplicate any other documents provided by the claimant or the Division. The RPD Rules themselves contain no restriction on the volume of documents that may be disclosed, and they make no distinctions between different types of documents. The authority cited in the practice notice is that the Chairperson of the IRB has the authority to take any action that may be necessary to ensure that members of the Board are able to carry out their duties efficiently and without undue delay as per paragraph 159(1)(g) of the Act. In addition, Rule 69 of the RPD Rules specifies that in the absence of a provision in the Rules dealing with a matter raised during the proceedings, the Division may do whatever is necessary to deal with the matter. The sufficiency of this legislative provision and Rule as authority for what appears to be an amendment to the Rules via practice notice (that was not authorized by the Governor in Council, as required), does not appear to have received judicial consideration. See Canadian Refugee Procedure/About for details about how the RPD rules were authorized by the Governor General in Council. However, the Federal Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Thamotharem v. Canada would appear to provide some support for the Board’s action.[61]

    The Board has jurisdiction to refuse to admit documents for reasons that are broader than the Rule 35 criteria

    Rule 35 provides two criteria for all documents provided by a party for use at a proceeding: they must be relevant and not duplicative. Does the fact that the Rules only enumerate these two criteria here mean that, by implication, the Board may not refuse to admit documents for other reasons beyond those enumerated in Rule 35? No. The Board retains a broader discretion to control its process, including the documents that it admits in its proceedings. There are numerous examples of this, including:

    • Excluding evidence where doing so is required by the Constitution: For example, the Division has the power to exclude evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter where the evidence was collected in violation of Charter rights, an issue which usually arises regarding port of entry interview notes in situation where the right to counsel was violated; see, as an example, Huang v. Canada.[62]
    • Excluding evidence where doing so is required by law: The Board states in its Legal Services paper on Weighing Evidence that "in some cases it is not appropriate to admit evidence and give it little or no weight, instead the panel should refuse to admit the evidence at all. This may arise, for example, where the evidence is ... protected by privilege or statutory protection of its confidentiality".[63] This would apply, for example, where the use of the evidence is prohibited by the Privacy Act. The Board frequently considers this issue when determining whether to admit decisions from other panels into evidence where they are provided by the parties, see, for example Canadian Refugee Procedure/Proceedings must be held in the absence of the public#Should a panel admit copies of decisions from other claims?.
    • Excluding evidence as a discretionary decision made by the tribunal: The Board states in its Legal Services paper on Weighing Evidence that "in some cases it is not appropriate to admit evidence and give it little or no weight, instead the panel should refuse to admit the evidence at all. This may arise, for example, where the evidence is not relevant to the issues in the case; or where the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value; ... or where the evidence is unduly repetitive."[63]

    Rule 36 - Use of undisclosed documents

    Use of undisclosed documents
    36 A party who does not provide a document in accordance with rule 34 must not use the document at the hearing unless allowed to do so by the Division. In deciding whether to allow its use, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
    (a) the document’s relevance and probative value;
    (b) any new evidence the document brings to the hearing; and
    (c) whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document as required by rule 34.

    The Board must weigh the relevant factors

    The court has provided guidance on how the RPD should approach the task of weighing these factors, noting that considering such factors does not mean merely listing them, but involves actively weighing them to determine whether the documents in question should be admitted.[64]

    Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, the RPD had a practice notice in effect entitled Notice to parties and counsel appearing before the Refugee Protection Division – late disclosure.[65] Nothing in this practice notice relieved the Board of the obligation to exercise its discretion under Rule 36:

    La règle 36 des Règles de la SPR donne clairement à la SPR une discrétion d’accepter lors de l’audience un document non communiqué. Cette discrétion existe même si la demande d’une partie n’est pas conforme à l’Avis aux parties et aux conseils comparaissant devant la Section de la protection des réfugiés – communication tardive publiée par la Commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada, bien que ce défaut puisse être un élément pertinent dans la détermination de la demande. Quand un demandeur d’asile demande à la SPR d’exercer cette discrétion, les principes d’équité procédurale exigent qu’il ou elle soit accordé la possibilité de présenter des observations sur cette question.[66]

    Past consideration of the Rule 36 factors

    Past decisions of the Board have considered the above factors thusly:

    • (a) the document’s relevance and probative value
      • Is the source of the document reliable? For country conditions evidence, probative value can be assessed in part by considering the source of the document. For example, in Hasan v. Canada the Board refused to admit a series of documents concerning country conditions relevant to the claim: "Within the Disclosure Package are a number of reports from various organizations attesting to the ill-treatment of Palestinian males, the severe measures taken against Palestinians, and the unlawful killings and other abuses directed against Palestinians by Israeli forces." The court held that it could be considered that "These reports come from such traditionally accepted (for purposes of evidence) sources as Amnesty International. In addition, several reports emanated from Israeli sources such as the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories."[67]
      • How central are these documents to the core elements of the claim? The RAD has held that, as part of this probative value assessment, there should be an analysis as to the centrality of the documents to the core elements of the claim.[68]
    • (b) any new evidence the document brings to the proceedings
    • (c) whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document as required by rule 34
      • Is the claimant educated? In Mercado v. Canada the court affirmed that it is proper to consider a claimant's level of education when making this decision, stating with approval that "The panel clearly took into consideration the fact that the applicant was educated."[69]
      • Has the claimant been self-represented? The Board's Chairperson Guidelines 7 provide that "Generally speaking, the RPD will make allowances for self-represented claimants who are unfamiliar with the RPD's processes and rules."[70] That said, it may be considered that the Claimant's Kit that all claimants receive, and the instructions on the BOC form, emphasize the document disclosure deadlines (see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#The deadline for providing documents to the Board depends on the nature of the document).
      • Is the party's counsel experienced? In Mercado v. Canada the court affirmed that it is proper to consider the fact that a claimant was represented by experienced counsel when making this decision. The court stated: "Contrary to the applicant’s argument, the RPD did not impose a heavier burden on him simply because he was represented by this counsel. That was simply a part of the facts relevant to assessing the reasonable efforts that could objectively be expected on the part of a person in the applicant’s position."[69]
      • How much time has the party had to try to obtain the document? In Mercado v. Canada the court affirmed that it is proper to consider how much time a claimant has had to access the document in question, writing "the RPD also considered that the applicant had more than two years to obtain this documentation and that it should have been easy to access".[71]
      • Were the documents available to the party earlier? Lorne Waldman writes in his text that a panel of the Board should consider the explanation provided for the late disclosure: "If the documents were available and could have been disclosed earlier than this will weigh against acceptance of the documents."[72] For example, in Mercado v. Canada the court commented with approval that the RPD "considered that the applicant had more than two years to obtain this documentation and that it should have been easy to access because the principal applicant seemed to indicate that the tax return was in his father’s possession in Venezuela."[71]
      • Was a party's ability to produce this document affected by the Covid-19 pandemic? The RPD should consider the principle set out in the Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings that it will apply the rules flexibly in light of Covid-19.[73]

    Furthermore, the Board is to consider any other relevant factors, which have included:

    • When were the documents actually disclosed? As stated in the Board's public commentary on the previous version of these rules under the heading Other factors the Division may consider where disclosure is late, "The Division may also consider other relevant factors such as ... when the documents were actually disclosed. Thus the parties should make every effort to disclose their documents as soon as possible."[49] For example, in one decision on this matter RAD Member Angus Grant noted that it was relevant that the documents had been submitted "a full five days prior to the hearing".[74]
    • Will admitting the documents result in delay to the proceedings? Lorne Waldman writes in his text that a panel properly considers "whether or not the admission of the late disclosure will result in a lengthy delay in the proceedings."[72] Where it would, this would point against admission of the late document. Where it would not, this would support admitting the document.
    • Would admitting the evidence cause prejudice to the other party in the proceedings? The court considered this factor in Hasan v. Canada when it concluded that the Board was wrong to refuse late evidence in a case where the Minister was not participating.[75] Lorne Waldman writes in his text that "In light of the wording of these Rules and given the importance of the procedure to the individual involved, it is certainly arguable that relevant documents should be excluded only if their admission would be highly prejudicial to one of the parties and if this prejudice could not be rectified by a short adjournment."[76]
    • Are there any relevant personal circumstances of the claimant? As stated in the Board's public commentary on the previous version of these rules under the heading Other factors the Division may consider where disclosure is late, "The Division may also consider other relevant factors such as the personal circumstances of the claimant".[49] For example, one may consider the statement in the Board's SOGIE guidelines that "A reasonable delay may also arise out of an individual's reluctance to reveal their SOGIE to a spouse or other family member, or in their realizing or accepting their SOGIE."[77]

    Rule concerns use of undisclosed documents at a hearing, as opposed to other types of proceedings

    Rule 36 provides that a party who does not provide a document in accordance with Rule 34 (which specifies the process and timeline for disclosure of documents by a party) must not use the document at the hearing unless allowed to do so by the Division as per the process specified above. In interpreting this rule, the definitions section in Rule 1 provides a definition of a "proceeding" which is apposite. It defines a proceeding as including "a conference, an application or a hearing". As such, the fact that such documents cannot be used at a "hearing" appears to imply that they may be used in other types of proceedings, subject to other relevant rules. One such rule is Rule 43 concerning additional documents provided after a hearing. If the hearing has occurred, then any documents provided afterwards must meet the requirements of that rule. The fact that this rule does not limit a party's ability to use documents in, say, a pre-hearing application or conference stems from the wording of Rule 34, which establishes the deadline for providing such documents as being "10 days before the date fixed for the hearing". Instead, if a late-filed document being relied upon in a pre-hearing conference or application were to cause prejudice to another party, then general principles of procedural fairness would guide the Board's actions.

    The Division may impose conditions on the use of late documents

    As stated in the Board's public commentary on the previous version of these rules, "Where the Division allows the use of a document provided outside the time limit in the rules, it may impose conditions on its use that it considers appropriate. For example, the Division may decide that only certain relevant portions of a long document will be referred to."[49]

    If the panel admits late documents pursuant to Rule 36, it should not then assign those documents low weight for the sole reason that they are late

    In Pineda v. Canada, the Division had accepted documents that were submitted late. However, in its reasons, the tribunal concluded that it would afford the documents little weight because of the late disclosure. The court concluded that this was in error: "having exercised its discretion to allow the filing of this evidence pursuant to Rule 30 outside of the delay provided for in Rule 29, it appears somewhat counterintuitive considering the criteria to be used in the exercise of such discretion to then assign very little weight to this evidence on the basis that it was filed late and without considering the explanation provided by the applicant as to why it was so."[78]

    The Rule 36 factors need not be considered where a document is otherwise inadmissible, for example where it has not been translated

    The requirement that the tribunal consider whether to accept a late document does not apply where the issue is not the lateness of the document but rather the lack of a proper translation. In Soares v. Canada the court held that this rule need not be considered in a case where the issue is not that a document had been disclosed late, but rather that it has been disclosed without translation.[79] In short, the fact that a party is attempting to provide untranslated analysis late does not change the fact that both this rule and Rule 32 properly apply in such circumstances: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Where evidence has not been translated in accordance with the rules, the Board may decline to accept it or may assign it low weight.

    Rule 37 - Rules apply to any document

    Providing a Document
    
    General provision
    37 Rules 38 to 41 apply to any document, including a notice or request in writing.

    Rule 38 - How to provide documents to the Division, the Minister, and any other person

    Providing documents to Division
    38 (1) A document to be provided to the Division must be provided to the registry office specified by the Division.
    
    Providing documents to Minister
    (2) A document to be provided to the Minister must be provided to the Minister’s counsel.
    
    Providing documents to person other than Minister
    (3) A document to be provided to a person other than the Minister must be provided to the person’s counsel if the person has counsel of record. If the person does not have counsel of record, the document must be provided to the person.

    Rule 39 - Ways that a document may be provided

    How to provide document
    39 Unless these Rules provide otherwise, a document may be provided in any of the following ways:
    (a) by hand;
    (b) by regular mail or registered mail;
    (c) by courier;
    (d) by fax if the recipient has a fax number and the document is no more than 20 pages long, unless the recipient consents to receiving more than 20 pages; and
    (e) by email or other electronic means if the Division allows.

    This limit has been increased to 50 pages by practice notice

    As per the Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings from the RPD dated June 24, 2020, the 20 page limit for faxes has been increased to 50 pages.[73]

    As stated in the Board's public commentary on the previous version of these rules, "The maximum number of pages that may be faxed to the Division or to another party is 20 pages, including a cover sheet. The recipient's consent must be obtained before faxing a document or package of documents longer than 20 pages; otherwise, the documents will not be considered to have been received."[49] This statement would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the new limit of 50 pages.

    Rule 40 - Application if unable to provide document

    Application if unable to provide document
    40 (1) If a party is unable to provide a document in a way required by rule 39, the party may make an application to the Division to be allowed to provide the document in another way or to be excused from providing the document.
    
    Form of application
    (2) The application must be made in accordance with rule 50.
    
    Allowing application
    (3) The Division must not allow the application unless the party has made reasonable efforts to provide the document to the person to whom the document must be provided.

    Rule 40(3): The party must have made reasonable efforts to provide the document to the person to whom the document must be provided

    This is an issue that arises with applications to vacate and cease refugee protection where the protected person cannot be located: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Applications to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection#Rule 64(3): The Minister must provide a copy of the application to the protected person. Such applications may proceed in the absence of the person concerned unless doing so would amount to a breach of the tribunal's duty of fairness. The Division must not allow an application to proceed without having provided notice to the person concerned unless the Minister can show, to the Division's satisfaction, that reasonable efforts have been made to provide the document as required, as stated in Rule 40(3). In determining applications under rule 40, the RPD has considered such factors as:

    • the Minister’s efforts to search internet databases,
    • the Minister's searches in the Canadian Police Information Centre database,
    • the Minister's personal attendance at the last known address,
    • the Minister's attempts to reach the protected person at the last known telephone number, and
    • the relative quality of the Minister’s evidence on the merits of the application to cease.[80]

    Rule 41 - When documents are considered received

    When document received by Division
    41 (1) A document provided to the Division is considered to be received by the Division on the day on which the document is date-stamped by the Division.
    
    When document received by recipient other than Division
    (2) A document provided by regular mail other than to the Division is considered to be received seven days after the day on which it was mailed. If the seventh day is not a working day, the document is considered to be received on the next working day.
    
    Extension of time limit — next working day
    (3) When the time limit for providing a document ends on a day that is not a working day, the time limit is extended to the next working day.

    The fact that a document is "considered to be received" on a particular day creates a rebuttable presumption of fact

    Rule 41(2) states that "a document provided by regular mail...is considered to be received seven days after the day on which it was mailed." The fact that a document is "considered to be received" on that date means that it can be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the document was received on the date in question. However, this is a rebuttable presumption of fact. Where, for example, the mail is returned as undeliverable, the presumption would not hold. Similarly, if information came to the attention of the sender that the document in question in reality was received on a later day, for example because the recipient was outside of the country for an extended period, then it would not be proper to simply "consider" the document as having been received after the seven-day period. This interpretation is supported by the Board's public commentary on the previous version of the rules which held that the fact that a document is "considered to be received" in this way "does not relieve a party of ensuring that [it was actually received]": "If a document is sent by regular mail, [this subsection] of the Rules states that the document is considered to be received seven days after the day it was mailed. If the seventh day is not a working day, the document is considered received on the next working day. However, mailing the document does not relieve a party of ensuring that the Division actually receives the document within the specified time limit."[49] Similarly, while it will be presumed that a notice of hearing mailed to a claimant (or their counsel) provides adequate notice of a hearing, where the evidence establishes that the notice was not in fact received, then any abandonment determination could be set aside, subject to a broader examination of the principles relevant to abandonment proceedings including whether the claimant was diligent in keeping the Board up-to-date with their contact information.[81]

    Rule 42 - Original documents

    Original Documents
    
    Original documents
    42 (1) A party who has provided a copy of a document to the Division must provide the original document to the Division
    (a) without delay, on the written request of the Division; or
    (b) if the Division does not make a request, no later than at the beginning of the proceeding at which the document will be used.
    
    Documents referred to in paragraph 3(5)(e) or (g)
    (2) On the written request of the Division, the Minister must without delay provide to the Division the original of any document referred to in paragraph 3(5)(e) or (g) that is in the possession of an officer.

    The Board has suspended the application of Rule 42(1)(b) during the Covid-19 pandemic

    In its Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings which applies during the Covid-19 period, the Board has states that "until further notice, the RPD waives the requirement in RPD Rule 42(1)(b) to provide the original documents at the beginning of the hearing, unless directed in advance by the presiding member."[82] This practice notice states that "original documents must still be retained and provided to the Division upon request."

    Rule 43 - Additional documents provided as evidence after a hearing

    Additional Documents
    
    Documents after hearing
    43 (1) A party who wants to provide a document as evidence after a hearing but before a decision takes effect must make an application to the Division.
    
    Application
    (2) The party must attach a copy of the document to the application that must be made in accordance with rule 50, but the party is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.
    
    Factors
    (3) In deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
    (a) the document’s relevance and probative value;
    (b) any new evidence the document brings to the proceedings; and
    (c) whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document as required by rule 34.

    Rule 43 applies to evidence, not submissions, caselaw, or other tribunal decisions

    Rule 43 does not apply to submissions made after a hearing. This is because, as stated in Yared Belay v. Canada, this rule sets out a procedure for filing evidence after a hearing, not submissions.[5] Furthermore, a party cannot make an application to submit another decision of the Refugee Protection Division, or indeed some other tribunal, or a piece of caselaw pursuant to this rule. As the court commented in Petrovic v. Canada:

    I do not find that a copy of a tribunal decision constitutes “evidence” under subsection 43(1) of the Rules for the following reasons. First, the RPD is not required to analyze each piece of case law, as it would material evidence. Second, with the presentation of new evidence, the opposing party is generally given the opportunity to make submissions on the admissibility of said evidence, including cross‑examination. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could oppose the admissibility of a piece of case law (decision). Lastly, if Parliament wanted previous RPD decisions to constitute evidence under section 43 of the Rules, I believe it would have explicitly indicated so.[6]

    The relevant rule for extending the time to supply non-evidentiary documents is Rule 70 (which see).

    The Division has no substantive duty to accept post-hearing evidence or submissions, but it must consider the newly submitted evidence expressly

    As held in Aguilera v Canada, the Board "has no duty to accept post-hearing evidence or to allow submissions thereon".[83] It does, however, have a duty to "acknowledge the post-hearing evidence submitted by the Applicants and to explain why it should or should not be considered".[84] In short, "the Board ha[s] a duty to consider the newly submitted evidence expressly".[85] This duty extends until such time as the decision is rendered.[86] Where a panel fails to acknowledge and review a claimant's post-hearing evidentiary submissions, it will have violated the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in the adjudication of the claim. However, this obligation does not entitle a claimant to any particular result other than a fair process in which the relevant rules, such as Rule 43, are considered and the evidence is then either accepted or rejected.

    New evidence submitted post-hearing should be assessed pursuant to Rule 43 even where the party does not explicitly refer to the rule

    In Shuaib, the Court addressed the issue of whether the RPD could reject post-hearing documents on the basis that no formal application for their admission was made in accordance with Rule 43. The Court found that providing the documents, accompanied by an explanation as to why they should be considered, met the requirements of the Rules.[87] The Court determined that the RPD made a reviewable error in ignoring the post-hearing evidence. Similarly, the RAD has held that the RPD erred in not considering documents where it was "implicit in the correspondence to the RPD that an application was being made to have further evidence considered post-hearing." Member M. Pettinella of the RAD commented on this obligation as follows in one case:

    The RAD notes that the Minister’s correspondence was received by the Board after the Appellant’s hearing and before a decision was rendered by the RPD. It is implicit in the Minister’s correspondence to the RPD that an application was being made to have further evidence considered post-hearing. The RPD erred when it failed to consider the Minister’s correspondence as an application. The RPD had an obligation to consider the Minister’s application and determine if the evidence was admissible within its rules. RPD rule 43(3) indicates that the RPD must consider any relevant factors, including, the document’s relevance and probative value; any new evidence the document brings to the proceedings; and whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document as required by rule [43].[88]

    The Board must consider each of the Rule 43(3) factors

    Pursuant to Rule 43(3), in deciding this type of application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including:

    • (a) the document’s relevance and probative value
    • (b) any new evidence the document brings to the proceedings
    • (c) whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document as required by rule 34

    As such, the Board is required to consider the relevance, probative value, newness of the documents, as well as whether the party, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document on time, i.e. the factors enumerated in Rules 36(a), (b), and (c). The text Refugee Law states that "the criteria for the receipt of post-hearing evidence are similar to the long-established grounds at common law by which an individual may tender new evidence on appeal."[89] The court has held that "While the list of factors to be considered in [Rule 36] is not exhaustive, the use of the word “including” rather than the words “such as” before the list of factors indicates the intent that each of the factors included in the sub-rule be considered. A failure to do so gives rise to a breach of procedural fairness."[90] As such, in a case where the Board's decision weighed only one factor, the court concluded that it had erred.

    Rule 43(3) factors are not exhaustive, and as such, the Board may consider additional factors

    The fact that, per Rule 43(3), the Division should consider "any relevant factors" means that it is not limited to the factors above, which are enumerated in the rule, and may consider other factors. In the words of Mr. Justice Near, "the list of factors to be considered in Rule 37(3) is not exhaustive".[90]

    The consideration of the Rule 43(3) factors in past decisions

    See the discussion of the identical factors in the commentary for Rule 36 above (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 36 - Use of undisclosed documents). Additional factors particular to post-hearing documents that have been considered have included:

    • Whether a claimant made an earlier application to provide post-hearing documents that did not include this type of document: Where a panel has provided a claimant with leave to submit some specified type of document post-hearing, the claimant should not expect that another, unrelated, type of document will be allowed absent an application on point. In Farkas v. Canada, the court noted that "the post-hearing documents actually submitted do not fit within the type for which the RPD had given leave to file, that is to say 'corroborative police and/or medical documents'. As the post-hearing evidence did not fall within the scope of the RPD’s grant of permission, the RPD would have been justified rejecting it."[91]
    • Whether the document exists at the time of the application: At times, parties will apply for a proceeding to be held in abeyance until some document comes into their possession, for example a court decision from a foreign judicial process that has not yet concluded. This rule does not apply to such requests because this rule only applies where the party has and submits a copy of the document that it wants the Board to consider, per Rule 43(2). Instead, requests for leave to provide documents post-hearing, and to refrain from providing a decision until such documents are provided are not strictly assessed under Rule 43, but should instead be considered based on the Board's plenary jurisdiction.

    Requests for submit a document post-hearing that the claimant does not have in its possession are not made pursuant to Rule 43

    At times, parties will apply for a proceeding to be held in abeyance until some document comes into their possession, for example a court decision from a foreign judicial process that has not yet concluded. This rule does not apply to such requests because this rule only applies where the party has and submits a copy of the document that it wants the Board to consider, per Rule 43(2). Instead, requests for leave to provide documents post-hearing, and to refrain from providing a decision until such documents are provided are not strictly assessed under Rule 43, but should instead be considered based on the Board's plenary jurisdiction. The general approach is to decline to hold a proceeding in abeyance pending the outcome of a foreign process, but it should be noted that, when considering the overall scheme of the Act, In cases where the person has been charged with an offence in Canada punishable by ten or more years, and the criminal proceedings are still pending, the officer has the discretion to await the outcome of the trial before making a determination as to an individual's admissibility to file a claim.[92] As such, there is some precedent in the IRPA for putting proceedings into abeyance pending another proceeding's conclusion and documents related thereto becoming available.

    The court held in Gulamsakhi v. Canada that the Board should generally have a liberal approach to allowing reasonable requests to submit post-hearing documents given the issues that are usually at stake in refugee claims:

    In my opinion, in the circumstances of this case, the RPD erred in refusing to grant the Applicant an adjournment or permission to file evidence later. All adjournments require a balancing of the many circumstances of the case. Here, the primary error was that the RPD did not factor into its balancing the consequences of deportation for this Applicant. ... In the present case, particularly given the potentially horrific fate awaiting the Applicant, not only at the hands of her husband but also at the hands of criminal and possibly religious justice authorities, and given little prejudice an adjournment would realistically cause the RPD or Canadian authorities, in my view in the circumstances overall fairness required the RPD to grant the adjournment to enable the Applicant to provide the RPD with the corroborating documents it was requested.[93]

    If credibility concerns emerge from documents submitted by a claimant post-hearing, the panel generally need not resume the hearing

    The general rule is that the RPD has no obligation to return to a claimant with concerns arising from their own post-hearing submissions. The court has stated that "To do so would be onerous on the RPD. It must be kept in mind that it was up to the Applicants to submit credible and corroborative evidence to support their claim."[94] This conclusion may differ where the Minister is involved in a proceeding and their post-hearing submissions raise issues as to the credibility of the claimant, or vice versa.

    References

    1. Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 559, par. 26, <http://canlii.ca/t/51s6#26>, retrieved on 2020-02-02
    2. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, Rule 27.
    3. 1 2 Hernandez Cortes v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 583 (CanLII), para. 26.
    4. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 56261 (CA IRB), par. 49, <http://canlii.ca/t/h5p78#par49>, retrieved on 2020-08-19.
    5. 1 2 Yared Belay v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1387 (CanLII), paras. 41-42 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2016/2016fc1387/2016fc1387.html>.
    6. 1 2 Petrovic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 637 (CanLII), para. 11.
    7. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 15012 (CA IRB), para. 16.
    8. Londono v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 CanLII 95605 (CA IRB), para. 17 (interpreting its analogous and identically-worded rule).
    9. Glibchenko v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014 CanLII 95427 (CA IRB), para. 6.
    10. X (Re), 2013 CanLII 99305 (CA IRB), para. 15.
    11. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 95934 (CA IRB), paras. 14-15.
    12. Stellbrink v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 CanLII 98269 (CA IRB), para. 5.
    13. 1 2 Zhao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 CanLII 57822 (CA IRB), para. 9.
    14. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 93295 (CA IRB), para. 34.
    15. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107659 (CA IRB), para. 27.
    16. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French, Date modified: 2018-07-03 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/pnnpollo.aspx> (Accessed January 22, 2020).
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    23. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, page 2.
    24. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 144401 (CA IRB), para. 10.
    25. Huang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 CanLII 98247 (CA IRB), para. 5.
    26. Da Costa Soares v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 190 (CanLII), paras. 15-25.
    27. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 170 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec170> retrieved on 2020-02-01.
    28. Duale v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 150 (CanLII), par. 5, <http://canlii.ca/t/1gcff#5>, retrieved on 2020-01-27
    29. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 62221 (CA IRB), <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii62221/2016canlii62221.html>.
    30. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 62221 (CA IRB), para. 15.
    31. Canada (Attorney General) v. Viola, [1991] 1 F.C. 373, at page 386.
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    35. Bolanos Blanco v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 280 (CanLII), paras. 12-20.
    36. Official Languages Committee on Dec. 16th, 2010, House of Commons Hansard <https://openparliament.ca/committees/official-languages/40-3/39/sylvia-cox-duquette-1/>.
    37. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
    38. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, Rule 28(2).
    39. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 Version <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>, Appendix - Pages 1-2.
    40. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Suska, 2007 BCSC 1838.
    41. 1 2 3 Grandmont v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 CanLII 97579 (CA IRB), para. 43.
    42. Huang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 CanLII 46522 (CA IRB), para. 19.
    43. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 151861 (CA IRB), para. 10.
    44. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 95934 (CA IRB), para. 15.
    45. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division Practice Notice: Compliance with Refugee Protection Division Rules, Effective date: December 8, 2014 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/AviPraNotRpdSprComRulResReg.aspx> (Accessed January 25, 2020).
    46. Yeung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 CanLII 80130 (CA IRB), para. 8.
    47. For more information see Society of Translators and Interpreters of British Columbia, www.stibc.org.
    48. University of Ottawa Refugee Assistance Project, UORAP Hearing Preparation Kit, Guide 3: Preparing Evidence for your Hearing <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/hearing_preparation_kit.pdf>, page 14.
    49. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
    50. 1 2 3 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy on National Documentation Packages in Refugee Determination Proceedings, Effective date: June 5, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/national-documentation-packages.aspx> (Accessed August 30, 2020).
    51. Zhao v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1593 (CanLII), par. 31, <http://canlii.ca/t/j48rf#par31>, retrieved on 2020-04-01.
    52. Oymali v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 889.
    53. Nagulesan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1382 (CanLII), para. 13.
    54. Worku v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 784.
    55. B135 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 871 at para. 26.
    56. Ahortor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 65 F.T.R. 137 (FCT).
    57. Trboljevac v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 26 (CanLII), para. 52.
    58. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Notice to parties and counsel appearing before the Refugee Protection Division – voluminous country conditions evidence, Date modified: 2018-06-26 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/voluminous-country-conditions-evidence-preuve-volumineuse-relative-aux-conditions-dans-le-pays.aspx>.
    59. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, July 10​, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx#toc34> (Accessed August 14, 2020).
    60. Instructions for Gathering and Disclosing Information for Refugee Protection Division Proceedings, Instructions issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 159(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, amended December, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/InstructInfo.aspx>.
    61. Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 198 (CanLII), [2008] 1 FCR 385.
    62. Huang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 149 (CanLII), [2002] 3 FC 266, par. 23, <http://canlii.ca/t/lgk#par23>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
    63. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Weighing Evidence - Chapter 3: Assessing Evidence, Last Updated December 31, 2003, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/EvidPreu03.aspx> (Accessed February 6, 2020).
    64. Mbirimujo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 553, at para. 23.
    65. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Notice to parties and counsel appearing before the Refugee Protection Division – late disclosure, May 7, 2018 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/late-disclosure-communication-tardive.aspx>
    66. Alvarez Rivera c. Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2021 CF 99 (CanLII), par. 24, <https://canlii.ca/t/jczlf#par24>, consulté le 2021-02-22.
    67. Hasan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1537 (CanLII), para. 9-10.
    68. X (Re), 2019 CanLII 140842 (CA IRB), par. 18, <http://canlii.ca/t/j8rc1#par18>, retrieved on 2020-12-18.
    69. 1 2 Mercado v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 311, 2010 FC 289 (F.C.), para. 38.
    70. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division, Amended December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx#FailureA4> (Accessed January 26, 2020), section 1.3.
    71. 1 2 Mercado v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 311, 2010 FC 289 (F.C.), para. 40.
    72. 1 2 Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1724 of the PDF.
    73. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, June 24, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx> (Accessed June 24, 2020).
    74. X (Re), 2019 CanLII 140842 (CA IRB), par. 18, <http://canlii.ca/t/j8rc1#par18>, retrieved on 2020-12-17.
    75. Hasan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1537 (CanLII), para. 12.
    76. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1720 of the PDF.
    77. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson's Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir09.aspx>, at section 8.5.11.
    78. Pineda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 538, 2010 FC 454 (F.C.), para. 35.
    79. Soares v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 254, 2007 FC 190 (F.C.).
    80. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Legal Resources - Chapter 12 - Applications to Cease Refugee Protection, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/RefDef12.aspx#n1242> (Accessed December 6, 2020), at s. 12.4.2.
    81. Anwar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] FCJ No 622 (FC), as cited in Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 307.
    82. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, June 23, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx#toc25> (Accessed August 1, 2020).
    83. Aguilera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 507, 167 ACWS (3d) 967.
    84. Mannan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 144 (CanLII), para. 52.
    85. Matingou-Testie v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 389, [2012] FCJ No 401 at para 43.
    86. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 108739 (CA IRB), paras. 13-19.
    87. Mannan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 144 (CanLII), para. 46.
    88. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107435 (CA IRB), para. 17.
    89. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 304.
    90. 1 2 Cox v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1220 (CanLII), para. 27.
    91. Farkas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 542 (CanLII), para. 13.
    92. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 100(2) <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec100subsec2> retrieved on 2020-04-13.
    93. Gulamsakhi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2015] F.C.J. No. 271, 2015 FC 105 (F.C.), para. 25.
    94. Behary v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 794 (CanLII), para. 31.

    Witnesses (Rules 44-48)

    Rule 44 - Witness notification

    The text of the relevant rules reads:

    Witnesses
     
    Providing witness information
     
    44 (1) If a party wants to call a witness, the party must provide the following witness information in writing to the other party, if any, and to the Division:
     (a) the witness’s contact information;
     (b) a brief statement of the purpose and substance of the witness’s testimony or, in the case of an expert witness, the expert witness’s brief signed summary of the testimony to be given;
     (c) the time needed for the witness’s testimony;
     (d) the party’s relationship to the witness;
     (e) in the case of an expert witness, a description of the expert witness’s qualifications; and
     (f) whether the party wants the witness to testify by means of live telecommunication.
     
    Proof witness information provided
    (2) The witness information provided to the Division must be accompanied by a written statement indicating how and when it was provided to the other party, if any.
     
    Time limit
    (3) Documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the hearing.
     
    Failure to provide witness information
    (4) If a party does not provide the witness information, the witness must not testify at the hearing unless the Division allows them to testify.
     
    Factors
    (5) In deciding whether to allow a witness to testify, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
     (a) the relevance and probative value of the proposed testimony; and
     (b) the reason why the witness information was not provided.

    44(1)(f): If a party wants to call a witness, the party must provide information on whether the party wants the witness to testify by means of live telecommunication

    Rule 44(1)(f) provides that if a party wants to call a witness, the party must provide witness information in writing to the other party, if any, and to the Division including whether the party wants the witness to testify by means of live telecommunication. The Federal Court has held that the general rule before the RPD is that witnesses should be physically present.[1] In Aslani v Canada, the RPD member required that the proposed overseas witnesses report to the Canadian embassy in the countries where they resided to be identified, before she would hear them. On judicial review, the claimant maintained that a non-existent procedural rule was imposed upon him and that this infringed his right to be heard. The court, however, upheld the RPD's refusal to hear from the witnesses on the basis that testimony by telephone can create particular issues around establishing the identity of the witness.[1]

    44(4): Division has discretion not to allow a witness to testify where proper notice has not been provided

    Pursuant to Rule 44(4), if a party does not provide the witness information required by the rule, their witness must not testify at the hearing unless the Division allows them to testify. In exercising this discretion, the Board must consider any relevant factors, including those specified in Rule 44(5). The courts have granted significant leeway to the RPD in the exercise of this discretion. For example, in Parveen v. Canada, the Board declared that the claimant had abandoned their claim. The claimant indicated during the hearing that she wished to have her landlord provide testimony in her special hearing on abandonment. The RPD declined to allow the testimony because no notice was given that he would be called as a witness, and he had not been excluded from the Applicant’s testimony. The court upheld this decision for these reasons.[2]

    Witnesses have a right to testify in the official language of their choice

    The IRB Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French provides that "All persons in the hearing room are free to speak the official language of their choice, including counsel for the subject of the proceeding. At the request of any party to the proceeding, the IRB will make arrangements to provide interpretation from one official language to the other, taking into consideration third language interpretation may also be required for the case." The policy emphasizes that both the Official Languages Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establish official languages rights for parties as well as for individuals who are otherwise involved in IRB proceedings, such as witnesses and counsel.[3]

    The Refugee Appeal Division has found that testimony from a claimant's counsel inadmissible before the tribunal, writing "I find counsel’s statutory declaration is inadmissible as evidence in this appeal." In reaching this conclusion, the RAD referred to the Code of Conduct of the Law Society of Alberta which provides that:

    The Lawyer as Witness
    4.02(1) A lawyer who appears as advocate must not testify or submit his or her own affidavit evidence before the tribunal unless permitted to do so by law, the tribunal, the Rules of Court or the rules of procedure of the tribunal, or unless the matter is purely formal or uncontroverted.[4]

    The Board also noted that the Commentary set out in the Alberta Code also states:

    A lawyer should not express personal opinions or beliefs or assert as a fact anything that is properly subject to legal proof, cross-examination or challenge. The lawyer should not, in effect, appear as an unsworn witness or put the lawyer’s own credibility at issue. The lawyer who is a necessary witness should testify and entrust the conduct of the case to another lawyer. There are no restrictions on the applicant’s right to cross-examine another lawyer, however, and the lawyer who does appear as a witness should not expect to receive special treatment because of professional status.[5]

    The RAD concluded that "I find that his statutory declaration improperly provides evidence and is, therefore, not admissible."[6] The ability of a lawyer to provide evidence in this way may thus depend on the jurisdiction and the rules of the Law Society in question. See also the following discussion of how the Board is not bound by technical rules of evidence: Canadian Refugee Procedure/IRPA Section 170 - Proceedings#IRPA Section 170(g) - Is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence. As "the Division is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence"[7] it is not bound to reject evidence provided by counsel, but it nonetheless has the residual discretion to do so as part of the broader discretion that it has to control its own process and balance the probative value of evidence with its prejudicial effect, if any, on the hearing process.

    Rule 45(1) - Requesting summons

    Requesting summons
    45 (1) A party who wants the Division to order a person to testify at a hearing must make a request to the Division for a summons, either orally at a proceeding or in writing.

    The authority of the Division to issue a summons for a person or documents

    The legislative authority for enforcing a summons is found under s. 5 of the Inquiries Act.[8] This provision allows the Division to either summon an individual or to compel the production of evidence. For a discussion of this provision, see Canadian Refugee Procedure/Powers of a Member. A second basis for the Board's authority to summon a witness is s. 127(c) of the IRPA, which reads:

    Misrepresentation
    
    127 No person shall knowingly
    (a) directly or indirectly misrepresent or withhold material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act;
    (b) communicate, directly or indirectly, by any means, false or misleading information or declarations with intent to induce or deter immigration to Canada; or
    (c) refuse to be sworn or to affirm or declare, as the case may be, or to answer a question put to the person at an examination or at a proceeding held under this Act.

    Rule 45 does not have extraterritorial effect and only allows the Board to summon a person within Canada

    When interpreting its identical rule, the IAD commented that it does not have extraterritorial effect: "The request for a summons or subpoena is denied for reasons that the IAD has no jurisdiction to issue a summons for persons outside Canada where the IAD has no extraterritorial power to enforce the summons. The jurisdiction of the IAD with respect to the issuance of summons under Rule 38 of the IAD Rules does not extend beyond Canada."[9] It would appear that this interpretation is a persuasive one when interpreting the scope of the equivalent RPD rule.

    Rule 45(2) - Factors the Division must consider in deciding whether to issue a summons

    Factors
    45(2) In deciding whether to issue a summons, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
    (a) the necessity of the testimony to a full and proper hearing;
    (b) the person’s ability to give that testimony; and
    (c) whether the person has agreed to be summoned as a witness.

    Factors the Division is to consider when deciding whether to issue a summons

    Rule 45(2) provides that in deciding whether to issue a summons, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including:

    • (a) the necessity of the testimony to a full and proper hearing.
      • Is the testimony duplicative of evidence that will already be provided? In interpreting its identical rule, the Immigration Appeal Division considered this factor in Lama v. Canada when rejecting an application for a summons by noting that the testimony that the applicant sought to adduce from the persons who would be summoned was duplicated by, and less probative than, persons who were already going to be witnesses: "The appellant’s counsel submits the evidence of family members and the close relatives who witnessed the marriage ceremony is highly relevant to the proceeding. The wedding celebration is one of the many factors which will be considered by the Panel. The appellant’s and applicant’s testimonies are the more relevant pertaining to the genuineness of their marriage. For these reasons, I don’t find the testimony of the appellant’s sister and “big mommy” necessary for the full and proper hearing."[10]
      • Can the evidence be obtained in other ways? In Ahmadpour v. Canada, the Board rejected a request for a summons on the basis that the evidence in question could be obtained in alternative ways, such as by the claimant's counsel and family members obtaining documents.[11]
      • May the testimony of the witness lead to other potentially relevant witnesses? In Akram v. Canada the Federal Court held that the RPD had been wrong to deny a request to summon a CBSA officer on the basis that even if the officer was unlikely to provide direct testimony that was relevant to the issue being considered, "the Officer had the ability to provide information about other individuals involved in the investigation" and that it was important to consider this purpose for summoning the officer.[12]
    • (b) the person’s ability to give that testimony. If the person in question has provided information that they have no knowledge of the matter in question, this is a relevant consideration. In one case where a protected person sought to summon a CBSA officer who had been involved in his claim, the panel of the RPD stated that she "considered the factors laid out in the Rules and denied the application to summon the officer at the pre-hearing conference. The officer has already explained in writing the limited scope of his role in the investigation and his inability to give further testimony about any timeline. This was the basis for not agreeing to be summoned as a witness, which I find to be reasonable."[13] This was on the basis that the officer in question had had a limited role in the claim about a decade prior and that the officer "took no further action, has no further knowledge about applications brought against the respondent, the related background, circumstances or the timeline."[14]
    • (c) whether the person has agreed to be summoned as a witness. In one decision considering this factor in its identical rules, the Immigration Appeal Division weighed a respondent's disinclination to testify as follows: "the appellant provides in the June 8, 2017 submissions that he not wish to be a witness for the Minister. Having considered the respondent’s wishes, I find that the interests of justice, including the public interest that tribunals render full and fair decisions, outweigh any prejudice to the respondent and mandate the provision of his testimony at this appeal."[15] The reasoning of the IAD has been similar in cases where information about whether the person has agreed to be summoned is simply not before the tribunal, e.g. in Liu v. Canada the Board commented as follows: "As to whether Mr. Reid has agreed to be summoned as a witness, it is not clear that he has.  However, I find that the interests of justice outweigh any inconvenience or prejudice to Mr. Reid.  Therefore, I require the provision of his testimony at this appeal."[16]

    As the Division is to consider "any relevant factors", factors other than those listed above may properly be considered by a panel when making a decision, including:

    • The timing of the request and whether it may delay proceedings: Where a party has not acted diligently and a request for a summons risks delaying a proceeding, this may appropriately be considered when issuing a summons. For example, when interpreting its identical provision, the IAD commented as follows in Liu v. Canada: "While the relevant factors in this case support the granting of a summons, I note that the Appellant brought this application on April 2, 2019 with a hearing resumption date scheduled for April 24, 2019.  This matter was adjourned following the first sitting on January 29, 2019 and the content of Mr. Reid’s statutory declaration were known to the Appellant at that sitting and prior to the commencement of the hearing of this appeal.  As such, while the application for a summons is granted, the Appellant should be prepared to proceed on April 24, 2019 regardless of whether Mr. Reid appears at the hearing."

    Rule 45(3) - How to use a summons

    Using summons
    (3) If a party wants to use a summons, the party must
    (a) provide the summons to the person by hand;
    (b) provide a copy of the summons to the Division, together with a written statement indicating the name of the person who provided the summons and the date, time and place that it was provided by hand; and
    (c) pay or offer to pay the person the applicable witness fees and travel expenses set out in Tariff A of the Federal Courts Rules.

    Rule 45(3)(a) Requires Personal Service of the Summons

    When interpreting its similar rule, the Immigration Appeal Division commented on the fact that electronic service is not sufficient to meet the requirement that the summons be provided "to the person by hand": "The Appellant shall comply with section 38(3) of the IAD Rules and any other relevant requirements in executing the summons. Section 38(3)(a) of the IAD Rules states that the Appellant must 'provide the summons to the summoned person by hand'. The Appellant has indicated that she will notify Mr. Reid of the summons by electronic means. While the Appellant is free to do so, the use of electronic means does not discharge the obligation of personal service as required in section 38(3)(a) of the IAD Rules."[17]

    Rule 46 - Cancelling summons

    Cancelling summons
     46 (1) If a person who is summoned to appear as a witness wants the summons cancelled, the person must make an application in writing to the Division.
     
     Application
     (2) The person must make the application in accordance with rule 50, but is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.

    Rule 47 - Arrest warrant

    Arrest warrant
     47 (1) If a person does not obey a summons to appear as a witness, the party who requested the summons may make a request to the Division orally at the hearing, or in writing, to issue a warrant for the person’s arrest.
     
     Written request
     (2) A party who makes a written request for a warrant must provide supporting evidence by affidavit or statutory declaration.
     
     Requirements for issue of arrest warrant
     (3) The Division must not issue a warrant unless
     (a) the person was provided the summons by hand or the person is avoiding being provided the summons;
     (b) the person was paid or offered the applicable witness fees and travel expenses set out in Tariff A of the Federal Courts Rules;
     (c) the person did not appear at the hearing as required by the summons; and
     (d) the person’s testimony is still needed for a full and proper hearing.
     
     Content of warrant
     (4) A warrant issued by the Division for the arrest of a person must include directions concerning detention or release.

    Rule 48 - Excluded witnesses

    Excluded witness
    48 If the Division excludes a witness from a hearing room, no person may communicate to the witness any evidence given while the witness was excluded unless allowed to do so by the Division or until the witness has finished testifying.

    Communicating with an excluded witness may amount to witness tampering

    In (Re) Mumtaz Khan, counsel for a claimant provided information to an excluded witness and the Board concluded that this amounted to witness tampering and sanctioned the counsel.[18]

    References

    1. 1 2 Aslani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 351, <http://canlii.ca/t/1q8jk>.
    2. Parveen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 155 (CanLII), para. 23.
    3. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy Statement on Official Languages and the Principle of the Substantive Equality of English and French, Date modified: 2018-07-03 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/pnnpollo.aspx> (Accessed January 22, 2020).
    4. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 96662 (CA IRB), par. 35, <http://canlii.ca/t/glc8d#par35>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
    5. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 96662 (CA IRB), par. 36, <http://canlii.ca/t/glc8d#par36>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
    6. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 96662 (CA IRB), par. 41, <http://canlii.ca/t/glc8d#par41>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
    7. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 170 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec170> retrieved on 2020-02-07.
    8. Inquiries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-11
    9. Ahmadpour v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 CanLII 79685 (CA IRB), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/fp9fj#9>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    10. Lama v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 CanLII 139884 (CA IRB), par. 5, <http://canlii.ca/t/hzrg2#5>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    11. Ahmadpour v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 CanLII 79685 (CA IRB), par. 7, <http://canlii.ca/t/fp9fj#7>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    12. Akram v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 171 (CanLII), par. 32, <http://canlii.ca/t/hxh6c#32>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    13. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 72628 (CA IRB), par. 24, <http://canlii.ca/t/htc27#24>, retrieved on 2020-02-05 (reversed in Akram v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 171 (CanLII), but on other grounds relating not to this basis for concluded that the person was unable to provide significant testimony on this issue, but on another ground that the officer may be able to provide testimony about another unrelated issue).
    14. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 72628 (CA IRB), par. 20, <http://canlii.ca/t/htc27#20>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    15. Nguyen v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 CanLII 68077 (CA IRB), par. 7, <http://canlii.ca/t/h6nx3#7>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    16. Liu v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 CanLII 82084 (CA IRB), par. 7, <http://canlii.ca/t/j287f#7>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    17. Liu v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 CanLII 82084 (CA IRB), par. 10, <http://canlii.ca/t/j287f#10>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
    18. (Re) Mumtaz Khan, December 18, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/decisions/Pages/mumtaz-khan.aspx> (Accessed February 1, 20201)

    Applications (Rules 49-52)

    Rule 49 - General provision describing how to make, respond to, and reply to a response to an application

    The text of Rule 49 reads:

    Applications
    
    General
    
    General provision
    49 Unless these Rules provide otherwise,
    (a) a party who wants the Division to make a decision on any matter in a proceeding, including the procedure to be followed, must make an application to the Division in accordance with rule 50;
    (b) a party who wants to respond to the application must respond in accordance with rule 51; and
    (c) a party who wants to reply to a response must reply in accordance with rule 52.

    Evidence attached to an application, a response to an application, or a reply to a response must meet the requirements in Rules 35, 36 or 43 regarding relevance, probative value, new evidence, etc. (as applicable)

    The fact that Rules 50(4), 51(2), and 52(2) make provision for a party to attach evidence to an application, a response, or a reply to a response, does not establish the legal framework for whether or not such evidence is to be accepted. It merely provides the process and procedure for providing such evidence. Instead, the rules for whether or not such evidence should be accepted are Rule 35 (if the evidence is provided at least 10 days prior to the hearing date), Rule 36 (if the evidence is provided within 10 days of the hearing), or Rule 43 (if the evidence is provided post-hearing).

    The Board may convene a conference in response to an application made under these rules

    As Lorne Waldman notes in his text, "once all of the documents have been received by the parties, the Refugee Protection Division may order a hearing into the application or, in cases where it is satisfied that no injustice would result, may dispose of the matter without a hearing."[1] The framework in the Rules for having such a hearing are the provisions in Rule 24 on case conferences: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Conferences#Rule 24 - Conferences.

    Rule 50 - How to Make an Application

    How to Make an Application
    
    Written application and time limit
    50 (1) Unless these Rules provide otherwise, an application must be made in writing, without delay, and must be received by the Division no later than 10 days before the date fixed for the next proceeding.
    
    Oral application
    (2) The Division must not allow a party to make an application orally at a proceeding unless the party, with reasonable effort, could not have made a written application before the proceeding.
    
    Content of application
    (3) Unless these Rules provide otherwise, in a written application, the party must
    (a) state the decision the party wants the Division to make;
    (b) give reasons why the Division should make that decision; and
    (c) if there is another party and the views of that party are known, state whether the other party agrees to the application.
    
    Affidavit or statutory declaration
    (4) Unless these Rules provide otherwise, any evidence that the party wants the Division to consider with a written application must be given in an affidavit or statutory declaration that accompanies the application.
    
    Providing application to other party and Division
    (5) A party who makes a written application must provide
    (a) to the other party, if any, a copy of the application and a copy of any affidavit or statutory declaration; and
    (b) to the Division, the original application and the original of any affidavit or statutory declaration, together with a written statement indicating how and when the party provided a copy to the other party, if any.

    Rule 51 - How to Respond to a Written Application

    How to Respond to a Written Application
    
    Responding to written application
    51 (1) A response to a written application must be in writing and
    (a) state the decision the party wants the Division to make; and
    (b) give reasons why the Division should make that decision.
    
    Evidence in written response
    (2) Any evidence that the party wants the Division to consider with the written response must be given in an affidavit or statutory declaration that accompanies the response. Unless the Division requires it, an affidavit or statutory declaration is not required if the party who made the application was not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration, together with the application.
    
    Providing response
    (3) A party who responds to a written application must provide
    (a) to the other party, a copy of the response and a copy of any affidavit or statutory declaration; and
    (b) to the Division, the original response and the original of any affidavit or statutory declaration, together with a written statement indicating how and when the party provided a copy to the other party.
    
    Time limit
    (4) Documents provided under subrule (3) must be received by their recipients no later than five days after the date on which the party receives the copy of the application.

    Rule 52 - How to Reply to a Written Response

    How to Reply to a Written Response
    
    Replying to written response
    52 (1) A reply to a written response must be in writing.
    
    Evidence in reply
    (2) Any evidence that the party wants the Division to consider with the written reply must be given in an affidavit or statutory declaration that accompanies the reply. Unless the Division requires it, an affidavit or statutory declaration is not required if the party was not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration, together with the application.
    
    Providing reply
    (3) A party who replies to a written response must provide
    (a) to the other party, a copy of the reply and a copy of any affidavit or statutory declaration; and
    (b) to the Division, the original reply and the original of any affidavit or statutory declaration, together with a written statement indicating how and when the party provided a copy to the other party.
    
    Time limit
    (4) Documents provided under subrule (3) must be received by their recipients no later than three days after the date on which the party receives the copy of the response.

    References

    1. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1746 of the PDF.

    Changing the Location of a Proceeding (Rule 53)

    Rule 53 - Changing the Location of a Proceeding

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Changing the Location of a Proceeding
    
    Application to change location
    53 (1) A party may make an application to the Division to change the location of a proceeding.
    
    Form and content of application
    (2) The party must make the application in accordance with rule 50, but is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.
    
    Time limit
    (3) Documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than 20 days before the date fixed for the proceeding.
    
    Factors
    (4) In deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
    (a) whether the party is residing in the location where the party wants the proceeding to be held;
    (b) whether a change of location would allow the proceeding to be full and proper;
    (c) whether a change of location would likely delay the proceeding;
    (d) how a change of location would affect the Division’s operation;
    (e) how a change of location would affect the parties;
    (f) whether a change of location is necessary to accommodate a vulnerable person; and
    (g) whether a hearing may be conducted by a means of live telecommunication with the claimant or protected person.
    
    Duty to appear
    (5) Unless a party receives a decision from the Division allowing the application, the party must appear for the proceeding at the location fixed and be ready to start or continue the proceeding.

    Commentary on the Rule 53(4) Factors

    The IRB provides a specific form to make such applications, the Application to Change the Location of a Proceeding form.[1] Waldman notes in his text that "The Rules confer a broad discretion on the Division to determine whether or not to grant the change of venue, and it is unlikely that the discretion will be interfered with by a reviewing court unless the Division acts arbitrarily."[2] Past decisions have commented on the above factors thusly:

    • (a) whether the party is residing in the location where the party wants the proceeding to be held:
      • Where a party has moved, this points to moving the proceedings: The instructions provided on the IRB website about these applications is that the Application to Change the Location of a Proceeding form "can be used by claimants who have moved or who intend to move, and who wish to have their proceeding held at a Refugee Protection Division (RPD) office in another city in Canada."[3] As a result, the fact that a party is residing in the new location is a factor in favour of moving proceedings there.
      • An intent to move is also properly considered: Additionally, as per the instructions quoted supra, the Board has communicated that it is also appropriate for those who intend to move to bring such applications prior to doing so.[3]
      • Location of counsel not generally an appropriate consideration: In contrast, where such applications have been made to move proceedings away from where an individual resides to another city where the individual's counsel resides, the fact that the individual concerned does not reside in the new city being proposed has been taken as a factor pointing against accepting the application.[4] In interpreting its similar rule, the Immigration Appeal Division commented on this as follows: "I note that the appellant`s representative of choice resides in Vancouver and although not stated, may be one of the factors driving the application to change the location of the proceeding. In the absence of argument or evidence to suggest that travel for the representative is more onerous than travel for the appellant, that is a neutral consideration in this case."[5] The general view is that it was open to counsel not to accept the retainer and to suggest to the claimant seek counsel in the province where they reside, and that not having done this, counsel can either travel to the location where the hearing is being held to participate in the hearing in-person, counsel can request that they be able to appear via video or telephone, or the claimant can retain any of the number of counsel who are available to provide legal services in in the location where the hearing is being held.
    • (b) whether a change of location would allow the proceeding to be full and proper:
      • Not generally necessary for witnesses to testify in person for a proceeding to be "full and proper": It is common that witnesses will provide testimony by telephone and it will not generally be necessary to change a location in order to hear from witnesses in person. In this respect, where witnesses are in another city in Canada and they testify by telephone, the claimant is in no different a position from the numerous claimants who rely on witnesses located overseas and consequently adduce their evidence by telephone or video.
    • (c) whether a change of location would likely delay the proceeding: This is a consideration both where a date has been set and where a date has not been set.
      • Where hearing date set: In terms of cases where a date has been set, in interpreting its similar rule, the Immigration Appeal Division has held that a change of location that would require abandoning an existing date and substituting it for a later date is a factor that points against granting an application to change location.[4]
      • Where hearing date not set: Delay of a proceeding is also a factor even for claims where a hearing date has not yet been scheduled. The Board publishes statistics on the number of pending cases in each of its regions on its website.[6] The Eastern region has a greater number of pending cases than the Central region, which in turn has a greater number of pending cases than the Western region, and as a result, all else being equal, changing location to the Eastern region is likely to delay a proceeding, while changing location to the Western region is unlikely to do so.
      • Delay should be considered, not expediting a hearing: While the Division must consider whether a change of venue request will result in a delay or slowing of the proceedings, the expediting of proceedings is not a listed factor. While it is open to the Division to consider any relevant factors, as a matter of policy, claimants should not be permitted to change the venue of their cases simply to obtain an earlier hearing date. Allowing applications for a change of venue so as to allow an earlier hearing date is not proper, as the likely impact on proceedings is that claimants will seek to bring such applications as a form of “forum shopping.” Ultimately, this would not benefit the operation of the Division as pressures would simply shift from one location to another, with a concomitant increase in delay in the receiving location. Furthermore, this option would be available only to those with sufficient financial means to travel for the purpose of attending their hearing. This provision cannot have been intended to provide an advantage to those of greater financial means. Instead, the Refugee Protection Division has a Policy on the Transfer of Files for Hearings by Videoconference which provides for a principled, as opposed to ad hoc, approach to transferring workload between regions and using videoconferencing in order to efficiently and fairly utilize the Board's resources.[7]
    • (d) how a change of location would affect the Division’s operation:
      • Does the Board have an office in the location proposed? In commenting on its similar rule, the Immigration Appeal Division has noted that there are administrative and operational implications for IAD processes conducted in itinerant locations.[8] The Board has registries in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, and it has permanent offices in a number of other cities including Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton, and Winnipeg, and facilities and resources to conduct hearings in those cities are generally more readily available than in itinerant locations such as Saskatoon, where the Board's presence is more occasional. Such operational realities are properly considered when entertaining such requests to move proceedings.
    • (e) how a change of location would affect the parties:
      • Effect on Minister: The administrative and operational effects on the Minister of a change in location requested by a claimant is a factor to be considered where the Minister is intervening in a proceeding. It is for this reason that the the Application to Change the Location of a Proceeding form instructs that any application made by a claimant "must also include the views of the Minister, if known." By way of example, in interpreting its similar rule, the Immigration Appeal Division concluded that this factor pointed against a change of location as follows: "In this case, the file would have to be physically transferred between the two Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) units that serve the IAD’s Western Region and a different hearings officer would be required to prepare the file on relatively short notice. A transfer within one week of an ADR proceeding would, in this circumstance, be an unreasonable hardship on the respondent in the absence of other exceptional circumstances that would compel such a transfer."[5]
    • (f) whether a change of location is necessary to accommodate a vulnerable person: Vulnerable persons are individuals whose ability to present their cases before the IRB is severely impaired. Regard should be had to the Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB.[9] A number of commonly considered accommodations, such as allowing the vulnerable person to provide evidence by videoconference or other means, allowing a support person to participate in a hearing, and creating a more informal setting for a hearing may be relevant to requests to change the location of a hearing.
    • (g) whether a hearing may be conducted by a means of live telecommunication with the claimant or protected person:
      • In general, videoconferencing is not considered unfair or a detriment: Section 164 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provides that "where a hearing is held by a Division, it may, at the Division's discretion, be conducted in the presence of, or by means of, live telecommunication with, the person who is the subject of the proceedings." The Board has a policy entitled Use of Videoconferencing in Proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada which sets out that it is the IRB's position that provided that it is carried out in accordance with appropriate technological and procedural standards, videoconferencing does not affect the quality of the hearing or decision-making and respects the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.[10] That said, while not strictly a legal consideration, it may be noted that many counsel do not like videoconferencing and academic commentators have called on the Board to "limit this practice as much as possible"[11] because of the way that, among other things, the subtle lags inherent in the technology can affect perceptions of credibility according to psychological research.[12] The Board commissioned an external review of the use of videoconferencing technology in hearings and the resultant report includes much grousing from Board Members;[13] the Board made some changes to its practices in response to the report,[14] but other challenges identified by Members and counsel therein remain.
      • The Board can partially accommodate a request: In his text, Waldman notes that "in some cases, the tribunal will partially accommodate the request by allowing the person to appear by video conference so that the tribunal is located in the location set for the hearing and the claimant and their counsel are located at a different location."[2]
      • Claimant retains the option to attend in person: The Refugee Protection Division Policy on the Transfer of Files for Hearings by Videoconference states that where a file is heard via videoconference at a different RPD office from that nearest to the claimant, a claimant retains the right to, at their own expense, attend a hearing in-person in another region from where they reside: "a claimant, and counsel, if any, may choose to attend the hearing in person in the receiving region at claimant's own expense."[7]
      • Types of cases where videoconferencing is inappropriate: The Refugee Protection Division Policy on the Transfer of Files for Hearings by Videoconference recognizes that there are circumstances in which it is inappropriate to hold a hearing by videoconference, including certain cases involving unaccompanied minors and persons who, in the opinion of the RPD, are unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings; some cases involving detained persons receiving priority processing; and particular highly complex cases, for example, cases likely to involve multiple sittings, those involving in-person Ministerial interventions where case complexities have been confirmed, or those involving the joining of multiple files where significant case complexities exist.

    An application to change the location of a proceeding does not put other timelines on hold

    Nothing in the Refugee Protection Division Rules or the BOC forms indicates a hold period pending a venue change request. As such, the fact that an individual has moved and has submitted a request to transfer their file does not excuse them from appearing at other proceedings, filing completed BOC forms on time, etc.[15]

    References

    1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Application to Change the Location of a Proceeding, Date modified: July 31, 2018, Accessed January 2, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr1901e.pdf>.
    2. 1 2 Waldman, Lorne, Immigration Law and Practice, 2nd Edition, Rel. 49-2/215, Publisher: LexisNexis Canada, ISBN/ISSN: 9780433449867, at section 9.345 (Page 9-146.3).
    3. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Application to Change the Location of a Proceeding, Date modified: 2018-07-05, Accessed January 2, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Pages/RpdSpr2020.aspx>.
    4. 1 2 Rai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 CanLII 87173 (CA IRB), para. 3 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2009/2009canlii87173/2009canlii87173.html>.
    5. 1 2 Nguyen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 CanLII 47216 (CA IRB), para. 5 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii47216/2016canlii47216.html>.
    6. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Claims (New System) Statistics, Date modified: Nov 20, 2019, Accessed: January 2, 2019 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/statistics/protection/Pages/RPDStat.aspx>.
    7. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy on the Transfer of Files for Hearings by Videoconference (Refugee Protection Division), Policy dated June 28, 2004, Accessed January 2, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/PolTransfer.aspx>.
    8. Nguyen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 CanLII 47216 (CA IRB), para. 4 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii47216/2016canlii47216.html>.
    9. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB, Amended: December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir08.aspx>.
    10. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Use of Videoconferencing in Proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy dated 15 December 2010, Accessed January 2, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/Videoconf.aspx>.
    11. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, page 130 (Accessed January 25, 2020).
    12. Mark Federman, “On the Media Effects of Immigration and Refugee Board Hearings via Videoconference” (2006) 19(4) J of Refugee Studies 433 [Federman] at 442.
    13. S. Ronald Ellis, Q.C., Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Published by Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Date October 21, 2004 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/Video.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
    14. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board Response to the Report on Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Date modified listed on webpage: 2018-06-26, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/VideoRespRep.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
    15. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 11, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par11>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.

    Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding (Rule 54)

    The Act, Regulation, and Rules all include provisions that are relevant to the (re)scheduling of proceedings before the Board. Rule 54 is the relevant rule in the RPD Rules for changing the date or time of a proceeding. It operates against the background of section 159.9 of the regulations and section 162 of the Act, which follows.

    IRPA Section 162

    Sole and exclusive jurisdiction
    162 (1) Each Division of the Board has, in respect of proceedings brought before it under this Act, sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction.
    
    Procedure
    (2) Each Division shall deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit.

    For discussion of this provision, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Board Jurisdiction and Procedure.

    Relevant Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulation Provisions

    Hearing Before Refugee Protection Division
    
    Time limits for hearing
    159.9 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), for the purpose of subsection 100(4.1) of the Act, the date fixed for the hearing before the Refugee Protection Division must be not later than
    (a) in the case of a claimant referred to in subsection 111.1(2) of the Act,
    (i) 30 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, if the claim is made inside Canada other than at a port of entry, and
    (ii) 45 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, if the claim is made inside Canada at a port of entry; and
    (b) in the case of any other claimant, 60 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, whether the claim is made inside Canada at a port of entry or inside Canada other than at a port of entry.
    
    Exclusion
    (2) If the time limit set out in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) or paragraph (1)(b) ends on a Saturday, that time limit is extended to the next working day.
    
    Exceptions
    (3) If the hearing cannot be held within the time limit set out in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) or paragraph (1)(b) for any of the following reasons, the hearing must be held as soon as feasible after that time limit:
    (a) for reasons of fairness and natural justice;
    (b) because of a pending investigation or inquiry relating to any of sections 34 to 37 of the Act; or
    (c) because of operational limitations of the Refugee Protection Division.

    Regulation 159.9(1): The Board does not generally follow the timelines for scheduling hearings prescribed in the regulation

    Section 159.9(1) of the Regulation establishes mandatory timelines for scheduling refugee hearings. Section 159.9(1)(a) establishes timelines for claimants referred to in subsection 111.1(2) of the Act, which is the regime for Designation of countries of origin established in the Act. In effect, the regime allows the Minister to designate particular countries of origin where there is a low success rate for claims at the Division and/or the country is one where there is an independent judicial system, basic democratic rights and freedoms are recognized and mechanisms for redress are available if those rights or freedoms are infringed, and civil society organizations exist.[1] For the time being, this provision is something of a dead letter since the Minister has not designated any countries under this provision.[2] As such, the operative provision in s. 159.9 of the Regulation is 159.9(1)(b), which provides that the date fixed for a hearing before the Refugee Protection Division must be not later than 60 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division. This provision, too, is something of a dead letter since the policy of the referring officers and the Board is not to schedule such cases within 60 days of referral. Instead, because of s. 159.9(3)(c) ("operational limitations of the Refugee Protection Division") the practice is to not advise claimants of a date and time on which their claim is scheduled when the matter is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, but instead to schedule their claim at a later point, generally giving them 2 to 3 months notice of the hearing then. The Board announced this as follows in a press release in 2018:

    The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) is changing its scheduling practice for refugee hearings and will now be hearing claims primarily in the order in which they were received. ... In December 2012, time limits for scheduling were incorporated into regulations. The result was that new cases had to be prioritized over old ones. The regulations allow for an exception to the time limits due to the operational limitations of the Board. With rising intake, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) has been obligated to remove a certain percentage of hearings from its schedule under this exception because it does not have the capacity to hear them.[3]

    The IRB stated at that point that the expected wait time for status determination under the new schedule was expected to be approximately 20 months.[4] In a 2019 audit of the refugee system, the Auditor General concluded that about 65% of hearings were postponed at least once before a decision was made.[5] These are the reasons for the postponements:

    Reasons for postponed hearings Percentage of postponed hearings
    Board member unavailable (operational limitations) 49%
    Claimant or claimant’s counsel unavailable 14%
    Security screening results still pending 10%
    Lack of time to complete a hearing 6%
    Need to hear family members’ claims together or separately 5%
    Waiting for documents or late disclosure of documents 4%
    Interpreter unavailable 3%
    Other 9%

    Regulation 159.9(1): The Board will provide priority scheduling for certain types of claims

    Scholars have emphasized the consequences of slowness and waiting in the governance of migrants. They point towards the painful state of limbo that waiting can induce in people with undetermined immigration status.[6] The Board has stated that notwithstanding the general "First In First Out" scheduling policy noted above, it may provide priority scheduling for certain types of claims, including:

    • Unaccompanied minors:[3] Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues provides that "The claim should be given scheduling and processing priority because it is generally in the best interests of the child to have the claim processed as expeditiously as possible. There may be circumstances, however, where in the best interests of the child the claim should be delayed. For example, if the child is having a great deal of difficulty adjusting to Canada, he or she may need more time before coming to the CRDD for a hearing." A 2019 audit of the system by the Auditor General found that the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada was able to prioritize protection decisions for unaccompanied minors. For the 628 claims made by unaccompanied minors over their audit period, most had hearings within 60 days and received protection decisions an average of two months earlier than other claims.[7]
    • Vulnerable persons:[3] Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures With Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB states that vulnerable persons may be given scheduling priority in appropriate cases. Guideline 8 underlines that “the uncertainty and anxiety caused by delay can be particularly detrimental to some vulnerable persons.” Therefore, it is possible for the Board to grant priority processing as a procedural accommodation under Guideline 8.
    • Claimants with family members in dangerous and precarious situations in their home country: The Division has control over its hearing schedule and, in the particular circumstances of a case, it may find on the evidence before it that the situation of family members justifies an earlier hearing date in priority to other claims. That said, many claimants may face difficulties relating to family circumstances in their countries of origin, and the Division must be fair to all claimants who are waiting for their claim to be heard. Therefore, while the situation of family members by itself may not be determinative in most cases, it remains a factor that can assist in appreciating the nature of a claimant’s vulnerability and in determining whether priority scheduling should be granted.
    • Board scheduling strategies to ensure integrity and efficiency: The Board states that it may also make exceptions to its "First In First Out" policy for certain claims or groups of claims where the Board decides to implement specific scheduling strategies to ensure the integrity and efficiency of the refugee determination process.[3]

    Regulation 159.9(3)(b): What is a pending investigation or inquiry relating to sections 34 to 37 of the Act?

    The sections of the Act referred to in Regulation section 159.9(3)(b) are those at Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ss. 34-37.[8] The provisions in question are lengthy and verbose, and for that reason, they are not reproduced here. The Board has a policy which guides its actions to await such inquiries, the Instructions Governing the Management of Refugee Protection Claims Awaiting Front-End Security Screening. The instructions read as follows:

    In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received in time for the initially scheduled hearing, the IRB will remove the hearing from the schedule and set a new date and time for the hearing as soon as feasible upon confirmation of the security screening. Parties will be advised in accordance with the process outlined in [the Notification section of the Instructions].

    In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received at six (6) months from the date of referral, the RPD will normally proceed to schedule and hear the claim unless the CBSA files an application change the date and time that is granted by the IRB. In considering such an application, the RPD will provide an opportunity to the claimant to make representations.

    In those cases where the IRB grants a delay and confirmation of security screening is subsequently received, it will be rescheduled as soon as feasible.

    In cases where confirmation of security screening remains pending at twelve (12) months from the date of referral, the RPD will convene a conference with the claimant, counsel and Minister’s counsel and may fix a date for a hearing.[9]

    Comparison of the interpretation of the different exceptions to the mandatory timelines

    If found eligible, a hearing date will be set within 30 days for claimants from a designated country of origin, and within 60 days for others. These timelines are set out in s.159.9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations and they are mandatory. The section sets out the situations in which there may not be compliance with the timelines:

    (a) for reasons of fairness and natural justice;

    (b) because of a pending investigation or inquiry relating to any of sections 34 to 37 of the Act; or

    (c) because of operational limitations of the Refugee Protection Division.

    While the Board appears to be taking a very restrictive view of timelines set out in s.159.9(1)(a) of IRPR (see commentary on Rule 54), the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre has noted that the Board’s interpretation of 159.9(1)(b) is much more liberal,[10] and there is a broad policy of providing time for the Minister to engage in initial security screening. The Minister does not need to apply for more time, as the Board will not proceed with a hearing in the first six months if the Minister has not provided confirmation that front end security screening is complete:

    In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received in time for the initially scheduled hearing, the IRB will remove the hearing from the schedule and set a new date and time for the hearing as soon as feasible upon confirmation of the security screening. ... In those cases where confirmation of security screening has not been received at six (6) months from the date of referral, the RPD will normally proceed to schedule and hear the claim unless the CBSA files an application to change the date and time that is granted by the IRB.[11]

    In Alhaqli v. Canada the court was asked to consider this issue. In that case, the applicants submitted that the Board's process of automatically postponing hearings where FESS has not been completed breaches procedural fairness because the policy gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias by granting the Minister a cancellation of a refugee hearing without following the procedures for the scheduling and postponement of refugee claims as provided in the IRPA, Regulations, and Rules. As a result, the claimants argued that the Minister is provided preferential treatment via an automatic postponement whenever the CBSA has not performed its statutory duties in accordance with the prescribed time-frames, because the Minister neither has to establish that the legislative and regulatory criteria for a postponement have been satisfied nor move for the relief sought.[12] In that case, the court declined to rule on the issue, holding that the matter as raised was moot. The fact that the Board may treat the Minister and claimants differently in this respect appears to originate from the language of the regulation. There are many examples of such differential treatment in the IRPA. For example, in Muheka v. Canada the Immigration Appeal Division considered an argument that the fact that under the statute the Minister has a de novo appeal at the IAD but a claimant does not offends the Canadian Bill of Rights. The panel accepted the Minister’s submissions that the Respondent cannot compare himself to the Crown and demand equal treatment as if the Crown were an individual, relying on the following Charter s. 15(1) jurisprudence:

    With respect to the issue of whether the appellants have received unequal treatment, it must be apparent that the Crown cannot be equated with an individual. The Crown represents the State. It constitutes the means by which the federal aspect of our Canadian society functions. It must represent the interests of all members of Canadian society in court claims brought against the Crown in right of Canada. The interests and obligations of the Crown are vastly different from those of private litigants making claims against the Federal Government. Henry J., in my opinion, properly applied the decision in R. v. Stoddart, supra. I agree with the words of Tarnopolsky J.A., speaking for the court in that case, at pp. 362–63, where he stated:  The Crown is not an “individual” with whom a comparison can be made to determine a s. 15(1) violation.[13]

    The Board's actions on its own motion (ex proprio motu)

    Rule 54 concerns applications from parties to change the date or time of a proceeding. The Board also has the power to act on its own motion to reschedule a matter, which is referred to as its power to act ex proprio motu. Where the Board so acts, it must confirm with the Act and the regulation, but Rule 54 does not apply to the Board's decision, since that Rule applies only to applications from parties.

    The Board may have an obligation to reschedule a matter on its own motion in certain circumstances

    There will be circumstances in which fairness requires the Board to act on its own motion to reschedule a matter. In Alvarez v. Canada, the Court found a breach of natural justice in circumstances where the tribunal proceeded despite the fact that it was clear that the applicant was not understanding the proceedings.[14] This was so even though the claimant had not formally requested an adjournment at the time of the hearing.

    Even when acting on its own motion, the Board should consider relevant Board guidelines

    In exercising such discretion, panels of the Board should considered any applicable guidelines issued by the Chairperson of the Board. The Chairperson is empowered to issue written guidelines on any matter within his or her purview, including the procedure to be followed by the RPD in fixing the time of a hearing: ss. 159(1)(h) and 159(1)(f) of the IRPA:

    Chairperson
    159 (1) The Chairperson is, by virtue of holding that office, a member of each Division of the Board and is the chief executive officer of the Board. In that capacity, the Chairperson
    (f) apportions work among the members of the Board and fixes the place, date and time of proceedings;
    (h) may issue guidelines in writing to members of the Board and identify decisions of the Board as jurisprudential guides, after consulting with the Deputy Chairpersons, to assist members in carrying out their duties;

    The most relevant such guideline is the Chairperson Guideline 6: Scheduling and Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding. Furthermore, the Board's guidelines on vulnerable persons may be relevant.

    Rule 54(1)-(3) - Process for making an application to change the date or time of a proceeding

    The text of the relevant rule reads:

    Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding
    
    Application in writing
    54 (1) Subject to subrule (5), an application to change the date or time of a proceeding must be made in accordance with rule 50, but the party is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.
    
    Time limit and content of application
    (2) The application must
    (a) be made without delay;
    (b) be received by the Division no later than three working days before the date fixed for the proceeding, unless the application is made for medical reasons or other emergencies; and
    (c) include at least three dates and times, which are no later than 10 working days after the date originally fixed for the proceeding, on which the party is available to start or continue the proceeding.
    
    Oral application
    (3) If it is not possible for the party to make the application in accordance with paragraph (2)(b), the party must appear on the date fixed for the proceeding and make the application orally before the time fixed for the proceeding.

    Terminology about adjournments and postponements

    The terminology of this rule is that the Board is entertaining and application to change the date and time of the proceeding. Nonetheless, many terms borrowed from court proceedings seep into such decisions. For example, postponements (changing the date of a hearing prior to any evidence being heard), adjournment (adding a new day to a proceeding once some evidence has been heard), and recesses (a break in the proceeding).[15]

    Roles of Board, parties, and Minister's officers in scheduling

    The roles of officers for CBSA and IRCC, counsel for the parties, and the ability of the Board to reschedule on its own motion are discussed at the following commentary regarding Rule 3, which concerns initial scheduling decisions: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Roles of officers, parties, and Board in scheduling matters.

    Time limit for the written application to change the date or time of the proceeding

    As per Rule 54(1), such applications are to be made in accordance with rule 50, which requires that they be made in writing, unless the party could not have applied without unreasonable effort.[16] Per Rule 54(2), such applications must "be made without delay". The Board's public commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules commented on this requirement, noting that "An application to change the date or time of a proceeding should normally be made in writing and at the earliest opportunity before the proceeding".[17] As per Rule 54(2)(b), such applications must be received by the Division no later than three working days before the date fixed for the proceeding. However, consistent with the requirements of Rule 54(2), this three-day rule is a minimum, not a target to aim for, and if an application can be made prior to that, it should be. According to 54(3) and 54(2)(b) of the Rules, applications less than three days before the hearing should be made orally at the hearing. It is a best practice to make such applications in writing in an event, even if one or two days prior to the hearing, even though parties cannot count on the Board receiving the application prior to the hearing. This is consistent with the Board's commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules which read: "A party who wants to make an application orally for a change of date or time of the proceeding should make every effort to notify the Division and any other party of his or her intention to apply and the reasons for that request. This should be done in writing and at the earliest opportunity before the proceeding."[17]

    When an oral application is allowed at the hearing

    According to Rule 54(2)(b), an application may be made orally at the hearing where there is a medical reason "or other emergency" which is the cause of the application. As the Court stated in Guylas v. Canada, this exception to the requirement to apply in writing applies where the party "could not have applied without unreasonable effort".[18] Some guidance on this provision was provided in Freeman v. Canada, where the claimant's grounds for an adjournment was a recent change in counsel, allegedly as a result of the incompetence of prior counsel, which necessitated witness preparation and the additional filing of documents. The court held in that case that this does not constitute a medical or other emergency which would warrant an oral application for an adjournment. As such, the request for an adjournment was not properly before the Board.[19] If the party wants to make an application three working days or less before a hearing, an application hearing or a conference, the party must appear 30 minutes prior to the scheduled time of the proceeding to have the application heard orally by a Coordinating Member or Assistant Deputy Chairperson.  

      History of requirement to provide three dates and times when the party will be available

      A draft of this rule originally required counsel to provide three days when they would be available within five days of the original hearing. This requirement was modified as a result of stakeholder feedback: "Several respondents expressed concern regarding the tight timelines in the rule pertaining to an application for a change of date or time of a proceeding. The rule required that the claimant, when requesting a change of date or time, provide three days on which they would be available to proceed which fall within five working days after the date originally fixed for the proceeding. Respondents felt that this was unrealistic, particularly given the anticipated busy schedules of counsel." Noting this concern along with the overall scheme of the IRPA and the IRPR as well as the scheme of the RPD Rules, the IRB has changed the rule such that claimants provide three dates within a window of ten working days. Similarly, the rules state that the new date fixed by the Division must be no later than ten working days, or as soon as possible thereafter.[20] This compares to the previous version of the RPD Rules in which the obligation on counsel was that "A party applying for a change of date or time of a proceeding must give a minimum of six alternative dates within the following three months, or such other time period as the Division specifies, when the party is available to proceed."[17]

      That said, despite the requirement that counsel provide such dates, it is rare that a hearing that is being rescheduled will be rescheduled within 10 days of the old date. According to a 2019 Auditor General report, fewer than 10% of hearings where the date or time was changed were rescheduled within this 10-day timeframe. The Board's schedule is generally fully booked for at least three months ahead. As a result, when a claim is postponed the usual delay is of several months.[5]

      Rule 54(4) - Factors to consider

      Factors
      (4) Subject to subrule (5), the Division must not allow the application unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as
      (a) the change is required to accommodate a vulnerable person; or
      (b) an emergency or other development outside the party’s control and the party has acted diligently.

      Board's general approach to (re)scheduling

      The guiding principle, as noted in Mohammed v. Canada, is that the exercise of discretion has been severely limited under the revised RPD Rules, with strict timelines in place to obtain an order changing the date or time of a proceeding.[21]

      The Board must consider all relevant factors when determining whether there are exceptional circumstances, not merely the two examples listed above

      The Federal Court commented in Tung v. Canada that in exercising its discretion to reschedule a case, the Board must generally take into account all relevant factors. This will include the exceptional circumstances listed in Rule 54(4) (accommodating a vulnerable person or an emergency or other development outside of a party's control where the party has acted diligently) as well as any other relevant factors. Where the Board fails to take into account relevant factors and refuses an adjournment request, it will have acted unreasonably.[22] This is the case even where the Board considers a claimant's vulnerability or whether there was an emergency beyond a party's control. As the court notes in Tung v. Canada, these Rule 54(4) factors are merely examples of exceptional circumstances, not an exhaustive definition of all relevant exceptional circumstances. In that case, the Federal Court concluded that the Board had erred because it "appeared not to consider whether Ms Tung’s personal situation amounted to exceptional circumstances in the broader sense."[22]

      What exceptional circumstances have, and have not, been found to justify an application to change a date and time?

      Situations involving vulnerable persons

      Rule 54(4)(a) provides that the Division must not allow an application to reschedule a hearing unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as the change being required to accommodate a vulnerable person. "Vulnerable person" is a defined term in the rules, and it "means a person who has been identified as vulnerable under the Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB issued under paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Act." As such, the term "vulnerable person" should be used consistently throughout the Canadian refugee status determination regime. What should be considered when determining whether a claimant's vulnerability constitutes an exceptional circumstances justifying the rescheduling of a proceeding? The following are some factors that emerge from past decisions:

      • Absence of representation: The RAD has noted that the guiding principle is that the RPD has an obligation to ensure a fair proceeding, especially where refugee claimants are without representation and suffering from apparent mental health issues.[23] As noted by the Federal Court, the right to counsel is important and can be a determinative factor in the outcome of these decisions, particularly where there is some sense that the applicants are vulnerable: "The failure to have counsel present at the hearing generally leaves the clients at a serious disadvantage when new issues arise, or where the RPD member asks a question that would normally give rise to reply questions by counsel to elucidate a matter."[24]
      • Lack of sophistication: In one case, the RAD held that the RPD had erred in refusing an adjournment request from an unrepresented claimant who was unprepared as of the date of the hearing, had been hospitalized for several days prior to the refugee hearing as a result of mental-health issues, and, in the RAD's words, was "clearly unsophisticated as to the appropriate CDT procedures".[23] Similarly, in Galamb v. Canada the court commented on the fact that the applicants were 20 and 21 years of age and had only completed an eight-grade education and noted that in the circumstances they "clearly did not understand what was required of them on several points", which meant that they could not "participate in a meaningful way at the hearing".[25]
      • Inability to speak English or French: As noted by the Federal Court, a factor to be considered in such assessments is a claimant's ability in the official language of the proceeding: "In this matter, the applicants were not conversant in English and there appear to have been some issues with respect to the quality of the interpretation".[24] The BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, in a report on the refugee system, observes that "The ability of a claimant to effectively review hundreds of pages of detailed country condition documentation is often very limited, even in cases where they can read English."[26]
      • Past trauma: As the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre notes in a report, many refugee claimants have experienced severe trauma before arriving in Canada. Some have survived or witnessed torture, killing and other forms of inhumanity. Many live with mental or physical disabilities, often linked to past persecution in the form of injuries or psychological scars that manifest in conditions like post- traumatic stress disorder. They write that "these challenges make it incredibly difficult for some claimants to be able to tell their story in a coherent way and to remain engaged in the system without assistance. Collecting documents, filling out forms, and providing testimony at a hearing are very difficult for many claimants."[27]
      • Detained persons: The BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre notes that being detained is a significant barrier to accessing legal representation and preparing for one's claim.[28] At times, however, this factor will point in the opposite direction where, by virtue of being detained, a claimant has been repeatedly provided with counsel to represent them in their detention reviews. For further discussion of this, see the commentary to Rule 30: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Claimant or Protected Person in Custody.
      • Mental health challenges: Persons who are deeply depressed, suicidal, experiencing ongoing psychological impacts of trauma, and experiencing other mental health issues may justifiably argue that their ability to prepare for their hearing was impeded by such issues.[29] In appropriate cases, this may justify changing the date of their hearing and providing them with additional time to prepare their claim.

      Situations involving emergencies and other developments outside of a party's control

      Rule 54(4)(b) provides that the Division must not allow an application to reschedule a hearing unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as an emergency or other development outside the party’s control and the party has acted diligently. How has this been considered in past decisions?

      • A recent change of counsel, incompetency of old: A recent change of counsel, required by alleged incompetence, which necessitated witness preparation and the filing of further documents does not constitute an emergency: Freeman v. Canada.[30] In contrast, Castroman v. Canada is an example of the exceptional situation where the claimant’s counsel withdrew in the middle of the hearing, leaving the claimant unrepresented.[31] The Court concluded that the Board's decision to deny a request for an adjournment to enable the claimant to find new counsel was unfair in the circumstances.
      • Legislative changes potentially rendering a claimant ineligible: As a result of legislative changes which render claimants ineligible where they have previously made a claim in another country, the Minister is obliged to determine the eligibility of many claimants who have previously been referred to the Board. This legislative change has generally been accepted as a development outside of the Minister's control.

      Assessments of whether a party has acted diligently

      • Inability to obtain counsel at an earlier date for financial reasons: An issue that arises with some regularity is where a claimant lacks money to have counsel represent them and then secures counsel at a late stage in the proceeding. The court commented on one such situation and concluded that it was consistent with a claimant have acted with due diligence as follows: "The male applicant outlined his problems with obtaining funding. I am satisfied that the applicants were acting in good faith at all times – they understood their disadvantage in not being represented and made diligent attempts to obtain counsel. They finally succeeded at the last moment, but given the short time-frame, their lawyer explained the situation to the RPD and requested a short postponement to allow him to represent the applicants."[32]

      Other exceptional circumstances

      The courts have made the following comments that relate to other exceptional circumstances that may be considered when assessing rescheduling requests:

      • whether the applicant has done everything in her power to be represented by counsel: The Board commentary on the previous version of these rules stated: "Where counsel accepts a retainer in a case for which a hearing date has been set, the Division expects counsel to appear on that date, prepared to proceed. Where, for any reason, counsel is unable to appear at a proceeding, counsel is expected to make diligent efforts to arrange for a replacement. Counsel who applies for a change of date or time of a proceeding because counsel is unable to arrange for a replacement or considers the use of a replacement inappropriate is expected to provide particulars."[17] Where counsel does not comply with such obligations and a claimant is abandoned at the last minute, this points towards granting a request to reschedule. For example, in Singh v. Canada the court the decision to deny the adjournment was unreasonable given that the applicant's previous counsel had withdrawn two days before the hearing.[33]
      • the number of previous adjournments granted, including any peremptory adjournments: In Perez v. Canada, the Court set aside a negative determination in a refugee claim due to breach of the right to counsel. The Court found that the tribunal erred because it did not weigh the unfairness of proceeding without counsel against the need for an expeditious hearing in light of the fact that this was the first request for an adjournment.[34]
      • the duration of the requested adjournment: The short duration of any requested adjournment is an important factor that points towards granting an adjournment.[35] The Court has commented that when there is some question about the duration that has been requested, one option for the Board is that "any dates that were available could have been stipulated by the RPD on a take-it-or-leave-it basis".[32]
      • the effect on the immigration system: In overturning decisions, the court has commented that "There is no indication on the record that the RPD could not have accommodated a postponement to the proposed dates or that any other operational considerations would have prevented the case from being reassigned to another date."[32] However, the court has also noted that "In an assignment procedure where dates are set long in advance of their occurrence, the need for a restrictive policy on adjournments can be understood."[36]
      • whether needless delay would result:
      • whether the applicant is to blame:
      • consent of the parties: The Board commented in its previous commentary to the old version of the Rules that "The Division has discretion to allow or not to allow an application for a change of date or time of a proceeding. Consent of the parties is a factor, but it is not the only one that the Division will consider in exercising its discretion. Therefore, parties who consent to a change of date or time should not presume that the application will be allowed."[17]
      • when the party made the application:
      • the time the party has had to prepare for the proceeding:
      • the efforts made by the party to be ready to start or continue the proceeding: The Division will consider whether the party making the application has demonstrated good faith and reasonable diligence.[17]
      • in the case of a party who wants more time to obtain information in support of the party’s arguments, the ability of the Division to proceed in the absence of that information without causing an injustice: The Chairperson Guideline 6: Scheduling and Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding state that "If a party requests a change of date or time of the proceedings for the purpose of obtaining documentation, the RPD generally proceeds and will determine at the end of the hearing whether or not it is necessary to grant a delay to obtain and provide the documents."[37]
      • whether the party has counsel:
      • the knowledge and experience of any counsel who represents the party:
        • Timing of retainer: The timing of obtaining counsel is important in considering the knowledge that that counsel will have related to the file in question. If counsel is retained too late to be able to work effectively on a claimant’s case, then access to counsel has not been meaningful.[38] As Lorne Waldman puts it, "in order to ensure that the person’s right to counsel is meaningful, counsel must be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare the case."[39] In Madoui v. Canada, the Court found a breach of natural justice and set aside a decision when the tribunal refused to adjourn in order to allow newly retained counsel to prepare.[40]
        • Experience of counsel: The quality of counsel is also important. Simply being able to retain a lawyer who has little or no experience in refugee law is not proper access to counsel in the context of a refugee claim with high stakes for a claimant.[38]
        • Whether the claimant has particular counsel of choice: There is some jurisprudence that would suggest that the right to counsel may also include the right to counsel of choice.[41] In Rosales v. Canada, the Member refused to grant an adjournment of six weeks to a date when the applicant’s counsel of choice would be willing to proceed. The Member stated in his reasons for refusing the adjournment that there were many competent counsel in Winnipeg who could be retained to act on behalf of the applicant. The Court found that, given that the adjournment was only for six weeks, this was not an unreasonable delay, and issued a prohibition prohibiting the Member from proceeding with the hearing until the applicant’s counsel of choice was present.[42]
      • any previous delays and the reasons for them: Where past delays have been caused by factors outside of a claimant's control, such as the illness of their counsel, this should not rightfully be held against the claimant, as the court concluded in N. v. Canada: "Here, the Board considered the timing of the request and the fact that there had been a previous postponement of the hearing. Had it considered the other relevant factors, it would have noted that Ms. M.C.S.N. was to blame for neither adjournment. The first resulted from her counsel’s illness, and the second was due to his unavailability."[43]
      • whether the date and time fixed were peremptory:
      • whether allowing the application would unreasonably delay the proceedings or likely cause an injustice:
      • the nature and complexity of the matter to be heard: In some cases claimants will face possible exclusion from refugee protection due to status in a third country, or because of the alleged commission of serious crimes. The application of the exclusion provisions has been described as "often complex and involving a substantial and changing body of law".[27] This may properly point towards allowing a request to reschedule a matter. Similarly, in N. v. Canada the court commented that "hers was a fairly complex case, raising difficult legal issues such as nexus, state protection and internal flight alternative. She could not have been expected to make any meaningful submissions on those issues, especially through an interpreter." As a result, the court concluded that proceeding in the absence of counsel created a risk of injustice."[44]
      • any alternatives to allowing the application: The Division should consider the feasibility of any alternative to allowing an application to change the date or time of a proceeding.[17]

      History of this provision

      The old RPD Rules required the RPD to consider numerous factors in deciding whether to grant a change of date or time.[45] Specifically, section 48 of the RPD Rules set out eleven factors that were to be considered in dealing with a request to change the time of the hearing:

      (a) in the case of a date and time that was fixed after the Division consulted or tried to consult the party, any exceptional circumstances for allowing the application;

      (b) when the party made the application;

      (c) the time the party has had to prepare for the proceeding;

      (d) the efforts made by the party to be ready to start or continue the proceeding;

      (e) in the case of a party who wants more time to obtain information in support of the party’s arguments, the ability of the Division to proceed in the absence of that information without causing an injustice;

      (f) whether the party has counsel;

      (g) the knowledge and experience of any counsel who represents the party;

      (h) any previous delays and the reasons for them;

      (i) whether the date and time fixed were peremptory;

      (j) whether allowing the application would unreasonably delay the proceedings or likely cause an injustice; and

      (k) the nature and complexity of the matter to be heard.[46]

      However, the current Rules, last amended on December 15, 2012, do not include that list of factors. Instead, as set out above, the Rules provide that the RPD must not change the date or time unless there are exceptional circumstances.

      Rule 54(5) - Counsel retained or availability of counsel provided after hearing date fixed

      Counsel retained or availability of counsel provided after hearing date fixed
      (5) If, at the time the officer fixed the hearing date under subrule 3(1), a claimant did not have counsel or was unable to provide the dates when their counsel would be available to attend a hearing, the claimant may make an application to change the date or time of the hearing. Subject to operational limitations, the Division must allow the application if
      (a) the claimant retains counsel no later than five working days after the day on which the hearing date was fixed by the officer;
      (b) the counsel retained is not available on the date fixed for the hearing;
      (c) the application is made in writing;
      (d) the application is made without delay and no later than five working days after the day on which the hearing date was fixed by the officer; and
      (e) the claimant provides at least three dates and times when counsel is available, which are within the time limits set out in the Regulations for the hearing of the claim.

      Subrule 54(5) sets out circumstances where an adjournment is mandatory, does not restrict the Board's ability to otherwise grant adjournments

      This rule sets out circumstances where the Board must grant a postponement of the hearing. Where those circumstances do not exist, the Board nonetheless has the discretion to grant an adjournment where the applicant’s personal situation warrants it.[47]

      There is no blanket rule that a new lawyer must be ready to go with an existing hearing date when they pick up a file

      The Chairperson Guideline 6: Scheduling and Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding provide guidance on how to consider requests that a hearing be rescheduled. The guidelines state at para. 3.6.2 that the Board does not generally allow applications to change the date of a proceeding where newly retained counsel is not available on the date scheduled for the hearing:

      If counsel is retained after a date has already been set for a proceeding, the party is responsible for making sure that counsel is available and ready to proceed on the scheduled date. The IRB does not generally allow applications to change the date or time of a proceeding if a party chooses to retain counsel who is not available on a date that has already been fixed.[48]

      Even though it is the case that the Board will not generally allow an application to change the date of a proceeding because of the unavailability of newly retained counsel, there is no blanket rule that a new lawyer must be ready to go with an existing hearing date when they pick up a file. In Guylas v. Canada, the Member commented "if [a new] lawyer picks up a file he has to be ready to go at the hearing. Yours wasn’t. So you have to go ahead [in the absence of counsel]." The court held that this was a misstatement of the law and rules on point.[49]

      Factors for assessing requests to reschedule a hearing based on the (un)availability of counsel

      The Federal Court commented in Tung v. Canada that in exercising its discretion to reschedule a case, the Board must generally take into account all relevant factors. This will include the exceptional circumstances listed in Rule 54(4) (accommodating a vulnerable person or an emergency or other development outside of a party's control where the party has acted diligently) as well as any other relevant factors. Siloch v. Canada provides the following factors to be considered with respect to assessing applications to reschedule where the right to counsel is at issue:

      • whether the applicant has done everything in their power to be represented by counsel;
      • the number of previous adjournments granted, including any peremptory adjournments;
      • the duration of the requested adjournment;
      • the effect on the immigration system;
      • whether needless delay would result; and
      • whether the applicant is to blame.

      The Siloch v. Canada[50] factors above are still considered to be good law despite the fact that the case pre-dates the changes made to the RPD Rules in 2012.[51] Where the Board fails to take into account relevant factors cited above and refuses an adjournment request, it will have acted unreasonably.[22] This is the case even where the Board considers a claimant's vulnerability or whether there was an emergency beyond a party's control. As the court notes in Tung v. Canada, the latter are merely examples of exceptional circumstances, not an exhaustive definition of all relevant exceptional circumstances. In that case, the Federal Court concluded that the Board had erred because it "appeared not to consider whether Ms Tung’s personal situation amounted to exceptional circumstances in the broader sense."[22] That said, the above factors need not take on a check-list quality: the Federal Court of Appeal has rejected the argument that the factors in Siloch must be considered whenever a party requests an adjournment, it being a non-exhaustive list of the sorts of factors a judge deciding the case may find useful to consider.[52] The Federal Court in Mohammed v. Canada concluded that this decision is relevant to the refugee context.[53]

      Rule 54(6)-(8) - Medical Reasons

      Application for medical reasons
      (6) If a claimant or protected person makes the application for medical reasons, other than those related to their counsel, they must provide, together with the application, a legible, recently dated medical certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner whose name and address are printed or stamped on the certificate. A claimant or protected person who has provided a copy of the certificate to the Division must provide the original document to the Division without delay.
      
      Content of certificate
      (7) The medical certificate must set out
      (a) the particulars of the medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevent the claimant or protected person from participating in the proceeding on the date fixed for the proceeding; and
      (b) the date on which the claimant or protected person is expected to be able to participate in the proceeding.
      
      Failure to provide medical certificate
      (8) If a claimant or protected person fails to provide a medical certificate in accordance with subrules (6) and (7), they must include in their application
      (a) particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence;
      (b) particulars of the medical reasons for the application, supported by corroborating evidence; and
      (c) an explanation of how the medical condition prevents them from participating in the proceeding on the date fixed for the proceeding.

      Commentary

      See the discussion of the very similar rules regarding medical certificates in the context of the RPD Rules on Abandonment: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Abandonment#Rules 65(5)-(7) - Medical reasons.

      Rule 54(9) - Subsequent applications

      Subsequent application
      (9) If the party made a previous application that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.

      Rule 54(10) - Duty to appear

      Duty to appear
      (10) Unless a party receives a decision from the Division allowing the application, the party must appear for the proceeding at the date and time fixed and be ready to start or continue the proceeding.

      Rule 54(11) - Scheduling the new date

      New date
      (11) If an application for a change to the date or time of a proceeding is allowed, the new date fixed by the Division must be no later than 10 working days after the date originally fixed for the proceeding or as soon as possible after that date.

      Commentary

      The courts have held that fundamental justice does not provide for a specific amount of time within which to prepare for a hearing.[54] The phrase "as soon as possible after that date" has a specific meaning in the refugee law context considering the history of changes to the IRPA. Section 48(2) of the Act mandates that "If a removal order is enforceable, ... the order must be enforced as soon as possible." The phrase “as soon as possible” used in that portion of the Act replaced the previous version of the statute in which the phrase read “as soon as is reasonably practicable.” As such, where the phrase "as soon as possible" is used in this regime, as it is here, it connotes a different, and arguably stronger, obligation than that connoted by the phrase "reasonably practicable".[55]

      References

      1. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 109.1 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec109.1> retrieved on 2020-02-08.
      2. Government of Canada, Canada ends the Designated Country of Origin practice, May 17, 2019 <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2019/05/canada-ends-the-designated-country-of-origin-practice.html> (Accessed February 8, 2020).
      3. 1 2 3 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada changes how refugee hearings are scheduled, February 20, 2018 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/news/2018/Pages/hearing-schedule.aspx> (Accessed February 8, 2020).
      4. Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, Imperfect Evidence and Uncertain Justice: An Exploratory Study of Access to Justice Issues in Canada's Asylum System, 53 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2020), page 45.
      5. 1 2 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Processing of Asylum Claims, Spring 2019 <https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201905_02_e_43339.html> (Accessed January 19, 2020).
      6. Hambly, J. and Gill, N. (2020), Law and Speed: Asylum Appeals and the Techniques and Consequences of Legal Quickening. J. Law Soc., 47: 3-28. doi:10.1111/jols.12220.
      7. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Processing of Asylum Claims, Spring 2019 <https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201905_02_e_43339.html> (Accessed January 19, 2020).
      8. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss. 34-37 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec33> retrieved on 2020-01-17.
      9. Alhaqli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 728 (CanLII), para. 62.
      10. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 15.
      11. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Instructions Governing the Management of Refugee Protection Claims Awaiting Front-end Security Screening, <http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/instructions/Pages/InstructSecurit.aspx> (accessed Jan 7, 2015).
      12. Alhaqli v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 728 (CanLII), para. 30.
      13. Muheka v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 CanLII 98239 (CA IRB), par. 22, <http://canlii.ca/t/hqr82#22>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
      14. Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 1007, 2010 FC 792 (F.C.).
      15. Jorda v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 77324 (CA IRB), para. 6.
      16. Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), par. 34, <http://canlii.ca/t/gggrc#par34>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
      17. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
      18. Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 34.
      19. Freeman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 682 (CanLII), para. 24.
      20. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
      21. Mohammed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1038 (CanLII), para. 7.
      22. 1 2 3 4 Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1296 (CanLII), para. 7.
      23. 1 2 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 146099 (CA IRB), para. 9.
      24. 1 2 Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 37.
      25. Galamb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2014] F.C.J. No. 582, 2014 FC 563 (F.C.).
      26. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform Paper, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf>, page 12.
      27. 1 2 BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 25.
      28. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 29.
      29. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 31.
      30. Freeman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 682 (CanLII), para. 25.
      31. Castroman v Canada (Secretary of State), [1994] FCJ No 962 (TD).
      32. 1 2 3 Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 38.
      33. Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] F.C.J. No. 208, 2015 FC 191 (F.C.).
      34. Perez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 1578 (F.C.).
      35. Vazquez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 411, 2012 FC 385 (F.C.).
      36. Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), par. 35, <http://canlii.ca/t/gggrc#par35>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
      37. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 6: Scheduling and Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir06.aspx> (Accessed February 6, 2020) at para. 7.7.
      38. 1 2 BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 27.
      39. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 207 of the PDF.
      40. Madoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2010] F.C.J. No. 119, 2010 FC 106 (F.C.).
      41. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 209 of the PDF.
      42. Rosales v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1982] F.C.J. No. 118 (F.C.T.D.).
      43. N. (M.C.S.) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 1020, 2012 FC 956 (F.C.), para. 13.
      44. N. (M.C.S.) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2012] F.C.J. No. 1020, 2012 FC 956 (F.C.), para. 13.
      45. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 95397 (CA IRB), paras. 21-22 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2014/2014canlii95397/2014canlii95397.html>.
      46. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, Rule 48.
      47. Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1296 (CanLII), para. 8.
      48. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 6: Scheduling and Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir06.aspx> (Accessed February 6, 2020) at para. 3.6.2.
      49. Guylas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 202 (CanLII), para. 14.
      50. Siloch v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 10.
      51. Tung v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1296 (CanLII), para. 6.
      52. Montana v. Canada (National Revenue), 2017 FCA 194 (CanLII) at para. 8.
      53. Mohammed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1038 (CanLII), par. 6, <http://canlii.ca/t/j1vc7#par6>, retrieved on 2020-02-06.
      54. Alomari v. Canada (Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism), 2015 FC 573 (CanLII), para. 15.
      55. Berger, Max, Canadian Bar Association Immigration Essentials Presentation, 2013, Montreal Quebec CBA Immigration Conference, <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/pdf/imm13_paper_berger.pdf>, page 26.

      Joining or Separating Claims or Applications (Rules 55-56)

      Rule 55

      The text of Rule 55 reads:

      Joining or Separating Claims or Applications
      
      Claims automatically joined
      55 (1) The Division must join the claim of a claimant to a claim made by the claimant’s spouse or common-law partner, child, parent, legal guardian, brother, sister, grandchild or grandparent, unless it is not practicable to do so.
      
      Applications joined if claims joined
      (2) Applications to vacate or to cease refugee protection are joined if the claims of the protected persons were joined.

      History of this Rule

      Rule 55 is identical to Rule 49 in the former RPD Rules which were in place for many years before the new rules came into force.[1]

      Ongoing obligation on claimants to amend forms in order to disclose relationships

      Claimants are under an ongoing relationship to update their Basis of Claim form to ensure that they reflect the above relationships. For example, if a claimant marries or becomes a common-law partner to another claimant after submitting the BOC form, but prior to a hearing being held, then the form should be updated so that any assessment required by Rule 55(1) can be conducted. The obligation to provide such updates arises from, and is reflected in, Rule 9 ("Changes or additions to Basis of Claim Form"), the fact that claimants swear or affirm at the beginning of their hearing that their Basis of Claim form is "complete, true, and correct",[2] the instruction on the BOC form that "if your information changes or if you want to add information, you must inform the IRB",[3] the statements in the IRB's Claimant's Guide that "If you find a mistake on your BOC Form or realize that you forgot something important, or receive additional information, you must tell the RPD",[4] and caselaw that all the important facts of a claim for refugee protection must appear in the BOC Form.[5]

      Situations in which it is "not practicable" to join claims

      It is mandatory for the Division to join the claims of the family members listed in Rule 55 unless it is not practicable to do so. How should the Division determine whether or not joinder is practicable in a given case? Joinder will be considered impracticable where, inter alia, the resultant proceeding would be procedurally unfair, inefficient, or otherwise unjust. For example, RAD Member Philip MacAulay found in one case that "if the joinder is maintained, that result would be in violation of the appellant wife’s procedural fairness rights" and on this basis separated the claims.[6] Recourse may be had to the factors in Rule 56(5) for discerning when it is not practicable to join claims.

      While it is not necessary for the claimants to consent to their claims being joined (it being automatic that they be joined) information to this effect may support a determination that such joinder is practicable. Conversely, the instructions on the Basis of Claim form invite claimants to provide information of their own accord which would point to such joinder not being practicable. The BOC form states: "Although the confidentiality of the personal information you give in your BOC Form is protected, your information may be used in other claims that are related to yours or similar to yours, even if the other person is not claiming refugee protection with you."[3] The instructions go on to note that "The IRB will not release the information if there is a serious possibility that releasing it will put someone's life, liberty or security in danger or is likely to cause an injustice. If you do not want your personal information to be released, please explain on a separate sheet of paper why you think there is a serious possibility that releasing your information may put someone's life, liberty or security in danger or is likely to cause an injustice." Such information regarding a listed family member would be strong prima facie evidence of joinder not being practicable.

      Where the Board will act on its own motion to determine that it is "not practicable" to join claims, it is acting pursuant to Rule 70 of the RPD Rules, and should provide parties with the notice and opportunity to object described therein. See Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Division's power to, on its own motion, separate the claims of persons listed in Rule 55(1) after they have been joined below for more details.

      Division's power to, on its own motion, join the claims of classes of persons not listed in Rule 55(1)

      It is mandatory for the Division to join the claims of the family members listed in Rule 55 unless it is not practicable to do so. Presumptively, the claims of those in relationships that are not listed in the rule need not be joined by the Division. This reflects the principle of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the concept that when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned, others of the same class are excluded by virtue of not having been listed. Put another way, Rule 55 could have been crafted to specify that all family members, for instance, presumptively be joined. The fact that the rule was not written this way reflects a judgment about the best way to balance efficiency, justice, and consistency in these refugee proceedings. For other claims, for example the claims of friends from a country claiming at the same time, or the claims of more extended family members, the Division retains the discretion per Rules 69 and 70(a) to join them on a case-by-case basis. When exercising such discretion, as Waldman states in his text, the primary interests of the Board are efficiency and consistency.[7] Specifically, efficiency will often point against joinder (hearings growing more complex and lengthy with more claimants, counsel, etc.) but consistency may point towards joinder in circumstances where, reading the claims jointly, some issue of program integrity arises. The factors in Rule 56(5) discussed below do not strictly apply to such a decision, but so long as this is acknowledged (see discussion of Koky v. Canada below) they may usefully guide such exercises of discretion.

      Where the Board will act on its own motion to join claims for persons not listed in the above rule, it is acting pursuant to Rule 70(a) of the RPD Rules. This rule provides that "the Division may, after giving the parties notice and an opportunity to object, (a) act on its own initiative, without a party having to make an application or request to the Division". As such, where the Board will join claims of persons who are not listed in Rule 55(1), it is required by the Rules to provide parties with notice and opportunity to object before so acting.

      Division's power to, on its own motion, separate the claims of persons listed in Rule 55(1) after they have been joined

      The Division has the power to act on its own motion to separate claims at any time. Rule 55(1) indicates that the listed claims must be joined "unless it is not practicable to do so". The rule does not specify a timeline for assessing practicability. The relevant principle of statutory interpretation is that the law is considered to always be speaking. Section 10 of the federal Interpretation Act provides that "The law shall be considered as always speaking, and where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as they arise, so that effect may be given to the enactment according to its true spirit, intent and meaning."[8] As such, where a provision is written in the present tense, as with Rule 55(1), it is considered to be "always speaking" throughout the duration of the Board's proceedings. The Division may thus act to separate claims if it becomes clear that it is no longer practicable for them to remain joined. This is supported by the Board's plenary jurisdiction provided for in Rules 69 and 70(a), the latter of which requires that the Board give the parties notice and an opportunity to object prior to acting.

      Once claims are joined, information on one claim is properly available to the other joined claimants

      Refugee proceedings are, by default, confidential. This principle is enshrined in section 166 of the IRPA, which provides that proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division must be held in the absence of the public.[9] As stated on the Basis of Claim form, "the confidentiality of the information you provide in this form is protected by the Privacy Act. Your personal information may be disclosed only in the circumstances where such disclosure is permitted under the terms of that Act and of the Access to Information Act."[3] Sections 7 and 8 of the Privacy Act specify the circumstances under which an individual's personal information can be used and disclosed. The relevant section for this analysis is 8(2)(a), which provides that personal information may be disclosed for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose.[10] The purpose for which this type of refugee claim information is obtained has been characterized as "the determination of the applicant's claim for Convention refugee status".[11] Where proceedings are joined, by default all of the information from each claim is available to each other joined claimant as per RPD Rule 21(6).[12] This use and disclosure of the information to ongoing claims by a claimant and their family members is considered to be consistent with the purpose for which the information was obtained.[13] Claimants should expect that when they file a claim, if their spouse, common-law partner, child, parent, legal guardian, brother, sister, grandchild, or grandparent is also filing a claim, then their information will ordinarily be disclosed to those family members. This is reflected in the instructions provided in the Basis of Claim form that "All members of your family who are claiming refugee protection must provide their own BOC Form, even though your claims will be processed together. The information given in each person's BOC Form will be used to make decisions in the claims of the other family members."

      There will be cases in which claimants are not comfortable with their personal information being disclosed to their family members. The BOC form states: "The IRB will not release [your] information if there is a serious possibility that releasing it will put someone's life, liberty or security in danger or is likely to cause an injustice. If you do not want your personal information to be released, please explain on a separate sheet of paper why you think there is a serious possibility that releasing your information may put someone's life, liberty or security in danger or is likely to cause an injustice."[3] Claimants should identify any concerns with such information-sharing that they have when filing their claim and then it can be taken into account by the Board when determining whether it is practicable to join the claims: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Situations in which it is "not practicable" to join claims.

      Rule 55 decisions and confidentiality

      A question can arise about providing reasons not to join claims pursuant to Rule 55(1) and the disclosure of confidential information. Rule 55(1) provides that the Division must join the claims of the above-listed family members unless it is not practicable to do so. Where the Division determines that it is not practicable to join the claims of such family members, it is expected that the Division will provide reasons for this determination to all of the claimants that would have been joined in the normal course. This is consistent with the ordinary expectation that administrative decisions will be "transparent, intelligible and justified."[14] It is also consistent with the requirement in RPD Rule 70(a) that where the Division acts on its own initiative (in this case, to make a determination that it is not practicable to join the claims), then it will give the parties notice and an opportunity to object.

      Does the Division err, or violate privacy if, in providing reasons about why it is not practicable to join claims, it discusses aspects of those claims, for example, that the languages of the proceedings differ, that the counsel involved differ, or that the subject-matter of the claims differ? No - the Division does not err where it does so. This is because claimants are told to expect that this will happen and there is no rule that prevents the RPD from doing so. First, the Basis of Claim form that claimants complete advises them to expect such disclosure: "All members of your family who are claiming refugee protection must provide their own BOC Form, even though your claims will be processed together. The information given in each person's BOC Form will be used to make decisions in the claims of the other family members." Second, Rule 21 of the RPD Rules is the rule governing disclosure of personal information, and pursuant to RPD Rule 21(3), the Division may disclose information about one claim where doing so is necessary to permit another claimant to make an informed decision about a matter involving sharing information between two claims. While there is no directly analogous provision under Rule 55, the Division has the power to disclose such information in a like manner pursuant to Rule 69 [the RPD Rule which applies in situations where there is no other applicable rule - Canadian Refugee Procedure/General Provisions#Rule 69 - No applicable rule]. Third, the Privacy Act does not prohibit such disclosure as, per s. 8(2)(a), the information is being disclosed for the purpose for which the information was obtained, namely determining the claimant's claim for refugee status, and making preliminary decisions about the manner in which that hearing will occur. The is akin to the Court's holding in Ossé v. Canada that the claimant had consented to her information being provided to a third party.[15]

      Such a result may be different where a claimant makes it clear in providing the information that they do not consent to the information being provided to a particular third party, for example because of a particularized security concern that they enumerate at upon filing their claim. AB v. Canada is a relevant case, where the then-PIF form stated "Moreover, this form and the information it contains may be used as evidence at the hearings of other claimants who are related to you or whose claims appear to be closely linked to yours. Should you have a reasonable objection to this use please state it below. The Refugee Division will consider your objection based on whether the use of your form and information would endanger the life, liberty or security of any person or would be likely to cause an injustice." In the space provided under the above wording, the applicant wrote: "Requests for disclosure will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Otherwise, consent is denied."[16] In that case, the Federal Court set aside the Board's decision to release the claimant's personal information in a related proceeding.

      Statistics about joinder

      What percentage of claims are heard jointly, where the claim of a principal claimant is heard alongside associate claimants? Of RPD new system cases in 2018, there were 14,051 principal claimants who received a decision in their claims, and of those 4,881 had their claims joined with associate claimants. In other words, about 2/3 of all hearings involved just one claimant.[17] Claimants from some countries are disproportionately to have their claims joined to other family members, while claimants from other countries are disproportionately likely to be claiming solo. The following are the data for each country where the Board adjudicated more than 30 new system claims in 2018:

      Country Number of principal claimants Number of hearings with associate claimants % of claims that were joined
      Slovakia 117 87 74%
      Colombia 257 182 71%
      Czech Republic 47 32 68%
      Hungary 269 166 62%
      Venezuela 279 171 61%
      Jordan 63 35 56%
      Palestine 146 80 55%
      El Salvador 191 101 53%
      Syria 240 126 53%
      Nigeria 1161 597 51%
      Romania 225 114 51%
      Honduras 71 35 49%
      Saudi Arabia 71 34 48%
      Bangladesh 116 55 47%
      Lebanon 126 59 47%
      Libya 108 49 45%
      Angola 39 17 44%
      Egypt 239 102 43%
      Sudan 219 90 41%
      Guatemala 58 23 40%
      Iran 322 122 38%
      Mexico 437 164 38%
      Iraq 289 105 36%
      Turkey 769 275 36%
      Haiti 1573 546 35%
      Russia 44 15 34%
      Pakistan 569 192 34%
      Yemen 259 81 31%
      India 430 134 31%
      Azerbaijan 135 42 31%
      Burundi 235 67 29%
      Djibouti 196 54 28%
      Ukraine 153 42 27%
      Algeria 51 13 25%
      Eritrea 436 107 25%
      Bahamas 53 13 25%
      United States of America 73 17 23%
      Zimbabwe 74 16 22%
      China 752 162 22%
      Ethiopia 233 48 21%
      Congo, Democratic Republic 191 38 20%
      Afghanistan 321 63 20%
      Albania 77 15 19%
      Guinea 33 6 18%
      Kenya 67 11 16%
      Georgia 106 17 16%
      Jamaica 71 11 15%
      Sri Lanka 130 20 15%
      Rwanda 65 10 15%
      Nepal 103 14 14%
      Tanzania 42 5 12%
      Chad 77 9 12%
      Somalia 468 47 10%
      Uganda 99 7 7%
      Ghana 123 8 7%
      Cameroon 141 7 5%

      Rule 56

      Application to join
      56 (1) A party may make an application to the Division to join claims or applications to vacate or to cease refugee protection.
      
      Application to separate
      (2) A party may make an application to the Division to separate claims or applications to vacate or to cease refugee protection that are joined.
      
      Form of application and providing application
      (3) A party who makes an application to join or separate claims or applications to vacate or to cease refugee protection must do so in accordance with rule 50, but the party is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration. The party must also
      (a) provide a copy of the application to any person who will be affected by the Division’s decision on the application; and
      (b) provide to the Division a written statement indicating how and when the copy of the application was provided to any affected person, together with proof that the party provided the copy to that person.
      
      Time limit
      (4) Documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than 20 days before the date fixed for the hearing.
      
      Factors
      (5) In deciding the application to join or separate, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including whether
      (a) the claims or applications to vacate or to cease refugee protection involve similar questions of fact or law;
      (b) allowing the application to join or separate would promote the efficient administration of the Division’s work; and
      (c) allowing the application to join or separate would likely cause an injustice.

      Rule 56 only applies to applications from parties, not actions on the Division's own motion

      Where the Division acts of its own initiative to join or disjoin claims, it does not act pursuant to Rule 56. As is apparent from the text of this rule, it pertains to disjoinder upon application by a party. In Koky v. Canada, the Federal Court held that were the Minister had not intervened in a claim, the only parties were the claimants, and they did not bring a motion for disjoinder, then the Division was wrong to cite Rule 56 in disjoining claims on its own motion.[18] Instead, as per that case, where the Division wishes to act on its own motion to join or disjoin claims that are not covered by the circumstances detailed in Rule 55, then it does so through its plenary powers. See Canadian Refugee Procedure/General Provisions for a discussion of those powers, which include rules 69 and 70, as well as several provisions of the IRPA.

      Application of factors in Rule 56(5)

      In deciding an application to join or separate, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including those specified in Rule 56(5):

      • (a) the claims or applications to vacate or to cease refugee protection involve similar questions of fact or law:
        • Similar facts: If two cases rely on much of the same evidence, efficiency and consistency would rule in favour of joinder. This involves several considerations, including:
          • Consistent decisions: The value of consistency promotes the Board's mission by ensuring that like cases receive like dispositions, and where dispositions are unlike, reasons are articulated for the differing outcomes. For example, in Hayek v. Canada, joinder was considered appropriate where two friends from Ethiopia made references to each other in their written narratives.[19]
          • Program Integrity: Issues of program integrity are entwined with issues of consistency, for example where two claims discuss the same events, but are either inconsistent or suspiciously similar in a way that raises credibility issues. Where such issues arise, this may point towards joinder.
          • Workload and efficiency: Where claims will involve hearing the same evidence, hearing from the same witnesses, and having the same claimants act as witnesses in each other's hearings, this would point towards the efficiency of joinder because this may save hearing and member preparation time. In contrast, the fact that there are different countries of reference for different claimants will usually point against joinder on the basis that the facts to be considered will be different.
        • Similar law: Even where two matters involve similar questions of fact, it may be that the questions of law are dissimilar and thus militate against joining the matters. For example, Member Tock of the Refugee Protection Division rejected an application by the Minister to join a cessation and vacation application on the basis that "although the vacation and cessation applications may deal with similar issues, the assessment of each matter is different. The Minister is relying on the same package of evidence for both matters. However, each application requires a different assessment of the same evidence; as such, the evidence needs to be assessed in a different light for each application. Therefore, it is neither efficient and nor does it allow me to combine the same questions of law when deciding each of the applications, in accordance with the factors set out in RPD Rule 56."[20]
      • (b) allowing the application to join or separate would promote the efficient administration of the Division’s work: Factors that may be considered here include:
        • Counsel: Whether the claimants have the same counsel (it may be cumbersome to conduct a hearing with multiple counsel).
        • Language: Whether the proceedings will be in the same language (it may duplicate or slow work if one claimant wishes to proceed in French and the other in English or if multiple interpreters are required to interpret the proceedings into different languages). This may also involve issues of fairness where counsel for one claimant does not understand the language that the other claimant is proceeding it (e.g. if one claimant is proceeding in English but counsel is only able to read documents in French, or vice versa). As a matter of fairness, in such circumstances the IRB should consider paying for the translation of all documents if it is not appropriate to separate the claims.
        • Location: Whether the claimants are in the same location or whether joining the claims would require transferring files or the use of videoconferencing. While the use of videoconferencing is not, in and of itself, unfair, it does create logistical hurdles where multiple counsel are not located in the same place and would thus face challenges conferring privately.
        • Type and stage of proceeding: This factor may point both for and against joinder, as in the following cases:
          • File-review or short hearing processes: For example, if a claim would be eligible for the file-review process but for a US-born child that could be joined to the claim, then joinder may be inappropriate. Conversely, such factors may support separating claims where, say, but for the claim of a US-born child, all of the remaining claimants would be eligible for the file-review process.
          • Designated Countries of Origin: The Federal Court has commented on this issue as follows: "The Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, (Rules) require that claims of family members be joined. When, as here, this means the joining of DCO and non-DCO claims, the hearing will be scheduled along the DCO timelines, which are shorter than for non-DCO claims. However, Rule 56(2) allows a refugee claimant to make an application to the RPD to separate claims. Therefore, a procedural vehicle does exist to correct defects that can arise from joining claims together."[21]
          • Extradition Act: Similarly, when the Division receives information regarding a refugee claimant for whom an authority to proceed has been issued under section 15 of the Extradition Act, and that person is part of a family claim, the Division may, on its own initiative, wish to separate that person’s claim from the other family members’ claims to promote the efficient administration of the Division’s work. This is because, as per s. 105(1) of IRPA, the Refugee Protection Division shall not commence or shall suspend consideration of any matter concerning a person against whom an authority to proceed has been issued under section 15 of the Extradition Act with respect to an offence under Canadian law that is punishable under an Act of Parliament by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, until a final decision under the Extradition Act with respect to the discharge or surrender of the person has been made.
        • Readiness to proceed: If one claimant is not prepared to proceed and joining claims will delay the hearing of both claims, or would require rescheduling an existing hearing, then this may point against joinder and point towards the Board proceeding with the claimant that is ready individually.
        • Timeliness of application: Rule 56(4) requires that an application be made at least 20 days prior to the hearing. Where an application is made after this, and granting the application would necessitate cancelling a hearing and setting new hearing dates, this will point strongly against accepting the application. For example, the court endorsed the following submission from the Minister in Frederick v. Canada: "The Board could not reasonably have joined the claims, as it would have had to either preserve the applicant’s testimony up to that point on the record despite the unfairness to Handra of doing so, or else remove the two hours of testimony from the record and severely impact its ability to assess the applicant’s credibility. Given this difficult situation, as well as the applicant’s failure to bring Handra’s claim to the Board’s attention in a timely manner, the respondent submits that it was reasonable for the Board to refuse to join the claims and to delay the remainder of the applicant’s hearing until Handra’s claim was ready to be heard."[22]
      • (c) allowing the application to join or separate would likely cause an injustice:
        • Complexity of the proceeding: Combining issues may make a proceeding "exponentially more complex", limit counsel's ability to adequately prepare for the hearing, and thereby cause an injustice. For example, Member Tock of the Refugee Protection Division rejected an application by the Minister to join a cessation and vacation application involving the same claimant on this basis, stating that "although joining the matters may result in a marginally quicker conclusion, doing so would negatively impact the fairness of the proceedings. I agree with counsel’s submissions that joining the matters will exponentially complicate the case. I find that it would not be procedurally fair to the respondent to expect him to prepare to proceed with all the issues within the vacation and cessation applications at the same time."[23]
        • The ability of one claimant to testify may be compromised by the presence of another claimant: One situation where fairness may mitigate against joinder is where there is evidence that the ability of one claimant to testify will be adversely affected by the presence of another. For example, in Amin v. Canada there was psychiatric evidence before the Board that suggested that one claimant would have difficulty testifying before another.[24] In contrast, where claimants live together at the same address per the claimant address forms provided, this may point to it being appropriate to process their claims jointly, absent contrary information. Expected difficulty testifying may also be ameliorated in other ways, such as where the claimant that may have difficulty testifying can be represented by an independent designated representative who can provide testimony on their behalf, as with children providing testimony in cases where it is alleged that they have been kidnapped (see A.B. v. Canada as an example of such a case which was not separated).[25]
          • A joint proceeding could inhibit a claimant's ability to disclose their SOGIE: Section 3.9 of the Chairperson's Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression stipulate that "In some circumstances, individuals with diverse SOGIE may be part of joint claims or appeals that inhibit their ability to disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. When a decision-maker becomes aware that the individual wishes to assert an independent claim or appeal based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, the claims or appeals should, where appropriate, be separated."[26] That said, instead of separating claims, at times panels of the Board have allowed one claimant to testify while the other claimant(s) are excused from the hearing room. Provided that all claimants consent to this, it may be an appropriate process. The claimants will, of course, need to agree on the process to be used should any credibility issues emerge during testimony while the other claimants are excused from the hearing room, should those credibility concerns impact the other joined claims, for example that the claimant who was out of the room could then listen to the audio recording. For more detail, see the commentary to section 164 of the Act: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Presence of parties and use of telecommunications for hearings.
          • A joint proceeding could inhibit a woman's ability to disclose gendered violence: International best practices for refugee status determination provide that ensuring women have the possibility of being interviewed separately from their family (both at screening and during any substantive claim) should be prioritized. Some women who have experienced and/or fear gender-based violence may not disclose in front of family members, including small children.[27] That said, this arguably does not reflect the common practice of the IRB, which has generally been reticent to conduct separate proceedings in such circumstances.
        • A conflict of interest between claimants: The Federal Court held in Rezmuves v. Canada that where two claimants are opposed in interest, their claims should be separated so that one may cross-examine the other. The court reasoned as follows: "In the circumstances, the refusal of the disjoinder motion amounted to a violation of procedural fairness because Mr. and Ms. Resmuves were opposed in interest, Mr. Resmuves was questioned about his views on Ms. Resmuves’ claim, Ms. Resmuves was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Resmuves and his views about her truthfulness were used by the Member as the primary reason to reject her claim. This is fundamentally unfair as Ms. Resmuves had no ability to test the unfavourable evidence of her estranged spouse nor to point out the rather obvious reasons why, following their separation, he might be pre-disposed against her."[28] The reasoning in this case arguably no longer applies since the current version of the rules does not limit the ability to ask questions of, or summon, any person (see, particularly, Rule 44). However, it may nonetheless be impractical to expect two claimants adverse in interest to put forward claims in the same proceeding given that this would inevitably require some degree of cooperation between the parties. For this reason, the RAD has continued to rely on this case when interpreting the current RPD rules.[29]
        • Danger to a person: Where joining claims would endanger the life, liberty, or security of any person, then it will presumptively be considered unjust. This may be the case, for instance, where spouses are both claiming and one of the spouses is experiencing domestic violence from the other spouse and wishes to keep information about their whereabouts confidential from their spouse.

      Furthermore, given the requirement in the rule that the Division consider "any relevant factors", in addition to considering the above factors, including whether allowing the application would likely cause an injustice, the Division should also consider whether refusing the application could be expected to cause an injustice.

      Common types of applications to separate and usual practice

      Whether to separate the claims of children from their parent when there is a suspicion of abduction

      One of the circumstances in which applications to separate arise is from designated representatives assigned to represent children in cases where their accompanying parent is accused of having kidnapped them. While each decision will turn on its own facts, the usual practice is to have the claims remain joined. The rationale for this was articled by RAD Member David Lowe when responding to one such application to disjoin in his reasons in a 2018 case.[30] Similarly, in the leading cases on child abduction and how it intersects with 1F(b) exclusion in the refugee context, the claims of the parent and child have remained joined, as in Kovacs v. Canada,[31] A.B. v. Canada,[32] and Rodriguez v. Canada.[33] However, in Montoya v. Canada the claims of the children were separated from the parent's claim to be heard on another date.[34]

      The Board's practice in this respect appears to be consistent with guidance in the UNHCR Handbook that "If the will of the parents cannot be ascertained or if such will is in doubt or in conflict with the will of the child, then the examiner, in cooperation with the experts assisting him, will have to come to a decision as to the well‐foundedness of the minor’s fear on the basis of all the known circumstances, which may call for a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt."[35] This would point towards the claim remaining joined with the parent's so that more information may be admitted and considered when assessing the child's claim.

      Standard of review for decisions to join or separate claims

      Insofar as decisions to join or separate claims may affect the fairness of the resultant proceeding, such decisions should be assessed by reviewing bodies such as the RAD and Federal Court for whether they are correct and deference should not be shown to the decision of the Division.[36]

      References

      1. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/regu/sor-2002-228/latest/sor-2002-228.html>.
      2. Community Legal Education Ontario (CLEO), Refugee Rights in Ontario: Answering questions at the hearing, Updated Jan 29, 2014, Accessed January 5, 2020, <https://refugee.cleo.on.ca/en/answering-questions-hearing>.
      3. 1 2 3 4 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Basis of Claim Form, November 2012 version, Accessed January 5, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr0201_e.pdf>.
      4. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant's Guide, Date modified: 2018-08-29, Accessed January 5, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/Pages/ClaDemGuide.aspx>.
      5. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 56636 (CA IRB), para. 43 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2015/2015canlii56636/2015canlii56636.html>.
      6. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 105239 (CA IRB), para. 51, <http://canlii.ca/t/h40sq#par51>, retrieved on 2020-01-03 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii105239/2016canlii105239.html>.
      7. Waldman, Lorne, Immigration Law and Practice, 2nd Edition (Butterworths), Looseleaf at 9-140 (Section 9.322) Rel. 49-2/2015.
      8. Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s. 10 <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-21/page-2.html#h-279243>.
      9. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s. 166(c).
      10. Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21.
      11. AB v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 471 (CanLII), [2003] 1 FC 3, para. 61.
      12. Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, Rule 21(6).
      13. Chen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 CanLII 69789 (CA IRB), para. 17 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2010/2010canlii69789/2010canlii69789.html>.
      14. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), para. 15.
      15. Ossé v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1552 (CanLII), paras. 13-14.
      16. AB v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2002 FCT 471 (CanLII), [2003] 1 FC 3, para. 53.
      17. Sean Rehaag, “2018 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates” (19 June 2019), online: https://ccrweb.ca/en/2018-refugee-claim-data
      18. Koky v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 562 (CanLII), para. 37 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2015/2015fc562/2015fc562.html#par37>.
      19. Hayek v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1055, 2005 FC 848.
      20. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 147883 (CA IRB), para. 9 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2017/2017canlii147883/2017canlii147883.html>.
      21. Alomari v. Canada (Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism), 2015 FC 573 (CanLII), para. 14.
      22. Frederick v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 649 (CanLII), paras. 16-17 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2012/2012fc649/2012fc649.html>.
      23. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 147883 (CA IRB), para. 8 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2017/2017canlii147883/2017canlii147883.html>.
      24. Amin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 716 (T.D.).
      25. A.B. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1385 (CanLII).
      26. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson's Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression, Effective date: May 1, 2017, Accessed January 2, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir09.aspx>.
      27. Council of Europe, Gender-Based Asylum Claims and Non-Refoulement: Articles 60 and 61 of the Istanbul Convention, December 2019 <https://rm.coe.int/conventionistanbularticle60-61-web/1680995244> (Accessed March 15, 2020) at page 38 of document.
      28. Rezmuves v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 973 (CanLII), at para. 26.
      29. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 105239 (CA IRB), para. 55 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii105239/2016canlii105239.html>.
      30. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 143648 (CA IRB)
      31. Kovacs v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1473 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/1lwqb>.
      32. A. B. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1385 (CanLII).
      33. Puerto Rodriguez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1360 (CanLII)
      34. Paris Montoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1674 (CanLII).
      35. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb474b27.html [accessed 26 January 2020], para. 219.
      36. Rezmuves v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 973 (CanLII), at para. 7.

      Proceedings Conducted in Public (Rule 57)

      Rule 57 - Proceedings Conducted in Public

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      Proceedings Conducted in Public
      
      Minister considered party
      57 (1) For the purpose of this rule, the Minister is considered to be a party whether or not the Minister takes part in the proceedings.
      
      Application
      (2) A person who makes an application to the Division to have a proceeding conducted in public must do so in writing and in accordance with this rule rather than rule 50.
      
      Oral application
      (3) The Division must not allow a person to make an application orally at a proceeding unless the person, with reasonable effort, could not have made a written application before the proceeding.
      
      Content of application
      (4) In the application, the person must
      (a) state the decision they want the Division to make;
      (b) give reasons why the Division should make that decision;
      (c) state whether they want the Division to consider the application in public or in the absence of the public;
      (d) give reasons why the Division should consider the application in public or in the absence of the public;
      (e) if they want the Division to hear the application orally, give reasons why the Division should do so; and
      (f) include any evidence that they want the Division to consider in deciding the application.
      
      Providing application
      (5) The person must provide the original application together with two copies to the Division. The Division must provide a copy of the application to the parties.
      
      Response to application
      (6) A party may respond to a written application. The response must
      (a) state the decision they want the Division to make;
      (b) give reasons why the Division should make that decision;
      (c) state whether they want the Division to consider the application in public or in the absence of the public;
      (d) give reasons why the Division should consider the application in public or in the absence of the public;
      (e) if they want the Division to hear the application orally, give reasons why the Division should do so; and
      (f) include any evidence that they want the Division to consider in deciding the application.
      
      Providing response
      (7) The party must provide a copy of the response to the other party and provide the original response and a copy to the Division, together with a written statement indicating how and when the party provided the copy to the other party.
      
      Providing response to applicant
      (8) The Division must provide to the applicant either a copy of the response or a summary of the response referred to in paragraph (12)(a).
      
      Reply to response
      (9) An applicant or a party may reply in writing to a written response or a summary of a response.
      
      Providing reply
      (10) An applicant or a party who replies to a written response or a summary of a response must provide the original reply and two copies to the Division. The Division must provide a copy of the reply to the parties.
      
      Time limit
      (11) An application made under this rule must be received by the Division without delay. The Division must specify the time limit within which a response or reply, if any, is to be provided.
      
      Confidentiality
      (12) The Division may take any measures it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the proceeding in respect of the application, including
      (a) providing a summary of the response to the applicant instead of a copy; and
      (b) if the Division holds a hearing in respect of the application,
      (i) excluding the applicant or the applicant and their counsel from the hearing while the party responding to the application provides evidence and makes representations, or
      (ii) allowing the presence of the applicant’s counsel at the hearing while the party responding to the application provides evidence and makes representations, upon receipt of a written undertaking by counsel not to disclose any evidence or information adduced until a decision is made to hold the hearing in public.
      
      Summary of response
      (13) If the Division provides a summary of the response under paragraph (12)(a), or excludes the applicant and their counsel from a hearing in respect of the application under subparagraph (12)(b)(i), the Division must provide a summary of the representations and evidence, if any, that is sufficient to enable the applicant to reply, while ensuring the confidentiality of the proceeding having regard to the factors set out in paragraph 166(b) of the Act.
      
      Notification of decision on application
      (14) The Division must notify the applicant and the parties of its decision on the application and provide reasons for the decision.

      By default, the Act requires proceedings to be conducted in private

      By default, the IRPA requires that hearings before the RPD be conducted in camera: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Proceedings must be held in the absence of the public. That said, the Board may open a refugee hearing to the public in exceptional circumstances. The Irwin Law text Refugee Law states that this almost always happens with the consent of the claimant.[1] It notes, by way of example, that in recent years, several high-profile refugee claims have been heard in public with the consent of the claimants, including the claims of US military deserters Jeremy Hinzman and Brandon Hughey; US marijuana campaigner Steven Kubby and his family; and Chinese businessman Lai Cheong Sing and his family.[1]

      The Board may order that proceedings be conducted in private, in whole or in part

      The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division rules states that "The [Division] may take any necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality of the proceeding, such as: a) hearing in private the evidence concerning the factors to be taken into consideration; and b) ordering that the proceeding be conducted in private, in whole or in part."[2] A panel can attach conditions to its order, for example in Key (Re), a panel of the Refugee Protection Division provided for the following conditions on allowing the media to observe a hearing: "only non-disruptive audio equipment be allowed in the hearing room during proceedings and cameras to take still photographs only be allowed in the hearing room when the hearing was not in progress."[3]

      The Board may order a publication ban, in whole or in part

      The Board's public commentary on the analogous Immigration Division rules states that "Even if it allows the proceeding to be conducted in public, the [Division] may take any necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality of the proceeding, such as: 1. hearing in private the evidence concerning the factors to be taken into consideration; and 2. ordering a ban on publication of the proceedings, in whole or in part."[2]

      References

      1. 1 2 Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 297.
      2. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Immigration Division Rules, Date modified listed on webpage: 2018-06-23, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/CommentIdSi.aspx> (Accessed January 27, 2020).
      3. Key (Re), 2010 CanLII 62705 (CA IRB), par. 3, <http://canlii.ca/t/2d3c7#par3>, retrieved on 2020-08-16.

      Observers (Rule 58)

      Rule 58

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      Observers
      
      Observers
      58 (1) An application under rule 57 is not necessary if an observer is a member of the staff of the Board or a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or if the claimant or protected person consents to or requests the presence of an observer other than a representative of the press or other media of communication at the proceeding.
      
      Observers — factor
      (2) The Division must allow the attendance of an observer unless, in the opinion of the Division, the observer’s attendance is likely to impede the proceeding.
      
      Observers — confidentiality of proceeding
      (3) The Division may take any measures that it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the proceeding despite the presence of an observer.

      Rule 58 should be read in conjunction with section 166(e) of the IRPA

      Section 166(e) of the IRPA provides:

      166 Proceedings before a Division are to be conducted as follows:
      ...
      (e) despite paragraphs (b) to (c.1), a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is entitled to observe proceedings concerning a protected person or a person who has made a claim for refugee protection or an application for protection;

      For further details, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Proceedings must be held in the absence of the public.

      It is best practice to provide counsel with an opportunity to comment on the presence of any observers who are RPD employees

      In Azanor v. Canada, an opportunity was provided to counsel to comment on the presence of persons observing the hearing, and it was not taken. The court concluded that "it is conceivable that the presence in the hearing room of the Principal Applicant’s two children, and the two observers from the IRB, created some awkwardness and discomfort for the Principal Applicant. Nevertheless, objections to this were not raised by the Principal Applicant or her counsel at the time of the hearing. These objections were only raised afterwards. In the absence of complaint, the RPD Member did not err in proceeding with the sensitive yet relevant line of questioning concerning the Principal Applicant’s sexual identity."[1]

      References

      1. Azanor et al v. CIC (F.C. no. IMM-4472-19), Mosley, May 12, 2020, 2020 FC 613.

      Withdrawal (Rule 59)

      In certain circumstances, claimants may wish to withdraw a claim. This may happen, for example, if they have otherwise acquired status in Canada or if they wish to leave Canada.[1]

      IRPA Section 168(2)

      Abuse of process
      168(2) A Division may refuse to allow an applicant to withdraw from a proceeding if it is of the opinion that the withdrawal would be an abuse of process under its rules.

      Rule 59

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      Withdrawal
      
      Abuse of process
      59 (1) For the purpose of subsection 168(2) of the Act, withdrawal of a claim or of an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection is an abuse of process if withdrawal would likely have a negative effect on the Division’s integrity. If no substantive evidence has been accepted in the hearing, withdrawal is not an abuse of process.
      
      Withdrawal if no substantive evidence accepted
      (2) If no substantive evidence has been accepted in the hearing, a party may withdraw the party’s claim or the application to vacate or to cease refugee protection by notifying the Division orally at a proceeding or in writing.
      
      Withdrawal if substantive evidence accepted
      (3) If substantive evidence has been accepted in the hearing, a party who wants to withdraw the party’s claim or the application to vacate or to cease refugee protection must make an application to the Division in accordance with rule 50.

      Commentary

      No decision is required from the Board to accept a withdrawal notice where no substantive evidence has been accepted

      Board member Daniel Tucci has commented in one decision that "once the Notice to withdraw the claim is filed with the RPD, the claim is considered withdrawn and no decision is required by the RPD."[2] This principle was explained by the Federal Court in Arndorfer v. Canada, a case considering a previous version of the RPD Rules which applies with equal force to the present rule:

      The applicants complained in their affidavits that they were not contacted in order to confirm that they were withdrawing their claims. Such a complaint is not justified. As discussed above, the CRDD is entitled to rely on documents which it receives, and is entitled to presume that they have been properly executed. In addition, the abandonment hearings to which applicants have a right under s. 69.1(6) of the Act are not necessary in the case of a withdrawal. The applicant who is found by the CRDD to have abandoned a claim requires, as a matter of procedural fairness, the right to be heard by the body that is making that decision with regard to his or her claim. In the case of a withdrawal, the applicant is the one who makes the decision and exercises his right to put an end to his claim.[3]

      References

      1. Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 306.
      2. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 65021 (CA IRB), par. 5, <http://canlii.ca/t/gtxqh#5>, retrieved on 2020-01-29.
      3. Arndorfer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 2007 (CanLII), [2002] F.C.J. No 1659).

      Reinstating a Withdrawn Claim or Application (Rules 60-61)

      Rule 60 - Reinstating a Withdrawn Claim or Application

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      Reinstating a Withdrawn Claim or Application
      
      Application to reinstate withdrawn claim
      60 (1) A person may make an application to the Division to reinstate a claim that was made by the person and was withdrawn.
      
      Form and content of application
      (2) The person must make the application in accordance with rule 50, include in the application their contact information and, if represented by counsel, their counsel’s contact information and any limitations on counsel’s retainer, and provide a copy of the application to the Minister.
      
      Factors
      (3) The Division must not allow the application unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice or it is otherwise in the interests of justice to allow the application.
      
      Factors
      (4) In deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including whether the application was made in a timely manner and the justification for any delay.
      
      Subsequent application
      (5) If the person made a previous application to reinstate that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.

      Commentary

      Rule 60(3): When is there a relevant failure to observe a principle of natural justice?

      The full range of violations of natural justice may potentially be considered here. For a discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing. Where an applicant acted voluntarily and without constraint and any failure on the part of a claimant to inform themselves of the consequences of their withdrawal did not result from a breach of natural justice by the RPD or counsel, then a violation of procedural fairness will generally not be found.[1]

      Rule 60(3): When is it "otherwise in the interests of justice to allow the application"?

      Pursuant to RPD Rule 60(3), the Division must not allow an application to reinstate a withdrawn claim unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice or it is otherwise in the interests of justice to allow the application. How is the Board to approach the question of whether it is "otherwise in the interests of justice to allow the application"? As a starting point, the term "otherwise in the interests of justice" are broad words giving the Board a wide discretion to reinstate.[2] At the same time, the court has held that reinstatement is an exception to the norm and must be interpreted and applied in that context.[2]

      Pursuant to Rule 60(4), in deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors. As such, in making these determinations, the Board must weigh all the circumstances of a case and it is not just to approach the question from the vantage point of an applicant's interests.[2] The Board’s reasons must deal with the “interests of justice” that both favour and militate against reinstatement.[3] As such, the interests of justice should not be considered only from the vantage point of the Board. The court has said that "if this were so, few, if any, applications for reinstatement would ever succeed".[4] As Waldman puts it in his text, "based on this jurisprudence it is clear that the tribunal must consider all of the circumstances that are placed before it when assessing whether or not it would be in the interests of justice to allow the claim to be reinstated. This requires the tribunal to assess the circumstances from the perspective of the applicant and from that of the tribunal."[5]

      Factors that past panels have considered have included:

      • Did the claimant make an informed decision to withdraw their claim? The starting point is that a claimant should be presumed to have understood and intended the effect of their past withdrawal. The Board has noted in past decisions that the form a claimant signs to withdraw their claim involves them stating that they acknowledge that they are aware of the consequence of withdrawing their claim.[6] Specifically, the form that a claimant signs to withdraw their claim includes the following statement: "I am freely withdrawing my claim for refugee protection, and I am fully aware of the consequences of this withdrawal. I am aware that as a result of the withdrawal of my claim, the Canada Border Services Agency may require me to leave Canada, and I will not be permitted to make another claim for refugee protection in Canada."[7] There are strong policy reasons for presuming that a claimant's signature on this form was an informed one, as the court articulated in Arndorfer v Canada where they stated that "the IRB and the respondent must be able to rely on what is communicated to them by claimants. If the IRB and the Minister had to impose on themselves a waiting period before acting on such notices as the Notice of Withdrawal, or impose extra steps on themselves simply to ensure that the statement of the claimant is indeed his or her final answer, the refugee claims process would be encumbered, which would in turn worsen an already critical backlog in the refugee claims system."[8] When considering a claimant's argument that their decision was not informed, decision-makers have considered the following:
        • Did language issues prevent the claimant from understanding the withdrawal form? The form that a claimant completes to withdraw their claim requires a claimant to either declare that "I declare that I am able to read English and that I fully understand the entire content of this notice in English" or else to have an interpreter declare that "I (please print clearly), _____________________________, certify that I have accurately translated the entire content of this form for the claimant from the English language to the_____________________ language. The claimant indicate that he/she fully understands the entire content of this notice as translated."[7] A claimant's ability to understand what they have signed has been considered in past decisions, for example in Dezsone v. Canada the court noted that: "Ms. Dezsone signed a notice of withdrawal willingly, a notice that had, moreover, been translated for her from French to Hungarian."[9]
        • Was the decision to withdraw made by mistake? The court commented that this is a relevant factor to consider in Ohanyan v. Canada.[10]
          • Allegation of a mistake induced by the negligence of counsel: In Arndorfer v. Canada, the applicants argued that they had not intended to withdraw their claims for refugee protection and that as a result the withdrawal of their claims was non est factum; in other words, it was not an act that they knowingly and willingly performed. In that case, they argued that the reason for their act was that they were misled by their counsel, and, if it were not for the misleading acts of counsel, they would not have signed the forms. In that case, the facts did not disclose that there had been any deficiency in counsel's conduct. In any event, this factor of mistake (or non est factum) appears to have a limited role in this analysis because if counsel really has mislead the claimants, then this will likely be considered a procedural fairness violation and the reinstatement application could be accepted pursuant to the first part of Rule 60(3). In contrast, where there has not been such a procedural fairness violation, then the ordinary result is that stated by the court in Arndorfer, subject to the exceptions described in the following excerpt: "The Court made reference to earlier jurisprudence describing non est factum as being a state in which the mind of a party did not follow his hand at the time of the execution of the document. Carelessness in a situation where reasonable care could have, and should have been taken, precludes a party from claiming that his or her mind did not follow the hand. The Court raised the policy concern that allowing non est factum to be pleaded in a case where a party was careless would essentially have the effect of shifting to an innocent third party harm or loss which could have been prevented by greater care on the part of the parties. The policy considerations related to concerns for reliability and security are present to some extent in the case before this Court. Counsel, who act for refugee claimants, ought to be able to rely on the expressed wishes of their clients, subject to a duty to ensure that clients with a limited understanding of English or of the law, are aware of the consequences of acting on those wishes. Similarly, the IRB and the respondent must be able to rely on what is communicated to them by claimants."[11]
          • Allegation of a mistake induced by the Board: In Cuni v. Canada, the court found that the applicant had withdrawn her refugee claim because she had been given incorrect evidence by the RPD. As such the court found that it was in the interests of justice that her case be allowed to proceed.[12] The facts in that case were described in the case as follows: "June 28, 2008 is a day that Zymryte Cuni will never forget. That is the day she last saw her husband. That was the day she and her infant son Tigran arrived in Canada. They filed a refugee claim. Her husband was supposed to join them but was detained in England and never made it here. Relying on misinformation, she withdrew their claim for refugee protection in an attempt to reunite with her husband. However, she could not leave Canada because she had no travel documents. She attempted to reinstate their claim. Her application was rejected by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board. This is a judicial review of that decision." The court went on to make the following finding of fact: "The information given to Ms. Cuni by someone at the RPD office on Victoria Street in Toronto was incorrect. She did not need to withdraw her refugee claim in order to leave the country. Her problem is that without proper travel documents no airline will accept her. Had she had a valid passport, she could have left the country without notifying the RPD, which in due course would have come to the conclusion that she had abandoned her claim."[13]
        • Did the claimant consult with counsel and family members before withdrawing? The court has commented approvingly on the Board considering factors such as whether the applicant was unrepresented when they withdrew and what measures were taken to ensure that the claimant understood the consequences of the withdrawal of their refugee claim.[14] RPD Member Daniel Tucci considered this factor as follows in one claim: "The claimant’s decision was done with the advice of counsel and in consultation with his wife. Although the application was filed in a timely manner, the timeliness not sufficient to overcome the fact that the claimant had time to consult with counsel and his wife before completing the withdrawal form and that he freely chose to withdraw knowing what the consequences of that decision would be."[15] Even where the claimant has not consulted with family and counsel prior to withdrawing, this fact will not be determinative: in Dezsone v. Canada, the court stated that "In the circumstances, I do not believe that...it is otherwise in the interests of justice to require that the RPD ensure that Ms. Dezsone had consulted her children and her counsel before withdrawing her refugee protection claim."[16]
        • Did a medical condition vitiate the claimant's intention to withdraw? The Board should consider any medical conditions through the lens of how they affected the claimant's decision to withdraw. Where a past medical condition may be said to have vitiated the claimant's intention to withdraw, this points towards it being in the interests of justice to allow the application. An example of this is where a claimant was affected by schizophrenia when they withdrew and the claimant then reconsiders that decision when in a different state of mind. In contrast, where a medical condition may have caused upset and distress but did not impact the decision to withdraw the claim, then this would not support a reinstatement application, as with the following comments from RPD Member Daniel Tucci: "The RPD has also considered the claimant’s health problems. The evidence before the RPD indicates that the claimant received medical attention in Canada at least twice. It appears that the claimant is suffering from a heart ailment. The RPD accepts that the claimant was upset and distressed with his medical condition. That being said, the RPD finds that the claimant’s medical condition was not sufficient to impact the decision he made to withdraw his claim. The RPD finds that the claimant freely and knowingly made the decision to withdraw his refugee claim despite his medical condition. The RPD has not been presented with any medical reports stating that the claimant’s medical condition impaired his ability to understand his actions."[17] Similarly, in Dezsone v. Canada the court commented on the necessity of evidence regarding the effects of any medical issues: "Although the issue of Ms. Dezsone’s mental state was raised, there was no evidence adduced in that regard. At best, it can be said that she made a bad decision, a decision that she wishes she had not made."[18]
      • Did the claimant make a free decision to withdraw their claim?
        • Was the decision to withdraw made under duress? The court has overturned Board decisions failing to reinstate claims where it was clear that the applicant was under duress. In Kaur v. Canada, the “pressure on her was such that she was not free to speak about the situation she was in and unable to retain counsel to assist her in her choices”.[19] In Acevedo v. Canada, the applicant had presented evidence that “the abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband . . . had prevented her from participating in the claim”.[20]
        • Was a designated representative acting in the best interests of a minor or incompetent persons when withdrawing a claim? In Castillo v. Canada the principal applicant and her son (a minor) applied for refugee protection in Canada on the basis that they feared persecution by the principal applicant’s abusive ex-partner. The Board rejected their application to reinstate their claims, but this decision was found to be unreasonable by the court on the basis that the decision contained "no reference to the personal circumstances of the Minor Applicant who cannot be blamed for the decision of the Principal Applicant to withdraw their refugee application."[21] The Board's Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues provide that "in determining the procedure to be followed when considering the refugee claim of a child, the CRDD should give primary consideration to the best interests of the child."[22] That said, a designated representative must be appointed by the Board. There will be a period of time in which claims, including those of a minor have been made, but the designated representative relationship has not been established by the Board. This does not preclude the parent from acting on the child's behalf to withdraw the claim during this period notwithstanding the lack of a formal DR appointment: Arndorfer v. Canada.[23]
      • Whether the application to reinstate was made in a timely manner: Pursuant to Rule 60(4), in deciding the application, the Division must consider whether the application was made in a timely manner (and the justification for any delay).
        • The claimant's diligence in making the reinstatement application can be assessed: In Arcila v. Canada, the applicant withdrew her claim and then waited more than 2 months before asking that it be reinstated. The applicant stated that she was awaiting her PIF before making her application to reinstate and had difficulty in obtaining it. The RPD commented that, had the applicant made the request for her PIF to the RPD office, she would have received a copy. The RPD stated in its reasons that, pursuant to [the then] Rule 44 of the RPD Rules, an application to reinstate a refugee claim must be made without delay. The RPD found that the applicant had not acted without delay, as she did not apply to reinstate until nearly three months after withdrawing her claim. This conclusion was upheld by the court.[24]
        • A timely application is a factor, but is not determinative: RPD Member Daniel Tucci considered this factor as follows in one case, finding the factor not to be determinative: "The RPD acknowledges that the application for reconsideration was made in a timely manner. Counsel for the claimant informed the RPD on December 14, 2015 that the claimant no longer wished to withdraw his refugee claim. Following the RPD’s decision to accept the withdrawal, counsel for the claimant filed the application to reinstate the claim. ... Although the application was filed in a timely manner, the timeliness not sufficient to overcome the fact that the claimant had time to consult with counsel and his wife before completing the withdrawal form and that he freely chose to withdraw knowing what the consequences of that decision would be."[15]
      • Is the claimant's behaviour consistent with someone seeking protection? When the Board has considered reinstatement applications, it has often looked at the applicant's behaviour in totality to assess whether it is consistent with the behaviour that would be expected of someone seeking protection. Where this is not found to be the case, this will properly indicated that the interests of justice do not require reinstating the claim.
        • A claimant's actions over time evince a desire to return to their country: Where a claimant undertakes a series of steps over time that evince a desire to return to their country, then this will not be considered behaviour consistent with someone who has a genuine fear of persecution or who anticipates harm in their country. For example, in Arcila v. Canada, the applicant was as a minor claimant in her mother’s claim for refugee protection. Her PIF was signed and filed by her mother, as she was only 17 years old at the time. She stated that she and her mother had a serious argument on December 29, 2010, and, as a result, she made the dangerous and irrational decision to call Immigration and ask to cancel her refugee claim so she could obtain her passport and return to Colombia. The RPD acknowledged the applicant’s evidence that she withdrew the claim impulsively and recklessly because of the fight with her mother. However, based on all of the evidence, the Board did not accept that the decision was a simple mistake made in a moment of pique. Instead, in that case, the RPD found that the applicant’s behaviour was not that of someone with a genuine fear for her life if she returned to Colombia. The claimant had taken steps over a series of months, even after becoming an adult, to return to Colombia, including by asking her father to send her passport on December 20, 2010 (before any confrontation with her mother) and y then booking a flight home, writing to the Board to request her passport, and then waiting months before asking for her claim to be reinstated.[25]
        • A claimant was more focused on obtaining status quickly than on pursuing their refugee claim: For example, in Sathasivam v. Canada the applicant had filed a claim for protection, then got married and, on the advice of his counsel, withdrew his claim and attempted to obtain status in Canada through a spousal sponsorship. When this spousal sponsorship application was denied, the claimant subsequently attempted to reinstate his refugee claim. The Board declined to do so, stating: "The claimant came to Canada as a Convention Refugee alleging a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka. Within a year of his arrival in Canada, the claimant decided to renounce his refugee claim only in order to expedite his landing in Canada. Despite alleging today a continued fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, the panel is not persuaded that the claimant's behaviour in Canada is consistent with the behaviour of someone seeking protection. The Refugee Protection system exists to protect refugees and is not a means of obtaining immigrant status in Canada. Thus, if the claimant came to Canada for the reasons alleged in his Personal Information Form (PIF), why would he renounce to them so quickly? The panel is not persuaded by claimant's explanation as having to wait a longer period for a full refugee claim hearing."[26]
        • Gender guidelines should be considered where appropriate: In Castillo v. Canada, Ms. Diaz Ordaz Castillo says she fled to Canada order to escape her abusive ex-partner. She filed a refugee claim, contacted a lawyer, acquired a Legal Aid certificate, and set up an appointment with counsel to fill out her personal information form (PIF). She arrived late for the appointment and could not re-schedule another prior to the due date for her PIF. Nor could she obtain the assistance of anyone else over the holiday period. As a result, she failed to submit her PIF by the deadline. Ms. Diaz Ordaz Castillo’s ex-partner contacted her at that point and asked her to return to Mexico. Because she was feeling depressed and isolated, and was having difficulty raising her son on her own, she agreed. She formally withdrew her refugee claim at a hearing convened to determine whether she had abandoned it. However, Ms. Diaz Ordaz Castillo then changed her mind. Her ex-partner continued to contact her and was now becoming verbally abusive, accusing her of having slept with his best friend. She decided that it was not safe for her to return to Mexico after all, so she submitted an application to reinstate her claim. The Board dismissed it. Ms. Diaz Ordaz Castillo submits that the Board failed to appreciate that her mental state at the point in time when she withdrew her refugee claim was affected by the abusive relationship she had fled. In effect, she was unable to make a free and informed decision about her claim. Further, Ms. Diaz Ordaz Castillo submits that the Board failed to consider the Gender Guidelines applicable to women making refugee claims, as well as and an affidavit she had filed describing, in general terms, why women sometimes choose to remain in abusive relationships. In the court's view, the Board did not ignore the evidence of Ms. Diaz Ordaz Castillo’s mental state. However, the evidence before the Board member did not suggest that her mental state had prevented her from making an informed decision to withdraw her claim. She spoke of feeling “alone and isolated”, “defeated” and “without hope” and that these feelings caused her to agree to return to Mexico. The court stated: "While these feelings were no doubt genuine and perhaps natural in her circumstances, I cannot fault the Board for concluding that there had been no breach of natural justice."[27] While the gender guidelines will not preordain any particular result or finding in a reinstatement application, their discussion of the cycle of abuse and issues like Battered Women's Syndrome are appropriately considered at this stage of the analysis.
      • Related legal proceedings: The existence of related legal proceedings may point towards or away from a conclusion that it would be in the interests of justice to allow a claim to be reopened.
        • The fact that a claimant decided to abandon a claim knowing that their family members were still pursuing claims: A family will often file claims altogether, even if some of the claimants are more at risk than others. A decision by a claimant to withdraw their claim where they have the knowledge that their family members' claims are proceedings, may reflect a reasoned judgement about relative risks and merits. For example, RPD Member Daniel Tucci considered such a situation and concluded that the fact that the applicant's family were still pursuing their claims, and that the claimant was aware of this prior to withdrawing his, was a factor pointing against accepting his application to reinstate, as follows: "The RPD also takes into consideration that his wife and child are pursuing their refugee claims. This could be an important factor if the evidence before the RPD showed that the claimant was not in contact with his wife prior to making the decision to withdraw his claim. In this case, the claimant spoke to his wife on two occasions on December 4, 2015 and the purpose of the call was to discuss his withdrawal. One call was made before he consulted with legal counsel and a second call was made after his consultation with legal counsel. The RPD finds that the claimant made the decision to withdraw his refugee claim knowing that his wife and child would pursue their claim."[28]
        • A Hague Convention proceeding: In Zagroudnitski v. Canada, the court considered allegations of child abduction against the applicant who wanted to reinstate his claim. The court concluded that a related Hague Convention application and the facts related thereto pointed strongly against accepting the reinstatement application: "On May 2, 2014, in the context of an Application under the Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, [1983] Can TS 35 (the Hague Convention), filed by the minor Applicant’s mother, who lives in France, Justice L.S. Parent of the Ontario Court of Justice ordered the return of the minor Applicant to France, and held that the mother had custody rights in respect of the child at the time of father’s removal of the child. The father’s removal and retention of the child was wrongful and breached the mother’s rights under the Hague Convention (N.A. v A.Z., 2014 ONCJ 293; Affidavit of Irena Kakowska, dated March 11, 2015). ... Upon review of the Certified Tribunal Record and the parties’ submissions, which depict an alarming portrait, to say the least, of allegations of parental abduction, abuse, instability and detention in regard to the child in the proceedings, it is clear that the application cannot succeed."[29]
      • The efficient use of Board resources: This is a proper consideration for the Board when considering the interests of justice under this rule. For example, in Castillo v. Canada the Board noted that it offered a hearing at which the issue of abandonment could have been addressed but that the claimant chose to withdraw her application instead. Therefore, the Board concluded that to grant the reinstatement request would be to duplicate the process that had already been provided to her and which she had declined. The Board noted that a member and an interpreter had already been assigned to hear and consider her submissions and that, accordingly, allowing the reinstatement of the claim would prejudice Board’s efforts to deal with these matters efficiently and in a timely manner and would not be in the interests of justice for that reason. In that case, the court appears to accept that it was proper for the Board to consider this criterion, even if this criterion, on its own, was not determinative.[30]
      • Considerations related to events developing in the claimant's home country:
        • A desire to return to one's country because of a family member's medical condition is not generally a good reason to withdraw a claim: In Dezsone v. Canada the claimant left Hungary for Canada to claim refugee protection on the basis of her Roma origins. Shortly afterwards, she learned that her grandson had been hospitalized in Hungary. She then decided to return there, but the Canadian authorities were in possession of her passport. To get it back, she withdrew her refugee protection claim. In the end, Ms. Dezsone did not return to Hungary. She instead decided to file an application to reinstate her refugee protection claim. That reinstated application was not approved by the Board and the court upheld the reasonableness of that decision.[31]
        • The re-emergence of the risk that is at the heart of the claim is generally not a sound basis for reinstatement: A common issue that arises in applications for reinstatement is a change of circumstances in the claimant's country or the claimant's knowledge of the risk in their country. For example, in Ohanyan v. Canada, the Applicant was a 29 year old citizen of Armenia who claimed refugee protection. Shortly thereafter he withdrew his claim because his wife informed him that government agents had stopped looking for him and it was safe to return. A few weeks later his wife advised him that the government agents had returned to his house looking for him. The Applicant then applied to reinstate his refugee claim. The court concluded that the Board was right to reject the claimant's reinstatement application: "The Applicant made a strategic decision which apparently did not work to his advantage. The Rule is not designed to protect applicants from the consequences of their freely chosen course of conduct even where they have made a decision or taken a step which did not work out as they may have hoped."[10] If the claimant made an assessment of risk and decided to return to their country, only to change their assessment upon receiving new information, the proper process for the claimant is to avail themselves of the PRRA process that is designed to consider such new information, not to attempt to reinstate their claim.

      Those unable to reinstate a claim still entitled to PRRA

      It should be noted that it does not necessarily follow that a claimant whose application to reinstate is refused will be removed to a country where she was allegedly persecuted (or had a well-founded fear thereof). As the court states, "[they are] still entitled to a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). Under sections 112 and 113 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, [a] PRRA will address all of the risks listed in sections 96 and 97 of the Act."[32]

      An oral hearing is unnecessary when deciding reinstatement applications, unless credibility is at issue

      In Ohanyan v. Canada, the Board denied the claimant's application to reinstate his withdrawn claim. As is the usual practice, the Board assessed the claimant's written application to reinstate the claim but did not hold an oral hearing for the application. The court held that failing to have an oral hearing was not a breach of natural justice "because a hearing was unnecessary". The court noted that in the application "neither the Applicant’s credibility nor any of the relevant facts were in issue. The Applicant was able to make all of his representations in writing."[33] In contrast, in Sathasivam v. Canada the Board drew negative inferences about the credibility of some of the evidence tendered by the applicant without giving him an opportunity to reply; this was held to be in error: "In my opinion, the Board erred in law in relying upon its own knowledge of the applicant's former counsel to discredit, and to disbelieve his evidence that he had been misled by counsel's advice, without giving the applicant notice of its doubt about that evidence and an opportunity to address that doubt. ... Failure to provide notice to the applicant, and an opportunity to respond to the CRDD's conclusion that key evidence, concerning alleged advice from former counsel, was implausible and not to be believed, constituted procedural unfairness in this case, warranting the Court's intervention."[34]

      "Full" written reasons for an application to reopen are not required, but the rationale of the decision-maker should be provided

      The court concluded in Ahmad v. Canada that "full written reasons" are not required for interlocutory decisions, only final ones.[35] That decision went on to note that "decisions regarding refusals to reopen or grant leave to appeal have always been considered interlocutory decisions". As such, the court held that they do not require full written reasons. The court cited with approval Faghihi v. Canada in which Evans J. stated: "I am prepared to assume for present purposes that a motion to reopen a decision is an "interlocutory matter" because, if granted, it will not be a final disposition of the case. It will simply open the gate to a redetermination of the claim by the Refugee Division".[36] The court went on to note that on the record before it, "in this case, the Board gave an extensive endorsement which certainly indicates the rationale of the decision maker." It noted that such endorsements "can take the place of written reasons".[37] An endorsement appears to be a shorter set of reasons for decision provided by the decision-maker that are often written on a pre-printed form and may be in highly summary form. While Ahmad concerned an application to reopen a claim, not reinstate a withdrawn one, the ratio of that decision is equally persuasive when consideration reinstatement applications, mutatis mutandis.

      In practice, however, courts have been willing to overturn decisions not to reinstate on the basis that they did not adequately grapple with the evidence and record before them. For example, in Castillo v. Canada the court overturned a decision on the basis that it was not persuaded that the Board had regard to all of the evidence before it. The decision states:

      I agree with the Respondent that, in general, the Board is presumed to have considered all of the evidence, and has no obligation to refer to every document in the record. However, in this case the Board refers to no documents. It is widely accepted that where a document is important to a determination by the Board it is necessary for the decision-maker to explicitly address that document. There were many documents before the Board that were relevant to the determination of what was “in the interests of justice” and should have been considered. It is not sufficient for the Board to baldly state “I am not swayed by the evidence submitted”.[38]

      A claim can only be reinstated pursuant to this rule after it has been referred to the Board

      Section 100(3) of the IRPA provides that the Refugee Protection Division may not consider a claim until it is referred by an officer. The RPD has considered the interaction of this provision of the Act with Rule 60. In that case, the claimant was intercepted and interviewed by CBSA officers when the claimant disembarked from his flight to Canada. After indicating that he wished to make a claim, that same day the claimant signed and completed the Withdrawal of a Claim for Refugee Protection Prior to Referral to the Refugee Protection Division. This was done before the claim had been referred to the RPD. The Board held that the claimant could not attempt to reinstate the claim pursuant to Rule 60 because the Board lacked jurisdiction since the claim was never referred to the Board:

      I have also considered Section 162(1) of the IRPA. This provisions gives the RPD wide authority, but only with respect to matters “brought before it.” In particular, this section provides that in respect of proceedings brought before it, the RPD has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction. However, for the reasons given above, it cannot be said that the refugee claim has been brought before the RPD, which reinforces the fact that the RPD does not have jurisdiction. The applicant made submissions to the effect that Rule 60 allows the RPD to reinstate a claim in the circumstances of this case. However, the RPD Rules are a subordinate set of legislation that cannot conflict with the statute that enables them, in this case, the IRPA. In simpler terms, an application made under Rule 60 to reinstate a claim does not confer jurisdiction where the RPD would not otherwise have jurisdiction. Again, in reviewing the evidence there is a signed Withdrawal of a Claim for Refugee Protection Prior to Referral to the Refugee Protection Division on the file which in my view by its very name would clearly suggest that the person concerned is signing a withdrawal form prior to it being referred to the RPD.[39]

      This conclusion is consistent with the court's reasoning in Duri v. Canada.[40]

      Rule 61 - Application to reinstate withdrawn application to vacate or to cease refugee protection

      Application to reinstate withdrawn application to vacate or to cease refugee protection
      
      61 (1) The Minister may make an application to the Division to reinstate an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection that was withdrawn.
      
      Form of application
      (2) The Minister must make the application in accordance with rule 50.
      
      Factors
      (3) The Division must not allow the application unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice or it is otherwise in the interests of justice to allow the application.
      
      Factors
      (4) In deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including whether the application was made in a timely manner and the justification for any delay.
      
      Subsequent application
      (5) If the Minister made a previous application to reinstate that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.

      Commentary

      References

      1. Posada Arcila v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 210 (CanLII), par. 19, <http://canlii.ca/t/fwg4k#19>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      2. 1 2 3 Ohanyan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1078 at para 13.
      3. Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1227 (CanLII), par. 18, <http://canlii.ca/t/26wwt#18>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      4. Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1227 (CanLII), par. 17, <http://canlii.ca/t/26wwt#17>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      5. Waldman, Lorne, Immigration Law and Practice, vol. 2.  Markham, Ont.:  Butterworths (loose-leaf updated April 2017, release 61-2, Pub. 5912), at 9.142.7 (page 9-51).
      6. Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1227 (CanLII), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/26wwt#9>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      7. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Notice of Withdrawal of a Claim for Refugee Protection Form, July 31, 2018 version of the form <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/forms/Documents/RpdSpr2401e.pdf> (Accessed January 29, 2020).
      8. Arndorfer v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 2007 (CanLII), 225 FTR 124, [2002] FCJ No 1659 (QL), at paragraph 44.
      9. Ambrus Dezsone v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1396 (CanLII), par. 5, <http://canlii.ca/t/fpdxt#5>, retrieved on 2020-01-29.
      10. 1 2 Ohanyan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1078 (CanLII), par. 14, <http://canlii.ca/t/1p8cj#14>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      11. Arndorfer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 2007 (CanLII), par. 41, <http://canlii.ca/t/j02#41>, retrieved on 2020-01-30
      12. Cuni v. Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1249, 2009 FC 1024, as cited and summarized in Waldman, Lorne, Immigration Law and Practice, vol. 2.  Markham, Ont.:  Butterworths (loose-leaf updated April 2017, release 61-2, Pub. 5912), at 9.142.2.
      13. Cuni v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1024 (CanLII), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/2659x#9>, retrieved on 2020-01-30
      14. Zagroudnitski v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 582 (CanLII), par. 16, <http://canlii.ca/t/ghhr6#16>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      15. 1 2 X (Re), 2016 CanLII 65021 (CA IRB), par. 25, <http://canlii.ca/t/gtxqh#25>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      16. Ambrus Dezsone v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1396 (CanLII), par. 7, <http://canlii.ca/t/fpdxt#7>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      17. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 65021 (CA IRB), par. 27, <http://canlii.ca/t/gtxqh#27>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      18. Ambrus Dezsone v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1396 (CanLII), par. 6, <http://canlii.ca/t/fpdxt#6>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      19. Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989 CanLII 5272 (FCA), [1990] 2 F.C. 209 (C.A.), at para. 32
      20. Acevedo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 496, para. 3
      21. De Lourdes Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1185 (CanLII), par. 12, <http://canlii.ca/t/2dq12#12>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      22. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir03.aspx> (Accessed January 29, 2020).
      23. Arndorfer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 2007 (CanLII), par. 63, <http://canlii.ca/t/j02#63>, retrieved on 2020-01-30
      24. Posada Arcila v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 210 (CanLII), par. 10, <http://canlii.ca/t/fwg4k#10>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      25. Posada Arcila v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 210 (CanLII), par. 18, <http://canlii.ca/t/fwg4k#18>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      26. Sathasivam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 438 (CanLII), par. 33, <http://canlii.ca/t/1gt5r#33>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      27. Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1227 (CanLII), par. 12, <http://canlii.ca/t/26wwt#12>, retrieved on 2020-01-30
      28. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 65021 (CA IRB), par. 26, <http://canlii.ca/t/gtxqh#26>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      29. Zagroudnitski v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 582 (CanLII), par. 6, <http://canlii.ca/t/ghhr6#6>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      30. Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1227 (CanLII), par. 15, <http://canlii.ca/t/26wwt#15>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      31. Ambrus Dezsone v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1396 (CanLII), par. 2, <http://canlii.ca/t/fpdxt#2>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      32. Ambrus Dezsone v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1396 (CanLII), par. 9, <http://canlii.ca/t/fpdxt#9>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      33. Ohanyan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1078 (CanLII), par. 8, <http://canlii.ca/t/1p8cj#8>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      34. Sathasivam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1080 (CanLII), par. 17, <http://canlii.ca/t/mr7#17>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      35. Ahmad v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 279 (CanLII)
      36. Faghihi v. Canada (M.C.I.) 1999 CanLII 9370 (FC), [2000] 1 F.C 249 at para 28
      37. Wackowski v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2004] FC 280
      38. De Lourdes Diaz Ordaz Castillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1185 (CanLII), par. 11, <http://canlii.ca/t/2dq12#11>, retrieved on 2020-01-29
      39. X (Re), 2018 CanLII 140557 (CA IRB).
      40. Duri v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 125 (CanLII), par. 14, <http://canlii.ca/t/27xqn#14>, retrieved on 2020-01-29.

      Reopening a Claim or Application (Rules 62-63)

      Section 170.2 of the IRPA

      The legislative provision reads:

      No reopening of claim or application
      170.2 The Refugee Protection Division does not have jurisdiction to reopen on any ground — including a failure to observe a principle of natural justice — a claim for refugee protection, an application for protection or an application for cessation or vacation, in respect of which the Refugee Appeal Division or the Federal Court, as the case may be, has made a final determination.

      What jurisdiction does the Board have to reopen a decision that it has reached?

      The principle of functus officio provides that judgments are final and that a decision-maker loses jurisdiction once a formal decision is rendered, signed, and communicated to the parties. The principle is that, as a starting point, such decisions cannot be re-opened. Mr. Justice Francis Muldoon in Jimenez v. Canada articulated the principle of functus officio in the immigration context as follows:

      [T]he principle of functus officio favours the finality of proceedings, although it is flexible in its application in the case of administrative tribunals. By this it is meant that whether or not the parties agree with the decision rendered, the case cannot be reopened unless it can be established that there was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the decision-maker or if there is a clerical error that needs to be corrected: Paper Machinery Ltd. v. J.O. Ross Engineering Corp., 1934 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1934] S.C.R. 186. Recently, Justice Nadon of this Court also recognized that cases may be reopened if necessary to adhere to the principles of natural justice: Zelzle v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1996 CanLII 4043 (FC), [1996] 3 F.C. 20 (T.D.). The principle specifically does not allow a tribunal to revisit a decision.[1]

      As such, per the principle of functus officio, a decision, once made (and even if wrongly made), is still a binding decision. In the absence of statutory authority, a decision once made cannot be administratively revisited. That said, Justice Nadon held in Zelzle v. Canada that "while the principle of functus officio favours the finality of proceedings, its application is flexible in the case of administrative tribunals. Proceedings may be reopened if justice requires it."[2] Exceptions to the principle of functus officio provide that a matter may be reopened in the following circumstances:

      • Clerical error: There was a clerical error in drawing up the formal judgment that needs to be corrected.[3]
      • Error expressing the intention of the decision-maker: There was an error expressing the manifest intention of the decision-maker.[3] This exception cannot simply reflect a decision-maker having changed their mind; as a general rule, once a tribunal has reached a final decision in respect to the matter that is before it in accordance with its enabling statute, that decision cannot be revisited because the tribunal has changed its mind.[4]
      • Denial of natural justice: There was a denial of natural justice which makes a decision rendered a nullity.[5] This, however, cannot simply reflect a realization that the tribunal made an error or law; as a general rule, once a tribunal has reached a final decision in respect to the matter that is before it in accordance with its enabling statute, that decision cannot be revisited because the tribunal made an error within jurisdiction.[4]
      • New information: Should new information be brought to light, a decision can be reconsidered.[6] However, the information cannot simply reflect a change in circumstances; as a general rule, once a tribunal has reached a final decision in respect to the matter that is before it in accordance with its enabling statute, that decision cannot be revisited because there has been a change of circumstances.[4]

      As such, the Board has the power to revisit its decisions for such reasons. The only limit on this jurisdiction in the statute is section 170.2 of the IRPA, above, which provides that the Division lacks jurisdiction to reopen on any ground once the Federal Court or RAD has made a final determination of a matter.

      Once reopened, is a claim to be heard de novo or as a redetermination based on the previous record?

      A hearing de novo is, as the term implies, an altogether fresh or new hearing and is not limited to an inquiry to determine if the tribunal acted properly and correctly on the evidence and material before it.[7] Black's Law Dictionary defines, "hearing de novo" in the following manner: "Generally, a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally heard and a review of previous hearing. On hearing 'de novo', a court hears a matter as a court of original, and not appellate, jurisdiction."[8] Whether a claim, once reopened, will be approached de novo or as a redetermination primarily based on the previous record is a question of procedural fairness that must be decided in each case. In some cases, a procedural fairness violation in the original proceeding will be of such a nature that it would be unfair for the newly constituted panel to be presented with the previous, tainted evidence (for example in the case of interpretation inaccuracies).

      Rule 62(1) - Who may make an application to reopen when

      The text of the relevant rules reads:

      Reopening a Claim or Application
      
      Application to reopen claim
      62 (1) At any time before the Refugee Appeal Division or the Federal Court has made a final determination in respect of a claim for refugee protection that has been decided or declared abandoned, the claimant or the Minister may make an application to the Division to reopen the claim.

      Limitation on reopening where a final determination has been made by the RAD or Federal Court

      Rule 62(9) should be read in conjunction with s. 170.2 of the IRPA which forecloses any reopening of a claim for refugee protection or a claim for protection, pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1), respectively, of the Act, when a “final determination” has been made by either the Refugee Appeal Division or the Federal Court:

      170.2 The Refugee Protection Division does not have jurisdiction to reopen on any ground — including a failure to observe a principle of natural justice — a claim for refugee protection, an application for protection or an application for cessation or vacation, in respect of which the Refugee Appeal Division or the Federal Court, as the case may be, has made a final determination.

      Burden of proof

      As stated in Rule 62(1), either a claimant or the Minister may make an application to the Division to reopen a claim. The burden of proof is on the applicant.[9]

      Rule 62(2) - Form of the application for reopening

      The text of the relevant rules reads:

      Form of application
      (2) The application must be made in accordance with rule 50 and, for the purpose of paragraph 50(5)(a), the Minister is considered to be a party whether or not the Minister took part in the proceedings.

      Full Rule 50 requirements apply to such applications

      Per Rule 50, the application will have to consist of a notice specifying the grounds on which the application is made, an affidavit setting out the facts [a requirement currently waived by the Covid-19 practice notice], and a statement of law and of argument that is to be relied upon by the applicant: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Applications#Rule 50 - How to Make an Application.

      Rule 62(3) - Contact information

      Contact information
      (3) If a claimant makes the application, they must include in the application their contact information and, if represented by counsel, their counsel’s contact information and any limitations on counsel’s retainer.

      Rule 62(4) - Allegations against counsel

      Allegations against counsel
      (4) If it is alleged in the application that the claimant’s counsel in the proceedings that are the subject of the application provided inadequate representation,
      (a) the claimant must first provide a copy of the application to the counsel and then provide the original application to the Division, and
      (b) the application provided to the Division must be accompanied by a written statement indicating how and when the copy of the application was provided to the counsel.

      A claimant must follow the process set out in the relevant Board Practice Notice

      See the IRB Practice Notice on Allegations Against Former Counsel.[10] For more details on the right to counsel, and making arguments about the incompetence thereof, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record#Deficiencies of counsel's conduct are properly attributed to their client.

      Rule 62(5) - Copy of the notice of appeal or pending application

      Copy of notice of appeal or pending application
      (5) The application must be accompanied by a copy of any notice of pending appeal or any pending application for leave to apply for judicial review or any pending application for judicial review.

      Rule 62(6) - Application must not be allowed absent failure to observe a principle of natural justice

      Factor
      (6) The Division must not allow the application unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice.

      History of this rule

      The Federal Court has noted that the RPD’s "power to reopen a refugee claim is very limited" and that "the Rules are highly prescriptive". Rule 62(6) states the RPD “must not allow the application unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice” [emphasis added]. This rule updated the Rule 55(4) found in the previous version of the Refugee Protection Division Rules, (SOR/2002-228), which was broader in scope and read that the RPD “must allow the application if it is established that there was a failure to observe a principal of natural justice” [emphasis added].[11]

      Rule 62(6) limits applications to reopen to circumstances where there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice

      While the Board may reopen its decisions on a number of grounds (listed above: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Reopening a Claim or Application#What jurisdiction does the Board have to reopen a decision that it has reached?), Rule 62(6) provides that the Division "must not allow" an application (from a party) to reopen unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice. The limitation in this rule applies to applications by a party but does not constrain any actions on the Board's own motion.

      What is a principle of natural justice and is this the same thing as procedural fairness?

      As the Federal Court stated in Huseen v. Canada, one can interpret Rule 62(6) as permitting the RPD to reopen a claim where there has been either a denial of natural justice or a denial of procedural fairness to the applicant.[12] This reflects the history of the terms "natural justice" and "procedural fairness". Originally, there was a distinction between the stricter rules of natural justice as they applied to judicial or quasi-judicial decisions ("natural justice") and those rules of fairness which would apply only to administrative decisions ("procedural fairness"). However, this distinction has been eroded and at present the Courts have accepted that there only exists a general duty of fairness which can be referred to by using either the term “natural justice” or the term “procedural fairness”.[13]

      An applicant may request that the Board reopen for a reason other than a failure to observe a principle of natural justice

      The Board has affirmed that the onus is on the applicant to establish on a balance of probabilities there was a denial of a principle of natural justice.[14] Nonetheless, it is open to a claimant to request that the Board act via Rule 70 to allow an application to reopen on a ground other than procedural fairness (Canadian Refugee Procedure/General Provisions#Rule 70 - Power to change a rule, excuse a person from a rule, extend a time limit, or act on its own initiative). This reflects the fact that it is clear from s. 170.2 of the Act that a panel may reopen on multiple grounds ("any ground"), of which a failure to observe a principle of natural justice is just one (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Reopening a Claim or Application#Section 170.2 of the IRPA).

      That said, it is arguable that when considering the scheme of the Act, panels should be reticent to waive the requirement of Rule 62(6) that matters only be reopened in situations where a principle of natural justice was not observed, particularly where a panel seeks to re-open for new evidence to be considered. Parliament chose to not make a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) available for 12 months following a refugee decision,[15] and chose to place limits on adducing new evidence at the Refugee Appeal Division.[16] A very liberal allowance for reopening to consider new evidence could run contrary to these aspects of the scheme of the Act, and hence these parliamentary choices. The Board has held that the role of the Division hearing an application to re-open does not include a fact-finding mission on behalf of the applicants, and the Division is not to second-guess the assessment of the situation of the original member who presided over the proceeding previously.[17]

      Rule 62(7) - Factors

      Factors
      (7) In deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
      (a) whether the application was made in a timely manner and the justification for any delay; and
      (b) the reasons why
          (i) a party who had the right of appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division did not appeal, or
          (ii) a party did not make an application for leave to apply for judicial review or an application for judicial review.

      "Any relevant factors"

      In deciding such an application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including, but not limited to,[18] those in (a) and (b) enumerated above. As the court noted in Lopez v. Canada, these factors must be relevant to the question of whether there has been a failure to observe a principle of natural justice (Rule 62(6)).[19] For example, if an application was not made in a timely manner for reasons that had to do with deficiency of counsel, and thus procedural fairness implications arise, then there may have been a failure to observe a principle of natural justice.[20] The courts have commented that the following factors will generally not be relevant to such an enquiry:

      • Lack of prejudice to the Minister is not generally relevant: As the Federal Court commented when considering the analogous Refugee Appeal Division Rule, "it is difficult to see how a lack of prejudice to the Respondent is relevant to whether...there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice. the Respondent certainly has a justifiable interest and obligation in ensuring that timelines are met. Otherwise, chaos would result. That is why there are time deadlines in the legislation and the relevant rules. Requiring any applicant to meet those timelines is not a breach of any principle of natural justice."[21]
      • There is no requirement that the failure to observe a principle of natural justice arise from an error or mistake by the Board: As stated in Djilal v Canada, a failure to observe a principle of natural justice does not have to be the result of an error or mistake of the RPD.[22] For example, negligence on the part of an applicant’s counsel has been recognized, in certain circumstances, as being sufficient to cause the applicant to have been denied natural justice in relation to an abandonment hearing.[23]
      • The fact that a claimant misunderstood their obligations does not in itself establish that they were denied procedural fairness: In Rokisini v. Canada the claimant stated that he mistakenly believed that his appeal to the RAD had been perfected. It had not been as the claimant had not submitted an application required, which is required. When the claimant failed to submit his application record by the required deadline, the RAD dismissed the appeal. On judicial review to the Federal Court, the claimant submitted that he misunderstood the obligations to file an appeal, and that if he had properly understood the steps required of him, he would have complied with them. In light of the language of the forms that had been sent by the Board to the claimant advising about the additional steps that he was required to take, the Board held that the claimant's misunderstanding was not sufficient to establish that procedural fairness had been denied: "I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s submissions that he mistakenly assumed that a hearing would be scheduled for the RAD appeal, and that the notice of appeal” was the equivalent of an appellant’s record.  A plain reading of the RAD Acknowledgement Letter would clearly compel the reader to take next steps".[24]

      In contrast, the Board and courts have commented that other factors are relevant, including:

      • Whether the claimants were represented by counsel.[25] There is nuance to this criterion, as the court noted in Huseen v. Canada wherein it stated "I wish to stress that a failure or delay in engaging counsel is, in itself, not an acceptable panacea to all the harm that results from missteps in the refugee process. Equally unacceptable, however, is a failure on the Board’s part to consider an individual’s circumstances in these situations."[26]
      • The language(s) the claimants speak. For example, in Huseen v. Canada the Board considered that the BOC kit was provided to the claimants in Arabic, their first language, and concluded that this properly pointed away from any conclusion that there had been a failure to observe a principle of natural justice in the case.[27]

      Whether the application was made in a timely manner and the justification for any delay

      Rule 62(7) requires that in deciding such an application, the Division must consider whether the application was made in a timely manner and the justification for any delay. Speed is often of the essence with applications to reopen, as claimants may be facing the prospect of imminent removal by CBSA, even prior to the Board arriving at a decision on the reopening application. A reopening application does not provide an automatic stay of removal. Reasons for delay that have been held to be "significant factors in play" in such cases have included:

      • Challenges finding counsel because of holidays. For example, in Huseen v. Canada the court noted that the claimants "had difficulty finding a lawyer between the move to Alberta on December 18, 2013 and the January 7, 2014 abandonment hearing due to the Christmas holiday season".[25]
      • Whether the claimant was diligent in keeping in touch with their counsel and the Board. For example, in Garcia v. Canada the Applicant could not be located despite (i) several months of both his counsel and the IRB trying unsuccessfully to locate and contact him, and (ii) the IRB thereafter rescheduling the hearing in the hope of giving the applicant a final chance. The court concluded that it was reasonable for the Board to refuse to reopen the claim in the circumstances.[28]
      • Whether the claimant was diligent in making attempts to understand the decision terminating their claim. For example, in Driss v. Canada, the claimant's claim was closed and then the claimant waited two years before attempting to reopen the claim. The court concluded that the evidence before the panel was that the claimant received the original decision terminating the claim in a timely manner but failed to understand its significance or to make any attempt to understand its content. The could upheld the Board's decision that the claimant's evidence was insufficient to justify a two-year delay.[29]

      Rule 62(8) - Subsequent application

      Subsequent application
      (8) If the party made a previous application to reopen that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.

      Rule 62(9) - Other remedies and timing of decision

      Other remedies
      (9) If there is a pending appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division or a pending application for leave to apply for judicial review or a pending application for judicial review on the same or similar grounds, the Division must, as soon as is practicable, allow the application to reopen if it is necessary for the timely and efficient processing of a claim, or dismiss the application.

      Rule 63 - Application to reopen application to vacate or to cease refugee protection

      Application to reopen application to vacate or to cease refugee protection
      63 (1) At any time before the Federal Court has made a final determination in respect of an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection that has been decided or declared abandoned, the Minister or the protected person may make an application to the Division to reopen the application.
      
      Form of application
      (2) The application must be made in accordance with rule 50.
      
      Contact information
      (3) If a protected person makes the application, they must include in the application their contact information and, if represented by counsel, their counsel’s contact information and any limitations on counsel’s retainer, and they must provide a copy of the application to the Minister.
      
      Allegations against counsel
      (4) If it is alleged in the application that the protected person’s counsel in the proceedings that are the subject of the application to reopen provided inadequate representation,
      (a) the protected person must first provide a copy of the application to the counsel and then provide the original application to the Division, and
      (b) the application provided to the Division must be accompanied by a written statement indicating how and when the copy of the application was provided to the counsel.
      
      Copy of pending application
      (5) The application must be accompanied by a copy of any pending application for leave to apply for judicial review or any pending application for judicial review in respect of the application to vacate or to cease refugee protection.
      
      Factor
      (6) The Division must not allow the application unless it is established that there was a failure to observe a principle of natural justice.
      
      Factors
      (7) In deciding the application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
      (a) whether the application was made in a timely manner and the justification for any delay; and
      (b) if a party did not make an application for leave to apply for judicial review or an application for judicial review, the reasons why an application was not made.
      
      Subsequent application
      (8) If the party made a previous application to reopen that was denied, the Division must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.
      
      Other remedies
      (9) If there is a pending application for leave to apply for judicial review or a pending application for judicial review on the same or similar grounds, the Division must, as soon as is practicable, allow the application to reopen if it is necessary for the timely and efficient processing of a claim, or dismiss the application.

      References

      1. Jimenez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 1998 CanLII 7595 (FC), 147 F.T.R. 199.
      2. Narvaez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 514 (CanLII), par. 33, <http://canlii.ca/t/25cg8#par33>, retrieved on 2020-02-07.
      3. 1 2 Narvaez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 514 (CanLII), par. 26, <http://canlii.ca/t/25cg8#par26>, retrieved on 2020-02-07.
      4. 1 2 3 Jimenez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 1998 CanLII 7595 (FC), 147 F.T.R. 199, para. 16.
      5. Narvaez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 514 (CanLII), par. 27, <http://canlii.ca/t/25cg8#par27>, retrieved on 2020-02-07.
      6. Narvaez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 514 (CanLII), par. 30, <http://canlii.ca/t/25cg8#par30>, retrieved on 2020-02-07.
      7. Newterm Ltd., Re (1988), 1988 CanLII 5493 (NL SC), 215 A.P.R. 216 (Nfld. T.D.) at paragraphs 4-5.
      8. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.), at page 649.
      9. Djilal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 812, para. 28.
      10. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Practice Notice — Allegations Against Former Counsel, Date modified: 2018-09-10 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/allegations-former-counsel.aspx> (Accessed April 13, 2020).
      11. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 14, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par14>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      12. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 20, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par20>, retrieved on 2020-03-11
      13. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 19, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par19>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      14. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 147621 (CA IRB), para. 18 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2017/2017canlii147621/2017canlii147621.html>.
      15. Mariyanayagam v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FC 1281 (CanLII), par. 3, <http://canlii.ca/t/h5mhw#par3>, retrieved on 2020-02-07.
      16. X (Re), 2019 CanLII 120805 (CA IRB), par. 14, <http://canlii.ca/t/j46ww#par14>, retrieved on 2020-02-08.
      17. X (Re), 2013 CanLII 97437 (CA IRB), para. 25 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2013/2013canlii97437/2013canlii97437.html>.
      18. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 22, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par22>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      19. Castro Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C., no. IMM-3074-19), Russell, February 04, 2020; 2020 FC 197, para. 61.
      20. Maxamud, Yussuf Maxumed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2907-19), Ahmed, January 24, 2020; 2020 FC 121, para. 20.
      21. Castro Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C., no. IMM-3074-19), Russell, February 04, 2020; 2020 FC 197, para. 66.
      22. Djilal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 812.
      23. Osagie v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1368 (CanLII) at para 27.
      24. Rokisini, Evas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4429-19), Ahmed, April 30, 2020; 2020 FC 575, para. 30.
      25. 1 2 Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 26, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par26>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      26. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 29, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par29>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      27. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 24, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par24>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      28. Mendoza Garcia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 924, paras. 5-8.
      29. Driss, Taleb v. M.C.I.  (F.C., no. IMM-3926-19), Walker, February 17, 2020; 2020 FC 254.

      Applications to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection (Rule 64)

      Rule 64

      The text of rule 64 reads:

      Applications to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection
      
      Form of application
      64 (1) An application to vacate or to cease refugee protection made by the Minister must be in writing and made in accordance with this rule.
      
      Content of application
      (2) In the application, the Minister must include
      (a) the contact information of the protected person and of their counsel, if any;
      (b) the identification number given by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to the protected person;
      (c) the date and file number of any Division decision with respect to the protected person;
      (d) in the case of a person whose application for protection was allowed abroad, the person’s file number, a copy of the decision and the location of the office;
      (e) the decision that the Minister wants the Division to make; and
      (f) the reasons why the Division should make that decision.
      
      Providing application to protected person and Division
      (3) The Minister must provide
      (a) a copy of the application to the protected person; and
      (b) the original of the application to the registry office that provided the notice of decision in the claim or to a registry office specified by the Division, together with a written statement indicating how and when a copy was provided to the protected person.

      Commentary

      History

      The CBSA identified cessation and vacation applications as a priority in 2013-14 and set itself an internal annual target of 875 applications.[1]

      Use of this rule where a previous application to cease or vacate protection has been withdrawn

      A question can arise about the interaction between this rule, which allows the Minister to commence an application to vacate or cease refugee protection, and Rule 61, which allows the Minister to reinstate a withdrawn application to vacate or to cease refugee protection: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Reinstating a Withdrawn Claim or Application#Rule 61 - Application to reinstate withdrawn application to vacate or to cease refugee protection. Where the Minister wishes to reinstate a previous application to vacate or cease refugee protection, they must use Rule 61. However, where the Minister wishes to make a new application based on new facts and allegations, then they may make a new application to cease or vacate refugee status, notwithstanding the existence of a previous withdrawn application for same that was based on different facts. This issue arose in Cohen v. Canada, a case in which a previous Minister's application to vacate refugee protection had been withdrawn by the Minister. The Minister then filed a subsequent application to vacate the applicant’s refugee status pursuant to Rule 64 of the Rules. The RPD found that the Minister’s vacation application filed pursuant to Rule 64 as a “new” application was filed in error and that the application should have been filed pursuant to Rule 61(1) as a reinstatement of the withdrawn application to vacate.[2] The answer as to whether Rule 61 or Rule 64 should be used in a particular case will be a factual one. If the application is substantially based on the previous allegations, or information which, while new to the Minister was obtainable with reasonable diligence, then the Minister should proceed by way of reinstatement. In contrast, where new events occur subsequent to the withdrawal of a previous application, for example a new act of reavailment of a country's protection, then this will point to the use of Rule 64 being appropriate for a new application. Any other result could lead to absurd consequences, for example tying the Minister's hands to bring a new application to cease protection even where a claimant has engaged in new, obvious, and high-profile instances of reavailment that could bring the refugee protection system into disrepute.

      Rule 64(3): The Minister must provide a copy of the application to the protected person

      Rule 64(3) requires that the Minister provide a copy of the application to the protected person and that the Minister provide a written statement indicating how and when a copy was provided to the protected person. In some circumstances, the Minister may not be able to locate the protected person to serve a copy of the application.[3] In those circumstances, the Minister is required to make an application under RPD Rule 40 to vary or be excused from the service requirement. That rule also provides that the RPD must not allow such an application unless it is satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to provide the document as required: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 40 - Application if unable to provide document. This service issue is distinct from issues that arise where a protected person has been served with an application and then does not keep their contact information current with the IRB and Minister; once a protected person has been served with an application, pursuant to RPD Rule 12, the onus is on that person to notify the Division and Minister of any address changes for themselves or their counsel: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 12 - Supplying contact information after an Application to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection.

      Rule 64(3): The Minister must provide a copy of the application to the protected person and this can be done even where the protected person is located outside of Canada

      Rule 64(3) requires the Minister to provide a copy of the application to the protected person. Where the protected person is no longer in Canada, the Minister may be permitted to serve the protected person at an address outside Canada and the person may participate by telephone or other appropriate means.[3] The fact that a protected person is located outside of Canada thus does not relieve the Minister of their service obligation.[4]

      References

      1. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 922.
      2. Cohen v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 FC 1101 (CanLII) <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2018/2018fc1101/2018fc1101.html>
      3. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Legal Resources - Chapter 12 - Applications to Cease Refugee Protection, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/RefDef12.aspx#n1242> (Accessed December 6, 2020).
      4. See, as an example, Seid, Faradj Mabrouk v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2555-18), LeBlanc, November 21, 2018; 2018 FC 1167 at paragraph 16 (protected person served in Chad).

      Abandonment (Rule 65)

      The RPD may declare a claim to be abandoned. A determination that a claim has been abandoned means that the claimant is "in default in the proceedings". Most declarations of abandonment occur because a claimant failed to complete and submit a BOC. However, a significant number of declarations of abandonment occur after a claimant fails to appear for a hearing.[1]

      Subsection 168(1) of the Act

      The relevant provision of the IRPA reads:

      Abandonment of proceeding
      168 (1) A Division may determine that a proceeding before it has been abandoned if the Division is of the opinion that the applicant is in default in the proceedings, including by failing to appear for a hearing, to provide information required by the Division or to communicate with the Division on being requested to do so.

      The Board may be required to provide written reasons for its determination that a claim has been abandoned

      In Parveen v. Canada, the Board provided an oral decision that the claim in question had been abandoned. The court noted that in that case, the RPD’s decision was rendered orally and in the presence of the claimant, her counsel and an interpreter. The court stated that the reasons were "detailed and comprehensive, setting out not only the findings but also the reasons they were made." The claimant then obtained a copy of the transcript of the hearing. The claimant argued on judicial review that the RPD’s failure to provide written reasons amounted to a breach of procedural fairness. The court noted that "it could be argued that the determination that a proceeding has been abandoned is a final decision which entails the rejection of the refugee claim, and that the RPD has an obligation to provide reasons in written form, as per paragraph 169(d) of the IRPA":

      Decisions and reasons
      169 In the case of a decision of a Division, other than an interlocutory decision: 
      …
      (d) if the Refugee Protection Division rejects a claim, written reasons must be provided to the claimant and the Minister;

      The court then went on to note that "on the other hand, it can be said that a determination that a claim has been abandoned is not a decision under section 169 of the IRPA, because it does not decide the merits of a claim, but the more circumscribed question of whether an applicant has abandoned his or her claim. This abandonment of a proceeding is rather dealt with in subsection 168(1) of the IRPA" (quoted above). In that case, the court accepted that "the letter of the law may impose a duty to provide written reasons". The court went on not to grant the judicial review on the basis that the claimant had not been sufficiently prejudiced, but the case does appear to indicate that the law imposes the same obligation to provide written reasons in the case of an abandonment as it does in the case of a rejection of a claim.[2]

      Rule 65(1) - Opportunity to Explain

      The text of Rule 65 (concerning abandonment) reads:

      Abandonment
      
      Opportunity to explain
      65 (1) In determining whether a claim has been abandoned under subsection 168(1) of the Act, the Division must give the claimant an opportunity to explain why the claim should not be declared abandoned,
      (a) immediately, if the claimant is present at the proceeding and the Division considers that it is fair to do so; or
      (b) in any other case, by way of a special hearing.

      Minor claimants must have a representative appointed for them prior to any decision on abandonment being made

      As the Federal Court of Appeal commented in Stumf v. Canada, "the age of the minor claimant was apparent from the outset, and the matter of designating a representative for her should have been considered at least at the point at which abandonment proceedings were in contemplation.... The failure of the Board to do so was an error that vitiates the decision...".[3]

      Rule 65(2) - When the BOC Abandonment hearing must be scheduled

      Special hearing — Basis of Claim Form
      (2) The special hearing on the abandonment of the claim for the failure to provide a completed Basis of Claim Form in accordance with paragraph 7(5)(a) must be held no later than five working days after the day on which the completed Basis of Claim Form was due. At the special hearing, the claimant must provide their completed Basis of Claim Form, unless the form has already been provided to the Division.

      This rule applies whether the BOC form is not supplied at all or whether the BOC form is only partially filled out

      The Board provided the following commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules, which applies equally to this wording:

      The [Form must] be complete. If the Division does not receive the [Form] or if the [Form] is not complete, a special hearing will be held ... to decide whether the claim should be declared abandoned (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, subsection 168(1)). The claimant will be given a chance to explain the delay or default and give reasons why the claim should not be declared abandoned.[4]

      Rule 65(3) - When the special hearing for failure to appear must be scheduled

      Special hearing — failure to appear
      (3) The special hearing on the abandonment of the claim for the failure to appear for the hearing of the claim must be held no later than five working days after the day originally fixed for the hearing of the claim.

      Where a claimant leaves the hearing early, should the Board schedule a resumption or commence the show cause abandonment?

      Nanava v. Canada is a case which raises the question of when the Board should commence the abandonment procedure. Specifically, in that case a hearing before the RPD was commenced on March 2, 2017. At that hearing, Mr. Nanava became ill and fainted. Security personnel attended to him until emergency medical staff arrived. Mr. Nanava eventually regained consciousness and was transported to Mount Sinai Hospital in Toronto, Ontario by the emergency medical staff. Counsel then applied to schedule a new sitting for the hearing of the claim to resume. The Member denied that request, and instead held that the proper procedure was that the claimant should demonstrate why he had not abandoned his claim by fainting and being taken to the hospital. The court commented on the Board's decision thusly:

      I note that the RPD’s decision to embark upon a show cause hearing was also unreasonable. Given that Mr. Nanava and Counsel attended the scheduled March 2 hearing fully prepared to argue Mr. Nanava’s refugee claim, and that they were interrupted during the hearing by medical circumstances beyond Mr. Nanava’s control, it would have been appropriate to adjourn the substantive hearing to another date. In my view, Mr. Nanava was not in default in the proceedings. It follows that the conditions necessary to move into a show cause hearing were not met.[5]

      In contrast, in Liang v. Canada the claimant appeared at the hearing but was not prepared to proceed and refused to do so. In that case, the court found that it was proper for the abandonment process to be triggered when the claimant refused to proceed and left the hearing.[6]

      Rule 65(4) - Factors to consider at an abandonment hearing

      Factors to consider
      (4) The Division must consider, in deciding if the claim should be declared abandoned, the explanation given by the claimant and any other relevant factors, including the fact that the claimant is ready to start or continue the proceedings.

      The Board should consider whether the claimant has pursued their claim with diligence

      Subrule 65(4) directs the RPD to consider, in determining if a claim should be declared abandoned, "the explanation given by the claimant", whether the claimant is ready to start or continue the proceedings, as well as any other relevant factors. The RPD must decide whether the Applicant’s conduct showed that they did not wish or had no interest in pursuing their claim with diligence.[7] It is said that the central consideration with respect to abandonment proceedings is whether the claimant’s conduct amounts to an expression of his or her intention to diligently prosecute his or her claim.[8] Another way that this test has been phrased is that it "must determine whether [the claimant's] absences could reasonably be deemed an expression of his intention to no longer pursue his refugee claim with diligence, bearing in mind his obligation to provide a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear, as well as all of the other relevant factors which bear upon the matter".[9] The Court has held that a person whose safety is threatened in his or her country of origin and who is seeking the protection of a country of refuge is necessarily keen to comply with the legal framework that has been established for that purpose, and that it should not tolerate laxity.[10] Factors that have been considered when assessing a claimant's diligence:

      • Whether the claimant and/or counsel have attended past proceedings before the Board: The Board's claimant guide instructs claimants that "the RPD may declare that your claim has been abandoned if you do not go to your refugee protection claim hearing or do not go to your special hearing on the abandonment of your claim, if you are required to do so."[11] As such, whether or not the claimant is appearing at the Board's proceedings is a very relevant consideration when determining whether or not the claimant has abandoned their claim. In Nanava v. Canada, the fact that Mr. Nanava and Counsel were at Mr. Nanava’s scheduled refugee claim hearing on March 2, 2017 in order to pursue Mr. Nanava’s substantive claim (but were unable to proceed) and the fact that counsel attempted to reschedule the abandonment hearing to a different date when he would be available so that he could reiterate his client’s intent to pursue his claim and show cause for Mr. Nanava’s absence were factors that pointed towards the claimant's continuing interest in pursuing his claim.[12] In contrast, counsel for the Minister argued that "the Member reasonably decided that Mr. Nanava had abandoned his claim after Mr. Nanava failed to show on two separate occasions, and failed to provide a proper medical certificate as evidence of his inability to attend." The court rejected that argument on the facts of that case, but in general this would appear to be a proper consideration to be balanced amongst others.
      • Whether past scheduling accommodations have been provided by the Board: For example, in Uandara v. Canada the Minister highlighted the number of accommodations that the claimants received, including two hearing postponements, the transferring of their file, and the scheduling of a videoconference. The court held that such factors were important in assessing the case: "For people who claim to fear returning to Namibia, the Applicants appear to have made little effort to establish their claim for refugee protection in Canada. The record suggests repeated accommodation by the Board and failures to appear by the Applicants that are more consistent with an attitude of avoidance than an attempt to assert a claim."[13]
      • Whether the claimant has complied with the provisions of the rules to provide medical documents, where applicable: In Parveen v. Canada, the court upheld a Board decision that this factor pointed towards the claimant having abandoned their claim, noting that the claimant lacked diligence in pursuing her claim by not presenting the required medical documentation.[14] Even where a claimant's medical certificate does not comply with Rules 65(5)-(7), this is but one factor that the Board must consider in a global assessment of "any relevant factors". For example, the court commented as follows in Nanava v. Canada: "Under the circumstances, I am not satisfied the Member considered any factors other than the purported inadequacy of Mr. Nanava’s medical evidence. Such an approach is inconsistent with the broad language of subsection 65(4) of the Rules and with the jurisprudence."[9]
      • Whether the claimant has provided credible testimony to explain the delay: In Parveen v. Canada, the panel found that the claimant's explanation of a medical reason for her failure to attend her hearing was not credible as her explanation was shifting, evasive, and inconsistent. The court accepted that this incredible testimony reasonably supported the Board's conclusion that the claimant was not pursuing her claim diligently.[14] Similarly, in Konya v. Canada, the court concluded that the fact that the claimant had submitted a fraudulent medical certificate to attempt to obtain a postponement of the hearing supported the Board's conclusion that they were not pursuing their claim diligently.[15] In contrast, in Nanava v. Canada the claimant's counsel appeared at the claimant's abandonment hearing with medical evidence to show cause for Mr. Nanava’s absence from the abandonment hearing. Even though this evidence did not meet all of the requirements of Rules 65(5)-(7), the court still held that it was relevant to the claimant's continuing intention to pursue his claim.[12]
      • The extent to which the claimant has submitted documents to support the case: As the Board indicated in its public commentary to the previous version of the rules, "Where a party, whether represented by counsel or not, is not prepared to proceed, the Division may determine that the proceeding before it has been abandoned if the Division is of the opinion that the party is in default in the proceedings".[4] The Irwin Law text Refugee Law notes that "although technically a claim may be declared abandoned for any default, including the failure to file documents, only the most serious defaults will generally lead to abandonment proceedings."[1] In Parveen v. Canada, the court upheld a Board decision that this factor pointed towards the claimant having abandoned their claim, noting that "While her claim has been pending for over six years, the Applicant has not submitted any supporting documents and has not given notice of any witnesses to be called. When asked why she had not submitted any supporting documents, the Applicant answered: 'They are … they are there. If you give me two to three weeks, yes, I can come along with those documents' In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the RPD to find that the Applicant was not ready to pursue her claim on the date originally scheduled or on the date of the show cause hearing."[16] As a result, where a party attends their hearing but is manifestly unready to proceed, for example without a complete BOC form that has been appropriately interpreted to them, then this is a factor that may rightfully point towards abandonment. In contrast, in Nanava v. Canada the claimant's counsel appeared at the claimant's abandonment hearing with documents pertaining to a substantive part of Mr. Nanava’s refugee claim in order to reiterate his client’s intent to pursue his claim. The court held that this was a factor pointing towards the claimant's continuing interest in pursuing his claim with diligence.[12]
      • Whether the claimant has been diligent in keeping the Board up to date with their current and correct contact information: The Board's claimant guide instructs claimants about the importance of providing the Board with their current contact information, warning that "the RPD may declare that your claim has been abandoned if you do not provide your current and correct contact information."[11] The RPD Rules also require claimants to provide any changes to their contact information in writing to the Division without delay: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 4 - Claimant's contact information. In Huseen v. Canada, the court commented on the Board's decision to abandon a claim in circumstances where a claimant had moved and had provided the Board with their updated contact information: "the Board had the opportunity and time to contact the [claimant] to inquire about any desire to abandon her claim. Indeed, the change request form had her telephone number and the address at which the [claimant] could have been reached in Alberta. However, the Board did not do so, choosing instead to presume that she intended to have her claim abandoned, despite the message implicit in her change of venue request."[17] The court held in that case that the Board had acted unreasonably. The steps that the claimant took are relevant, whether or not updated contact information actually received the Board, for example in Andreoli v Canada, the claimant had told an interpreter about a change in address, and the interpreter had said they would advise the RPD but failed to do so; the resultant abandonment was held by the Court to be unfair in the circumstances.[18]

      Rules 65(5)-(7) - Medical reasons

      Medical reasons
      (5) If the claimant’s explanation includes medical reasons, other than those related to their counsel, they must provide, together with the explanation, the original of a legible, recently dated medical certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner whose name and address are printed or stamped on the certificate.
      
      Content of certificate
      (6) The medical certificate must set out
      (a) the particulars of the medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevented the claimant from providing the completed Basis of Claim Form on the due date, appearing for the hearing of the claim, or otherwise pursuing their claim, as the case may be; and
      (b) the date on which the claimant is expected to be able to pursue their claim.
      
      Failure to provide medical certificate
      (7) If a claimant fails to provide a medical certificate in accordance with subrules (5) and (6), the claimant must include in their explanation
      (a) particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence;
      (b) particulars of the medical reasons included in the explanation, supported by corroborating evidence; and
      (c) an explanation of how the medical condition prevented them from providing the completed Basis of Claim Form on the due date, appearing for the hearing of the claim or otherwise pursuing their claim, as the case may be.

      Does the claimant's medical certificate comply with the requirements of Rule 65(5) and 65(6)?

      Until further notice, as a result of Covid-19, where the RPD Rules contain a requirement to provide a medical certificate, this requirement as well as the requirement to explain why there is no medical certificate, is waived.[19]

      Rule 65(6)(a): Does the medical certificate set out the particulars of the medical condition?

      Rules 65(6) requires that a claimant provide a medical certificate which sets out the particulars of their medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevented the claimant from pursuing their claim. The Board should assess the sufficiency of the reasons offered in light of the test above, namely which the claimant is diligently pursuing their claim. So, for example, in Uandara v. Canada, the claimants, residing in Edmonton, provided a doctor’s note saying that the female Applicant “probably should not be flying on an airplane to Toronto at this time.” The court held that this would not explain why the claimants could not attend the hearing by videoconference given that the claimants had been advised that they did not need to travel to Toronto for the hearing, that their counsel was participating in the hearing by videoconference, and that the claimant were told that they could participate from Edmonton by videoconference. The court noted that "There is no explanation from the Applicants, or anyone else, as to why they did not ask to attend by videoconference. They simply informed the Board that they would not be attending the hearing and the doctor’s note they eventually provided only speaks to air travel."[20] As such, this is an example of where the claimant's medical condition, even if accepted, did not indicate why the claimant was prevented from appearing for the hearing of the claim. This is an example of the way in which Rule 65(6)(a) requires a medical certificate, but then establishes a legal test for assessing whether the medical reasons offered are sufficient to explain the claimant's non-participation in the hearing.

      Rule 65(6)(b): When will a medical certificate have adequately stated when the claimant is expected to be able to pursue their claim?

      Rule 65(6)(b) indicates that a claimant must provide a medical certificate which sets out the date on which the claimant is expected to be able to pursue their claim. This issue arose in Guo v. Canada, the applicant’s hearing before the RPD was scheduled to take place on January 27, 2014. On January 23, 2014, applicant’s counsel requested that the hearing be postponed because the applicant was sick. In support of this request, counsel filed a letter from the applicant’s doctor dated January 23, 2014, indicating that the applicant: (i) had bronchitis and possibly hypertension, (ii) was prescribed antibiotics and cough syrup, and (iii) told his doctor that he had a fever on the night on January 22, 2014. The doctor's letter included a recommendation that the claimant stay home for one week. The RPD concluded that the claimant had abandoned his claim and that the medical note in question was deficient by failing to indicate the date on which the applicant was expected to be able to pursue the claim. On judicial review, the court concluded that the RPD acted unreasonably in so concluding. The court commented on this issue this way: "It follows that the end of that week indicates the date on which the applicant could be expected to be available. To ask for more seems pedantic."[21] As such, panels of the Board should not adopt an excessive technical or pedantic approach to the application of this rule. In contrast, in Parveen v. Canada, the claimant submitted a prescription and blood test results, documents which did not explain when the claimant would be able to pursue her claim. The court upheld the Board's determination that these documents did not comply with the requirements of Rule 65.[22]

      If the claimant has not provided a medical certificate, have they met the requirements of Rule 65(7)?

      Rule 65(7)(a): The claimant must provide particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate

      A claimant is to provide a medical certificate that complies with the requirements set out in rules 65(5) and 65(6). If they do not do so, they must include in the explanation that they provide to the Board particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence. Where they fail to do so, this will point against the claimant having sufficiently explained why they were nota able to attend their hearing and will point towards them having abandoned their claim. For example, in Parveen v. Canada, the claimant had not supplied the required medical certificate and "no explanation was submitted as to why the Applicant was unable to provide a medical certificate containing the required information in the form prescribed by subrules 65(5) and 65(6) of the RPD Rules." The court concluded that this supported the reasonableness of the Board's conclusion that the medical evidence offered was not sufficient to explain why the claimant had been unable to attend the hearing.

      Rule 65(7)(c): The claimant must explain how their medical condition prevented them from pursuing their claim

      The mere fact that the claimant has received some medical attention is insufficient to explain why they could not pursue their claim or attend at a hearing. In Parveen v. Canada, the claimant had provided a prescription and the results of a blood test, both dated February 15, 2018. The court held that "these documents do not explain why the Applicant was not able to attend on February 16, 2018". The Board held that the medical evidence offered was not sufficient to explain why the claimant had been unable to attend the hearing. The court concluded that this was a reasonable finding on the evidence.[22]

      How should the panel determine whether the medical reasons offered are sufficient?

      The documents offered should include details which "explain why the [claimant] was not able to attend" their hearing.[22] When will the medical documents offer a sufficient explanation? Some principles emerge from the caselaw:

      • A panel of the Board should not second-guess a doctor's recommendations: In Guo v. Canada, the claimant's doctor had diagnosed the claimant with acute bronchitis and had recommended that he stay home for a week. The Board concluded that the claimant's information about his medical condition was not sufficient to substantiate that the claimant would have been unable to participate in the hearing. The court stated that it was "not satisfied that the situation required that the applicant go against his doctor’s recommendation".[23] As such, where a doctor has provided a recommendation (in this case, to stay home) the Board should not second-guess that recommendation without good reason.
      • Even where the technical requirements of the above rules on medical documents have not been complied with, this is just one factor to consider under 65(4) and should not automatically result in the claim being declared abandoned: For example, in Nanava v. Canada, the court commented that "the Member unreasonably fixated upon the technical deficiencies of Mr. Nanava's medical certificates and failed to consider other relevant factors in assessing whether Mr. Nanava had abandoned his claim. As noted above, such an approach is contrary to subsection 65(4) of the Rules and the jurisprudence. As a result, the Decision is unreasonable."[24]

      Rule 65(8) - When the Division must start or continue the proceedings if it decides not to declare the claim abandoned

      Start or continue proceedings
      (8) If the Division decides not to declare the claim abandoned, other than under subrule (2), it must start or continue the proceedings on the day the decision is made or as soon as possible after that day.

      At what point should the Board conclude that a claimant is not late, but instead is not appearing for their hearing?

      The Chairperson Guidelines 7 Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division state that "The hearing will begin promptly as scheduled. Participants must be present on time and ready to proceed by the scheduled start time. If a party or counsel appears within 15 minutes after the scheduled start time, the member will note the explanation for the late arrival on the record." The guidelines go on to state that "after 15 minutes, if it is a claimant who has not appeared, the member will either adjourn the hearing or the claimant will have to appear at a special hearing to explain why the claim should not be declared abandoned."[25] The logic of this 15-minute presumption is bolstered by the fact that the Notice to Appear instructs claimants and counsel to arrive half an hour prior to the actual start time of the hearing, so if a party has not arrived 15 minutes after the start-time of the hearing, they are in that sense 45 minutes late. Nonetheless, where a claimant advises the Board of their lateness or otherwise appears shortly afterwards, it may be possible for the Board to proceed nonetheless.

      Front-End Security Screening (FESS) considerations where a claim is not declared abandoned and will then proceed to hearing

      The Board's Instructions Governing the Management of Refugee Protection Claims Awaiting Front-end Security Screening state that "Abandonment hearings may proceed notwithstanding that confirmation of security screening has not been received. Should a claimant successfully argue that their claim should not be declared abandoned, the matter will then be scheduled for hearing in accordance with these Instructions."[26]

      Statistics about abandonment

      By region

      Of all dispositions for principal claimants in the most recent year for which data are available (2018), about 6.3% of dispositions (claims being accepted, rejected, withdrawn, abandoned, etc.) were abandonments in each of the Central (Toronto) and Eastern (Ottawa and Montreal) regions, but only 2.1% of claims were abandoned in the Board's Western region, which runs from BC to Manitoba:[27]

      New System RPD Claims for Principal Claimants in 2018
      Region Abandoned Claims Total Decisions Abandonments as a Percentage of All Decisions
      Central 482 7629 6.3%
      Eastern 272 4273 6.3%
      Western 47 2149 2.1%

      By country

      Claims from certain countries appear to have disproportionately high (e.g. India, Mexico) or low (e.g. Turkey, Iran) abandonment rates:[27]

      New System RPD Claims for Principal Claimants in 2018, Top 19 Countries with Most Abandonments
      Country Abandoned Claims Total Decisions Abandonments as a Percentage of All Decisions
      India 156 430 36.3%
      Mexico 116 437 26.5%
      Romania 62 225 27.6%
      Nigeria 54 1161 4.7%
      Haiti 52 1573 3.3%
      Somalia 44 468 9.4%
      China 44 752 5.9%
      Pakistan 17 569 3.0%
      Czech Republic 13 47 27.7%
      United States of America 11 73 15.1%
      Colombia 11 257 4.3%
      Eritrea 11 436 2.5%
      Congo, Democratic Republic 10 191 5.2%
      Hungary 9 269 3.3%
      Jamaica 8 71 11.3%
      Sri Lanka 8 130 6.2%
      Iran 8 322 2.5%
      Gambia 7 24 29.2%
      Turkey 7 769 0.9%
      Grand Total 801 14051 5.7%

      By counsel

      About half of all claimants that abandon their claims do not have counsel (398 out of 801 principal claims declared abandoned in 2018). In contrast, overall about 94% of claimants are represented in their new system proceedings before the Board.[27] For example, of the 44 abandonment hearings held in British Columbia in 2013, claimants were represented by counsel at only 16 (or 36 percent). The rate at which claims were declared abandoned was almost twice as high for unrepresented claimants (21 out of 28, or 75 percent) than those who had counsel (7 out of 16, or 44 percent).[28]

      There are a number of hypotheses and explanations about why claimants without counsel are disproportionately likely to abandon their claims, including:

      • The importance of a relationship of trust with counsel in encouraging vulnerable claimants to continue with the process: Part of this may relate to having a trusting relationship with counsel that guides the claimant through the process. In an academic research study, one lawyer interviewed commented on this issue as follows: "establishing a trusting relationship is more than just, you know, something to check off the list. It’s the foundation of your legal representation because vulnerable clients tend to drop off the map if they don’t trust their lawyer."[29] Some lawyers note that "It’s very difficult for people who have low or little education to navigate a complex legal system."[30]
      • Counsel may be unwilling to take cases with a low chance of success: In one UNHCR report, they note that "there is some controversy relating to statistics for Roma asylum seekers, but it is clear that the success rate is low for claimants from Hungary and that a high number have also abandoned (or withdrawn) their claims over the last couple of years. One may presume that implicit in the governmental view on the abandonment/withdrawal rate is that these claimants are not represented (i.e. legal counsel would presumably want to win cases they accept to represent)."[30]
      • Claimants may be denied legal aid based on an assessment of the merit of their claim: Another aspect is that claimants without counsel may be disproportionately likely to have been rejected by legal aid on the basis that their claim lacked merit, and thus they may be disproportionately likely to abandon their claim for reasons associated with likelihood of success, with on UNHCR report stating "it is likely that many unrepresented claimants were refused legal aid following a “chance of success” screening and that their claims may have been relatively weak or unfounded."[31]

      References

      1. 1 2 Martin David Jones and Sasha Baglay. Refugee Law (Second Edition). Irwin Law, 2017, page 307.
      2. Parveen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 155 (CanLII), para. 21.
      3. Stumf v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 148, para. 6.
      4. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
      5. Nanava v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1118 (CanLII), para. 15.
      6. Liang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 918 (CanLII).
      7. Ahamad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 17106 (FC), [2000] 3 FC 109 at para 32
      8. Octave v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 597 at para 18, quoting Ahamad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 17106 (FC), [2000] 3 FC 109, at para 32.
      9. 1 2 Nanava v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1118 (CanLII), para. 12.
      10. Barrientos v Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5278
      11. 1 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Claimant's Guide (Print version), Version 5 - 2018 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-claims/Pages/ClaDemGuide.aspx> (Accessed January 25, 2020).
      12. 1 2 3 Nanava v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1118 (CanLII), para. 13.
      13. Uandara v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 254 (CanLII), para. 36.
      14. 1 2 Parveen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 155 (CanLII), para. 11.
      15. Attila Konya, et. al. v. Canada, Order of Madam Justice Snider, IMM-7163-12 (Date 2013 01 11).
      16. Parveen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 155 (CanLII), para. 29.
      17. Huseen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 845 (CanLII), par. 35, <http://canlii.ca/t/gkmz2#par35>, retrieved on 2020-03-11.
      18. Andreoli v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1111.
      19. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, June 23, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx> (Accessed August 1, 2020).
      20. Uandara v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 254 (CanLII), para. 39.
      21. Guo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 533 (CanLII), para. 11.
      22. 1 2 3 Parveen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 155 (CanLII), para. 26.
      23. Guo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 533 (CanLII), para. 10.
      24. Nanava v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1118 (CanLII), para. 14.
      25. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 7: Concerning Preparation and Conduct of a Hearing in the Refugee Protection Division, Amended December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx#FailureA4> (Accessed January 26, 2020), sections 4.2-4.5.
      26. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Instructions Governing the Management of Refugee Protection Claims Awaiting Front-end Security Screening, Amended: December 15, 2012 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/InstructSecurit.aspx#c3> (Accessed February 3, 2020), at section 4.
      27. 1 2 3 Sean Rehaag, “2018 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates” (19 June 2019), online: https://ccrweb.ca/en/2018-refugee-claim-data
      28. BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC), Refugee Reform and Access to Counsel in British Columbia, July 30, 2015, <https://bcpiac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFBC-Refugee-Reform-Paper-Final-July-30-2015-2.pdf> (Accessed January 12, 2020), page 27.
      29. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y>, page 93 (Accessed January 23, 2020).
      30. 1 2 Barutciski, Michael, The Impact of the Lack of Legal Representation in the Canadian Asylum Process, UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RPT-2012-06-legal_representation-e.pdf> (Accessed January 19, 2020), page 31
      31. Barutciski, Michael, The Impact of the Lack of Legal Representation in the Canadian Asylum Process, UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RPT-2012-06-legal_representation-e.pdf> (Accessed January 19, 2020), page 24

      Notice of Constitutional Question (Rule 66)

      Rule 66 - Notice of Constitutional Question

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      Notice of Constitutional Question

      Notice of constitutional question

      66 (1) A party who wants to challenge the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of a legislative provision must complete a notice of constitutional question.

      Form and content of notice

      (2) The party must complete the notice as set out in Form 69 of the Federal Courts Rules or any other form that includes

      (a) the party’s name;

      (b) the Division file number;

      (c) the date, time and location of the hearing;

      (d) the specific legislative provision that is being challenged;

      (e) the material facts relied on to support the constitutional challenge; and

      (f) a summary of the legal argument to be made in support of the constitutional challenge.

      Providing notice

      (3) The party must provide

      (a) a copy of the notice to the Attorney General of Canada and to the attorney general of each province of Canada, in accordance with section 57 of the Federal Courts Act;

      (b) a copy of the notice to the Minister;

      (c) a copy of the notice to the other party, if any; and

      (d) the original notice to the Division, together with a written statement indicating how and when the copies of the notice were provided under paragraphs (a) to (c), and proof that they were provided.

      Time limit

      (4) Documents provided under this rule must be received by their recipients no later than 10 days before the day on which the constitutional argument is made.

      Commentary

      The RPD possesses jurisdiction to decide questions of law pursuant to subsection 162(1) of the Act, which provides as follows:

      162. (1) Each Division of the Board has, in respect of proceedings brought before it under this Act, sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction.

      However, such constitutional questions must be raised while the Board retains jurisdiction to consider a claim.[1] A claimant cannot return to the Board to raise a constitutional issue after having lost a judicial review at the Federal Court because of s. 170.2 of the Act which provides that:

      170.2 The Refugee Protection Division does not have jurisdiction to reopen on any ground — including a failure to observe a principle of natural justice — a claim for refugee protection, an application for protection or an application for cessation or vacation, in respect of which the Refugee Appeal Division or the Federal Court, as the case may be, has made a final determination.

      Similarly, a claimant cannot raise a constitutional issue before a panel of the Refugee Protection Division regarding a provision of the IRPA that the RPD does not have the jurisdiction to consider or apply.[2]

      References

      1. N.O. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1186 (CanLII), [2016] 2 FCR 378 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2015/2015fc1186/2015fc1186.html>.
      2. X (Re), 2014 CanLII 95758 (CA IRB), para. 16 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2014/2014canlii95758/2014canlii95758.html>.

      Decisions (Rules 67-68)

      IRPA Section 169

      The Act includes the following provisions regarding the obligation to provide reasons:

      Decisions and reasons
      169 In the case of a decision of a Division, other than an interlocutory decision:
      (a) the decision takes effect in accordance with the rules;
      (b) reasons for the decision must be given;
      (c) the decision may be rendered orally or in writing, except a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division, which must be rendered in writing;
      (d) if the Refugee Protection Division rejects a claim, written reasons must be provided to the claimant and the Minister;
      (e) if the person who is the subject of proceedings before the Board or the Minister requests reasons for a decision within 10 days of notification of the decision, or in circumstances set out in the rules of the Board, the Division must provide written reasons; and
      (f) the period in which to apply for judicial review with respect to a decision of the Board is calculated from the giving of notice of the decision or from the sending of written reasons, whichever is later.

      Must the Board provide written reasons for its determination that a claim has been abandoned?

      In Parveen v. Canada, the Board provided an oral decision that the claim in question had been abandoned. The court noted that in that case, the RPD’s decision was rendered orally and in the presence of the claimant, her counsel and an interpreter. The court stated that the reasons were "detailed and comprehensive, setting out not only the findings but also the reasons they were made." The claimant had obtained a copy of the transcript of the hearing. The claimant argued on judicial review that the RPD’s failure to provide written reasons amounted to a breach of procedural fairness. The court noted that "it could be argued that the determination that a proceeding has been abandoned is a final decision which entails the rejection of the refugee claim, and that the RPD has an obligation to provide reasons in written form, as per paragraph 169(d) of the IRPA":

      Decisions and reasons
      169 In the case of a decision of a Division, other than an interlocutory decision: 
      …
      (d) if the Refugee Protection Division rejects a claim, written reasons must be provided to the claimant and the Minister;

      The court then went on to note that "on the other hand, it can be said that a determination that a claim has been abandoned is not a decision under section 169 of the IRPA, because it does not decide the merits of a claim, but the more circumscribed question of whether an applicant has abandoned his or her claim. This abandonment of a proceeding is rather dealt with in subsection 168(1) of the IRPA" (quoted above). In that case, the court accepted that "the letter of the law may impose a duty to provide written reasons". The court went on not to grant the judicial review on the basis that the claimant had not been sufficiently prejudiced, but the case does appear to indicate that the law imposes the same obligation to provide written reasons in the case of an abandonment as it does in the case of a rejection of a claim.[1]

      What percentage of refugee decisions are made publicly available?

      A small percentage of the RPD's decisions are anonymized and made publicly available on services such as CanLII. In Devinat v. Canada, the Board discussed the percentage of decisions which become publicly available, a percentage being published that seems roughly similar to its current practice:

      Excluding claims where there was a waiver or discontinuance, the CRDD rendered 16,630 decisions during 1996 and we anticipate that it will render 19,900 decisions in 1997. The vast majority of CRDD hearings are held behind closed doors to protect claimants' identity. Its decisions and reasons, if any, are communicated to the parties only and not to the public. Some decisions (295 in 1996) are summarized in our publication RefLex (see para. 16) and published in the Quicklaw database. These decisions are edited to remove identifying information before they are made public and entered in the Quicklaw database.[2]

      Rule 67 - Requirement for a Notice of Decision and when written reasons must be provided

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      Decisions
      
      Notice of decision and reasons
      67 (1) When the Division makes a decision, other than an interlocutory decision, it must provide in writing a notice of decision to the claimant or the protected person, as the case may be, and to the Minister.
      
      Written reasons
      (2) The Division must provide written reasons for the decision together with the notice of decision
      (a) if written reasons must be provided under paragraph 169(1)(d) of the Act;
      (b) if the Minister was not present when the Division rendered an oral decision and reasons allowing a claim for refugee protection; or
      (c) when the Division makes a decision on an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection.
      
      Request for written reasons
      (3) A request under paragraph 169(1)(e) of the Act for written reasons for a decision must be made in writing.

      What is the significance of a Notice of Decision issued by the Board registry?

      Member Maria De Andrade of the Refugee Appeal Division considered a case where, on December 9, 2014, the Board sent the appellant a positive notice of decision. There were no reasons included with the notice of decision. Then on December 23, 2014, the IRB sent the appellant a negative notice of decision, and the reasons included with the notice of decision were dated and signed December 3, 2014. The claimant argued that the RPD was functus officio when it sent the appellant a negative notice of decision on December 23, 2014, after it had already sent a positive notice of decision on December 9, 2014. According to the functus officio principle, a decision-maker no longer has jurisdiction over a matter once he or she has delivered the decision: the decision is final after it is signed and has been disclosed to the parties.[3] The RAD rejected this argument, concluding that the functus officio principle did not apply in this case because the first notice of decision was sent as a result of a clerical error by the RPD Registry.[4] The RAD noted rules 67 and 68 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules which stipulate that the Division must provide a notice of decision to the refugee protection claimant and to the Minister together with written reasons. As no written reasons were provided for the positive decision, and the only evidence was that the member signed and dated the reasons for decision on December 3, 2014, that was the only decision made as per Rule 68(1)(b). A similar issue has been raised with regards to oral decisions. Member Veena Verma of the Refugee Appeal Division considered a case where a decision was rendered orally on March 22, 2016 at the hearing and the notice of decision and a copy of the reasons were sent out on May 6, 2016. The RAD commented on these dates as follows:

      I believe it is necessary to clarify the relevant date when considering the admission of new evidence on appeal before the RAD. Subsection 110(4) of the Act refers to the admission of evidence either after or at the time of the rejection. The RPD rendered its oral decision and reasons on March 22, 2016 which is also the date when the decision came into effect. The RPD member did not “sign” his decision on May 6, 2016, rather this is the date on which the RPD Registrar sent the Appellant the Notice of Decision, pursuant to Rule 67 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules, and a written transcript of the decision. In other words, the date of the rejection, and the relevant date in assessing the new evidence under ss. 110(4) of the Act, is March 22, 2016, not May 6, 2016.[5]

      In what language or languages must the reasons for decisions be made available where they are publicly released?

      The Official Languages Act applies to the IRB. Section 20 of the Official Languages Act specifies the circumstances in which a final decision must be made available in both official languages, either simultaneously (s. 20(1)) or in one language and then the other "at the earliest possible time" (s. 20(2)):

      Decisions, orders and judgments that must be made available simultaneously
      20 (1) Any final decision, order or judgment, including any reasons given therefor, issued by any federal court shall be made available simultaneously in both official languages where
      (a) the decision, order or judgment determines a question of law of general public interest or importance; or
      (b) the proceedings leading to its issuance were conducted in whole or in part in both official languages.
      
      Other decisions, orders and judgments
      (2) Where
      (a) any final decision, order or judgment issued by a federal court is not required by subsection (1) to be made available simultaneously in both official languages, or
      (b) the decision, order or judgment is required by paragraph (1)(a) to be made available simultaneously in both official languages but the court is of the opinion that to make the decision, order or judgment, including any reasons given therefor, available simultaneously in both official languages would occasion a delay prejudicial to the public interest or resulting in injustice or hardship to any party to the proceedings leading to its issuance,
      the decision, order or judgment, including any reasons given therefor, shall be issued in the first instance in one of the official languages and thereafter, at the earliest possible time, in the other official language, each version to be effective from the time the first version is effective.

      It is notable that the Official Languages Act provides that the above obligations apply to "federal courts". This is a defined term which, per s. 3(2) of the Act, provides that the IRB is considered a "federal court" for the purposes of the preceding obligations: "In this section and in Parts II and III, federal court means any court, tribunal or other body that carries out adjudicative functions and is established by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament."[6] The Federal Court of Appeal considered the applicability of this provision of the Immigration and Refugee Board in Devinat v. Canada, upholding the following summary of the law from the motions judge in the case:

      In my view, the terms of section 20 of the OLA are clear. They require all federal courts, including the respondent [the IRB], to issue their decisions, orders and judgments in both official languages at the earliest possible time in most cases or simultaneously in the cases provided for in paragraph 20(1)(a), unless this would be seriously prejudicial to the public or result in injustice or hardship to any party, and in paragraph 20(1)(b).[7]

      As such, where the Board makes a decision available to the public, say via the CanLII website, they must do so in both official languages.

      Rule 68(1) - When a decision of a single member panel takes effect

      When decision of single member takes effect
      68 (1) A decision made by a single Division member allowing or rejecting a claim for refugee protection, on an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection, on the abandonment of a claim or of an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection, or allowing an application to withdraw a claim or to withdraw an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection takes effect
      (a) if given orally at a hearing, when the member states the decision and gives the reasons; and
      (b) if made in writing, when the member signs and dates the reasons for the decision.

      Rule 68(2) - When a decision of a three member panel takes effect

      When decision of three member panel takes effect
      (2) A decision made by a panel of three Division members allowing or rejecting a claim for refugee protection, on an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection, on the abandonment of a claim or of an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection, or allowing an application to withdraw a claim or to withdraw an application to vacate or to cease refugee protection takes effect
      (a) if given orally at a hearing, when all the members state their decision and give their reasons; and
      (b) if made in writing, when all the members sign and date their reasons for the decision.

      Policy and legislation on three-member panels

      The IRB has a policy on the designation of three-member panels at the Refugee Protection Division.[8] Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), hearings by a single member of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) are the norm. This presumption is reflected in the wording of section 163 of the IRPA, which reads: "Matters before a Division shall be conducted before a single member unless, except for matters before the Immigration Division, the Chairperson is of the opinion that a panel of three members should be constituted." The Chairperson's authority to designate three-member panels for matters before the RPD has been delegated to the Deputy Chairperson (DC) and to the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons (ADCs) of the RPD. Under this delegation cases may only be designated to be heard by three-member panels for training purposes. There were 94 new system hearings in 2018 in which a three-member panel was designated (0.7% of all hearings).[9]

      History of two-member panels at the Board

      The court has observed that throughout the 1990s, the Board carried a very heavy caseload and had a large membership. Its approximately 200 members sat across Canada in panels of two. That ended with the Introduction of the IRPA in the early 2000s.[10]

      References

      1. Parveen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 155 (CanLII), para. 21.
      2. Devinat v. Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board), 1999 CanLII 9386 (FCA), [2000] 2 FC 212, par. 64, <http://canlii.ca/t/4ll0#64>, retrieved on 2020-01-25.
      3. Arango v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 370 (CanLII).
      4. X (Re), 2015 CanLII 81070 (CA IRB), paras. 28-34 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2015/2015canlii81070/2015canlii81070.html>.
      5. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 52321 (CA IRB), para. 18 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2017/2017canlii52321/2017canlii52321.html>.
      6. Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp), s 3(2) <http://canlii.ca/t/530sl#sec3subsec2> retrieved on 2020-01-25.
      7. Devinat v. Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board), 1999 CanLII 9386 (FCA), [2000] 2 FC 212, par. 57, <http://canlii.ca/t/4ll0#57>, retrieved on 2020-01-25
      8. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Designation of three-member panels - Refugee Protection Division, Effective Date: September 2, 2015, Accessed January 6, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/PolRpdSpr3MemCom.aspx>.
      9. Sean Rehaag, “2018 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates” (19 June 2019), online: https://ccrweb.ca/en/2018-refugee-claim-data
      10. Kozak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124 (CanLII), [2006] 4 FCR 377, para. 55.

      General Provisions (Rules 69-71)

      The court has stated that the purpose of the following collection of rules "is to give the boards the flexibility to control their own processes by applying rules liberally to deal with proceedings in an informal and expeditious manner."[1]

      Rule 69 - No applicable rule

      The text of the relevant rules reads:

      General Provisions
      
      No applicable rule
      69 In the absence of a provision in these Rules dealing with a matter raised during the proceedings, the Division may do whatever is necessary to deal with the matter.

      This rule relates to the common law that tribunals control their own processes

      This rule relates to the common law as articulated in Siloch v. Canada where Décary J.A. recalled the general rule that, “It is well settled that in the absence of specific rules laid down by statute or regulation, administrative tribunals control their own proceedings … subject to the proviso that they comply with the rules of fairness and, where they exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the rules of natural justice.”[2]

      Rule 70 - Power to change a rule, excuse a person from a rule, extend a time limit, or act on its own initiative

      Powers of Division
      70 The Division may, after giving the parties notice and an opportunity to object,
      (a) act on its own initiative, without a party having to make an application or request to the Division;
      (b) change a requirement of a rule;
      (c) excuse a person from a requirement of a rule; and
      (d) extend a time limit, before or after the time limit has expired, or shorten it if the time limit has not expired.

      The procedural notice requirement in Rule 70 is a precondition for a panel to rely on it

      In engaging Rule 70 to amend the Rules, the RPD is required to take action, including by providing notice to parties that it is considering taking any of the actions listed in Rule 70, such as waiving a requirement of a rule. As noted in Cohen v. Canada, Rule 70 only applies when its requirements have been complied with, and it is not engaged if the Division does not take any explicit actions as required by the rule.[3] The requirement that before a Division of the IRB acts on its own initiative, it will give prior notice to the parties and give them an opportunity to object, was a substantive change to a previous draft of the Rules that resulted from the feedback of the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations.[4]

      Rule 71 - Failure to follow a rule

      Failure to follow rule
      71 Unless proceedings are declared invalid by the Division, a failure to follow any requirement of these Rules does not make the proceedings invalid.

      Effect of Rule 71 where the Division has explicitly changed the requirement of a rule

      The Federal Court commented on the meaning of what is now Rule 71 in Cohen v. Canada, noting that this provision appears to relate to the authority of the RPD to act to change the requirement of a Rule. That is, the failure to follow a Rule once changed does not render a proceeding invalid.[5] This is exemplified by the follow decision from the RAD, interpreting its analogous rule, where the panel concluded that, despite the fact that an application to withdraw an appeal was not made in conformity with the relevant rule, it would nonetheless be accepted:

      Rule 54 of the RAD Rules states that unless proceedings are declared invalid by the RAD, a failure to follow any requirement of these Rules does not make the proceedings invalid. Having analyzed the notice to withdraw submitted by the appellant on September 8, 2016, I am of the opinion that it is necessary, in the circumstances, to accept this withdrawal, even though it was not made in accordance with subrule 47(3) of the RAD Rules.[6]

      Effect of Rule 71 where the Division has not explicitly changed the requirement of a rule

      Rule 71 is also relevant to cases where a rule was not been followed, but this divergence from the rules was not explicitly authorized by the Division. Member Favreau of the Refugee Appeal Division commented on this in a case where the Minister had intervened in a case but, despite the requirement in Rule 29(2)(a) that the Minister identify the purpose of their intervention in their intervention notice, the Minister had not done so. The question for the Refugee Appeal Division in that case was whether that breach of the rules should lead to the original refugee determination proceeding being set aside. The RAD declined to set aside the RPD determination on the basis that the breach of the Rules was not necessarily a breach of procedural fairness:

      The purpose of the Rules in question is intended to ensure a claimant knows the case against them. The RAD takes note that Rule 71 states that, unless proceedings are declared invalid by the Division, a failure to follow any requirement of these Rules does not make the proceedings invalid. While it can be true in some cases that a failure to follow the Rules may result in a breach of procedural fairness, it is not true in the present case. The RAD must consider what impact that breach of the Rules had on the affected parties, in this case, the Appellants.[7]

      In this way, Rule 71 emphasizes that a failure to follow any requirements of the Rules does not, in and of itself, make proceedings invalid; such a breach may point, however, to the proceedings having been unfair.

      References

      1. Ahmed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1157 (CanLII), para. 42.
      2. Siloch v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] F.C.J. No. 10 (FCA).
      3. Cohen v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 FC 1101 (CanLII), para. 16 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2018/2018fc1101/2018fc1101.html>.
      4. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, RPD Rules Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Date modified: 2018-07-04, Accessed January 3, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/act-rules-regulations/Pages/RiasReir.aspx>.
      5. Cohen v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 FC 1101 (CanLII), para. 12 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2018/2018fc1101/2018fc1101.html>.
      6. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 98458 (CA IRB), para. 3.
      7. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107460 (CA IRB), para. 11 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/2016/2016canlii107460/2016canlii107460.html>.

      Coming into Force (Rule 74)

      Rule 74

      The text of the relevant rule reads:

      *74 These Rules come into force on the day on which section 26 of the Balanced Refugee Reform Act comes into force, but if they are registered after that day, they come into force on the day on which they are registered.

      Commentary

      Schedules to the Rules

      Schedule 1 - Claimant’s Information and Basis of Claim

      The text of this schedule to the rules follows:

      SCHEDULE 1
      (Rule 1)
      
      Claimant’s Information and Basis of Claim
      
      Item	Information
      1	Claimant’s name.
      2	Claimant’s date of birth.
      3	Claimant’s gender.
      4	Claimant’s nationality, ethnic or racial group, or tribe.
      5	Languages and dialects, if any, that the claimant speaks.
      6	Claimant’s religion and denomination or sect.
      7	Whether the claimant believes that they would experience harm, mistreatment or threats if they returned to their country today. If yes, description of what the claimant expects would happen, including who would harm, mistreat or threaten them and what the claimant believes would be the reasons for it.
      8	Whether the claimant or the claimant’s family have ever experienced harm, mistreatment or threats in the past. If yes, a description of the harm, mistreatment or threats, including when it occurred, who caused it, what the claimant believes are the reasons for it and whether similarly situated persons have experienced such harm, mistreatment or threats.
      9	Whether the claimant sought protection or help from any authority or organization in their country. If not, an explanation of why not. If yes, the authority or organization from which the claimant sought protection or help and a description of what the claimant did and what happened as a result.
      10	When the claimant left their country and the reasons for leaving at that time.
      11	Whether the claimant moved to another part of their country to seek safety. If not, an explanation of why not. If the claimant moved to another part of their country, the reasons for leaving it and an explanation why the claimant could not live there or in another part of their country today.
      12	Whether the claimant moved to another country to seek safety. If yes, details including the name of the country, when the claimant moved there, length of stay and whether the claimant claimed refugee protection there. If the claimant did not claim refugee protection there, an explanation of why not.
      13	Whether minors are claiming refugee protection with the claimant. If yes, whether the claimant is the minor’s parent and the other parent is in Canada, or whether the claimant is not the minor’s parent, or whether the claimant is the minor’s parent but the other parent is not in Canada. If the claimant is not the minor’s parent or if the claimant is the minor’s parent but the other parent is not in Canada, details of any legal documents or written consent allowing the claimant to take care of the minor or travel with the minor. If the claimant does not have such documents, an explanation of why not.
      14	If a child six years old or younger is claiming refugee protection with the claimant, an explanation of why the claimant believes the child would be at risk of being harmed, mistreated or threatened if returned to their country.
      15	Other details the claimant considers important for the refugee protection claim.
      16	Country or countries in which the claimant believes they are at risk of serious harm.
      17	The country or countries in which the claimant is or has been a citizen, including how and when citizenship was acquired and present status.
      18	Name, date of birth, citizenship and place and country of residence of relatives, living or dead, specifically the claimant’s spouse, common-law partner, children, parents, brothers and sisters.
      19	If the claimant or the claimant’s spouse, common-law partner, child, parent, brother or sister has claimed refugee protection or asylum in Canada or in any other country — including at a Canadian office abroad or from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees — the details of the claim including the name of the person who made the claim, and the date, location, result of the claim and IRB file number or CIC client ID number, if any.
      20	Whether the claimant applied for a visa to enter Canada. If yes, for what type of visa, the date of the application, at which Canadian office the application was made and whether or not it was accepted. If the visa was issued, the date of issue and the duration of the visa. If the application was refused, the date and reasons of refusal.
      21	Claimant’s contact information.
      22	Whether the claimant has counsel and if so, details concerning counsel — including what counsel has been retained to do and counsel’s contact information.
      23	Claimant’s choice of official language for communications with and proceedings before the Board.
      24	Whether the claimant needs an interpreter during any proceeding, and the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted.

      Schedule 2 - Information To Be Provided About the Claimant by an Officer

      SCHEDULE 2
      (Paragraph 3(5)(d))
      
      Information To Be Provided About the Claimant by an Officer
      
      Item	Information
      1	Name, gender and date of birth.
      2	Department of Citizenship and Immigration client identification number.
      3	If the claimant is detained, the name and address of the place of detention.
      4	Claimant’s contact information in Canada, if any.
      5	Contact information of any counsel for the claimant.
      6	Official language chosen by the claimant as the language of proceedings before the Board.
      7	Date the claim was referred or deemed to be referred to the Division.
      8	Section of the Act under which the claim is being referred.
      9	Officer’s decision about the claim’s eligibility under section 100 of the Act, if a decision has been made.
      10	The country or countries in which the claimant fears persecution, torture, a risk to their life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
      11	Whether the claimant may need a designated representative and the contact information for any proposed designated representative.
      12	Whether the claimant needs an interpreter, including a sign language interpreter, during any proceeding, and the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted.
      13	If a claim of the claimant’s spouse, common-law partner or any relative has been referred to the Division, the name and Department of Citizenship and Immigration client identification numbers of each of those persons.
      14	When and how the officer notified the claimant of the referral of the claim to the Division.
      15	Whether the claim was made at a port of entry or inside Canada other than at a port of entry.
      16	Any other information gathered by the officer about the claimant that is relevant to the claim.

      Schedule 3 - Information and Declarations — Counsel Not Representing or Advising for Consideration

      SCHEDULE 3
      (Rules 5 and 13)
      
      Information and Declarations — Counsel Not Representing or Advising for Consideration
      
      Item	Information
      1	IRB Division and file number with respect to the claimant or protected person.
      2	Name of counsel who is representing or advising the claimant or protected person and who is not receiving consideration for those services.
      3	Name of counsel’s firm or organization, if applicable, and counsel’s postal address, telephone number, fax number and email address, if any.
      4	If applicable, a declaration, signed by the interpreter, that includes the interpreter’s name, the language and dialect, if any, interpreted and a statement that the interpretation is accurate.
      5	Declaration signed by the claimant or protected person that the counsel who is representing or advising them is not receiving consideration and the information provided in the form is complete, true and correct.
      6	Declaration signed by counsel that they are not receiving consideration for representing or advising the claimant or protected person and that the information provided in the form is complete, true and correct.
      

      Commentary

      Annotated Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations

      Regulations Regarding Documents and Certified Copies

      The Regulation

      The text of the relevant section of the regulation reads:

      DIVISION 3
      Documents and Certified Copies
      
      Production of documents
      
      13 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a requirement of the Act or these Regulations to produce a document is met
      (a) by producing the original document;
      (b) by producing a certified copy of the original document; or
      (c) in the case of an application, if there is an application form on the Department’s website, by completing and producing the form printed from the website or by completing and submitting the form on-line, if the website indicates that the form can be submitted on-line.
      
      Exception
      (2) Unless these Regulations provide otherwise, a passport, a permanent resident visa, a permanent resident card, a temporary resident visa, a temporary resident permit, a work permit or a study permit may be produced only by producing the original document.

      Commentary

      References

        Section 13.11: Regulations Regarding Disclosure of Personal Information

        The Regulation

        The text of the relevant section of the regulation reads:

        DIVISION 4.1
        Use and Disclosure of Biometric Information and Related Personal Information
        
        Disclosure of information
        
        13.11 (1) Any biometric information and related personal information set out in subsection (2) that is collected under the Act and provided to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may be used or disclosed by it to a law enforcement agency in Canada for the following purposes, if there is a potential match between fingerprints collected under the Act and fingerprints collected by it or submitted to it by a law enforcement agency in Canada:
        (a) to establish or verify the identity of a person in order to prevent, investigate or prosecute an offence under any law of Canada or a province; and
        (b) to establish or verify the identity of a person whose identity cannot reasonably be otherwise established or verified because of a physical or mental condition or because of their death.
        
        Information that may be used or disclosed
        
        (2) The following information in respect of a foreign national or a permanent resident may be used or disclosed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police under subsection (1):
        (a) their fingerprints and the date on which they were taken;
        (b) their surname and first name;
        (c) their other names and aliases, if any;
        (d) their date of birth;
        (e) their gender; and
        (f) any file number associated with the biometric information or related personal information.

        Commentary

        References

          Section 315.21, et al.: Regulations Regarding Information Sharing Between Countries

          The Regulation

          The text of the relevant section of the regulation reads:

          PART 19.1
          Information Sharing Between Countries
          

          Commentary

          These provisions are quite lengthy and so they are not produced here, but see them on CanLII.[1]

          References

          1. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 315.21 <http://canlii.ca/t/543bm#sec315.21> retrieved on 2020-01-31

          Section 159.9: Regulations Regarding Time Limits for Holding Hearings

          Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations

          The text of the relevant section of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations[1] reads:

          Hearing Before Refugee Protection Division
          
          Time limits for hearing
          159.9 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), for the purpose of subsection 100(4.1) of the Act, the date fixed for the hearing before the Refugee Protection Division must be not later than
          (a) in the case of a claimant referred to in subsection 111.1(2) of the Act,
          (i) 30 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, if the claim is made inside Canada other than at a port of entry, and
          (ii) 45 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, if the claim is made inside Canada at a port of entry; and
          (b) in the case of any other claimant, 60 days after the day on which the claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division, whether the claim is made inside Canada at a port of entry or inside Canada other than at a port of entry.
          
          Exclusion
          (2) If the time limit set out in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) or paragraph (1)(b) ends on a Saturday, that time limit is extended to the next working day.
          
          Exceptions
          (3) If the hearing cannot be held within the time limit set out in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) or paragraph (1)(b) for any of the following reasons, the hearing must be held as soon as feasible after that time limit:
          (a) for reasons of fairness and natural justice;
          (b) because of a pending investigation or inquiry relating to any of sections 34 to 37 of the Act; or
          (c) because of operational limitations of the Refugee Protection Division.
          

          Commentary

          For a discussion of the issues raised in the interpretation of this regulation, see the commentary for the following RPD Rules: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding

          References

          1. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227

          Section 159.8: Regulations Regarding Time Limits for Providing Documents

          The Regulation

          The text of the relevant section of the regulation reads:

          Documents and Information
          
          Time limit — provision of documents and information to officer
          159.8 (1) For the purpose of subsection 99(3.1) of the Act, a person who makes a claim for refugee protection inside Canada other than at a port of entry must provide an officer with the documents and information referred to in that subsection not later than the day on which the officer determines the eligibility of their claim under subsection 100(1) of the Act.
          
          Time limit — provision of documents and information to Refugee Protection Division
          (2) Subject to subsection (3), for the purpose of subsection 100(4) of the Act, a person who makes a claim for refugee protection inside Canada at a port of entry must provide the Refugee Protection Division with the documents and information referred to in subsection 100(4) not later than 15 days after the day on which the claim is referred to that Division.
          
          Extension
          (3) If the documents and information cannot be provided within the time limit set out in subsection (2), the Refugee Protection Division may, for reasons of fairness and natural justice, extend that time limit by the number of days that is necessary in the circumstances.
          

          Commentary

          Time limit for persons to complete and provide the Basis of Claim form

          For a discussion of the deadlines for persons providing their BOC forms, whether they are making a POE claim, an inland claim, or are detained, see the commentary to Rule 7: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#When a claimant must provide their BOC form. The commentary to Rule 8 discusses the interpretation of this regulation and the way that the extension provision (s. 159.8(3)) should be interpreted: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 8 - Application for an extension of time to provide BOC.

          If a claimant does not meet the above timeline, the the BOC Abandonment process will commence

          If a claimant does not submit their BOC form within the timeline specified above, then the process for BOC Abandonment specified in Rule 65 will be triggered: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Abandonment#Rule 65(2) - When the BOC Abandonment hearing must be scheduled

          References

            Section 159-159.7: Regulations Regarding Eligibility to Claim and Safe Third Countries

            Regulation s. 159

            The text of the relevant section of the regulation reads:

            Determination of Eligibility of Claim
            
            Working day
            159 For the purposes of subsections 100(1) and (3) of the Act,
            (a) a working day does not include Saturdays or holidays;
            (b) a day that is not a working day is not included in the calculation of the three-day period; and
            (c) the three-day period begins from the day on which the claim is received.
            
            Definitions
            159.1 The following definitions apply in this section and sections 159.2 to 159.7.
            Agreement means the Agreement dated December 5, 2002 between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries. (Accord)
            claimant means a claimant referred to in paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act. (demandeur)
            designated country means a country designated by section 159.3. (pays désigné)
            family member, in respect of a claimant, means their spouse or common-law partner, their legal guardian, and any of the following persons, namely, their child, father, mother, brother, sister, grandfather, grandmother, grandchild, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. (membre de la famille)
            legal guardian, in respect of a claimant who has not attained the age of 18 years, means a person who has custody of the claimant or who is empowered to act on the claimant’s behalf by virtue of a court order or written agreement or by operation of law. (tuteur légal)
            United States means the United States of America, but does not include Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam or any other United States of America possession or territory. (États-Unis)
            
            Non-application — former habitual residence
            159.2 Paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act does not apply to a claimant who is a stateless person who comes directly or indirectly to Canada from a designated country that is their country of former habitual residence.
            
            Designation — United States
            159.3 The United States is designated under paragraph 102(1)(a) of the Act as a country that complies with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, and is a designated country for the purpose of the application of paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act.
            
            Non-application — ports of entry other than land ports of entry
            159.4 (1) Paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act does not apply to a claimant who seeks to enter Canada at
            (a) a location that is not a port of entry;
            (b) a port of entry that is a harbour port, including a ferry landing; or
            (c) subject to subsection (2), a port of entry that is an airport.
            
            In transit exception
            (2) Paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act applies to a claimant who has been ordered removed from the United States and who seeks to enter Canada at a port of entry that is an airport while they are in transit through Canada from the United States in the course of the enforcement of that order.
            
            Non-application — claimants at land ports of entry
            159.5 Paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act does not apply if a claimant who seeks to enter Canada at a location other than one identified in paragraphs 159.4(1)(a) to (c) establishes, in accordance with subsection 100(4) of the Act, that
            (a) a family member of the claimant is in Canada and is a Canadian citizen;
            (b) a family member of the claimant is in Canada and is
            (i) a protected person within the meaning of subsection 95(2) of the Act,
            (ii) a permanent resident under the Act, or
            (iii) a person in favour of whom a removal order has been stayed in accordance with section 233;
            (c) a family member of the claimant who has attained the age of 18 years is in Canada and has made a claim for refugee protection that has been referred to the Board for determination, unless
            (i) the claim has been withdrawn by the family member,
            (ii) the claim has been abandoned by the family member,
            (iii) the claim has been rejected, or
            (iv) any pending proceedings or proceedings respecting the claim have been terminated under subsection 104(2) of the Act or any decision respecting the claim has been nullified under that subsection;
            (d) a family member of the claimant who has attained the age of 18 years is in Canada and is the holder of a work permit or study permit other than
            (i) a work permit that was issued under paragraph 206(b) or that has become invalid as a result of the application of section 209, or
            (ii) a study permit that has become invalid as a result of the application of section 222;
            (e) the claimant is a person who
            (i) has not attained the age of 18 years and is not accompanied by their mother, father or legal guardian,
            (ii) has neither a spouse nor a common-law partner, and
            (iii) has neither a mother or father nor a legal guardian in Canada or the United States;
            (f) the claimant is the holder of any of the following documents, excluding any document issued for the sole purpose of transit through Canada, namely,
            (i) a permanent resident visa or a temporary resident visa referred to in section 6 and subsection 7(1), respectively,
            (ii) a temporary resident permit issued under subsection 24(1) of the Act,
            (iii) a travel document referred to in subsection 31(3) of the Act,
            (iv) refugee travel papers issued by the Minister, or
            (v) a temporary travel document referred to in section 151;
            (g) the claimant is a person
            (i) who may, under the Act or these Regulations, enter Canada without being required to hold a visa, and
            (ii) who would, if the claimant were entering the United States, be required to hold a visa; or
            (h) the claimant is
            (i) a foreign national who is seeking to re-enter Canada in circumstances where they have been refused entry to the United States without having a refugee claim adjudicated there, or
            (ii) a permanent resident who has been ordered removed from the United States and is being returned to Canada.
            
            Non-application — claimants at land ports of entry and in transit
            159.6 Paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act does not apply if a claimant establishes, in accordance with subsection 100(4) of the Act, that the claimant
            (a) is charged in the United States with, or has been convicted there of, an offence that is punishable with the death penalty in the United States; or
            (b) is charged in a country other than the United States with, or has been convicted there of, an offence that is punishable with the death penalty in that country.
            (c) [Repealed, SOR/2009-210, s. 1]
            
            Temporal operation
            159.7 (1) For the purposes of paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act, the application of all or part of sections 159.1 to 159.6 and this section is discontinued, in accordance with subsections (2) to (6), if
            (a) a notice of suspension of the Agreement setting out the period of suspension is publicized broadly in the various regions of Canada by the Minister via information media and on the website of the Department;
            (b) a notice of renewal of the suspension of the Agreement setting out the period of renewal of suspension is published in accordance with subsection (6);
            (c) a notice of suspension of a part of the Agreement is issued by the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States; or
            (d) a notice of termination of the Agreement is issued by the Government of Canada or the Government of the United States.
            
            Paragraph (1)(a) — notice of suspension of Agreement
            (2) Subject to subsection (3), if a notice of suspension of the Agreement is publicized under paragraph (1)(a), sections 159.2 to 159.6 are rendered inoperative for a period of up to three months that shall be set out in the notice, which period shall begin on the day after the day on which the notice is publicized.
            
            Paragraph (1)(b) — notice of renewal of suspension of Agreement
            (3) If a notice of renewal of the suspension of the Agreement is published under paragraph (1)(b), sections 159.2 to 159.6 are rendered inoperative for the further period of up to three months set out in the notice.
            
            Paragraph (1)(c) — suspension of part of Agreement
            (4) If a notice of suspension of part of the Agreement is issued under paragraph (1)(c), those provisions of these Regulations relating to the application of the Agreement that are referred to in the notice are rendered inoperative for a period that shall be set out in the notice. All other provisions of these Regulations continue to apply.
            
            Paragraph (1)(d) — termination of Agreement
            (5) If a notice of termination of the Agreement is issued under paragraph (1)(d), sections 159.1 to 159.6 and this section cease to have effect on the day set out in the notice.
            
            Publication requirement — Canada Gazette
            (6) Any notice referred to in paragraph (1)(b), (c) or (d) shall be published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, not less than seven days before the day on which the renewal, suspension in part or termination provided for in the notice is effective.
            

            Text of the agreement

            The above regulatory provisions implement the text of the Safe Third Country Agreement in Canadian law; see this citation for the text of the agreement between Canada and the US itself.[1]

            Factual background to the Safe Third Country Agreement

            The political background against which the safe third country agreement operates is the much higher number of refugee claims that Canada receives per capita than does the United States. The United States and Canada are both popular asylum-seeker destinations that conduct Refugee Status Determination on a relatively large scale. The United States consistently receives more asylum applications than any other country; in 2012, it received 17.4% of the total number of asylum applications lodged worldwide. Canada tends to hover in the top five most common receiving countries; in 2008 it was the second most popular and in 2012 it was sixth, with 4.3% of worldwide applications. Canada receives far more asylum seekers per capita than does the United States - during the five-year period between 2006 and 2010, for example, Canada received one asylum application for every 236 residents; in the United States, the ratio was one asylum application per every 1200 residents.[2]

            The "Direct Back Policy"

            Canada and the US have both employed what is termed the "direct back policy", which is related to, but distinct from the Safe Third Country Agreement. The "direct back policy” refers to the process whereby an asylum seeker approaches a port of entry at a time when border officials are unable to process his or her claim and is returned to the other country (primarily, returned to the U.S. from Canada[3]) after having been given a scheduled time for an interview. The policy was established by Canada in 2003, after the Safe Third Country Agreement was signed, but before it was implemented,[4] at a time when there was reportedly a large and sudden influx of persons arriving from the United States who wanted to lodge their claims in Canada before the entry into force of the Safe Third Country Agreement.[5] The UNHCR has criticized this policy on the basis that many claimants are not allowed to re-enter Canada to attend their scheduled interviews, writing in a report on the subject that "This has been especially problematic for asylum-seekers directed back from Canada to the United States, as a number were detained in the United States and unable to attend their scheduled interviews."[6] Canadian authorities stated that they have largely phased out the use of “direct back policies” as of August 31, 2006,[7] and going forward, it will be used only in exceptional cases.[8] See the 2007 amendments to Canadian policy manuals for details regarding the current parameters of Canada's direct back policy.[9]

            Constitutionality of the Safe Third Country Agreement with the United States

            In Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, the Federal Court held that IRPA s. 101(1)(e) and IRPR s.159.3 are declared to be no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 because they violate s. 7 of the Charter.[10] The Government of Canada appealed the Federal Court decision in August 2020.[11] The Federal Court's declaration of invalidity is currently suspended pending the outcome of the case at the Federal Court of Appeal.

            References

            1. Government of Canada, Final Text of the Safe Third Country Agreement, December 5, 2002 <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/safe-third-country-agreement/final-text.html> (Accessed August 22, 2020).
            2. Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. New York: Oxford University Press,  2014. Print. Page 26.
            3. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, A Partnership for Protection: One Year Review, Executive Summary (November 2006) at 13.
            4. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Refugee Law After 9/11: Sanctuary and Security in Canada and the US, UBC Press, 2020, ISBN 9780774861502, page 211.
            5. Canadian Council for Refugees, Closing the Front Door on Refugees: Report on the Safe Third Country Agreement, Six Months after Implementation, August 2005, <https://ccrweb.ca/files/closingdoordec05.pdf> (Accessed August 23, 2020), at 23.
            6. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, 2008 FCA 229 (CanLII), [2009] 3 FCR 136, par. 95, <http://canlii.ca/t/1z69f#par95>, retrieved on 2020-03-22.
            7. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, 2008 FCA 229 (CanLII), [2009] 3 FCR 136, par. 96, <http://canlii.ca/t/1z69f#par96>, retrieved on 2020-03-22.
            8. Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, House of Commons, "Testimony of Francisco Rico-Martinez", 39th Parl, 1st Sess (February 8, 2007) at 7.
            9. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ENF-4: Port of Entry Examinations, Dated 2019-08-15 <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf04-eng.pdf> (Accessed March 22, 2020) at, inter alia, page 5.
            10. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) (F.C., nos. IMM-775-17; IMM-2229-17; IMM-2977-17) McDonald, July 22, 2020; 2020 FC 770.
            11. Idil Atak, Zainab Abu Alrob, Claire Ellis, Expanding refugee ineligibility: Canada’s response to secondary refugee movements, Journal of Refugee Studies, 14 December 2020, https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1093/jrs/feaa103 at page 7.

            Annotated Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) Provisions

            Summary of provisions of the IRPA concerning refugees

            Subject Legislative Reference
            Objectives and application of the IRPA as concerns refugees A2, A3
            The right of the Minister of PSEP or IRCC to intervene at the RPD A170
            Definition of refugee protection A95(1)
            Definition of protected person A95(2)
            Definition of person in need of protection A97
            Definition of Convention Refugee A96
            Exclusion from the definition of refugee or of person in need of protection A98
            Application for refugee protection A99
            Eligibility of refugee protection claim A100, A102
            Grounds of ineligibility A101
            Suspension of a refugee protection claim by the RPD A103
            Notice of ineligibility at the RPD A104
            Extradition procedure A105
            Undocumented claimants A106
            Determination on refugee claims by the RPD A107(1)
            No credible basis A107(2)
            Determination of manifestly unfounded refugee claims (MUC) by the RPD A107.1
            Cessation of refugee protection A108, A40.1
            Vacation of refugee protection A109, A40(1)(c)
            Designated countries of origin by Minister (DCO) A109.1
            Appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) from the RPD A110
            Loss of permanent resident status A46
            Inadmissibility standard of proof A33
            Inadmissibility for security reasons A34
            Inadmissibility for violation of human or international rights A35
            Inadmissibility for serious criminality A36
            Inadmissibility for organized criminality A37
            Inadmissibility report A44
            Admissibility hearing by the Immigration Division A45, A172 and A173
            Pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) A112 to A116[1]

            References

            1. ENF 24 Ministerial interventions Policy <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf24-eng.pdf>, page 8.

            Sections 2 and 3: Definitions, objectives, and application of the IRPA

            IRPA Section 2

            Section 2 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

            Interpretation
            
            Definitions
            2 (1) The definitions in this subsection apply in this Act.
            Board means the Immigration and Refugee Board, which consists of the Refugee Protection Division, Refugee Appeal Division, Immigration Division and Immigration Appeal Division. (Commission)
            Convention Against Torture means the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed at New York on December 10, 1984. Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture is set out in the schedule. (Convention contre la torture)
            designated foreign national has the meaning assigned by subsection 20.1(2). (étranger désigné)
            foreign national means a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident, and includes a stateless person. (étranger)
            permanent resident means a person who has acquired permanent resident status and has not subsequently lost that status under section 46. (résident permanent)
            Refugee Convention means the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva on July 28, 1951, and the Protocol to that Convention, signed at New York on January 31, 1967. Sections E and F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention are set out in the schedule. (Convention sur les réfugiés)
            
            Act includes regulations and instructions
            (2) Unless otherwise indicated, references in this Act to “this Act” include regulations made under it and instructions given under subsection 14.1(1).

            The RPD Rules have a definitions section: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions. See also the following more general discussions of terms, acronyms, and definitions related to refugee procedure: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Glossary.

            IRPA Section 3

            Section 3(2) and 3(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act read:

            Objectives — refugees
            (2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
            (a) to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted;
            (b) to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm Canada’s commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement;
            (c) to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada’s humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution;
            (d) to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment;
            (e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings;
            (f) to support the self-sufficiency and the social and economic well-being of refugees by facilitating reunification with their family members in Canada;
            (g) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society; and
            (h) to promote international justice and security by denying access to Canadian territory to persons, including refugee claimants, who are security risks or serious criminals.
            
            Application
            (3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
            (a) furthers the domestic and international interests of Canada;
            (b) promotes accountability and transparency by enhancing public awareness of immigration and refugee programs;
            (c) facilitates cooperation between the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations;
            (d) ensures that decisions taken under this Act are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination and of the equality of English and French as the official languages of Canada;
            (e) supports the commitment of the Government of Canada to enhance the vitality of the English and French linguistic minority communities in Canada; and
            (f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.

            Interpretation

            For a discussion of these legislative provisions, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#IRPA ss. 2 and 3: Interpretation principles as derived from the Act.

            References

              Section 99: Claim for Refugee Protection

              IRPA Section 99: Claim for Refugee Protection

              Section 99 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

              Claim for Refugee Protection
              Claim
              
              99 (1) A claim for refugee protection may be made in or outside Canada.
              
              Claim outside Canada
              (2) A claim for refugee protection made by a person outside Canada must be made by making an application for a visa as a Convention refugee or a person in similar circumstances, and is governed by Part 1.
              
              Claim inside Canada
              (3) A claim for refugee protection made by a person inside Canada must be made to an officer, may not be made by a person who is subject to a removal order, and is governed by this Part.
              
              Claim made inside Canada — not at port of entry
              (3.1) A person who makes a claim for refugee protection inside Canada other than at a port of entry must provide the officer, within the time limits provided for in the regulations, with the documents and information — including in respect of the basis for the claim — required by the rules of the Board, in accordance with those rules.
              
              Permanent resident
              (4) An application to become a permanent resident made by a protected person is governed by Part 1.

              References

                Sections 100-102: Examination of Eligibility to Refer Claim

                IRPA Sections 100-102: Examination of Eligibility to Refer Claim

                Sections 100-102 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act read:

                100 (1) An officer shall, after receipt of a claim referred to in subsection 99(3), determine whether the claim is eligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division and, if it is eligible, shall refer the claim in accordance with the rules of the Board.
                
                Burden of proof
                (1.1) The burden of proving that a claim is eligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division rests on the claimant, who must answer truthfully all questions put to them.
                
                Decision
                (2) The officer shall suspend consideration of the eligibility of the person’s claim if
                (a) a report has been referred for a determination, at an admissibility hearing, of whether the person is inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality; or
                (b) the officer considers it necessary to wait for a decision of a court with respect to a claimant who is charged with an offence under an Act of Parliament that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
                
                Consideration of claim
                (3) The Refugee Protection Division may not consider a claim until it is referred by the officer.
                
                Documents and information to be provided
                (4) A person who makes a claim for refugee protection inside Canada at a port of entry and whose claim is referred to the Refugee Protection Division must provide the Division, within the time limits provided for in the regulations, with the documents and information — including in respect of the basis for the claim — required by the rules of the Board, in accordance with those rules.
                
                Date of hearing
                (4.1) The referring officer must, in accordance with the regulations, the rules of the Board and any directions of the Chairperson of the Board, fix the date on which the claimant is to attend a hearing before the Refugee Protection Division.
                
                Quarantine Act
                (5) If a traveller is detained or isolated under the Quarantine Act, the period referred to in subsections (1) and (3) does not begin to run until the day on which the detention or isolation ends.
                
                Ineligibility
                101 (1) A claim is ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division if
                (a) refugee protection has been conferred on the claimant under this Act;
                (b) a claim for refugee protection by the claimant has been rejected by the Board;
                (c) a prior claim by the claimant was determined to be ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division, or to have been withdrawn or abandoned;
                (c.1) the claimant has, before making a claim for refugee protection in Canada, made a claim for refugee protection to a country other than Canada, and the fact of its having been made has been confirmed in accordance with an agreement or arrangement entered into by Canada and that country for the purpose of facilitating information sharing to assist in the administration and enforcement of their immigration and citizenship laws;
                (d) the claimant has been recognized as a Convention refugee by a country other than Canada and can be sent or returned to that country;
                (e) the claimant came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country designated by the regulations, other than a country of their nationality or their former habitual residence; or
                (f) the claimant has been determined to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality, except for persons who are inadmissible solely on the grounds of paragraph 35(1)(c).
                
                Serious criminality
                (2) A claim is not ineligible by reason of serious criminality under paragraph (1)(f) unless
                (a) in the case of inadmissibility by reason of a conviction in Canada, the conviction is for an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or
                (b) in the case of inadmissibility by reason of a conviction outside Canada, the conviction is for an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
                
                Regulations
                102 (1) The regulations may govern matters relating to the application of sections 100 and 101, may, for the purposes of this Act, define the terms used in those sections and, for the purpose of sharing responsibility with governments of foreign states for the consideration of refugee claims, may include provisions
                (a) designating countries that comply with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture;
                (b) making a list of those countries and amending it as necessary; and
                (c) respecting the circumstances and criteria for the application of paragraph 101(1)(e).
                
                Factors
                (2) The following factors are to be considered in designating a country under paragraph (1)(a):
                (a) whether the country is a party to the Refugee Convention and to the Convention Against Torture;
                (b) its policies and practices with respect to claims under the Refugee Convention and with respect to obligations under the Convention Against Torture;
                (c) its human rights record; and
                (d) whether it is party to an agreement with the Government of Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee protection.
                
                Review
                (3) The Governor in Council must ensure the continuing review of factors set out in subsection (2) with respect to each designated country.

                The process set out in ss. 100-102 of the Act is designed to be an expeditious summary review

                The Federal Court has held that the expeditious and relatively straightforward process set out in sections 100 to 102 of the IRPA is intended to screen certain claims out of the Refugee Protection Division’s jurisdiction on the basis of a summary review by an immigration officer.[1]

                See the commentary to Rules 26-28

                For a discussion of the interpretation of these provisions of the Act, see the commentary to Rules 26-28, particularly: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#Rule 28(1)(c): When is a claim ineligible to be referred under section 101 of the Act?

                References

                1. Wangden v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1230 at para 76.

                Section 106: Claimant Without Identification - Credibility

                IRPA Section 106: Claimant Without Identification - Credibility

                Section 106 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                Claimant Without Identification
                Credibility
                106 The Refugee Protection Division must take into account, with respect to the credibility of a claimant, whether the claimant possesses acceptable documentation establishing identity, and if not, whether they have provided a reasonable explanation for the lack of documentation or have taken reasonable steps to obtain the documentation.

                For commentary, see Rule 11

                Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#Rule 11 - Documents Establishing Identity and Other Elements of the Claim

                References

                  Section 108: Cessation of Refugee Protection

                  IRPA Section 108: Cessation of Refugee Protection

                  Section 108 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                  Cessation of Refugee Protection
                  Rejection
                  
                  108 (1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances:
                  (a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themself of the protection of their country of nationality;
                  (b) the person has voluntarily reacquired their nationality;
                  (c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new nationality;
                  (d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee protection in Canada; or
                  (e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist.
                  
                  Cessation of refugee protection
                  (2) On application by the Minister, the Refugee Protection Division may determine that refugee protection referred to in subsection 95(1) has ceased for any of the reasons described in subsection (1).
                  
                  Effect of decision
                  (3) If the application is allowed, the claim of the person is deemed to be rejected.
                  
                  Exception
                  (4) Paragraph (1)(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment.

                  For commentary, see Rule 64

                  Canadian Refugee Procedure/Applications to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection

                  References

                    Section 109: Applications to Vacate

                    IRPA Section 109: Applications to Vacate

                    Section 109 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                    Applications to Vacate
                    Vacation of refugee protection
                    
                    109 (1) The Refugee Protection Division may, on application by the Minister, vacate a decision to allow a claim for refugee protection, if it finds that the decision was obtained as a result of directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter.
                    
                    Rejection of application
                    (2) The Refugee Protection Division may reject the application if it is satisfied that other sufficient evidence was considered at the time of the first determination to justify refugee protection.
                    
                    Allowance of application
                    (3) If the application is allowed, the claim of the person is deemed to be rejected and the decision that led to the conferral of refugee protection is nullified.

                    For commentary, see Rule 64

                    Canadian Refugee Procedure/Applications to Vacate or to Cease Refugee Protection

                    References

                      Section 159: Duties of Chairperson

                      IRPA Section 159: Duties of Chairperson

                      Section 159 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                      Chairperson
                      
                      159 (1) The Chairperson is, by virtue of holding that office, a member of each Division of the Board and is the chief executive officer of the Board. In that capacity, the Chairperson
                      (a) has supervision over and direction of the work and staff of the Board;
                      (b) may at any time assign a member appointed under paragraph 153(1)(a) to the Refugee Appeal Division or the Immigration Appeal Division;
                      (c) may at any time, despite paragraph 153(1)(a), assign a member of the Refugee Appeal Division or the Immigration Appeal Division to work in another regional or district office to satisfy operational requirements, but an assignment may not exceed 120 days without the approval of the Governor in Council;
                      (d) may designate, from among the full-time members appointed under paragraph 153(1)(a), coordinating members for the Refugee Appeal Division or the Immigration Appeal Division;
                      (e) assigns administrative functions to the members of the Board;
                      (f) apportions work among the members of the Board and fixes the place, date and time of proceedings;
                      (g) takes any action that may be necessary to ensure that the members of the Board carry out their duties efficiently and without undue delay;
                      (h) may issue guidelines in writing to members of the Board and identify decisions of the Board as jurisprudential guides, after consulting with the Deputy Chairpersons, to assist members in carrying out their duties; and
                      (i) may appoint and, subject to the approval of the Treasury Board, fix the remuneration of experts or persons having special knowledge to assist the Divisions in any matter.
                      
                      Delegation
                      (2) The Chairperson may delegate any of his or her powers under this Act to a member of the Board, except that
                      (a) powers referred to in subsection 161(1) may not be delegated;
                      (b) powers referred to in paragraphs (1)(a) and (i) may be delegated to the Executive Director of the Board;
                      (c) powers in relation to the Immigration Appeal Division and the Refugee Appeal Division may only be delegated to the Deputy Chairperson, the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons, or other members, including coordinating members, of either of those Divisions; and
                      (d) powers in relation to the Immigration Division or the Refugee Protection Division may only be delegated to the Deputy Chairperson, the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons or other members, including coordinating members, of that Division.

                      159(1)(h) May issue guidelines in writing to members of the Board and identify decisions of the Board as jurisprudential guides

                      Jurisprudential guides may relate to issues of fact

                      The Federal Court of Appeal holds that it is reasonable to interpret paragraph 159(1)(h) of the IRPA as conferring upon the Chairperson the authority to issue Jurisprudential Guides (JGs) on factual issues.[1] This is consistent with international standards for refugee adjudication; for example, the United Kingdom now has more than 300 country guidance cases relating to asylum seekers from more than 60 countries. They were introduced in the refugee status determination process in the UK in 2002 to help provide consistency in decision-making when considering the same or similar issues and evidence.[2]

                      Jurisprudential guides may be distinguished from lead cases

                      In the words of Sharryn Aiken, et. al., a lead case aims to identify a refugee claim on which to create a full evidential record that the hearing panel can use to make informed findings of fact and provide a complete analysis of the relevant legal issues. While not binding on other panels of the Board, the factual findings on country conditions and legal conclusions in a lead case are intended to guide future panels hearings similar cases and promote consistent, informed, efficient, and expeditious decision-making.[3] A "lead case" is different from a jurisprudential guide (JG) in that a lead case is planned and organized before the case is heard, whereas a decision is identified as a JG after it has been rendered.[4]

                      References

                      1. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 43, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par43>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.
                      2. Joshi, Makesh D., The use of country guidance case law in refugee recognition outside the UK, Forced Migration Review; Oxford Iss. 65,  (Nov 2020): 32 <https://search.proquest.com/openview/9a7d9d88a5717cee4832caf3a5c5af2a/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=55113>.
                      3. Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 207.
                      4. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 (CanLII), par. 101, <http://canlii.ca/t/jblsl#par101>, retrieved on 2020-11-17.

                      Section 161: Functioning of Board and Division Rules

                      IRPA Section 161: Functioning of Board and Division Rules

                      Section 161 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                      Functioning of Board
                      
                      Rules
                      161 (1) Subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, and in consultation with the Deputy Chairpersons, the Chairperson may make rules respecting
                      (a) the referral of a claim for refugee protection to the Refugee Protection Division;
                      (a.1) the factors to be taken into account in fixing or changing the date of the hearing referred to in subsection 100(4.1);
                      (a.2) the activities, practice and procedure of each of the Divisions of the Board, including the periods for appeal, other than in respect of appeals of decisions of the Refugee Protection Division, the priority to be given to proceedings, the notice that is required and the period in which notice must be given;
                      (b) the conduct of persons in proceedings before the Board, as well as the consequences of, and sanctions for, the breach of those rules;
                      (c) the information that may be required and the manner in which, and the time within which, it must be provided with respect to a proceeding before the Board; and
                      (d) any other matter considered by the Chairperson to require rules.
                      
                      Distinctions
                      (1.1) The rules made under paragraph (1)(c) may distinguish among claimants for refugee protection who make their claims inside Canada on the basis of whether their claims are made at a port of entry or elsewhere or on the basis of whether they are nationals of a country that is, on the day on which their claim is made, a country designated under subsection 109.1(1).

                      161(1)(b): The Chairperson may make rules respecting the conduct of persons in proceedings before the Board

                      Paragraph 161(1)(b) contemplates the issuance of rules relating to the conduct of persons appearing before the IRB. In its decision regarding Mumtaz Khan, the Board concluded that this provision codifies the Board's common law power to make rules regarding the conduct of persons in proceedings before the Board, but that this provision does not limit the Board's pre-existing powers to take action regarding misconduct.[1]

                      References

                      1. re: Mumtaz Khan, December 18, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/decisions/Pages/mumtaz-khan.aspx> (Accessed February 1, 2021).

                      Section 162: The jurisdiction of the Board and its obligation to proceed quickly and informally

                      IRPA Section 162(1) - Board jurisdiction

                      Section 162(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                      Sole and exclusive jurisdiction
                      162 (1) Each Division of the Board has, in respect of proceedings brought before it under this Act, sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction.

                      This provision of the Act provides the Board's plenary jurisdiction

                      The above provision of the IRPA provide what can be referred to as the Board's plenary powers to control its process. In the absence of a specific rule, they provide the Board with the authority to act. For example, in Koky v. Canada the Federal Court noted that in the absence of a specific provision in the rules for the Division disjoining claims on its own motion, it could rely on the authority conferred to it by the above provision in the Act.[1]

                      IRPA Section 162(2) - Obligation to proceed informally and expeditiously

                      Procedure
                      (2) Each Division shall deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit.

                      Each Division shall deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit

                      For more details regarding this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Principles for the interpretation of refugee procedure#IRPA Section 3(2)(e) - Fair and efficient procedures that maintain integrity and uphold human rights.

                      Member workload

                      A typical full-time Member of the Refugee Protection Division who is not on a special team is expedited to complete 120 files per year. It is difficult to compare workload among different systems, but many others appear to provide for much less time for decision-making. For example, in the French refugee determination system the Rapporteurs who research files for asylum judges participate in two to three full hearing days per month, each of which requires preparation of 13 files, totalling around 350 cases a year. This workload allows approximately half a working day for each file, with little room to deviate for complex cases.[2] That said, it is difficult to compare workloads because of the differences in the nature of each role and the comparatively limited support that RPD Members receive to prepare for hearings.

                      References

                      1. Koky v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 562 (CanLII), para. 37 <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2015/2015fc562/2015fc562.html#par37>
                      2. Hambly, J. and Gill, N. (2020), Law and Speed: Asylum Appeals and the Techniques and Consequences of Legal Quickening. J. Law Soc., 47: 3-28. doi:10.1111/jols.12220.

                      Section 163: Composition of Panels

                      IRPA Section 163

                      The relevant provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                      Composition of panels
                      163 Matters before a Division shall be conducted before a single member unless, except for matters before the Immigration Division, the Chairperson is of the opinion that a panel of three members should be constituted.

                      Commentary

                      The Board only uses three-member panels for training purposes

                      The IRB publishes a policy instrument on their website entitled Designation of three-member panels - Refugee Protection Division. It notes that the Chairperson's authority to designate three-member panels for matters before the RPD has been delegated to the Deputy Chairperson (DC) and to the Assistant Deputy Chairpersons (ADCs) of the RPD and so the Chairperson need not form the above-noted opinion personally. However, under this delegation cases may only be designated to be heard by three-member panels for training purposes.[1] That policy states that "assignment of three-member panels will be solely for training purposes" which appears to indicate that three-member panels will not be used in other circumstances, such as where a case is seen to be complex. For more details, see the commentary to Rule 68(2): Canadian Refugee Procedure/Decisions#Rule 68(2) - When a decision of a three member panel takes effect.

                      References

                      1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Designation of three-member panels - Refugee Protection Division, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/PolRpdSpr3MemCom.aspx> (Accessed April 13, 2020).

                      Section 164: Presence of parties and use of telecommunications for hearings

                      The IRB has successfully used videoconferencing and teleconferencing at hearings since the early 1990s. This section discusses the provision of the Act that relates most directly to this practice.

                      IRPA Section 164

                      The relevant provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                      Presence of parties
                      164 Where a hearing is held by a Division, it may, in the Division’s discretion, be conducted in the presence of, or by a means of live telecommunication with, the person who is the subject of the proceedings.

                      This section of the Act is frequently considered in applications to change the location of a proceeding

                      One of the ways that this section of the Act is frequently considered and relied upon is with applications to change the location of a proceeding where the Board elects to allow a claimant to appear by video from the place that they have moved to, rather than transferring the file to a different office in its entirety. See the commentary to RPD Rule 53(4)(g): Canadian Refugee Procedure/Changing the Location of a Proceeding.

                      Procedural fairness issues and best practices regarding videoconferencing

                      The use of videoconferencing is not per se unfair

                      Videoconferencing is widely used in refugee status determination procedures around the world, including Australia and the United States.[1] Section 164 of the Act provides that the Board may conduct a hearing via live telecommunication here in Canada. The Board has a policy entitled Use of Videoconferencing in Proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada which sets out that it is the IRB's position that provided that it is carried out in accordance with appropriate technological and procedural standards, videoconferencing does not affect the quality of the hearing or decision-making and respects the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.[2]

                      The Division provides that claimants have a choice at the time of scheduling about whether their hearing will be virtual or on-site

                      The Practice notice: Scheduling virtual hearings at the Refugee Protection Division provides that any claimants who prefer to have their hearing from an IRB office can advise the RPD of this when their claim is scheduled and the RPD will book an on-site hearing for them.[3]

                      Board policy specifies that videoconferencing is inappropriate for certain types of claims and claimants

                      It may be noted that many counsel do not like videoconferencing and academic commentators have called on the Board to "limit this practice as much as possible".[4] The 2004 RPD Policy on the Transfer of Files for Hearings by Videoconference states at Section 5.5 that counsel may bring matters to the attention of the RPD that are inappropriate for videoconferencing, by making an application.

                      In what circumstances may issues with videoconferencing arise that implicate procedural fairness?

                      • Disability issues: In Al-Gumer v. Canada the appellant was hearing impaired and required the assistance of sign language interpreter at his hearing and, further, his counsel required a captionist or an ASL interpreter. In the circumstances, it was determined that it was not practical to conduct that hearing remotely given the technology available.[5] This decision of the Immigration Appeal Division should be persuasive for the Refugee Protection Division.
                      • Parties should have 'feedback screens': The Board commissioned an external review of the use of videoconferencing at the IRB which recommended the the Board "install feedback screens in all of the claimant's rooms in the system." The report went on to state that "Fairness and effectiveness both require that both the claimants and their counsel be aware at all times of the picture of their room transmitted to the screen in the member's room."[6] IRB management accepted this recommendation, stating that it is their policy that "All offices with videoconferencing equipment currently have feedback screens: either picture-in-picture or a separate television screen. The Board, through the designated employee, will ensure that participants are using this technology correctly."[7]
                      • Awareness of effects of video on the assessment of demeanour: Subtle lags inherent in the technology can affect perceptions of credibility according to psychological research.[8] Board Members should be aware of this and consider this when thinking about their subjective assessment of witness credibility.

                      A party may waive the right to be present at the hearing

                      The right to be present at the hearing can be waived if there is an express waiver by the claimant.[9]

                      References

                      1. Mark Federman, “On the Media Effects of Immigration and Refugee Board Hearings via Videoconference” (2006) 19(4) J of Refugee Studies 433 at 434.
                      2. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Use of Videoconferencing in Proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy dated 15 December 2010, Accessed January 2, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/Videoconf.aspx>.
                      3. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Practice notice: Scheduling virtual hearings at the Refugee Protection Division, Signed on December 7​, 2020 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-virtual-hearings.aspx> (Accessed January 12, 2021).
                      4. Acton, Tess, Understanding Refugee Stories: Lawyers, Interpreters, and Refugee Claims in Canada, 2015, Master of Laws Thesis, <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/6213/Acton_Tess_LLM_2015.pdf>, page 130 (Accessed January 25, 2020).
                      5. Nazer Jassim Al-Gumer v. Canada (M.C.I.) TA4-1257, Neron, November 2005.
                      6. S. Ronald Ellis, Q.C., Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Published by Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Date October 21, 2004 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/Video.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
                      7. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board Response to the Report on Videoconferencing in Refugee Hearings, Date modified listed on webpage: 2018-06-26, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/VideoRespRep.aspx> (Accessed January 26, 2020).
                      8. Mark Federman, “On the Media Effects of Immigration and Refugee Board Hearings via Videoconference” (2006) 19(4) J of Refugee Studies 433 at 442.
                      9. Rodriguez-Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1297, 70 F.T.R. 298 (F.C.T.D.).

                      Section 165: Powers of a Member

                      Section 165 of the IRPA

                      The legislative provision reads:

                      Powers of a commissioner
                      165 The Refugee Protection Division, the Refugee Appeal Division and the Immigration Division and each member of those Divisions have the powers and authority of a commissioner appointed under Part I of the Inquiries Act and may do any other thing they consider necessary to provide a full and proper hearing.

                      This legislative provision allows the Board to unilaterally adjust timelines in appropriate cases

                      During the COVID-19 epidemic, the Board lengthened the time period that claimants had to provide a Basis of Claim form after making a claim at the Port of Entry. The practice notice doing so cited this provision of the Act ("[The Division]...may do any other thing they consider necessary to provide a full and proper hearing") as authority for that decision, as discussed in this commentary on RPD Rule 8: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Information and Documents to be Provided#This Rule applies to applications for an extension of time, but not decisions on the Board's own motion to extend the deadline.

                      Part I of the Inquiries Act

                      The complete text of Part I of the Inquiries Act reads:

                      PART I
                      Public Inquiries
                      
                      Inquiry
                      2 The Governor in Council may, whenever the Governor in Council deems it expedient, cause inquiry to be made into and concerning any matter connected with the good government of Canada or the conduct of any part of the public business thereof.
                      
                      Appointment of commissioners
                      3 Where an inquiry as described in section 2 is not regulated by any special law, the Governor in Council may, by a commission, appoint persons as commissioners by whom the inquiry shall be conducted.
                      
                      Powers of commissioners concerning evidence
                      4 The commissioners have the power of summoning before them any witnesses, and of requiring them to
                      (a) give evidence, orally or in writing, and on oath or, if they are persons entitled to affirm in civil matters on solemn affirmation; and
                      (b) produce such documents and things as the commissioners deem requisite to the full investigation of the matters into which they are appointed to examine.
                      
                      Idem, enforcement
                      5 The commissioners have the same power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to give evidence as is vested in any court of record in civil cases.

                      These provisions allow a panel to compel testimony and the production of evidence

                      As stated in the text The Conduct of Public Inquiries, the central procedural feature of the Inquiries Act is to "authorize commissioners to compel testimony and the production of evidence".[1] The Board will exercise its power to summon individuals through the framework of Rules 44-48: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Witnesses. For a discussion of the Board's power to summon documents, see Canada v. Kahlon.[2]

                      Part III of the Inquiries Act

                      Part III of the Inquiries Act is a general provision that applies to commissioners with powers under Part I, as well as to commissioners appointed under Part II of the Act (which is not relevant to IRB Board Members):

                      PART III
                      General
                      
                      Employment of counsel, experts and assistants
                      11 (1) The commissioners, whether appointed under Part I or under Part II, may, if authorized by the commission issued in the case, engage the services of
                      (a) such accountants, engineers, technical advisers or other experts, clerks, reporters and assistants as they deem necessary or advisable; and
                      (b) counsel to aid and assist the commissioners in an inquiry.
                      
                      Experts may take evidence and report
                      (2) The commissioners may authorize and depute any accountants, engineers, technical advisers or other experts, the services of whom are engaged under subsection (1), or any other qualified persons, to inquire into any matter within the scope of the commission as may be directed by the commissioners.
                      
                      Powers
                      (3) The persons deputed under subsection (2), when authorized by order in council, have the same powers as the commissioners have to take evidence, issue subpoenas, enforce the attendance of witnesses, compel them to give evidence, and otherwise conduct the inquiry.
                      
                      Report
                      (4) The persons deputed under subsection (2) shall report the evidence and their findings, if any, thereon to the commissioners.
                      
                      Parties may employ counsel
                      12 The commissioners may allow any person whose conduct is being investigated under this Act, and shall allow any person against whom any charge is made in the course of an investigation, to be represented by counsel.
                      
                      Notice to persons charged
                      13 No report shall be made against any person until reasonable notice has been given to the person of the charge of misconduct alleged against him and the person has been allowed full opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel.

                      References

                      1. Ratushny, Ed, The Conduct of Public Inquiries: Law, Policy and Practice, Released 2009/09/28, Irwin Law: Toronto, online eBook: https://www.deslibris.ca/ID/432671, page 301.
                      2. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness) v. Kahlon, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1335, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 493 (F.C.).

                      Section 166: Proceedings must be held in the absence of the public

                      Section 166 of the IRPA

                      The legislative provision reads:

                      166 Proceedings before a Division are to be conducted as follows:
                      (a) subject to the other provisions of this section, proceedings must be held in public;
                      (b) on application or on its own initiative, the Division may conduct a proceeding in the absence of the public, or take any other measure that it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the proceedings, if, after having considered all available alternate measures, the Division is satisfied that there is
                         (i) a serious possibility that the life, liberty or security of a person will be endangered if the proceeding is held in public,
                         (ii) a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the proceeding such that the need to prevent disclosure outweighs the societal interest that the proceeding be conducted in public, or
                         (iii) a real and substantial risk that matters involving public security will be disclosed;
                      (c) subject to paragraph (d), proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division and the Refugee Appeal Division must be held in the absence of the public;
                      (c.1) subject to paragraph (d), proceedings before the Immigration Division must be held in the absence of the public if they concern a person who is the subject of a proceeding before the Refugee Protection Division or the Refugee Appeal Division that is pending or who has made an application for protection to the Minister that is pending;
                      (d) on application or on its own initiative, the Division may conduct a proceeding in public, or take any other measure that it considers necessary to ensure the appropriate access to the proceedings if, after having considered all available alternate measures and the factors set out in paragraph (b), the Division is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so;
                      (e) despite paragraphs (b) to (c.1), a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is entitled to observe proceedings concerning a protected person or a person who has made a claim for refugee protection or an application for protection; and
                      (f) despite paragraph (e), the representative or agent may not observe any part of the proceedings that deals with information or other evidence in respect of which an application has been made under section 86, and not rejected, or with information or other evidence protected under that section.

                      The purpose and history of section 166(c) with respect to refugees

                      IRCC takes the position that the purpose of the provisions under s. 166 of the IRPA are to provide protection for the refugee and their family against harm that might occur from disclosure of their case in public.[1] They note that "in many cases, refugees have family members that are not accompanying them and revealing their identity may put remaining family members in the country of persecution at risk" and that "protecting the confidentiality of a refugee claimant's identity, the particulars of their claim for protection, and the fact that they had submitted a claim is 'vital to ensuring that no claimant is put at additional risk of serious harm, including persecution and torture. Otherwise, disclosure of information could lead to the country of persecution learning of the applicants' whereabouts, which could result in harm to the applicant.'"[1] This is consistent with guidance from the UNHCR that "confidentiality and data protection extend to all communications with current and former asylum-seekers and refugees, as well as all personal data or information obtained from or about them".[2]

                      In Bill C-86, tabled in the House of Commons on June 16, 1992, the government considered changing this provision. As originally tabled, the bill provided for public hearings of refugee cases. This provision of the bill raised "a storm of protest" as, it was charged, public hearings would place refugee applicants in jeopardy. In response to this criticism the government reverted to the old rule that hearings before the refugee board would be in camera. Only in exceptional cases would they be held in public.[3]

                      What is encompassed by the phrase "proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division"?

                      Section 166(c) provides that "...proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division...must be held in the absence of the public". What is encompassed by the term "proceedings" as it is used in this provision? For a discussion of that, see the definitions section of the RPD Rules, which comments on the definition of the term "proceeding": Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions#Commentary on the definition of "proceeding".

                      What is entailed by the legislative requirement that proceedings be conducted in the absence of the public?

                      The personal information in refugee claim files is generally accorded "Protected B" status. This is defined as "information where unauthorized disclosure could cause serious injury to an individual, organization or government. Examples include: medical information, information protected by solicitor-client or litigation privilege, and information received in confidence from other government departments and agencies."[4] The legal standards requiring the protection of information also stem from the Directive on Departmental Security Management[5] and the Privacy Act, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Once claims are joined, information on one claim is properly available to the other joined claimants.

                      Facilities in which proceedings are held shall be sufficiently private

                      The requirement in s. 166(c) that refugee proceedings be conducted in the absence of the public tracks Canada’s international obligations. The UNHCR Executive Committee has outlined certain basic requirements for fair and effective status determination procedures.[6] These requirements ensure that people seeking protection are provided with “necessary facilities,” which is defined to include an interview space that respects the privacy of the individuals being assessed.[7]

                      RPD staff must maintain confidences and be sufficiently trustworthy

                      Persons who have access to "Protected B" information within the government must have "Reliability Status". This is defined as "The minimum standard of security screening required for individuals to have unsupervised access to Protected government information, assets or work sites. Security screening for Reliability Status appraises an individual's honesty and whether he or she can be trusted to protect the government's interests."[4]

                      Facilities in which information is stored must be sufficiently private

                      The facilities in which refugee claim information are stored must be sufficiently private. As stated in the UNHCR "Privacy Protection Guidelines", "refugee information must be filed and stored in a way that is accessible only through authorized personnel and transferred only through the use of protected means of communication."[1] For example, protected information must not be carried in the open when it is being carried out of the office. When being handled outside of an operational zone, Protected B files must not be "in the open" but carried in an envelope or comparable mechanism.[8]

                      Protected information should be transmitted and communicated in a way that is sufficiently secure and private

                      As stated in the UNHCR Privacy Protection Guidelines, refugee information must be transferred only through the use of protected means of communication.[1] This has a number of implications: when contacting a claimant, the RPD should not leave a voicemail about their case on an unknown voicemail if there is an indication that their phone number may have changed.[9] Furthermore, the RPD should not communicate Protected B-level information or higher by email. The Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) has a practice notice on communicating by email. It states that "the IAD will not transmit a document by email if it contains Protected B or higher information or it has been declared confidential or is subject to an order restricting publication, broadcasting or transmission by the IAD or any other competent authority."[10] The same principles should apply to the Refugee Protection Division emailing any such information.

                      Members shall not disclose confidential information, even to other staff, where doing so is not operationally required

                      IRB personnel are only permitted access to hearings held in the absence of the public as required for work-related purposes. In the words of the Guideline for Employees of the Government of Canada: Information Management (IM) Basics, the government should ensure that "protected information is only made available on a need-to-know basis to those who are authorized to access it."[11] The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members shall not disclose or make known any information of a confidential nature that was obtained in their capacity as a member. This means disclosure outside of the IRB to other government departments or agencies or to the general public, as well as disclosure within the IRB to members or staff where such disclosure is not operationally required."[12] This is in keeping with the UNHCR "Privacy Protection Guidelines" which require that "refugee information must be filed and stored in a way that is accessible only through authorized personnel and transferred only through the use of protected means of communication."[1]

                      Members should only include necessary personal information in their decisions

                      The Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provides that "Members have a responsibility to consider the privacy interests of individuals in the conduct of proceedings and the writing of decisions, ensuring that decisions contain only the personal information that is necessary to explain the reasoning of the decision."[13]

                      The federal Privacy Act applies to information submitted to the Refugee Protection Division

                      Quite apart from section 166 of the IRPA, the federal Privacy Act also places limitations on the ability of a government institution to use and disclose personal information under its control without the consent of the individual to whom it relates.[14] Section 7 of the Privacy Act states that "personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, be used by the institution except (a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose; or (b) for a purpose [listed in subsection 8(2) of the Act]."[14]

                      What are uses consistent with the purpose for which information is obtained in the refugee context?

                      According to the Treasury Board Interim Policy on Privacy Protection, consistent use is defined as one that has a reasonable and direct connection to the original purpose(s) for which the information was obtained or compiled. This means that the original purpose and the proposed purpose are so closely related that the individual would expect that the information would be used for the consistent purpose, even if the use is not spelled out. In Bernard v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that to qualify as a “consistent use” under paragraph. 8(2)(a), a use need not be identical to the purpose for which information was obtained.[15] There need only be a sufficiently direct connection between the purpose for obtaining the information and the proposed use, such that an individual could reasonably expect that the information could be used in the manner proposed.

                      The following are examples of consistent uses that have been identified in previous decisions:

                      • Disclosing a claimant's identity to a foreign government for the purpose of investigating their claim: In Igbinosun v. Canada the Federal Court held that disclosure of a claimant's identity to a foreign government for the purpose of investigating their potential exclusion from the refugee protection regime was a use of the information "consistent with [the purpose for which the information was obtained]" within the meaning of paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act.[16] The normal practice of the Minister in such circumstances was exemplified in Moin v. Canada, wherein the Minister disclosed the claimant’s name to a foreign state (the alleged persecutors) but there was no indication that the Minister had advised authorities in the foreign country that the claimant had made a claim for asylum. As such, this inquiry was seen as unobjectionable by the court in that case.[17] Where the Minister goes beyond providing a claimant's name and discloses additional information to the alleged persecutor, such as copies of documents that a claimant submitted, they may err. For example, in Canada v. X, Member McCool of the Refugee Protection Division stated: "In investigating the merits, bona fides or veracity of claims brought before the Division, the Minister must balance, and be seen to balance, the need to protect the individual, including those who have been determined to be Convention refugees, against the need, in the public interest, to detect and prevent fraud."[18]
                      • Disclosing information regarding the conduct of authorized representatives to regulatory bodies: Section 13.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations provides that if a member of the Board or an officer determines that the conduct of a representative in connection with a proceeding before the Board is likely to constitute a breach of the person's professional or ethical obligations, the Board may disclose information to a body that is responsible for governing or investigating that conduct or to a person who is responsible for investigating that conduct. The Board has a Policy on Disclosing Information Regarding the Conduct of Authorized Representatives to Regulatory Bodies which states that it is the view of the IRB that such disclosures are in accordance with paragraph 8(2)(b) of the Privacy Act, namely that it is for a purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made thereunder that authorizes disclosure.[19]

                      For further discussion of the Privacy Act in the refugee context, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Joining or Separating Claims or Applications#Once claims are joined, information on one claim is properly available to the other joined claimants.

                      An application may be made to have the proceedings conducted in public

                      Applications to have proceedings conducted in public are considered under the rubric of Rule 57: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Proceedings Conducted in Public#Rule 57 - Proceedings Conducted in Public.

                      Should a panel admit copies of decisions from other claims?

                      As section 166(c) of the Act provides, refugee proceedings are to be conducted in the absence of the public. Some decisions are anonymized and are posted on CanLII by the Board. At times, counsel will want to provide decisions to a panel of the Board from other panels of the Board that have not been published. It is common practice that counsel will indicate that they have the consent of the claimant in question to provide the decision and that they will anonymize parts of the decision that disclose the claimant's identity. Where this is not done, panels of the Board have declined to admit such information. For example, in one such case Refugee Appeal Division Member Kim Polowek stated that "the RAD notes that proceedings before the Refugee Protection Division and Refugee Appeal Division must be held in the absence of the public and should not be disclosed without the consent of the persons involved in the proceeding (i.e. the claimant). Given that the Appellant has not provided any confirmation which would indicate that each claimant referred to in these RPD decisions has provided consent for disclosure to the RAD, and the fact that despite the partial redactions, many personal details remain in each of the RPD decisions, the Appellant’s Application [] to submit these RPD decisions to the RAD as new evidence fails".[20] That reasoning may be persuasive in similar cases. In contrast, where the consent of the claimant has been obtained and/or the decision has been well redacted of personally-identifying information, a panel may decide to admit such decisions.

                      References

                      1. 1 2 3 4 5 Postmedia Network Inc. v HMTQ, 2019 BCSC 929 (CanLII), par. 24, <http://canlii.ca/t/j0xlx#par24>, retrieved on 2020-08-16.
                      2. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate, 26 August 2020, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e870b254.html [accessed 5 September 2020], page 15.
                      3. Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2015, March 2016, ISBN 978-1-45973-285-8, Dundurn Press: Toronto, pp. 238-240.
                      4. 1 2 Government of Canada, Department of Justice Guidelines on Security for Domestic Legal Agents: Protected Information and Assets, Date modified: 2016-09-06, <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/la-man/security-securite/a.html> (Accessed March 16, 2020).
                      5. Government of Canada, Archived [2019-06-28] - Directive on Departmental Security Management, Date modified: 2009-07-07 <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=16579> (Accessed April 16, 2020).
                      6. UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No 8, ‘Determination of Refugee Status’ (1975). See also UNHCR, ‘Note on Determination of Refugee Status under International Instruments’, UN doc EC/SCP/5 (24 August 1977), para 16.
                      7. Azadeh Dastyari & Daniel Ghezelbash, Asylum at Sea: The Legality of Shipboard Refugee Status Determination Procedures, International Journal of Refugee Law, eez046, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eez046>.
                      8. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Audit of Information Management Report, February 2014 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/AudVerGesInfMan.aspx> (Accessed March 25, 2020).
                      9. Perez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1171 (CanLII), par. 30, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc9b0#par30>, retrieved on 2021-01-14.
                      10. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Practice notice: communicating by email at the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), Date modified: 2020-01-31 <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/iad-email-communication.aspx> (Accessed March 25, 2020).
                      11. Treasury Board Secretariat, Guideline for Employees of the Government of Canada: Information Management (IM) Basics, Date modified: 2015-06-19 <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=16557&section=HTML> (Accessed February 1, 2021).
                      12. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 23.
                      13. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Code of Conduct for Members of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Effective Date: April 9, 2019, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/members/Pages/MemComCode.aspx> (Accessed May 3, 2020), at section 36.
                      14. 1 2 Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21, ss. 7-8 <http://canlii.ca/t/543hl#sec7>.
                      15. Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 13.
                      16. Igbinosun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1705 (F.C.T.D.) (QL).
                      17. Moin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2007 FC 473.
                      18. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. X, 2010 CanLII 66495 (CA IRB), par. 37, <http://canlii.ca/t/2dcq0#par37>, retrieved on 2020-08-16.
                      19. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Policy on Disclosing Information Regarding the Conduct of Authorized Representatives to Regulatory Bodies, Date modified: 2018-07-10, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/PolCondRep.aspx> (Accessed November 27, 2020).
                      20. X (Re), 2019 CanLII 123992 (CA IRB), par. 16, <http://canlii.ca/t/j4cbg#par16>, retrieved on 2020-03-29.

                      Right to counsel and representation by a designated representative

                      Section 167 of the IRPA

                      The legislative provision reads:

                      Right to counsel
                      167 (1) A person who is the subject of proceedings before any Division of the Board and the Minister may, at their own expense, be represented by legal or other counsel.
                      
                      Representation
                      (2) If a person who is the subject of proceedings is under 18 years of age or unable, in the opinion of the applicable Division, to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, the Division shall designate a person to represent the person.

                      Commentary

                      For a discussion of the right to counsel and issues that arise related thereto, see the commentary under the RPD Rule on Counsel of Record: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Counsel of Record. For a discussion of issues related to designated representatives, see the commentary under the relevant rule: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Designated Representatives.

                      References

                        Section 169: Decisions and Reasons

                        Section 169 of the IRPA

                        The legislative provision reads:

                        Decisions and reasons
                        169 In the case of a decision of a Division, other than an interlocutory decision:
                        (a) the decision takes effect in accordance with the rules;
                        (b) reasons for the decision must be given;
                        (c) the decision may be rendered orally or in writing, except a decision of the Refugee Appeal Division, which must be rendered in writing;
                        (d) if the Refugee Protection Division rejects a claim, written reasons must be provided to the claimant and the Minister;
                        (e) if the person who is the subject of proceedings before the Board or the Minister requests reasons for a decision within 10 days of notification of the decision, or in circumstances set out in the rules of the Board, the Division must provide written reasons; and
                        (f) the period in which to apply for judicial review with respect to a decision of the Board is calculated from the giving of notice of the decision or from the sending of written reasons, whichever is later.

                        For commentary, see Rule 67

                        See: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Decisions.

                        References

                          Section 169.1 - Composition

                          IRPA Section 169.1 - Composition

                          The relevant provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                          Refugee Protection Division
                          
                          Composition
                          169.1 (1) The Refugee Protection Division consists of the Deputy Chairperson, Assistant Deputy Chairpersons and other members, including coordinating members, necessary to carry out its functions.
                          
                          Public Service Employment Act
                          (2) The members of the Refugee Protection Division are appointed in accordance with the Public Service Employment Act.

                          References

                            Section 170: Proceedings

                            IRPA Section 170

                            The relevant provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act reads:

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it,
                            (a) may inquire into any matter that it considers relevant to establishing whether a claim is well-founded;
                            (b) must hold a hearing;
                            (c) must notify the person who is the subject of the proceeding and the Minister of the hearing;
                            (d) must provide the Minister, on request, with the documents and information referred to in subsection 100(4);
                            (d.1) may question the witnesses, including the person who is the subject of the proceeding;
                            (e) must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations;
                            (f) may, despite paragraph (b), allow a claim for refugee protection without a hearing, if the Minister has not notified the Division, within the period set out in the rules of the Board, of the Minister’s intention to intervene;
                            (g) is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence;
                            (h) may receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances; and
                            (i) may take notice of any facts that may be judicially noticed, any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge.

                            IRPA Section 170(a) - May inquire into any matter that it considers relevant to establishing whether a claim is well-founded

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it,
                            (a) may inquire into any matter that it considers relevant to establishing whether a claim is well-founded; ...

                            IRPA Section 170(b) - Must hold a hearing

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (b) must hold a hearing;

                            IRPA Section 170(c) - Must notify the person who is the subject of the proceeding and the Minister of the hearing

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (c) must notify the person who is the subject of the proceeding and the Minister of the hearing;

                            Minister must be notified of the hearing regardless of whether they are a party under the rules

                            As stated in the Board's public commentary to the previous version of the RPD Rules, "The Minister must be notified of the hearing of a claim for refugee protection even if the Minister has not intervened in the claim under...the Rules".[1]

                            IRPA Section 170(d) - Must provide the Minister, on request, with the documents and information referred to in subsection 100(4)

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (d) must provide the Minister, on request, with the documents and information referred to in subsection 100(4);

                            IRPA Section 170(d.1) - May question the witnesses, including the person who is the subject of the proceeding

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (d.1) may question the witnesses, including the person who is the subject of the proceeding;

                            IRPA Section 170(e) - Must provide an opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (e) must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations;

                            This relates to the right to be heard and procedural fairness

                            For a discussion of how this relates to the right to be heard, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The right to a hearing and the right to be heard#Parties are entitled to an oral hearing. The RPD Rules require that the Minister be notified of certain issues, for example where there is a possibility of exclusion. If a panel proceeds without notifying the Minister as required, the Minister's right to be heard has been violated, as discussed in the commentary to Rule 26: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Exclusion, Integrity Issues, Inadmissibility and Ineligibility#Can a panel of the Board decline to provide such notice so long as it does not accept the claim?. Similarly, if the Board accepts a claim without holding a hearing, and without providing advance notice to the Minister, then the Minister's right to participate in the hearing process may have been violated: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Allowing a Claim Without a Hearing#When may a Member decide a claim without having held a hearing?.

                            IRPA Section 170(f) - May allow a claim without a hearing

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (b) must hold a hearing; ...
                            (f) may, despite paragraph (b), allow a claim for refugee protection without a hearing, if the Minister has not notified the Division, within the period set out in the rules of the Board, of the Minister’s intention to intervene;

                            Timeline and commentary

                            The timeline for the Minister to notify the Board of its intention to intervene is provided in Rule 23: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Allowing a Claim Without a Hearing.

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (g) is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence;

                            The Division may receive evidence that does not comply with the Canada Evidence Act and common law rules of evidence

                            Section 170(g) of the Act provides that the Refugee Protection Division, in any proceedings before it, is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence. As such, the Board is not required to refuse to admit evidence merely because it does not comply with a rule of evidence. For example, a panel of the Board is not required to refuse to admit an affidavit merely because it does not meet the requirements of Part III of the Canada Evidence Act, which governs the taking of affidavits abroad.[2] Similarly, the Board is not enjoined from compelling a party's wife to testify about communications made to her in the course of their marriage, something that would ordinarily be prohibited by section 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act which provides that "No husband is compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during their marriage, and no wife is compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during their marriage."[3]

                            That said, each Canada Evidence Act provision should be examined to determine how it interacts with s. 170(g) of the IRPA. In Brown v. Canada, when commenting on the scope of disclosure required of the Minister necessary for a matter to be procedurally fair, the Federal Court of Appeal made reference to the Canada Evidence Act, as follows: "Subject to recognized public interest privileges arising under section 38.01 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, relevant evidence of communications with a receiving country ought to be disclosed in advance of the hearing."[4] They went on to note that "it would be a rare case where a member could properly exercise their discretion to continue detention in the absence of this evidence." In this way, despite the Immigration Division in that case not being "bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence"[5] (the language of the relevant IRPA provision which applies to the Immigration Division), this Canada Evidence Act provision nonetheless applied as a result of the specific wording of this specific provision of the CEA.

                            The Division must refuse to admit evidence where admitting it would violate a substantive rule of law such as solicitor-client privilege

                            Section 170(g) of the Act provides that the Refugee Protection Division, in any proceedings before it, is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence. This means that provisions of the Canada Evidence Act do not constrain the Board's ability to admit evidence. This principle applies to rules of evidence, such as spousal privilege, but not to rules of substantive law such as solicitor-client privilege.[6] In this way, a panel of the RPD is obliged to respect solicitor-client privilege and must decline to admit information so protected, except where a relevant exception applies.

                            While the Division is not bound by any rules of evidence, the Division may still have regard to them

                            Section 170(g) of the IRPA is clear that the Refugee Protection Division is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence. That said, the Division may nonetheless have regard to such rules in a number of ways, including:

                            • When assigning weight to evidence. Lorne Waldman writes in his text that "in cases where the evidence is not normally admissible in a court of law, the Division must give careful consideration to the weight given to the evidence."[7]
                            • When exercising residual discretion about whether to admit the evidence. Simply because a panel of the Board may accept evidence does not mean that it must; the panel has a discretion to decline to admit the evidence as part of the broader discretion that it has to control its own process and balance the probative value of evidence with its prejudicial effect, if any, on the hearing process. In the words of the Refugee Appeal Division, “since the RPD is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence, it must generally admit all evidence unless it is irrelevant, repetitive or prejudicial”,[8] highlighting this residual discretion to decline to admit certain prejudicial evidence. For example, see decisions regarding the Board's discretion to refuse to allow a lawyer to act as a witness in a matter where they are also acting as counsel: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Witnesses#Limitations on the ability of legal counsel to act as a witness in a proceeding.

                            IRPA Section 170(h) - May receive evidence considered credible or trustworthy

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            (h) may receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances;

                            Burden of proof

                            The burden of proof rests on a claimant to show that they meet the definition of a 'person in need of protection' or Convention Refugee in the Act. For further discussion of this, see: Canadian Refugee Procedure/The Board's inquisitorial mandate#A claimant has an onus to show that they meet the criteria to be recognized as a refugee.

                            Where there is a dispute, the Division should explain why evidence was considered credible and trustworthy

                            Section 170(h) of the Act provides that the Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, may receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances. In this way, a Division of the Board is entitled to rely on sources of information that may not be admissible evidence in a court proceeding, provided that the Division explains why the information is credible or trustworthy. See a discussion of this in Pascal v. Canada, which, while a decision relating to the Board's Immigration Division, applies mutatis mutandis to the Refugee Protection Division.[9] See also Fong v Canada, a decision concerning the Board's Immigration Appeal Division, in which the IAD accepted police reports into evidence concerning a crime that Mr. Fong had been acquitted of.[10] The Federal Court held that the IAD had erred in doing so because it had failed to determine that the police reports were either credible or trustworthy, as required by the Act:

                            in light of the acquittal of the applicant on the charges to which they related, [the police reports] were prima facie neither credible nor trustworthy as they set out the factual foundation for charges laid that were subsequently not proven. The police reports should not have been admitted into evidence in these circumstances.[11]

                            This relates to James Hathaway's statement that it is not the case that "every piece of paper tendered [should] be received, even with the stipulation that differential weight will be accorded to less relevant materials" as the statutory reference to the admission only of evidence which is trustworthy or credible requires that evidence not logically probative of a legally material fact be excluded.[12] See also: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Documents#Rule 35 - Documents relevant and not duplicate.

                            How should the Division determine whether evidence should be considered credible or trustworthy?

                            A full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this section of this text. There are a number of tools utilized by refugee status determination bodies to this end, for example, UNHCR registration officers deploy tools such as checking the consistency of stories told to them by re-interviewing applicants.[13]

                            IRPA Section 170(i) - May take notice of facts

                            Proceedings
                            170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, ...
                            may take notice of any facts that may be judicially noticed, any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge.

                            RPD Rule 22 on Specialized Knowledge relates to this provision of the Act

                            For a discussion of the interpretation of this provision, see the commentary to RPD Rule 22: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Specialized Knowledge.

                            References

                            1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Commentaries to the Refugee Protection Division Rules, Date Modified: 2009-05-22 <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704062357/http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/aclo/pages/rpdcomment.aspx> (Accessed January 28, 2020).
                            2. Dhesi, Bhupinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. 84-A-342), Mahoney, Ryan, Hugessen, November 30, 1984.
                            3. Muheka v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 CanLII 98239 (CA IRB), par. 28, <http://canlii.ca/t/hqr82#28>, retrieved on 2020-02-05.
                            4. Brown et al. v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2020 FCA 130, <https://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/483607/index.do>, para. 145.
                            5. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 173 <http://canlii.ca/t/53z6t#sec173> retrieved on 2020-08-08.
                            6. R. v. Oland, 2015 NBQB 247, affirmed by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Oland v. R.,  2016 CanLII 101484 (NBCA).
                            7. Waldman, Lorne, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2018, ISBN 9780433478928, ISSN 1912-0311, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?5022478> (Accessed April 1, 2020) at page 1718 of the PDF.
                            8. X (Re), 2017 CanLII 56261 (CA IRB), par. 55, <http://canlii.ca/t/h5p78#par55>, retrieved on 2020-08-09.
                            9. Pascal, Adrian Edmond v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3379-19), McHaffie, July 9, 2020; 2020 FC 751.
                            10. As discussed in Sharryn Aiken, et al, Immigration and Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Third Edition), Jan. 1 2020, Emond, ISBN: 1772556319, at page 193.
                            11. Fong v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 1134, at para. 13.
                            12. Hathaway, James C., Rebuilding trust: A Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Studies Centre, Publisher: Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, December 1993, page 23.
                            13. Riva, S., Hoffstaedter, G. The aporia of refugee rights in a time of crises: the role of brokers in accessing refugee protection in transit and at the border. CMS 9, 1 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00212-2.

                            Section 170.2: No reopening of claim or application

                            Section 170.2 of the IRPA

                            The legislative provision reads:

                            No reopening of claim or application
                            170.2 The Refugee Protection Division does not have jurisdiction to reopen on any ground — including a failure to observe a principle of natural justice — a claim for refugee protection, an application for protection or an application for cessation or vacation, in respect of which the Refugee Appeal Division or the Federal Court, as the case may be, has made a final determination.

                            Commentary

                            For a discussion of this legislative provision, see the commentary to Rules 62 and 63: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Reopening a Claim or Application.

                            References

                              Chairperson's Guidelines

                              Guideline 4 - Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution

                              Women and girls constitute 47 percent of refugees and asylum-seekers globally.[1] The adoption of guidelines for protection in cases of gender-related persecution has been described as an improvement in the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention by academic commentators.[2] Canada's guidelines are part of an international trend to implement such guidelines or to add sex to legislation as an additional cause for recognition as a refugee, as as been done in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.[3]

                              The Guideline

                              The text of the relevant Guideline is available on the IRB website.[4]

                              Commentary

                              The guidelines may only be applied where gender is at issue in the proceeding or claim

                              In Agaman v. Canada, the court held that the Chairperson’s Guideline 4 could not be applied in the case because a fear of persecution based on gender was not alleged and there were no facts to support such persecution or other difficulties specific to the female applicant’s gender:

                              Les demandeurs ont également fait valoir que la SPR n’a pas « bien pris en considération » les Directives numéro 4. À cet égard, ils affirment qu’étant donné qu’ils n’ont plus de statut permanent au Brésil, ils devront retourner en Haïti. Ils soutiennent que la SPR aurait dû examiner si la demanderesse bénéficierait d’une certaine protection en Haïti, celle-ci étant ciblée par les partisans de Lavalas en tant que conjointe du demandeur. Ils reprochent à la SPR de n’avoir posé aucune question à la demanderesse sur le sujet et de n’avoir fait aucune mention des Directives numéro 4 dans ses motifs. La Cour estime cet argument mal fondé. La demanderesse n’a jamais allégué une crainte de persécution fondée sur le sexe et il n’y a pas de faits tendant à démontrer une telle persécution ni de difficultés spécifiques liées à son sexe. Les Directives numéro 4 ne trouvent pas d’application dans toutes les situations où une femme demande la protection. Il faut que le sexe d’une demanderesse joue un rôle dans sa crainte de persécution. La crainte de persécution en l’espèce est exclusivement basée sur son association avec le père du demandeur et à son passé politique. Il n’a pas été question de persécution ou discrimination fondée sur le sexe. Par ailleurs, la Cour n’a relevé aucune insensibilité à l’égard de la demanderesse.[5]

                              Not mentioning the guidelines will not be fatal to a decision where the record demonstrates compliance with them

                              RAD Member Atam Uppal noted in TB5-05211 that even though the RPD had not mentioned the Gender Guidelines in its reasons, nonetheless the RPD had respected the intent and spirit of them in the case at hand. The panel commented: "I note that the Appellant does not point to any evidence that the RPD was insensitive or inappropriate in its questions, or that it conducted the hearing in a way that was insensitive to the Appellant’s emotional state or her well-being."[6] As such, the RAD held in that case that despite not mentioning the guidelines in the original decision, this was not a basis on which to overturn the decision in and of itself.

                              The Board can consider the Gender Guidelines where a claim involves the "secondary victims" of gendered persecution, such as parents

                              The Refugee Appeal Division has concluded that "Although the Chairperson’s Guideline 4 addresses the primary victim of rape, I find that the secondary victims, in this case the parents, must benefit from a certain sensitivity and appropriate understanding on behalf of the decision-maker when he questions them about this".[7] That was a case in which the primary victim of the gendered persecution was not a party to the refugee claim, but the RAD nonetheless, on the basis of, inter alia, insensitive questions that had been posed to these parents, remitted the matter to the RPD for reconsideration and ordered that "The RPD must take into consideration the Chairperson’s Guideline 4 in the adjudication of this case."[8]

                              References

                              1. UNHCR, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (2009), available at Mhttp://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html>, p. 2.
                              2. Andreas Zimmermann (editor), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, 2011, 1799 pp, ISBN 978-0-19-954251-2, Regional Developments: Americas, Authors: Piovesan and Jubilut, at p. 216 (para. 44).
                              3. Murillo Gonzalez, J.C., LA PROTECCIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE REFUGIADOS EN EL CONTINENTE AMERICANO: NUEVOS DESARROLLOS, in XXXV Curso de Derecho International, <https://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/publicaciones_digital_XXXV_curso_derecho_internacional_2008_Juan_Carlos_Murillo_Gonzalez_2.pdf> pp. 351.
                              4. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Effective date: November 13, 1996, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx> (Accessed February 5, 2020).
                              5. Elisias, Agaman v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-974-19), Roussel, December 18, 2019; 2019 FC 1626, paras. 24-26.
                              6. X (Re), 2016 CanLII 106273 (CA IRB), par. 33, <http://canlii.ca/t/h5qg2#par33>, retrieved on 2020-05-13.
                              7. X (Re), 2020 CanLII 101262 (CA IRB), par. 14, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc75m#par14>, retrieved on 2020-12-21.
                              8. X (Re), 2020 CanLII 101262 (CA IRB), par. 21, <http://canlii.ca/t/jc75m#par21>, retrieved on 2020-12-21.

                              Guideline 8 - Concerning Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

                              The Guideline

                              The text of the Guideline is available on the IRB website.[1] Commentary on it follows.

                              2. Definition of vulnerable persons

                              2.1 For the purposes of this guideline, vulnerable persons are individuals whose ability to present their cases before the IRB is severely impaired. Such persons may include, but would not be limited to, the mentally ill, minors, the elderly, victims of torture, survivors of genocide and crimes against humanity, women who have suffered gender-related persecution, and individuals who have been victims of persecution based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
                              
                              2.2 The definition of vulnerable persons may apply to persons presenting a case before the IRB, namely, to refugee protection claimants (in the RPD), appellants (in the IAD and in the RAD), and persons concerned (in the ID). In certain circumstances, close family members of the vulnerable person who are also presenting their cases before the IRB may qualify as vulnerable persons because of the way in which they have been affected by their loved one's condition.
                              
                              2.3 Persons who appear before the IRB frequently find the process difficult for various reasons, including language and cultural barriers and because they may have suffered traumatic experiences that resulted in some degree of vulnerability. IRB proceedings have been designed to recognize the very nature of the IRB's mandate, which inherently involves persons who may have some vulnerabilities. In all cases, the IRB takes steps to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. This guideline addresses difficulties that go beyond those that are common to most persons appearing before the IRB. It is intended to apply to individuals who face particular difficulty and who require special consideration in the procedural handling of their cases. It applies to the more severe cases of vulnerability.
                              
                              2.4 Wherever it is reasonably possible, the vulnerability must be supported by independent credible evidence filed with the IRB Registry.

                              The Practice Notice on Covid-19 does not explicitly speak to the provision of medical evidence for vulnerable person applications

                              Section 2.4 of the guideline provides that whenever it is reasonably possible, the vulnerability must be supported by independent credible evidence filed with the IRB Registry. This will normally take the form of expert evidence of the sort discussed at section 8 of the guideline (below). During the Covid-19 period, the Board has issued a practice notice entitled Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings. Section 3.2 of that practice notice is entitled "Waiver (removal) of requirement to file a medical certificate" and it reads "Until further notice, where the RPD Rules contain a requirement to provide a medical certificate, this requirement as well as the requirement to explain why there is no medical certificate, is waived. [emphasis added]".[2] Footnote 6 of that practice notice lists what Rules it applies to, none of which relate to vulnerable persons:

                              This applies to applications to extend the time to provide the BOC Form (RPD Rules 8(3), (4) and (5)); applications to change the date or time of a hearing (RPD Rules 54 (6), (7), and (8)); and a certificate provided in support of explanations given at a special hearing on abandonment (RPD Rules 65(5), (6); and (7)).

                              Vulnerable persons are discussed in the RPD Rules, but they are not discussed in any of the aforementioned rules, instead they are discussed at Rules 1 (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Definitions) and 53 (Canadian Refugee Procedure/Changing the Location of a Proceeding), among others. As such, the practice notice removing the requirement to file medical evidence during the Covid-19 period does not in and of itself modify Guideline 8. That said, as set out in the IRB’s Practice Notice – Special Measures Due to Covid-19, the RPD commits to apply its rules flexibly where the parties have difficulty complying with them due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[3]

                              2.3: This guideline applies to the more severe cases of vulnerability

                              Section 2.3 of the guideline states that "This guideline addresses difficulties that go beyond those that are common to most persons appearing before the IRB. It is intended to apply to individuals who face particular difficulty and who require special consideration in the procedural handling of their cases. It applies to the more severe cases of vulnerability." In Conde v. Canada, the claimant submitted a psychological assessment which diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The Member concluded that this fact alone, together with the details of the psychological assessment provided, did not indicate difficulties that go beyond what is common for those appearing before the RPD:

                              I find that neither of these psychological assessments indicate difficulties that go beyond what is common for those appearing before the RPD. Dr. Devins diagnosed the principal claimant with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): however, this type of diagnosis is extremely common for people who appear before the RPD, as most claimants, if not all, have experienced trauma. In any event. Dr. Devins’ assessments do not indicate a severe impairment. Dr. Devins indicates that the principal claimant responded directly to questions during the assessment and cooperated fully.[4]

                              The court rejected this reasoning, stating "There is no indication of what qualifications the Member has to make this kind of assessment and decide that the PA’s psychological trauma is the same as other applicants."[5] This was in a context in which the court accepted that the claimant had experienced "severe trauma", including having been shot, trauma which the court found had a "continuing impact upon his psychological health."[6] As such, Conde v. Canada emphasizes that when determining whether a given claimant faces "particular difficulty", one should not place undue emphasis on the fact that many persons appearing before the Board have PTSD diagnoses and should instead focus on the totality of their circumstances.

                              5. General principles

                              5.1 A person may be identified as vulnerable, and procedural accommodations made, so that the person is not disadvantaged in the presentation of their case. The identification of vulnerability will usually be made at an early stage, before the IRB has considered all the evidence in the case and before an assessment of the person's credibility has been made.
                              
                              5.2 A person may be identified as vulnerable based, in part, on alleged underlying facts that are also central to the ultimate determination of their case before the IRB. An identification of vulnerability does not indicate the IRB's acceptance of the alleged underlying facts. It is made for the purpose of procedural accommodation only. Thus, the identification of a person as vulnerable does not predispose a member to make a particular determination of the case on its merits. Rather, a determination of the merits of the case will be made on the basis of an assessment of all the evidence.
                              
                              5.3 Similarly, evidence initially used to identify a vulnerable person and to make procedural accommodations may not have been tested through credibility assessments or other means. If such evidence is then used to adjudicate the merits of the case, the member should ensure that the parties are given an opportunity to address this evidence as it relates to the merits of the case. This means that submissions may be made about the relevance of the evidence, and the evidence may be tested through such means as questioning by the parties and the member, and other methods. The credibility and probative value of the evidence may then be assessed by the member, even though the IRB previously accepted the evidence, for the purpose of identifying vulnerability and making procedural accommodations.

                              An identification of vulnerability will generally continue to apply to a redetermination of a claim

                              Section 5.1 of the Guideline notes that the identification of vulnerability will usually be made at an early stage in the process. In Conde v. Canada, the court considered a case where a claimant was designated as a vulnerable person, the Board's decision was overturned on judicial review, and at the redetermination of their claim, the panel considered whether they should continue to be recognized as vulnerable. In that case, the court noted that the Board "revoked" the claimant's vulnerable person status at the commencement of the new hearing redetermining the claim, implying that the fact that the claimant had been accepted as a vulnerable person at previous hearings meant that he should presumptively continue to be recognized as such at this new hearing.[5] In this way, the effect of a vulnerable person designation appears to mirror the Board's rules for appointing a designated representative for a claimant, which also continue to apply to subsequent proceedings before the institution: Canadian Refugee Procedure/Designated Representatives#Rule 20(6) - What proceedings the designation applies to.

                              8. Expert evidence

                              8.1 A medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other expert report regarding the vulnerable person is an important piece of evidence that must be considered. Expert evidence can be of great assistance to the IRB in applying this guideline if it addresses the person's particular difficulty in coping with the hearing process, including the person's ability to give coherent testimony.
                              
                              8.2 The IRB may suggest that an expert report be submitted but will not order or pay for it.
                              
                              8.3 Generally, experts' reports should contain the following information:
                              
                              # the particular qualifications and experience of the professional that demonstrate an expertise that pertains to the person's particular condition;
                              # the questions that were posed to the expert by the person who requested the expert report;
                              # the factual foundation underlying the expert's opinion;
                              # the methodology used by the expert in assessing the person, including whether an interview was conducted, the number and length of interviews, whether tests were administered, and, if so, what those tests were and the significance of the results;
                              # whether the person is receiving treatment and, if so, the nature of the treatment and whether the treatment is controlling the condition;
                              # whether the assessing expert was also treating the person at the time of producing the report; and
                              # the expert's opinion about the person's condition and ability to participate in the hearing process, including any suggested procedural accommodations and why particular procedural accommodations are recommended.
                              
                              8.4 Experts should not offer opinions on issues within the exclusive jurisdiction of the decision-maker, such as the merits of the person's case.
                              
                              8.5 An expert's opinion is not in itself proof of the truthfulness of the information upon which it is based. The weight given to the report will depend, among other things, on the credibility of the underlying facts in support of the allegation of vulnerability.
                              
                              8.6 The absence of expert evidence does not necessarily lead to a negative inference about whether the person is in fact vulnerable. The IRB will consider whether it was reasonably possible to obtain such evidence.

                              While expert evidence is helpful to the Board, it is not necessary and the Board may identify any individual as vulnerable even in the absence of expert evidence on point

                              Although an expert report or other independent credible evidence is the preferred way to prove vulnerability, it is not obligatory. The absence of expert evidence will not necessarily lead to a negative inference concerning vulnerability; the Board must consider whether it was “reasonably possible” to obtain such evidence, per para. 8.6 of the guidelines. As Janet Cleveland notes in an article on point, in several cases the IRB has concluded that a person was vulnerable based on a letter from counsel describing behaviour consistent with mental health problems.[7] She states that there have also been cases in which the Board recognized the person as vulnerable and ordered an early hearing on its own initiative based simply on the claimant’s BOC form as well as behaviour observed by Board staff.

                              The Board should not expect revised or updated expert evidence without reason

                              In Conde v. Canada, the claimant had submitted two medical reports, dated one and six years prior to the hearing. The claimant had been designated as a vulnerable person by a previous panel of the Board. The Board's previous decision had been overturned on judicial review and remitted to the Board for redetermination. On redetermination, the RPD revoked the claimant's vulnerable person status, stating "I considered both the psychological assessment of Dr. Devins dated October 9, 2013 and the updated psychological assessment dated January l1, 2018. The RPD was not provided with more up to date psychological assessment for this second re-determination." The court stated that, with respect to the panel's decision, "there was no reason, given the previous psychological evidence and the acceptance of the [applicant] as a vulnerable person at previous hearings, to expect that he needed to provide more psychological evidence without notice. Clearly, this was procedurally unfair."[5] As such, if a panel comments on a psychological report being dated, the panel should provide a reason as to why the passage of time reduces the weight that is properly attributed to the report.

                              References

                              1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guideline 8 - Concerning Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Amended: December 15, 2012, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir08.aspx> (Accessed February 9, 2020).
                              2. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, June 23, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx> (Accessed August 1, 2020).
                              3. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Protection Division: Practice Notice on the resumption of in-person hearings, June 23, 2020, <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procedures/Pages/rpd-pn-hearing-resumption.aspx> (Accessed August 1, 2020), section 3.5.
                              4. Losada Conde v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 626 (CanLII), par. 16, <http://canlii.ca/t/j8863#par16>, retrieved on 2020-08-31.
                              5. 1 2 3 Losada Conde v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 626 (CanLII), par. 96, <http://canlii.ca/t/j8863#par96>, retrieved on 2020-08-31.
                              6. Losada Conde v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 626 (CanLII), par. 103, <http://canlii.ca/t/j8863#par103>, retrieved on 2020-08-31.
                              7. Cleveland, J. (2008). The Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: A Critical Overview. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 25(2), 119-131. Retrieved from https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/26035, page 121.
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