Polar Line

The Nordland Line, which was originally proposed to run from Trondheim to Helgeland, was first launched by Ole Tobias Olsen in 1872.[12] By 1892, surveying on parts of the route had been started. The first specific plans for a railway north of Fauske was presented by the Norwegian State Railways (NSB) in 1901, which proposed the line be built to Røsvik with a branch to Bodø.[13] The first part of the Nordland Line, the Hell–Sunnan Line, was completed in 1905.[14]

In the Railway Plan of 1923, a 306 km-long (190 mi) line between Fauske and Narvik was included and estimated to cost 160 million Norwegian krone (NOK). At the same time, the Standing Committee on Railways stated that the Nordland Line would not meet its function until it had crossed Finnmark. A report on the section from Narvik to Kvesmenes was published in March 1923, followed by the section from Kvesmenes to Alteidet in June 1926, Alteidet to Porsangerfjorden in December 1926, from Porsangerfjorden to Tana in June 1927, from Tana to Vadsø in January 1928 and from Nyborg to Kirkenes in April 1928. The distance from Fauske to Vadsø was 1,144 km (711 mi) and from Fauske to Kirkenes 1,215 km (755 mi). Construction was estimated to NOK 375 million.[13]

NSB completed the Nordland Line to Mosjøen in 1940. Following the German occupation of Norway, construction of the line was accelerated.[15] On 11 December 1940, the Reichskommissariat Norwegen requested that NSB submit their plans. The plans north to Narvik were sent 21 March 1941 and the plans to Kirkenes on 20 January 1942.[13] NSB had three different proposals for the route between Fauske and Narvik. The first—the Ferry Line—was a railway from Fauske to Korsnes on Tysfjorden and onwards to Narvik by train ferry. It would also include a ferry terminal at Tjeldsundet, where there would be a connection northwards towards Kirkenes. The second alternative—the Fjord Line—would run via Tømmerneset, Innhavet and Musken, around the southern end of Tysfjorden and then followed the shoreline to Ballangen to Narvik. The third—the Mountain Line—would follow an inland route from Kobbvatnet up Gerdalen and then through a long tunnel to Tysfjorden. The Fjord Line was 40 km (25 mi) longer than the Mountain Line, but considerably cheaper to build. A fourth proposal, launched by the Wehrmacht, was to build a ferry crossing of Tysfjorden, but otherwise build closely to that of the Fjord Line.[16]

Underpass of the Polar Line in Hamarøy in 1947

The alternatives were considered by Vienna-based Ladislaus von Rabcewicz. He considered the alternatives based on that the railway would be extended to Kirkenes, that the railway should be built as quickly as possible, and considering the line's strategic location. Of military-strategic concerns, he discarded the proposals which involved a ferry.[16] The Fjord Line was considered advantageous gradients and close access to the fjords would allow for more work days per year. However, it had four tunnels longer than 5 km (3.1 mi), five tunnels between 4 and 5 km (2.5 and 3.1 mi), three tunnels between 3 and 4 km (1.9 and 2.5 mi), five tunnels between 2 and 3 km (1.2 and 1.9 mi) and twelve tunnels shorter than 2 km (1.2 mi). Rabcewicz stated that it would be necessary with immediate start of construction for all tunnels longer than 2.8 km (1.7 mi), with the establishment of 24 breaking-in points.[17]

Rabcewicz recommended a mountain line, but chose to build it to intersect with the Ofoten Line at Bjørnfjell, and use that line as a branch to reach Narvik, rather than build the line directly to the town.[16] The Mountain Line could be built faster because of shorter tunnels, the longest being 5.5 km (3.4 mi), which with an estimated 4 m (13 ft) per day would give a construction time of 33 months. The other main advantage of the line was that it lay so far inland that an Allied attack would be improbable.[18] However, Rabcewicz noted several disadvantages of the line, including steeper gradients, the lack of any fjords or residents between Kobbvatnet and Bjrnfjell and the increased amount of snow in the area. He estimated that the line could be completed by June 1945 given a work-force of 83,700 men.[19]

Planning of the route from Narvik to Kirkenes was led by Professor Flörke in Narvik. The first report was published on 4 July 1942, regarding the route from Kvesmenes to Skibotn. The report considered three proposals, that of NSB from the 1920s, that of the Reichskommissariat's railway division and that of the Flörke's group. NSB had recommended a route which followed the coastline, but Flörke stated that for military-strategic reasons this route had to be discarded. He further wanted to avoid long tunnels to decrease construction time. He also remarked that NSB's maps did not match the terrain, forcing his office to take aerial photography of the route from Nordreisa to Skippagurra between May and August 1942, while Narvik to Nordreisa was photographed between June and August. Plans consisting of the section from Setermoen to Nordreisa (325 km (202 mi) from Bjørnfjell) were sent to Einsatzgruppe Wiking in Oslo on 8 July 1942. The plans from Bjørnfjell to Setermoen were sent on 23 July.[20]

Remains of the Polar Line at Kobbelvvågen in 1950

As part of Operation Barbarossa—the German invasion of the Soviet Union—plans were immediately dispatched to complete a railway to Kirkenes. The responsibility was given to Organisation Todt. Plans called for the Nordland Line to be completed to Rognan on 1 August 1943 and later that same year to Fauske.[15] Construction of the section north of Fauske was, unlike the section southwards, without any Norwegian participation, including that of NSB.[21]

Construction was organized by Einsatzgruppe Wiking which was based in Mo i Rana and had clerks of works in Fauske and Tømmerneset. The work was performed through a number of German construction companies. Construction on the Polar Line started in January 1943. The first part of construction was for auxiliary facilities, such as barracks, quays and power supply. The workforce largely provided by Russian and Serbian prisoners of war (POW).[22] Despite the enormous amount of labour construction of the railway was notoriously inefficient and the part of the railway which were completed further south was of such bad quality that most of the permanent way had to be replaced.[15] North of Tysfjorden, the only work was a tote road between Narvik and Bjørnfjell.[20]

The area the line was being built was without road connection, and the steep terrain made it difficult to place the railway elsewhere than close by the fjords. As this was also the place where people lived, it caused a conflict of interest. According to the peace-time compulsory purchase law, the state was forced to pay due compensation for any land they needed to build public infrastructure. However, the Germans showed no interest in following these laws, took what property they needed, often without even informing the locals. In Lappstorvika, the road became so dilapidated that the locals chose to move away until after the war.[23]

Thirty thousand POWs were brought to work on the railway through Norland. The treatment of the POWs varied depending on their nationality, their status in regard to the Geneva Convention and their alignment.[24] Russians who converted to support Andrey Vlasov were treated better and often sent to own camps. Similarly, only two of over 1,000 Polish POWs in Nordland died, and were treated better because Polish people were generally regarded as pro-Axis.[25] Wehrmacht invested the equivalent of NOK 15 million in labour and other costs in the line. At the time of the German capitulation on 8 May 1945 there were an estimated 8,300 POWs living in camps on the segment between Fauske and Drag.[22] About ten percent of those who had worked on the line had died.[21]

On 4 December 1945, the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Oslo and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started work on a common Norwegian–Soviet commission which would investigate issues regarding Russian POWs in Norway. The commission was established in March 1946.[26] Both NSB and Norwegian authorities were concerned that the Soviet goal was to claim compensation for the effective work which the POWs had done in Norway.[27] Although vague estimates of the number of man-hours were calculated, no monetary value was ever determined, and no claim was submitted to the Norwegian authorities from the Soviet Union.[28]