Imia

The provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne that are relevant to the Imia and the related "grey-zones" issue, are the following:[20]

• Article 6

"[...] In the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets Iying within three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State."

• Article 12

"[...] Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty."

• Article 15

"Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: [here follows an enumeration of the 13 largest islands in the Dodecanese area, by name], and the islets dependent thereon [...]"

• Article 16

"Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. [...]"

The problem is because Imia is situated just outside the three-mile boundary of Article 6 and Article 12, but is also not in an obvious, strict sense geographically "dependent" (Article 15) on the larger Dodecanese islands (being still closer to the Turkish mainland than to the next larger island). Greece considers that the wording of Articles 12 and 16 together precludes any Turkish claim to territories outside the three-mile boundary once and for all, and that the criterion of "dependency" must be understood in a rather wide sense as covering everything in the whole general area of the Dodecanese outside the three-mile limit, in order to give the provisions of the treaty an inherently consistent meaning. Turkey, on the other hand, claims that the criterion of "dependency" must be understood in a narrow sense, and that formations such as Imia may therefore constitute "grey zones" that the treaty has left undecided; or indeed that Turkish sovereignty over them still holds.

Border Protocol of 1932 Demarcation line
Geographical points Turkish side
Point	Name in text	Modern name
A	Mordala I.
B	Kara Ada	Kara Ada
C	Guirejik I.	Gürecik Adası
D	Utchian I.	Kargı Adası
E	Arkialla Pt.
F	Hussein Pt.	Hüseyin Burnu
G	Lodo	Yassıada
H	Atsaki	Topan Adası / Zouka
I	Kato I.	Çavuş Adası
J	Pondikusa	Büyükkiremit Adası
K	Sandama Peninsula	İnce Burnu
L	C. Monodendri	Tekeağaç
Italian (later Greek) side
Point	Name in text	Modern name
A	C. Phuka	Ag. Fokas
B	Luro Pt	Akr. Psalidi
C	Kum Pt.	Akr. Ammoglossa
D	C. Russa	Akr. Roussa
E	Vasiliki Pt.	Vasiliki
F	Karapsili Pt.	Akr. Atsipas
G	Kardak (Rks)	Imia
H	Kalolimno	Kalolimnos
I	Agia Kiriaki	Ag. Kiriaki
J	Pharmako	Farmakonisi
Source: Text of the 1932 treaty and border protocol, and modern maps of the area.

After the Treaty of Lausanne, a dispute arose between Turkey and Italy over some other small islands, not directly related to the area of Imia. This dispute was settled through a compromise, which was sealed in a bilateral treaty in 1932 at Ankara. As an appendix to that treaty, the two governments formally assured each other that they now considered the whole remaining Dodecanese border between them to be uncontroversial, and appointed a bilateral technical committee to trace its exact delimitation cartographically.

The committee produced a technical protocol that was signed by envoys of the two foreign ministries in the same year.[21] This protocol mentions Imia explicitly, as being on the Italian (i.e. later Greek) side. The protocol itself, according to the present-day Turkish argument, does not bear the formal characteristics of an international treaty. The Greek side now holds that it nevertheless constitutes compelling evidence that the Turkish government of the time had made a binding commitment to accepting the delimitation as described in the protocol.[22] The Turkish side holds that the protocol is not binding as an international treaty and therefore has no value whatsoever for the resolution of the present dispute.[2]

Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands to Greece with the 1947 Treaty of Paris. Article 14 enumerates the islands to be transferred to Greek sovereignty, and states that adjacent islets are to be transferred. The Turkish and Greek sides dispute the meaning of the term. Turkey claims that Imia does not fit into the definition stipulated by the Article 14 of the treaty.[23]

After the 1996 crisis, the Turkish and Greek governments have made various claims that certain diplomatic exchanges between Turkey and Italy after 1932, and between Turkey and Greece after 1947, provided proof that the respective opponents at that time held legal opinions different from what they claim today, making their present stance inconsistent and untenable. Thus, Turkey has claimed that both the Italian government during the 1930s and the Greek government between 1947 and the 1950s had shown itself to be well aware that the 1932 protocol did not provide legal grounds for an exact delimitation of the boundary.[24]

Conversely, Greece claims that Turkey, already during the 1930s, had explicitly confirmed to Italy that it considered the 1932 protocol valid and binding.[22] However, most of this evidence is contained in diplomatic exchanges that have never been disclosed to the public by either of the two parties.

Greece also cites as evidence for a former Turkish acceptance of Greek sovereignty the diplomatic procedures around the original delimitation of Flight Information Regions (FIR) within the framework of the ICAO, in 1950. The relevant treaty states that, in the Aegean zone, the boundary between the Athens and Istanbul FIRs was to follow the boundaries of the territorial waters. This implies, according to the Greek view, that both parties at that time were taking for granted that a mutually agreed border did indeed exist, which would contradict the claims of persisting "grey zones" made today by Turkey.[22]

The maps of the air zones published after that agreement (e.g. an official map published by Turkey in 1953) do indeed show a line that runs where Greece today claims the territorial boundary should be, with Imia on the Greek side.[25][26] Turkey holds that the agreement about the FIR boundaries was not concerned with determining sovereignty, and thus has no bearing on the issue.

During and after the crisis of 1996, both sides put a lot of emphasis on previously published maps, which were cited as evidence purportedly showing that their respective views were shared by third parties, or had even been shared by the opposite side.[2][25] For instance, a national road map sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Defense,[27] published just before the crisis, shows Imia (Limnia) as Greek territory. There are other Turkish maps of before 1996 that show Imia as Greek.[25]

However, the cartographic evidence of before 1996 is so mixed that the only safe conclusion one can draw from it is that neither of the two governments ever bothered to enforce a consistent representation of whatever legal opinions they held with respect to these islands, in the work of their cartographic state agencies.[26]

There is also the case of a neighbouring islet, only a few miles from Imia, called Zouka, Dzouka or Topan Adası, which was consistently shown as Turkish in Greek naval maps,[25] but as Greek in Greek topographic maps.[26] When the attention of the Greek government was drawn to this fact in 2004, it was quick to admit that Zouka was in fact Turkish and that the attribution to Greece had been a mere technical mistake, since Zouka in fact lies on the Turkish side of the demarcation line of the 1932 protocol.[28]

Some of the existing cartographic problems can probably be traced back to a 1946–47 British cartographic survey conducted by the crew of HMS Childers. According to the account of its former navigation officer[29] it is possible that the islets in question were wrongfully charted as belonging to Turkey by his predecessor. The reason was that during the Second World War boats of a British Special Boat Service flotilla often evaded German patrols by making fast alongside Turkish fishing boats near the islet and convincing the Germans that they were Turkish fishermen in Turkish territory.

Out of this experience one officer of HMS Childers, who had served the special boat flotilla, probably charted the Turkish name of these islets, Kardak, and attributed them to Turkey. It is well possible that when the whole Dodecanese was ceded to Greece in 1947, these islets may not have been included in official maps because of the wartime experience of a British naval officer.

It appears, in short, that contradictory cartographic evidence in this field has been caused either by wartime mistakes, mere inattention or inadvertent proliferation of previous technical mistakes. It does not necessarily reflect consistent legal opinions or policies of either side. The conflicting cartographic evidence may nevertheless be one of the causes for the different sovereignty claims.

Bill Clinton said about the crisis: "I thought my aides were joking when they said Turkey and Greece would engage in war over rocks on which none but sheep live. I held phone calls with the leaders of both countries, and convinced them to not go to war over the rocks that inhabited mostly 20 sheep".

After 1996, most foreign countries have carefully avoided taking an unequivocal stand on the Imia issue in favour of either side. However, both Greek and Turkish public opinion has been eager to observe the stance of foreign governments on the issue, as evidenced through details such as the cartographic treatment of Imia in maps published by state agencies. Particular close attention has been paid in this context to maps published by US government agencies. Shortly after the 1996 crisis, the US National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) removed the Greek name Vrakhoi Imia from its maps, adding instead a note saying "Sovereignty undetermined",[2] but in a new edition a few months later, in October 1996, it reverted that move and returned to the Greek name.[30] In addition, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's claims be taken to a peaceful resolution according to the international law.[7]

The government of Italy, the original contracting party of the 1932 border protocol, stated on 6 February 1996 that it considered the protocol valid, thus lending support to the Greek position.[31][32]

The European Union backed the Greek side on the Imia Islets dispute, and warned Turkey to refrain from any military operations against Greek sovereignty, and, along with the European Parliament, called Turkey to solve any disputes it has with Greece through the International Court of Justice. The resolution by the European Parliament entitled "Resolution on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union" also stated that Greece's borders were EU borders.[33][34][35][36] In addition, it stated that the islets of Imia belongs to Dodecanese group of islands pursuant to the 1923, 1932 and 1947 treaties and whereas even on Turkish maps from the 1960s, these islets are shown as Greek territory.[7][36]

After the incident Greece threatened to reopen debate on implementation of an EU customs union accord with Turkey and to block an EU aid package that is part of the accord. Greece mentioned that Turkey broke a commitment under the accord to have amicable ties with EU members. Many EU foreign ministers urged the parties to solve differences amicably. EU members were concerned that Greece's moves against Turkey would violate the customs union accord and interfere with developing ties and access to Turkey's market. The United States were also concerned since they were a proponent of Turkish-European links. The French President Jacques Chirac “indicated that the fewer new problems Greece created for EU-Turkish cooperation, the more likely France would be to show solidarity with Greece.” Other European governments reportedly implied that if Greece sabotaged the customs union, then they would stall talks on Cyprus EU membership.

Greek Prime Minister said that Greece would cooperate with the EU once Turkey agreed to International Court of Justice jurisdiction, but Turkey must initiate an appeal to the International Court of Justice since it is questioning Greek rights. The Greek opposition criticized the government, for its inability to get more support from Europe, while Turkey sent officials to Europe to explain their views and to counter Greece's attempt to impede Turkish-EU relations and recalled its ambassador from Athens.

In October 2019, the US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, on his first official visit to Greece, when asked about a potential Imia scenario involving an escalation of Turkish aggression in the Aegean, stated that the US and Greece share the same values on sovereignty and vowed that the US would "protect […] these basic ideas of sovereignty".[37]