Jurisprudence of concepts

The jurisprudence of concepts was the first sub-school of legal positivism,[1][2] according to which, the written law must reflect concepts, when interpreted.[3] Its main representatives were Ihering, Savigny and Puchta.

Rudolf von Ihering, one of the juris philosophers of the jurisprudence of concepts

This school was, thus, the preceding trigger of the idea that law comes from a dogmatic source, imposition from man over man and not a natural consequence of other sciences or of metaphysical faith.

Among the main characters of the jurisprudence of concepts are:

  • formalism, search of rights in written law
  • systemisation
  • search for justifying specific norm with basis from more generic ones.[4]

So, according to this school, law should have prevailing sources based upon the legislative process, although needing to be proven by more inclusive ideas of a social sense.

See also

References
  1. Costa, Alexandre Araújo. "A Jurisprudência dos Conceitos". Arcos. Archived from the original on 27 January 2021. Retrieved 17 December 2011.
  2. Pepino, Elsa Maria Lopes Ferreira; Graviorno, Gracimeri, Vieira Soeiro de Castro; Filgueira, Sofia Varejão. "A importância da Jurisprudência dos Conceitos para a Metodologia Jurídica" (PDF). Revista Depoimentos, da Faculdade de Direito de Vitória. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 January 2012. Retrieved 17 December 2011.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  3. that means that the interpretation of the words stated in the law must be guided by the scientific concepts that these words represent.
  4. Rocha, Sérgio André (2009). "Evolução Histórica da Teoria Hermenêutica - do Formalismo do Século XVIII ao Pós-Positivismo". Retrieved 25 January 2012.


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