Jens Christian Hauge

He was a conscript in Stavern in the summer of 1936, and served 48[3] days [of recruit training ] at the anti-aircraft regimental recruits' school (Luftvernregimentets rekruttskole),[4] In 1938 he received 15 days of recruit training.[3] He received training as crew on anti-aircraft weapon (luftvernbatterimannskap).[5] In May 1939 he was summoned for the last 14 days of recruit training.[3] He replied to the summons with a medical certificate regarding his varicose veins,[3] adding that he was willing to be checked by military doctors, even though [his schedule] as a magistrate (konstituert sorenskriver) would make it difficult to leave work.[3] He received a medical discharge, according to an annotation dated 10 August 1939, by Hauge.[3]

He finished his final exams to become a lawyer, in autumn of 1937. He worked as a private lecturer (manuduktør) for law students, for the next year. In November 1938 he started as a dommerfullmektig in Kragerø, to perform his period as a judicial "conscript".[6] In January 1940 he again was working as a manuduktør in Oslo. While still a law student he became a member of the Norwegian Association for Women's Rights in 1936.[7]

In May 1943, he traveled to Sweden—his first trip abroad for Milorg.[24] (Njølstad says that Hauge's rapidly increasing influence in Milorg—and later in den samlede hjemmefrontsledelsen—was in part because he never feared traveling abroad. Furthermore, "[M]any Resistance leaders were reluctant to such travel, because they feared that, in practice, it would mean the end of their effort in Norway. Or they calculated that their power to influence was greater when they communicated with utefronten—from Norway, rather than meeting its representatives" abroad.[24]) 7–9 May saw one set of meetings, followed by Hauge's return to Milorg's Council, to be followed by another border crossing for meetings in Sweden's capital.[24] The High Command wanted more operative control of Milorg's units, particularly in the districts.[25] This is in part the reason for the establishment of radio links directly between Milorg's district commands and the High Command, without establishing radio links between Milorg districts; due to security concerns, the districts were only to communicate with each other through Sentralledelsen in Oslo.[25]

In September 1943, he became a permanent member of the Sentralledelsen's top decision making group—The Council (Rådet). "From then on, for all practical purposes, he was Milorg's top chief", according to Njølstad.[16]

From October 1944, the contact with Frithjof Hammersen (officer in Wehrmacht), was handled by Ingrid Furuseth, Hauge, and Ole Arntzen.[26] Evidence from Hammersen, was the first trustworthy evidence of cancelled plans for moving Hitler's inner circle members—to Festung Norwegen.[27] (In the last months of the war, Hauge had secret talks with Wehrmacht officers that gave information about the German plans for Norway. These talks facilitated the smooth transition to peace when the Germans surrendered in May 1945.)

A 5 December 1944 directive (direktiv) from SOE, stating "that it must be a prioritized task, for Milorg and NORIC to obstruct German forces from leaving" Norway.[28] (It was Hauge's understanding that, there was a wish for severing the lines of transportation on land, so that the Germans were forced out to sea—were the British were feeling increasingly stronger.[29])

On 16 December, the Germans attacked through the Ardennes Forest on the German-Belgian border.[30]

A 31 December failed aerial bombing attack on Gestapo headquarters in Oslo, had originally been requested by Hauge.[31] (77 died, [around] 1000 became homeless, 23 buildings were hit—whereof 6 were leveled. But Victoria terrasse was nearly undamaged.[31])

Karl Marthinsen was assassinated on 8 February 1945.[32] (Months earlier, Hauge was authorized by the government in exile, to have Marthinsen killed.[32])

Hauge and then General Inspector were arrested for traffic violations on 10 April, and released the next day.[33]

After Germany's capitulation, the fugitive chief of Gestapo in Norway was arrested on 31 May.[34] Hauge met him, to have him report in writing about Fehmer's work in Norway—with a 10-day deadline.[34] (Hauge's official motive was to cut off Gestapo leaders' options of telling lies in court, about everything they knew about hjemmefronten, but did not use against them.[35])

The only award he chose to receive for his wartime service, was the one that was given to all Milorg's men and women: a silver needle.[36]

In August 2008 signs were found of Hauge having been employed by Office of Strategic Services(OSS). His name was found in a directory of personnel files of employees from 1942 to 1945—released by the US National Archives in 2008, according to Klassekampen.[37] (Other Norwegians on the list were Wilhelm Hansteen, Håkon Kyllingmark and Knut Lier Hansen.[37][38])

On 14 May 1946 parliament decided to establish a brigade of 4000 soldiers to be stationed in West-Germany[45]—in line with the ministry's proposal—Norwegian Brigade Group in Germany. (In 1948 the cabinet decided that the brigade's soldiers were to be issued condoms.[48] 400 000 signatures of protest were collected, and Hauge asked advice from Trygve Bratteli about the possibility of having Labour Party employees do partial checks of the lists, and "Should it be done?".[48] (Municipal elections were scheduled for later in 1948, and Hauge thought that the signatures might harm the election campaign of the Labour Party.[48]) The resulting advice was that the partial checks could be done, but that it was not advisable.[48]

The autumn of 1946 saw the start of the Svalbard Crisis 1946–1947, involving the Soviet Union.[49]

On 13 March 1947 he showed a document to then minister of justice, regarding Knut Rød—who was preparing for trial in the appellate court.[50] (The document was a five-day-old report (to Evang) about Rød's participation in a group that collected intelligence on communists and sympathizers; and about Rød having accepted Norwegian kroner 500 for locating the election lists for the Norwegian Communist Party—pertaining to the last election of parliament and the municipal governments; and about Rød having recruited his brother, for the work [of the group].[50] (His brother was then a secretary in Kommunikasjonsdirektoratet—a government agency.[50])

Olav Njølstad says that "Before the Rød Case continued, the Defence- and Justice Minister knew that the defendant was concerned about the communist threat and could become a useful man in the communist surveillance that they had started constructing - that is, under the condition that he would not be convicted of Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II, and fired from the police force."[50]

In the middle of January 1948 he received a secret memo from Vilhelm Evang that stated that the Western military superpowers sensed an increased possibility for war with the Soviet Union.[51]

In January 1948, Koordinasjonsutvalget ("the coordination board") was established, to coordinate and gather information from the intelligence services—military and civil.[52] Its creation is largely[52] credited to Hauge.

On 25 February 1948, a coup in Czechoslovakia was completed,[53] and it was followed by the "Winter Crisis".[54] The same month the Soviet Union proposed to Finland a combined friendship and military pact.[53]

During the first days of March 1948 messages were received from the Foreign Ministry's stations abroad and embassies of Western nations, that Norway could be the next nation to be invaded by the Soviets.[55]

A front page of Norwegian daily Dagbladet insinuated that Hauge had never been a Norwegian soldier, because he in 1936 had been "discarded by den militære legenemd" ("the military board of doctors").[56] (He had served as a conscript before the war.)

The "Winter Crisis" resulted in a more encompassing political surveillance in Norway, in particular in the Armed Forces, and also within corporations and the civilian administration.[57] On 13 March 1948 a meeting was held in the prime minister's residence, regarding "what could be done to raise the level of preparedness against sabotage and coups within corporations and Norway's administration".[57] (The attendees were Arnfinn Vik, Haakon Lie, Rolf Gerhardsen, Tor Skjønsberg and Hauge [and the prime minister].[57])

On 11 May 1948 Winston Churchill came to Norway (with Oslo "on its head"[58]) and was a guest at Slottsmiddag. (A proposed visit in 1946 was cancelled, in the wake of the Fulton Speech.[54]) After the guests had been excused from the table, Churchill invited the prime minister over, for a conversation, and the prime minister asked Hauge to join.[59] During the conversation, Churchill said that it was in Norway's interest to obtain a security guarantee from the United States.[59] Furthermore, 'You ought not to follow Sweden. Sweden ought to follow Norway.'[59] Furthermore, "Norway interests the Americans because they think a lot about the defense of the Atlantic and about an Atlantic Treaty."[60] (Hauge had conversations with Churchill the next day (at Det runde bords klubb—"the round table club"), and at the farewell dinner held by Britain's ambassador—on 14 May.[60])

On 17 June 1948 parliament started its deliberations about the Helset Case.[56] Later in 1948 Olaf Helset resigned. (Njølstad says that the military and political opposition that were wishing to evict Hauge from his post as minister—through the Helset Case—ended up tethering him to the same.[61])

The Norwegian Base Declaration of 1 February 1949 was created after Soviet signalled[62] that it would not passively watch that the Western Powers established forward bases in Norway.[62]

On 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and Norway became a (founding) member of NATO. (When early in January the same year, "it became clear" that Sweden would not accept Norwegian conditions for a defence union of Denmark, Sweden and Norway——Hauge "became a forceful pådriver (a person who pushes things ahead) for Norway's joining the Atlantic Treaty. - No one person [alone] can be credited" for the joining.[63] (Bergens Tidende has said that then Labour Party secretary and Hauge "were decisive forces behind Norway's entry into NATO - against strong resistance within the Labour Party".[64])

Olav Njølstad says that points, about Hauge's contributions, deserving attention are: 1) "Through his British and American connections he contributed in fetching, for the government, a realistic understanding of the conditions under which Norway would be able to receive krigsmateriell ("war material") and other help from the Western powers."[63] Furthermore, "this was a corrective to the wishful thinking" ... "in discussions with the Swedes, and in the discussions within the Labour Party".[63] 2) "Hauge exerted great influence on the prime minister, who step by step reasoned and felt his way, to the standpoint which became Norway's choice."[63] 3) "[H]e was an effective spokesman (for membership in the A Treaty)"—to the rest of the cabinet, as well as the party's parliamentary group, and the party's leading organer (organs)."[63]

During the first days of 1951, Labour Party opplysningssekretærer ("education secretaries") had already become kommunistovervåkere ("overseers of communists").[65]

Around 1950 leading Israeli politicians contacted Haakon Lie, wishing to discuss the possibility of Israel becoming a member of NATO.[66] Lie sent them on to minister of defense Hauge, knowing that Hauge would reject the idea.[67]

General Eisenhower's visit to Oslo in February 1951, according to Hauge, resulted in something that doubtfully otherwise could have occurred: minister Brofoss accepted the doubling of expenses for the Armed Forces.[68]

Plans for Stay-behind were made, and "Rocambole" was the section pertained to sabotage and commando operations.[69] His policy about appointing Resistance leaders, in advance of a future military occupation, included: "the total occupation must produce its own leaders".[69]

At the end of October 1952 Norway's second nuclear reactor (which later was shut down in 1967) was officially opened[70] by dignitaries.

On 12–13 November 1951, then prime minister forced [70] the party leadership to accept his own upcoming resignation, and he named his replacement, who thereafter was approved: Oscar Torp.

On 5 January 1952 he resigned as minister of defense.[71]

At Labour Party headquarters he held a position as information secretary.[72] The party gave him extra work, and his income from the party surpassed the income he had as a minister.[72] Njølstad says that after the first days, "an enthusiastic and unusually productive cooperation arose within the triumvirate"—Gerhardsen, Haakon Lie and Hauge.[72]

In 1954 his law office was established.

On 10 May 1958 Odd Dahl (the acting director of Noratom) wrote to the Foreign Ministry that the company had authored "a draft for a contract regarding the construction and building of a 40 megawatt heavy water reactor for the production of plutonium".[78] Njølstad says, "Then came the difficult point, that Dahl in no way tried to underplay: Israel wished to follow an independent national direction, regarding the field of atomic energy, and was therefore not set on accepting the strict stipulations of control (kontrollbestemmelsene) that the US" had on their export of heavy water.[78] Furthermore, "For this reason the Israelis preferred "to buy water from Norway at a higher price than it can be bought from the United States"."[78] Furthermore Dahl said that, the Israeli plans were unrealistic, but "hardly unrealistic enough that they can be circumvented with plans of producing atombombs in the foreseeable future".[78] Furthermore, Dahl said that of course one could not rule out that the Israelis one day would want to go in that direction, but the help that Norway eventually might have given Israel to get started "with legitimate civilian applications today, presumably can hardly be viewed in [a] relation to such remote possibilities".[80]

On 21 August 1958 Hauge suggested to chargé d'affaires Miron that Israel might want to buy heavy water from Great Britain.[81] Miron replied that if Noratom purchased the water back from Great Britain, and sold it to Israel—with Norwegian stipulations of control—then that would seem okay, in principle.[79]

Njølstad says that "State Secretary Engen became more and more convinced that the heavy water was to be used for producing nuclear weapons",[82] and in several memos he advised then foreign minister to not go through with the [proposed] agreement.[83]

On 20 February 1959 the government authorized the deal, by royal decree (kongelig resolusjon).[84] Noratom took possession of [20 tons of] heavy water in the first quarter of 1959—from Britain's Atomic Authority[81]—and it was loaded onto a ship, that departed a British port. (Before being shipped out of Britain, Norwegian authorities saw no need for an export license, since the shipment was outside of Norway's borders.[81]) After sailing out of British jurisdiction, the ship was to be ordered to sail directly for Israel.[85]

On 8 April 1961 Hauge was taken to the Negev Desert for a private meeting with then prime minister of Israel.[86]

On 14 April 1961 Hauge conducted Norway's first and only inspection of the shipment of heavy water to Israel,[87] as a result of US' impetus. (This was done at Rehovot.[88])

He [later] told the foreign ministry that he had not been to the Dimona facility—thereby disinforming[73] the ministry.

On 1 September 1971 Hauge—vice chairman at Noratom-Norcontrol[89]—was informed that Noratom-Norcontrol [the same year] had purchased three tons of heavy water—at the request of Norsk Hydro—on behalf of Israel. Hauge demanded that the chairman be informed immediately, and that the chairman inform the foreign ministry that the sale had not been preceded by discussions by the board of directors.[90] He resigned from the board of directors, in part because of how the leaders of Noratom[90] and Norsk Hydro had handled the purchase.

By 30 September, the [1971] purchase of heavy water was cancelled.[90]

The 1959 transaction was uncovered in 1979, by Sverre Lodgaard.[91] Hauge told media that he had made a report to the government after the inspection, and that he declined further comment to the media.[92]

Nine tons (of the original twenty, later augmented by one ton) were purchased back by the Norwegian government.[91]

The September 1987 death of Einar Gerhardsen, according to Njølstad, "marked the beginning of the end of Hauge's political influence within the Labour Party".[102] (Before that, Gerhardsen wrote a letter of reconciliation to Haakon Lie, dated 15 April 1985; Hauge authored its redemptive[103] wording: "For a long time, I [Gerhardsen] have been aware of, that I back then should not have tatt ordet ("taken the word") and said what I said.".[103] (In 1967 at the national convention, according to Hauge, Gerhardsen "broke the staff over Haakon Lie".[103])

• Njølstad, Olav, Fullt og helt - en biografi om om Jens Chr. Hauge. (2008)

• Ulf Andenæs [in Norwegian] (10 April 2012). "A war hero is no saint". Aftenposten (in Norwegian). p. Kultur 11.