Emmanuelle Auriol

Auriol is an IDEI researcher, a member of the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and professor of economics at the University of Aix-Marseille (1996-1997) and Toulouse I (1998-).[3] She is mainly devoted to the study of the regulation and organization theory, including industrial organization and the economics of development.

Auriol is a fellow of the European Economic Association.[4] She is also a regular contributor to Le Monde and the economic press.

In 2015, as a solution to the problems posed by illegal immigration, Auriol proposed in Libération to "legalize economic immigration by selling visas to people who wish to work with us."[5] In 2021, she was the co-author of a government-sponsored report that described how France’s growth has been hampered by its immigration policies.[6]

Ahead of the 2017 French presidential election, Auriol publicly endorsed Emmanuel Macron's candidacy.[7]

• 1996: Prize of the French Association of Banks
• 2002: Nominated for the Best Young Economist of France, the newspaper Le Monde
• 2003 Bronze Medal of the CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique)
• 2003: Junior member of the Institut Universitaire de France
• 2009: Elected member of the Council of European Economic Association[8]
• 2009-2012: ANR Research Grant on public procurement and capture rents - in the case of Paraguay

• Caisse des dépôts et consignations, Member of the Supervisory Board[9]
• Cercle des économistes, Member[10]

Auriol is married and has two children.

• « Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay », IDEI Working Paper, n^o 661, 18 février 2011.(avec Thomas Flochel (University of Edinburgh) et Stéphane Straub (TSE))[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 477 Ko) ]
• « Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries », IDEI Working Paper, n^o 555, mai 2009.(avec Sara Biancini)[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF) ]
• « Public Private Partnerships in Water and Electricity in Africa », Agence Française de Développement, n^o 38, janvier 2007.(avec Aymeric Blanc) [ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 179 Ko) ]
• « Privatizations in Developing Countries and the Government's Budget Constraint », IDEI Working Paper, n^o 459, mai 2004.(avec Pierre M. Picard)[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 335 Ko) ]
• « Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market », IDEI Working Paper, n^o 165, 2003.(avec Steven G.M. Schilizzi)[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 456 Ko) | Résumé (Fichier PDF, 41 Ko) ]
• « The Costs and Benefits of Symbolic Differentiation in the Work Place », IDEI Working Paper, n^o 101, 2000, révision 2002.(avec Régis Renault)[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 648 Ko) | Résumé (Fichier PDF, 61 Ko) ]

• « Education and Migration Choices in Hierarchical Societies: The Case of Matam, Senegal », Regional Science and Urban Economics. doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2012.04.005.(avec Jean-Luc Demonsant (Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo León))[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 406 Ko) ]
• « On the Optimal Number of Representatives », Public Choice. doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3.(avec Robert J. Gary-Bobo)[ Version finale_Document de travail (Fichier PDF, 407 Ko) ]
• « A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.003.(avec Pierre M. Picard)[ Texte complet (Fichier PDF, 308 Ko) ]
• « The Marginal Cost of Public Funds and Tax Reform in Africa », Journal of Development Economics, vol. 97, n^o 1, janvier 2012, p. 58-72. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.01.003.(avec Michael Warlters)[ Version finale_Document de travail (Fichier PDF, 509 Ko) | CGE model of "The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa" (30 Ko) ]
• « Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly », The Economic Journal, vol. 119, n^o 540, octobre 2009, p. 1464-1493. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02291.x.(avec Pierre M. Picard)
• « Capture and Corruption in Public Utilities: the Cases of Water and Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa », Utilities Policy, vol. 17, n^o 2, juin 2009, p. 203-216.(avec Aymeric Blanc)
• « Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries », The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 23, n^o 1, 2009, p. 77-100. doi:10.1093/wber/lhn014.(avec Pierre M. Picard)
• « Status and Incentives », The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 39, n^o 1, Spring 2008, p. 305-326.(avec Régis Renault)
• « On Robust Constitution Design », Theory and Decision, vol. 62, n^o 3, mai 2007, p. 241-279.(avec Robert J. Gary-Bobo)
• « Corruption in Procurement and Public Purchase », International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 24, n^o 5, septembre 2006, p. 867-885.
• « Telecommunication Reforms in Developing Countries », Communications & Strategies, Special Issue, IDATE, Montpellier, novembre 2005, p. 31-53.
• « Taxation Base in Developing Countries », Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, n^o 4, Special Issue: Cornell - ISPE Conference on Public Finance and Development, avril 2005, p. 625-646. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.04.008.(avec Michael Warlters)
• The explosive combination of religious decentralization and autocracy: The case of Islam, [11]
• Sale of visas: A smuggler’s final song?[12]
• Government outsourcing: Public contracting with private monopoly [13]

• List of economists

• http://blogs.worldbank.org/team/emmanuelle-auriol