Dương Văn Đức

Đức was a member of the Vietnamese National Army of the French-backed State of Vietnam, which fought against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was run by the communist Viet Minh of Hồ Chí Minh. In 1955, during the transition period after the partition of Vietnam, Đức was a VNA colonel and fought in operations against the Hòa Hảo warlord Ba Cụt, who was trying to wrest power from Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm. After Ba Cụt was driven from the Mekong Delta, he fled to the Thất Sơn mountains near the border with Cambodia. There, Đức commanded an operation that attempt to capture Ba Cụt in 1955. He claimed to the media that he would capture Ba Cụt within ten days he was unable to do so. Ba Cụt was finally captured in April 1956 and executed several months later. By the end of that year, Diệm had proclaimed himself the president of the newly formed Republic of Vietnam,[2] and the VNA became the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

Đức was promoted to major general in 1956 and served as an officer in the Airborne Brigade.[3] He was sent abroad to act as the ambassador to South Korea from 1956 to 1957.[3] Đức was regarded as an effective but idiosyncratic officer.[4] During the later years of Diệm's rule, Đức was in exile in France. The arrest and assassination of Diệm after a November 1963 coup allowed Đức a chance to return to Vietnam.[5]

He returned from exile in Paris, where he had been working as a waiter,[5] and became an assistant to General Lê Văn Kim, the chief of the junta's general staff. At the time, there was a coup plot against the ruling junta of General Dương Văn Minh, and Đức was recruited by a group including Khánh, Đỗ Mậu and Trần Thiện Khiêm.[6]

At the time, the French President Charles de Gaulle wanted Vietnam to become a neutralist country, with the Americans out of the region. This was controversial among the anti-communist South Vietnamese and the plotters wanted to milk the furore by implicating their junta enemies. Đức had years of experience in France, which had given him a good feel of what the French might be up to and what their relations with Francophile members of the ARVN were. He used this to concoct some plausible sounding and incriminating documents for Mậu. They purported to show that three prominent members of the junta: Generals Minh, Kim and Trần Văn Đôn had been bought by French agents and were on the brink of declaring South Vietnam's neutrality and sign a peace deal to end the war with the North. Some of the documents were leaked to some senior U.S. officials.[7]

On the night of 29 January 1964, Mậu and Khiêm alerted their troops to assume their positions around Saigon. At 15:00 the next day, Khánh took over the Joint General Staff Headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base and seized power in a bloodless coup, having caught the junta off guard.[8] Khánh rewarded Đức by giving him an important command. Duc served as the commander of IV Corps,[9] which oversaw the Mekong Delta region of the country, from 4 March until 15 September 1964, when he was replaced by Major General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu.[9]

The removal was due to Buddhist lobbying, who accused Khánh of accommodating too many Catholics regarded as Diệm supporters in leadership positions.[10] This come after Khánh made an attempt to augment his power in August by ordering a state of emergency and introducing a new constitution, which resulted in mass unrest and calls for civilian rule, forcing Khánh to make concessions in an attempt to dampen discontent.[11] Meanwhile, General Lâm Văn Phát was dismissed as Interior Minister.[5] Disgruntled, the two launched a coup attempt before dawn on 13 September, using ten army battalions that they had recruited,[12] as well as tanks.[13] The coup was supported by Catholic and Đại Việt Quốc Dân Đảng elements.[4] Another member of the conspiracy was Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, who, while ostensibly a Catholic, was actually a communist spy trying to maximize infighting whenever possible.[14][15] General Khiêm, a member of the ruling triumvirate along with Khánh and Minh, but a rival of the dominant Khánh, was also believed to have supported the plot.[14]

They hoped to overthrow Khánh before their scheduled removal from command took effect. Four battalions of rebel troops moved before dawn from the Mekong Delta towards Saigon, with armored personnel carriers and jeeps carrying machine guns. After cowing several police checkpoints on the edge of the capital with threats of machine-gun and artillery fire,[16] the plotters put rebel sentries in their place to seal off the capital from incoming or outgoing traffic. They then captured communication facilities in the capital including the post office to prevent messages from being sent in or out.[17][18] Appearing on national radio, and claiming to represent "The Council for the Liberation of the Nation", Phát proclaimed the deposal of Khánh's junta, and accused Khánh of promoting conflict within the nation's military and political leadership. He further promised to capture Khánh and pursue a policy of increased anti-communism,[16] stronger government and military.[19] Phat said that he would use the ideology and legacy of Diệm to lay the foundation for his new junta. There was little reaction from most of the military commanders.[10]

According to historian George McTurnan Kahin, Phát's broadcast was "triumphant" and may have prompted senior officers who were neither part of the original conspiracy nor fully loyal to Khánh to conclude that Phát and Đức would not embrace them if they rallied to their side.[20] Đức claimed that the coup attempt was prompted by "the transfer to the capital of some neutralist elements, and by some pro-communists in the government".[4] However, Phát and Đức could not apprehend Khánh, who had escaped the capital and flew to the central highlands resort town of Đà Lạt. American officials encouraged Khánh to return to Saigon and reassert his control. The general refused to do so unless the Americans publicly announced their support for him to the nation. They then asked Khánh about his plans for the future, but felt he was directionless. After talking to Phát and Đức, they concluded the same and decided to back the incumbent, publicly releasing a statement through the embassy endorsing Khánh.[10] Khánh also received support from Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, the head of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force, who flew over the city and threatened to bomb the rebels, while Brigadier General Nguyễn Chánh Thi of the 1st Division also supported Khánh.[13]

The announcement helped to deter ARVN officers from joining Lam and Đức, who decided to give up. General William Westmoreland, the commander of American forces in Vietnam, had spoken to Đức and reported to Washington that he "in no uncertain terms ... informed him [Duc] that MACV, the U.S. Mission, and the U.S. Government did not support in any way his move, [and] advised that he get his troops moved out of town [Saigon] immediately. He said that he understood and thanked me. He seemed to be a shaky and insecure young man."[14] Đức mistakenly believed Kỳ and his subordinates would be joining the coup, but later realized he was mistaken.[21]

When he learned he had been tricked into thinking that the plotters had great strength, he soon defected.[21] According to an anonymous source, Phát's hardline Diệmist public statements and radio broadcast comments had caused Đức to reconsider his own participation in the coup.[1] After a further meeting between Phát and Đức and Kỳ, the rebels withdrew as Kỳ put on another show of force.[1][17][18]

As the coup collapsed, Kỳ and Đức appeared with other senior officers at a news conference where they proclaimed that the South Vietnamese military was united, and announced a resolution by the armed forces, signed by them and seven others claiming a united front against corruption.[22] The officers contended that the events in the capital were misinterpreted by observers, as "there was no coup". Kỳ claimed Khánh was in complete control and that the senior officers involved in the stand-off, including Đức, "agreed to rejoin their units to fight the Communists".[18]

Đức claimed that the leading officers had agreed:[18]

1. To put an end to attempts of the Viet Cong to seize power in South Vietnam
2. To purge all Viet Cong elements and their "puppets" out of Government agencies and the ranks of the administration
3. To build a unified nation without distinction based on religion
4. To have the Government treat its citizens impartially

Đức further commented that the fair treatment of citizens was the only way to defeat the communists.[18] When asked if he now supported Khánh, Đức, "looking ill with weariness, if nothing else",[19] simply nodded in agreement.[19] Kỳ claimed that no further action would be taken against those who were involved with Đức and Phát's activities. However, on 16 September, Khánh had Đức and the other plotters arrested and sent to trial.[22] He removed three of the four corps commanders and six of the nine division commanders for failing to move against Phát and Đức.[23]

• Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
• Kahin, George McT. (1979). "Political Polarization in South Vietnam: U.S. Policy in the Post-Diem Period". Pacific Affairs. Vancouver, British Columbia. 52 (4): 647–73. doi:10.2307/2757066. JSTOR 2757066.
• Kahin, George McT. (1986). Intervention: how America became involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf. ISBN 0-394-54367-X.
• Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
• Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-86911-0.
• Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. London: André Deutsch.
• Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.