Capture of the steamer Marquês de Olinda

Marquês de Olinda was built at the Estabelecimento de Fundição e Estaleiros Ponta da Areia, in Niterói, in the late 1850s. It was made of wood, driven by side wheels and masts. It had a low draft suitable for river navigation, displaced 180 tons and had an 80 hp steam engine.[1][2] The ship was commissioned on 8 November 1859 and its first captain was second lieutenant João Frederico Berrizo.[2] Its name was a tribute to prime minister, regent and president of the Imperial Council Pedro de Araújo Lima, the Marquis of Olinda.[3] The ship's first trip took place on 27 November of that year, on the Montevideo-Corumbá-Montevideo route. On this trip, it took about 70 passengers of various nationalities. Later, the vessel would make this trip eight times a year.[2]

With the companies Bernal & Cárrega, first, and G. Matti & Cia, later, between 1860 and 1862, it carried out the route between the city of Buenos Aires and Corumbá under the command of Berrizo, with stops in San Nicolás de lós Arroyos, Rosario, Paraná, Corrientes and Asunción.[1] Later it became part of the ship chart of the Alto Paraguai Navigation Company, still in 1862.[4] In 1863, under the command of Hipólito Betancour, it extended its service to the city of Cuiabá, about 660 kilometers from Corumbá, totaling a travel route of approximately three thousand kilometers.[1] At the time of the imprisonment, the Brazilian ship was commanded by the retired first lieutenant of the Imperial Navy Corps, Manoel Luiz da Silva Souto. This was the second voyage under Souto's command, and he had scribe Antonio Fernando Póvoas and 42 other crew aboard; two Imperial Army officers and five Navy officers among them.[2]

There were disagreements between Brazil and Paraguay, albeit peacefully, on the navigation of rivers and on what were the territorial limits of the two countries. For the former, the free navigation of the Paraguay River was of paramount importance, since it was the most practical means of reaching the remote province of Mato Grosso.[5] From Rio de Janeiro to Cuiabá, sailing along the river, it took around 18 days; by land, although closer, it took months due to the many natural obstacles along the way.[6] Paraguay was aware of this and used this situation to raise disputes on border issues, relating to the territory occupied by the Brazilians and located on the left bank of the Paraguay River, between the Apa and Branco rivers. Even with such disagreements, there had never been serious consequences or any conflict. Also, the Brazilian government had as a priority not to allow the Paraguayan union with the Argentine Confederation, which caused many problems due to its great political instability.[5]

This period of peaceful disagreement between Brazilians and Paraguayans ended with the death of president Carlos Antonio López; consequently, his son, Francisco Solano López, assumed the presidency and soon expanded the country's foreign policy, initiating talks with Argentine general Justo José de Urquiza, who governed the province of Entre Ríos,[5] and with the Blanco Party of Uruguay. Such talks, if successful, would facilitate Paraguay's access to the sea.[7]

With the Uruguayan War underway and after the Brazilian ultimatum to Uruguay, in order for these countries to guarantee that they would quickly reach an agreement that would resolve Brazil's claims and guarantee the security of Brazilian citizens in Uruguay, which did not happen, in 1864 the Empire began a military intervention in the country.[8][9] Upon learning of this, López immediately sent an ultimatum to Brazil, which was ignored.[10] Despite this, it was not expected that Paraguay could take any action that would lead to war between the two nations; on the contrary, the correspondence exchanged by the Brazilian ministers accredited in Asunción and Buenos Aires, and others that arrived in Paraguay, written in the wake of the Brazilian invasion of Uruguay, did not allude to the change in the relationship between the two governments.[11]

In July 1864, Antonio de las Carreras, leader of the Blanco Party in Uruguay, met with López in order to obtain guarantees from the Paraguayan government, who had a large and well-organized army, that it would be involved in the war in favor of Uruguay. López had previously promised that he would guarantee Uruguay's independence in the event of outside interference. Carreras returned to his country with the promise of the Paraguayan president that he would help them. As soon as he arrived, he assumed important positions in the government, such as that of Montevideo and three other Uruguayan departments, only to his disappointment, as the promised Paraguayan help never arrived, and was limited to a protest note with the Argentine government on 30 August.[11] Carreras, however, did not give up on getting some help from Solano López and, with the support of José Vasquez Sagastume, the Uruguayan minister residing in Asunción, tried to persuade him to take some hostile attitude, employing his army in actions that diverted Brazil's attention in Uruguay.[12]

The Uruguayans went to great lengths to encourage López to provoke an incident, regardless of how, as long as the Paraguayans acted in a hostile manner to Brazil. According to Charles Ames Washburn, "Sagastume knew the weaknesses of López", who liked to be praised, and with this in mind he did not save exaggerated praise about López, stating that since he was a child he had already shown great talent in the military area, though his detractors argued his troops did not participate in any fighting and that he had never approached a battlefield. Sagastume also claimed that Paraguay had a powerful army, capable of launching a major offensive against Brazil to take many cities and territories, threatening to destroy the empire and leading emperor Pedro II to agree to peace terms that were convenient for him.[12]

Solano López knew of the revolution that monitor ships and ironclads were in the American Civil War, and that Brazil and Argentina did not have such vessels.[12] He also stated that he was working to acquire these vessels, and that he would ask his country's Congress for authorization to take out a large loan in order to negotiate the acquisition of these ships in Europe. In Washburn's words, once obtained, López imagined that he would have a clear path to attack Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and from there attack Rio de Janeiro and dictate the terms of Pedro II's surrender. The Uruguayan War got in the way of his plans, as he was not yet ready to get involved in a war; he had not ordered the ships because he had not yet taken out the loan, in addition to not having strengthened some defensive positions on the Paraguay River, such as the Fortress of Humaitá, and not having received large amounts of armaments that he had ordered.[13]

The Uruguayan government, impatient with Paraguay's delay in acting, sent several agents to that country on an unofficial mission to urge immediate action and inform whether López was really preparing for war. Among them was a colonel named Laguna and agent Juan J. Soto, who were intimate with López and corresponded with him. Soto informed the Uruguayan government that López's attitudes were uncertain and indecisive.[13]

News of the Brazilian invasion of Uruguay, on 14 October 1864, reached Asunción in a few days. No action on the part of the Paraguayans happened immediately, and nothing suggested any interruption in their relationship with Brazil. On 9 November, the Brazilian steamer Marquês de Olinda was sailing on the Paraguay River, approaching the Fortress of Humaitá, on its regular voyage to the province of Mato Grosso.[14] Unaware of any danger, and after the usual greetings to the fort, the Brazilian ship resumed its journey to Corumbá. On 11 November, Marquês de Olinda docked at the port of Asunción and began routine procedures, such as the rapid distribution of mail and the replacement of coal. At thirteen o'clock of the same day, the steamer resumed its journey to Mato Grosso.[11]

On that day, Solano López was in the Cerro León encampment, about 56 kilometers from Asunción. He had been informed, in a letter delivered that morning, that the Marquês de Olinda, escorted by the war frigate Amazonas, was transporting the new president of the province of Mato Grosso, along with a military engineer, and many weapons and a valuable cargo. Soto, who had given López the letter, advised him to take possession of both ships. Amazonas, however, did not participate in this voyage, with the Marquês de Olinda sailing alone. The letter that López received had been sent from the Marquês de Olinda itself.[15]

On 30 August 1864, the Paraguayan government sent an ultimatum to the Empire of Brazil: “(...) the government of the Republic of Paraguay will consider any occupation of the Oriental Territory [Uruguay] by imperial forces... as an attack on the balance of the Platine States, which is of interest to the Republic of Paraguay as a guarantee of its security, peace and prosperity, and with the most solemn protest against such act, exempting itself from responsibility for events subsequent to the present declaration”. This protest only reached Brazil on 19 October, and from then on, preparations for the defense of Mato Grosso began. The ultimatum was reaffirmed in notes sent on 3 and 4 September, triggering the Paraguayan war.[26]

Upon imprisoning Marquês de Olinda, Solano López concluded that Brazil was determined to wage war against his country. A factor, which in his opinion, corroborated his reasoning, was the knowledge that the Brazilian war frigate Amazonas and two other Brazilian were navigating the Paraguay River towards Mato Grosso, transporting weapons, characterizing a form of war preparations. However, that was not the case. For López, war was inevitable, as a result, he began preparations for the invasion of Mato Grosso on 15 November, and this should take place as soon as possible.[27] And so it happened.[28]

López planned the invasion of Mato Grosso in two columns. One of them, under the command of Vincente Barrios, would advance along the Paraguay River, possibly heading towards Cuiabá. This column had 12 rifled artillery pieces, congreve rockets and more than a thousand cavalry. The expedition was joined by the steamers Tacuarí, Paraguarí, Igurey, Río Blanco and Ypora; the schooners Independencia and Aquidabán, the patache Rosario and the boats Humaita and Cerro León. Later, they were joined by Salto de Guaíra, Rio Apa and the Marquês de Olinda itself. The total force numbere 3,200 men. The second column was commanded by colonel Isidoro Resquín and was made up of 2,500 cavalry and infantrymen. It advanced through Bela Vista, Nioaque, Miranda, Coxim and from there, possibly, to Cuiabá, which would be attacked by the two converging columns. The invasion of Mato Grosso began on 27 December 1864.[28] From then on, the largest interstate armed conflict in South America began, the Paraguayan War,[29] which would last for more than five years, until Solano López was killed in the Battle of Cerro Corá in 1870.[30]

Marquês de Olinda on fire after the Battle of Riachuelo (Semana Illustrada, no. 248, 1865)

After the ship's capture, the Paraguayans converted it into a warship, arming it with 8 cannons.[31] On 11 June 1865, the Marquês de Olinda, under the command of lieutenant Wenceslao Robles,[32] was one of the ships that attacked Brazilian ships in the Battle of Riachuelo. At the time, the Brazilian ship Parnaíba was boarded by the Paraguayans aboard three ships, as well as the Jequitinhonha. A hand-to-hand combat began on the deck of Parnaíba, after which Marquês de Olinda came to aid and boarded Parnaíba with hundreds of experienced Paraguayan soldiers, armed with sabers, hatchets and revolvers.[33]

The Paraguayans achieved initial success, after an hour of fighting, taking the deck up to the mainmast. The artillerymen, protected by their own artillery pieces, fired at them incessantly, supported by Mearim and Belmonte. At the first shot of the ships, the boarders abandoned their companions who had climbed the Parnaíba.[33] Trying to help his companions, Marquês de Olinda approached the combat, but was prevented by Amazonas, which was previously firing at the coastal artillery batteries of José María Bruguez, who charged directly against the ship, ramming it and causing it to capsize, thus ending its participation in the war.[33][34]

The following day, the ship had been spotted and boarded by Araguari, under the command of lieutenant Antônio Luís von Hoonholtz. On board there were 55 crew members alive, in addition to a British machinist and his commander, lieutenant Ezequiel Robles, brother of Wenceslao Robles, the general commanding the troops in Corrientes, mortally wounded. Aided by a Paraguayan officer, Robles ceremonially handed over his sword to lieutenant Hoonholtz, dying of his wounds on 14 June. Marquês de Olinda's crew was taken on the same date, and the ship was dismantled and set on fire on 17 June.[34]

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