Battle of Três Lagoas

Map of the first tenentist revolt in Mato Grosso

Tenentism has a long history in southern Mato Grosso (which had not yet separated from the north),[1] as part of broader military participation in local political struggles.[2] The lower ranks of the Military Circumscription of Mato Grosso massively joined the first tenentist revolt, which began in 1922 in Rio de Janeiro.[3] The uprising was led by the commander of the Military Circumscription, general Clodoaldo da Fonseca, but he was not the real leader and merely followed the initiative and pressure of the young officers. Sympathy for the revolt was not shared by all garrisons and ranks; there were loyalist demonstrations by sergeants. The state government in Cuiabá did not accept the revolt,[4] and there was no popular enthusiasm. The rebels lowered their weapons without resistance when loyalist forces from São Paulo reached the border.[3]

Several of those involved fled into exile in neighboring countries, escaping arrest, and the region became a hotbed of military conspiracy.[3] The second lieutenant revolt, which broke out in São Paulo in 1924, had captain Joaquim Távora as one of its main articulators. In 1922, this officer commanded the 17th Battalion of Caçadores (BC), from Corumbá,[5] the main force of the rebels in Mato Grosso.[6] He was arrested, released and considered a deserter, devoting himself to the conspiracy.[5] The planners of the new uprising had supporters in Mato Grosso, having even prepared orders for the units in Coimbra, Corumbá, Campo Grande and Bela Vista.[7] After the outbreak of the São Paulo revolt on 5 July, this prediction came true, but only to a certain extent.[8]

In Campo Grande there were rumors of an uprising. The Mato Grosso flotilla received orders from General João Nepomuceno da Costa, commander of the Military Circumscription, to bomb the 17th BC if it joined the revolt. But there was only a real uprising in Bela Vista, in the 10th Independent Cavalry Regiment (RCI). On 12 July, officers led by lieutenants Pedro Martins da Rocha and Riograndino Kruel arrested the commander, lieutenant colonel Péricles de Albuquerque, and two trusted captains. Their objective was to unite with the São Paulo rebels.[9]

The rebels occupied the telegraph station, but the telegraph operator Bonifácio Ferreira managed to warn the authorities and keep the regimental sergeants abreast of loyalist countermeasures.[9] General Costa intended to block the exits from Bela Vista to Ponta Porã, Miranda, Nioaque, Aquidauana and Porto Murtinho. The revolt would be quelled by the 11th RCI, from Ponta Porã, with the support of the state government and the Mate Laranjeira Company and the mobilization of customs guards, local guides and others.[10] But the revolt was brought under control within the regiment itself by the sergeants, who arrested their officers at curfew review on the night of 12 July. Two corporals were wounded by the rebels at that moment. This rare case of counterrevolution from lower ranks was rewarded by the promotion of 18 sergeants.[11]

The circumscription command had reasons to believe that Bela Vista would be the radiating pole of revolts in other garrisons.[12] The joining of the Mato Grosso garrisons to the revolt in São Paulo was plausible for the government; according to general Costa, the officers were "almost the same [as in 1922], with the addition of new partisan elements exalted against the winning candidate of the last presidential election". Constant delays in the payment of salaries left the low level of officers and the enlisted men unhappy.[13] Some officers left Mato Grosso on their own to join the São Paulo rebels,[14] and the prospect of recruiting rebels was one of the reasons for the revolutionary army's incursion into the state.[15]

In response to the São Paulo Revolt, the Brazilian Army began a major mobilization and concentration of troops in Campo Grande. The Mato Grosso units were understaffed, and only the 16th, 17th, 18th BCs, a group from the 11th Mounted Artillery Regiment (RAM) and the 10th RCI were minimally organized. The summoning of reservists, recently implemented in the army, had poor results. Colonels were much more effective; of the approximately 2,000 men available, at least half were irregulars ("patriotic elements") called up by private agents, forming reserve units such as the 66th, 67th and 68th BCs and the 50th RCI. Reservists served in these units, but the officers were often from the former National Guard, and, due to the influence of the colonels, the army had little confidence in them.[16][17]

The army's plans to quell the São Paulo Revolt included the Mato Grosso Military Circumscription from the beginning: it would contribute one of the three brigades that would come from neighboring states to occupy the rear of the rebels, isolating them in the city of São Paulo.[18] The first objective was to occupy the city of Três Lagoas, on the border with São Paulo, on an emergency basis. There passed the Noroeste do Brasil Railway, and for this reason it was the focus of operations in 1922 and 1924.[19][20] The first unit at this location was the 1st Company of the 17th BC.[21] During the course of the conflict, the city became a logistics center with large stocks of war material and foodstuffs.[22]

Military situation in the interior of São Paulo in July (top) and August (bottom)

Then, it was necessary to quickly occupy Bauru, in São Paulo.[23] This city, at the convergence of three railroads, was an almost obligatory passage from the capital of São Paulo to Mato Grosso.[24] However, Mato Grosso loyalists were too slow to prevent the occupation of the city by the rebels on 18 July.[25] The journey from Campo Grande to Três Lagoas by rail took a few hours, but 20 days passed from the orders of concentration until the arrival at the destination. Transport was precarious — the circumscription, in the absence of its own trucks, depended on private individuals. The beginning of operations was marked by disorganization, improvisation and the government's mistrust of its troops. An anonymous letter published later in the newspaper A Capital accused general Nepomuceno of ineptitude.[26]

Only on 29 July did the first force cross the Paraná River, on the border, and even then it was delayed due to lack of supplies and ammunition.[26] At that time, the revolutionary army had already left the city of São Paulo and arrived in Bauru, heading towards the Paraná River.[27] Instead of heading northwest directly to Três Lagoas, they decided to reach the border via the Sorocabana Railway, passing through Botucatu.[28] On 1 August the circumscription was organized as an army detachment, with two mixed brigades and a cavalry brigade.[29] The vanguard for the occupation of Bauru would be lieutenant colonel Ciro Daltro's 1st Mixed Brigade, but he may have deliberately delayed the movement because he sympathized with his opponent. On 5 July the city was occupied by the 18th BC and the 50th RCI, but the rebels had already left the place. The Mato Grosso people met there with Colonel Malan d'Angrogne,[30] who was bringing his own loyalist column from Minas Gerais.[31]

Map of the extreme west of São Paulo and the banks of the Paraná River

The troops present in Bauru were withdrawn to defend Três Lagoas, but this movement was slow.[30] Further south on the border, spies from the 11th RCI watched the river crossing towards Paraná. 60–120 men from the 66th BC, commanded by colonel Germano Fetchner, stayed in Porto XV de Novembro, a town next to Porto Tibiriçá, on the São Paulo side of the border. This other city was occupied on 6 August by the vanguard of the revolutionary army, capturing a small loyalist contingent and the steamers Guairá, Paraná, Rio Pardo, Brilhante and Conde de Frontin. With only unprepared recruits, in a disadvantageous position on the ground, the commander abandoned Porto XV de Novembro and established new positions in Porto Uerê, leaving free navigation on the Paraná River.[32]

In Porto Tibiriçá, the revolutionary command disagreed about the next step, which could be Mato Grosso or Paraná. General Isidoro Dias Lopes, leader of the revolt, preferred Mato Grosso, as it would bring more immediate results. His information was that Três Lagoas was weakly defended.[29][33] Asdrúbal Gwyer de Azevedo, commander of the vanguard, wanted an immediate attack on Três Lagoas, but the leadership took too long to decide. The government had time to reinforce the site; troops in Bauru had already returned to Três Lagoas on 10 August,[21][34] and by 16 August the Malan column had also taken up positions in defense of that town.[35]

Mato Grosso offered the rebels an easy geography to defend.[33] As described by João Cabanas, artillery would prevent passage along the Paraná River, the Coimbra Fort would not allow any ship to go up the Paraguay River, and mobile columns would suffice on the cattle roads to Minas Gerais. A loyalist invasion from the north would be decimated by nature itself.[36][37] The government could be fought on an equal footing in conventional warfare.[38]

In possession of one of the largest states of the federation, the revolutionaries would proclaim the state of Brasilândia, or the Free State of the South. The export tariffs on yerba mate would be enough to finance the Free State, and the population would benefit from the elimination of import taxes. Within six months, elections would be held in the new territory, and neighboring countries were expected to recognize the state of belligerence. With their position consolidated in Mato Grosso, the revolutionaries could reconquer São Paulo and march to Rio de Janeiro,[36][37] force the government of Artur Bernardes to negotiate,[33] or, in the worst-case scenario, go into exile in Paraguay or Bolivia.[39]

Three expeditions were launched against Mato Grosso, respectively commanded by Luiz Barbedo, Luiz França de Albuquerque and Juarez Távora. The latter was the strongest. Captain Távora commanded the 3rd Battalion of the revolutionary army,[lower-alpha 1] reinforced by the Gwyer and Azhaury companies, from the França de Albuquerque battalion, and an artillery section of captain Filinto Müller. The shock troops were made up of foreign volunteers, especially captain Kuhn's Germans. All these elements added up to 570 men, according to the commander.[40][41] Foreigners were up to half the staff.[42]

The battalion went up the river in two steamers and disembarked 27 kilometers from Três Lagoas on the morning of 17 August. In a hurry, the rebels did not take their kitchens. Heat and thirst exhausted the soldiers; according to captain Ítalo Landucci, "the drought was at its height: beyond the banks of the rivers, the land was becoming scorched and most of the rivers had dried up". The plan was for a forced march, looping to the left, to attack the loyalists from the southwest.[41][43][44] Juarez Távora blamed the local guide for the maneuver not going as planned.[lower-alpha 2] At dusk, they had their first collision with a loyalist cavalry picket.[45] The troops slept on horseback on the road, in combat formation.[46]

Tenentist Nelson Tabajara de Oliveira defined what happened as "the bloodiest combat of the São Paulo revolution".[56] The defeat was disastrous.[48] The fire charred many corpses, making identification impossible.[57] Juarez Távora counted the loss, among dead, wounded and prisoners, of about 100 men and four heavy machine guns.[54] The government commander found 24 dead on 20 August and others the following day, with the capture of 90 rebels.[44] Gazeta de Notícias published 24 dead, 23 wounded and 67 prisoners, figures confirmed in general Costa's report.[48] Foreigners were the majority of prisoners.[58] Ítalo Landucci reported 400 casualties,[59] a figure that is probably overestimated.[48] According to the Public Force, 50 dead, 51 prisoners and a lot of weapons were left behind. Of the 600 attackers that landed, only 80 to 100 would have managed to re-embark.[51] General Oscar de Barros Falcão recorded the loss of 4 dead and 28 wounded in the loyalist army.[44] The Public Force of Minas Gerais recorded three dead, seven prisoners and ten missing.[57]