117th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery

Bofors gun and crew in action near Tunis, May 1943.

The Torch landings began on 8 November 1942, and First Army's units and formations were progressively fed into the fighting. IX Corps had still not embarked by 18 February,[14] but 117th LAA Rgt finally landed at Algiers on 5 March 1943, the date that the Corps Troops were considered to be complete. After the remainder of its equipment arrived three weeks later it moved 500 miles (800 km) eastwards to Le Kef in Tunisia, where the batteries deployed to guard bridges, Corps HQ and the corps troops.[2][15][16]

IX Corps launched an attack against the mountain passes at Fondouk on 8 April, and its AA guns were heavily engaged against both air and ground targets. Moving and deploying AA guns in the rough country with underpowered gun tractors was difficult but necessary as units in the forward areas were subjected to regular dive-bombing and ground attacks. Ammunition expenditure by the LAA batteries was high, and supply was sometimes erratic. With greater experience of 'snap' actions against fast low-flying aircraft, Bofors gun units increasingly abandoned using the Kerrison Predictor in favour of the simple 'Stiffkey Stick' deflection sight. By the time First Army prepared for the final attack on Tunis (Operations Vulcan and Strike) the Allied air forces had achieved virtual air superiority over the battlefield. IX Corps played a leading role in the operations, which ended in the surrender of all remaining Axis troops in Tunisia on 13 May.[17][18]

After the fall of Tunis IX Corps HQ was disbanded and 117th LAA Rgt was 'forgotten', deployed at a coastal location near Sousse. The commanding officer (CO) was then told to embark the regiment at Sfax for Malta. On arrival it emerged that Malta Command was expecting 107th LAA Rgt, not 117th. When 107th also landed a few days later it became clear that a mistake had been made. Only after several weeks did it emerge that 117th LAA Rgt should have been assigned to XXX Corps: unable to find 117th LAA Rgt in North Africa, XXX Corps had taken another regiment (from Malta) as its corps LAA unit. The confusion meant that the men's mail was delayed for 11 weeks.[19]

However, with its large establishment of 54 Bofors guns for a mobile LAA unit, the regiment was a useful addition to Malta's air defences just when the Luftwaffe was paying attention to the ships gathering in the island's harbours for the forthcoming Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky). It joined 7th Light Anti-Aircraft Brigade covering the airfields and low-level approaches to the harbours, with RHQ, 383 and 384 LAA Btys deployed at the fleet anchorage at St Paul's Bay in the north of the island and 385 LAA Bty detached to Birżebbuġa in the south. Two Luftwaffe raids were made in July, too high for LAA guns, but these were driven off by the heavy AA (HAA) guns and little damage was done.[20][21]

Operation Husky was launched on 9/10 July and 117th LAA Regiment embarked for Sicily on 8 August. There were serious problems with the loading of the ships, and some units including 117th LAA Rgt landed without their transport. 73rd AA Brigade had six LAA regiments ashore but only enough transport for a quarter of that number, and it was only by ruthlessly stripping vehicles from batteries in the rear areas that the brigade was able to move others forward. 117th LAA Regiment was sent to defend the airfields at Lentini, being attacked by Messerschmitt Bf 109s on the way.[19][22][23][24] By mid-September, after the capture of Sicily and Eighth Army's landing in mainland Italy (Operation Baytown), 117th LAA Rgt was deployed under 73rd AA Bde to protect the embarkation port and ferries at Milazzo.[25]

Allied ships burn after the raid on Bari.

On 29 September 117th LAA Rgt crossed to Taranto in Italy and went by road to Bari where it briefly joined 2nd AA Brigade.[26][27] 62nd AA Bde arrived on 2 October to take over defence of the ports of Bari, Barletta and Manfredonia, and a complex of inland airfields. The Luftwaffe mounted a series of low-intensity raids on Bari during November, then on the night of 2/3 December it carried out a large air raid aimed at knocking out the vital port. The raiders approached from the north dropping large amounts of 'Window' that confused the Ground-controlled interception radar, while communications were also out of order. No night fighters were ordered up until too late, no smokescreen was ignited, and there was no blackout. The result was a disaster: 20 aircraft attacked the port, which was working under floodlights, and the AA fire only began as the bombs started falling. With the guns blind, the LAA guns fired 6283 rounds in concentrations without apparent effect, although the HAA guns claimed some success with predicted fire. An ammunition ship blew up and many other vessels were sunk or damaged; the port was devastated. A Board of Enquiry was held after the raid on Bari and the AA defences and procedures were strengthened in line with its recommendations. A follow-up raid on 13/14 December caused no serious damage and the AA fire shot down some of the attackers.[28][29]