5 Commando (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

A Simba rebel with traditional clothing and weaponry. Poorly armed, the insurgents often placed an emphasis on magical protection to terrify and overwhelm their opponents.

In December 1963, a Communist-inspired rebellion broke out in Kwilu Province. It was initially a tribal dispute that grew to a challenge against the Central Government. Although it remained relatively minor, it marked the start of a spreading wave of rebellions against the current Congo central government. As unrest spread, leftist rebels established a Committee for National Liberation in Kivu, inspired by the late Patrice Lubumba.[2] In 1964, Moïse Tshombe returned from self-exile in Spain and declared himself as the only person who could bring about unity between the warring factions. His popularity and political acumen led him to being appointed as Prime Minister on 6 July 1964.[Note 1][3] By August, the rebellion had turned to limited civil war, and the Simba rebels were marching on Stanleyville, taking control of the city on 5 August 1964.[4] The routing of the ANC and capitulation of the capital city of Orientale Province came as a shock to the government, Belgium, as well as to the United States.[5] However, unlike the secessionist uprising of 1961, the United Nations and the United States did not wish to engage in direct intervention against the rebels. Based on Tshombe's 1961 experiences in Katanga, as well as America's reluctance for direct involvement, the Prime Minister contracted mercenaries to address the rebellion.[6][5]

In July 1964, Jerry Puren (a former mercenary officer in the Katangese Air Force) started recruiting mercenaries to support the Congolese Army on request of the Congolese Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe. Puren focused his efforts in South Africa and alerted 200 men of possible employment as mercenaries. The ex-British military officer, Mike Hoare, had known Tshombe and had served as one of his officers in 1961 and was the designated commander for the mercenary force.[Note 2] Puren was to be in charge of air operations. Second in command was former executive officer of the Rhodesian Special Air Services, Alastair Wicks, who had also served with both Hoare and Tshombe in 1961.[8]

Recruitment centers were established in South Africa and in both North and Southern Rhodesia.[8] Hoare placed newspaper ads in the South African Johannesburg Star newspaper and in Salisbury newspapers (modern Harare, Zimbabwe) calling upon physically fit white men "...capable of marching 20 miles per day and who were fond of combat and were "tremendous romantics" to join 5 Commando."[9] Contracts were for six months and basic pay was advertised at $280USD per month, plus $420USD danger pay and 37,000 Congolese francs as a monthly allowance. NCOs received basic pay of $400USD and senior officers were compensated with $1,100 in USD per month. Compensation of US$19,000 was payable to next of kin in the event of death.[10]

"Adventurers" from South Africa, many of whom had fought with Moise Tshombe in the secession of Katanga Province, signed up, as did recruits from Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Congolese, as well as officials of other African states, deeply resented the recruitment of South Africans and Rhodesians; this led to Tshombe frequently assuring the OAU that he would replace the white mercenaries with African replacements as soon as they could be recruited and trained.[11] 5 Commando eventually comprised volunteers from South Africa, Rhodesia, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany. Hoare described the men from the initial batch of recruits as being of "alarmingly low" standard with a "...high proportion of alcoholics, drunks, booze artists, bums and layabouts".[12] He also complained about drug addicts and homosexuals.[12] Belgian colonels Frédéric Vandewalle and Louis Marlière expressed similar doubts about the quality of the recruits, with the latter commenting that they were "pirates who are not worth anything in battle."[13] United States Ambassador George Godley described the unit as "an uncontrolled lot of toughs [...] who consider looting or safe-cracking fully within their prerogatives".[14]

Organizationally, 5 Commando was divided into eight sub-units, designated 51 to 58 Commando, with two officers and three sergeants per sub-unit; these were reinforced, platoon-sized units.[7] The first orders issued to Hoare by the chief of the ANC, Maj. Gen. Joseph Desire Mobutu instructed Hoare to: 1.) Deploy a company of 200 immediately to Kamina with the mission to retake Manono, Albertville, Fizi and Uvira. 2.) Designate 300 volunteers formed into six platoons for the six mobile groups that had been planned and 3.) Assign 500 volunteers in a company with elements of the ANC to immediately retake Stanleyville.[11] By 2 September 1964 recruiting had stopped as 1,000 recruits had been signed up, but the facilities, training and organization of the Commando made the attainment of the first orders highly unlikely.[15]

The Belgian government dispatched Colonel Vandewalle to the Congo; during a meeting with Tshombe, Vandewalle clarified he would not tolerate political interference with military operations. Consequently, he was given authority to work directly with the Belgian logistics units, the CIA's air support, and the mercenaries. As a result, Belgian logistics units funded 5 Commando through providing them with weapons, ammunition, trucks and uniforms.[16] After a few weeks of training, 5 Commando went into combat.[17]

Early on, 5 Commando was plagued by poor logistics and a lack of discipline. A few days after the first group of mercenaries for the unit in the Congo, Hoare launched two attacks against the Simba-held city of Albertville. Both were repulsed.[18] The lack of equipment, inadequate training, and irregularities in pay damaged the unit's morale and the unit initially sustained a high casualty rate.[14] Over the course of late 1964, the Congolese government improved the financial and logistical situation while Hoare screened out soldiers he deemed unfit. By the end of the year, 5 Commando still suffered from disciplinary problems.[12] By early 1965, the Congolese government had driven rebels out of much of the eastern Congo, but the situation remained unstable. The 5 Commando group was tasked with securing the border, reestablishing lines of communication, and clearing out pockets of resistance, especially in the Fizi-Baraka and Uvari areas.[19]

5 Commando played a significant role in rescuing hostages, particularly European hostages, from Simba rebels. These actions frequently made headlines in Europe and made the mercenaries popular heroes for a limited period.[20] Despite these headlines, the mercenaries supplemented their wages by searching bodies for cash and robbing banks in Stanleyville.[21]

5 Commando received ongoing support from the United States CIA through air support operations[22] as well as by providing and crewing Swift boats for operations on Lake Tanganyika.[23] The boats were used to support 5 Commando (often under 5 Commando command) and were crewed by Miami-Cuban, anti-Castro crews, recruited by and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[24] Washington insisted that there be "no overt relationship with the mercenaries," but this relationship between the CIA and 5 Commando could not be kept secret. This was further evidenced by frequent meetings between Mike Hoare and later John Peters[Note 3] and the CIA Congo Station Chief, Larry Devlin.[26] Besides tactical support, the United States provided F-250 trucks and 7-ton cargo vehicles for operational use by the mercenaries.[27]

Peters assumed command of 5 Commando from Hoare in December 1965. Georg Schroeder late assumed command from him.[19]

The 5 Commando were known for unsanctioned killing, torture, looting and rape in recaptured rebel areas.[28] In a press interview, Hoare himself described his men as "appalling thugs".[29] Some South African members of the unit were later convicted of manslaughter by Congolese courts.[19]