212th Rifle Division

By the second day of the German invasion the XXXXVIII Motorized Corps' 11th Panzer Division was driving east toward Dubno, northeast of Brody, but was coming under attack from the 37th Tank Division in the area of Kozin. The 212th's mobility issues were preventing it from keeping up with the 37th, while the 10th Tank Division was engaged with rear elements of 11th Panzer near Lopatyn; in fighting at Radekhov it claimed 20 panzers knocked out for the loss of 26 of its own. By the 27th the division had managed to link up with 10th Tanks east of Lopatyn, facing the flanking forces of the XXXXIV Army Corps as 37th Tanks moved northwest from Brody in support.[5] As of July 1 the remnants of 15th Mechanized Corps had left 6th Army and had come under direct command of the Front,[6] and had retreated to positions about 30 km south of Brody.[7]

By July 10 the Corps was back under 6th Army[8] and was falling back toward Berdychiv which marked the limit of 11th Panzer's advance by the end of July 14. During the next week the Corps was forced away from the Army, which was in the process of being encircled in what became the Uman pocket,[9] and the 212th was reassigned to 26th Army, still in Southwestern Front.[10] On July 29 the fiction of it being a motorized division was finally dropped and it was officially redesignated as the 212th Rifle Division.[11] On the same day General Baranov was taken prisoner. He would be executed while in German captivity in February 1942.

The 38th Army was added to the Front in August and by the start of September the 212th had been moved to that command.[14] At this point, as the largest part of the Front was being threatened with encirclement the main task of 38th Army was to contain the bridgehead over the Dniepr held by 1st Panzer Group at Kremenchuk. The division was on the northwest facing of this position, west of Kozelshchyna. The panzer group attacked northward on September 11 and soon broke through the Soviet lines, driving toward a linkup with 2nd Panzer Group which was pushing south. The 212th was forced off to the northwest across the Sula River near Orzhytsia. This placed the division inside the rapidly forming pocket,[15] but along with the 297th Rifle Division it was moved to the Front reserves[16] and managed to slip out to join what remained of the Front's forces as part of 21st Army in the Kursk area in October.[17]

One month later the 212th and 62nd Divisions had been assigned to the 10th Reserve Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, joining the 252nd and 277th Rifle Divisions.[25] The German 6th Army had reached Stalingrad on August 23 by driving a narrow corridor from the Don to the Volga and fighting for the city itself began on September 14. On September 29 Stalin dispatched Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov and Col. Gen. A. M. Vasilevskii to examine the possibilities of a strategic counteroffensive in the area. Zhukov was specifically directed to Don Front, commanded by Lt. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskii, who confirmed that his Front lacked the strength necessary to mount a credible counteroffensive. In response, on October 1 the STAVKA issued orders to reinforce the Front with seven fresh rifle divisions from 10th Reserve Army, including the 212th. They were slated to arrive between October 7–14.[26]

At this time the 62nd Army, isolated within the city, was under extremely heavy pressure from German forces pushing into the factory district. Beginning on September 3 the forces of Stalingrad Front north of the Don-Volga corridor had launched several offensives based on Kotluban in an effort to, ideally, relieve the siege of 62nd Army or, at minimum, divert German forces away from the city. These were directed largely against the XIV Panzer Corps which had originally created the corridor. By October Don Front had taken over this sector and Rokossovskii was preparing for a further effort to break the corridor, what has become known as the Fourth Kotluban Offensive.[27] After leaving the Reserve the 212th was assigned to 66th Army.[28]

The plan for the offensive called for a shock group deployed on the right (west) flank of 66th Army and the left flank of 24th Army to penetrate the German defenses in the 15 km-wide sector north and northeast of Kuzmichi and to advance southeastward toward Orlovka. It was to begin on October 20 and achieve its objective five days later. The 66th Army shock group consisted of the 212th, 62nd, 252nd and 226th Rifle Divisions from the Reserve, supported by the full-strength 91st, 121st and 64th Tank Brigades, each with a complement of roughly 53 tanks. The first three divisions, each with a tank brigade in direct support, formed the first echelon and would attack from the upper reaches of the Sukhaya Mechetka Balka to northeast of Kuzmichi, with the 226th in second echelon. The immediate objectives were Hills 112.7 and 139.7 and, ultimately, Orlovka. Fire support consisted of 664 guns and mortars and Guards-mortars from 12 regiments. The Army's remaining nine rifle divisions were to provide supporting attacks, but were all severely understrength. In light of earlier costly failures Rokossovskii later admitted that he expected the assault to achieve very little:

We were given permission to use seven infantry divisions from the GHQ Reserve for the operation but received no additional supporting means in the shape of artillery, armour, or aircraft. The chances of success were remote, especially as the enemy had well fortified positions. Since the main objective in the operation fell to 66th Army, I had a conversation with Malinovsky, who begged me not to commit the seven new divisions to action. "We'll only waste them," he said... Happily only two [actually four] of the promised seven new divisions arrived by the deadline... As expected, the attack failed. The armies of the Don Front were unable to penetrate the enemy's defenses...

At the end of October 21 the 212th was reported as attacking south of Hill 130.7, having advanced 300m from its jumping-off positions after encountering heavy fire. The next day the 252nd captured the region of the Motor Tractor Station 8 km northeast of Kuzmichi and this success allowed the 212th to advance to Hill 128.9 by 1400 hours. On October 23 the division advanced 1,000m from its jumping-off positions and began fighting for the northwestern slopes of Hill 139.7. On the following day the 226th Division was committed in an increasingly futile effort to maintain the offensive. By October 27 it was clear to both sides that it had run its course and although the STAVKA claimed German casualties of up to 7,000 personnel and 57 tanks the formerly fresh rifle divisions were no longer combat-effective.[29]

In the preparations for Operation Uranus, which would finally encircle the German 6th Army, Rokossovskii ordered seven rifle divisions, including the 212th, to be disbanded by November 2, with their remaining soldiers to be redistributed among the 66th and 24th Armies.[30] The division was officially disbanded on December 8. Colonel Anisimov was moved to command of the 252nd. He would go on to command several rifle corps during the war and gained the rank of lieutenant general in February 1944.

The 1st formation of this brigade was one of a small number of pre-war rifle brigades and was part of the 1st Red Banner Army of Far Eastern Front at the time of the German invasion.[32] It was soon disbanded to help bring the rifle divisions and fortified regions in this front up to full strength.[33]

The 2nd formation began in October and November in the Fergana region of Uzbekistan in the Central Asia Military District as an "Uzbek" national unit.[34] Before it completed forming it was moved by rail to the Moscow Military District where it completed forming for about a month in the Moscow Defence Zone before going to the front in January 1942.[35] In February it was assigned to the 5th Guards Rifle Corps in the reserves of Western Front and on March 17, along with the rest of the Corps it entered the front lines of the 16th Army in that Front.[36] The 4th Brigade remained in this Army for slightly more than a year, from August 11 onward usually as a separate brigade directly under Army command. On April 19, 1943 it was transferred to the 50th Army where it helped form the new 212th Rifle Division.[37]

This brigade began forming in December 1941 in the Urals Military District but it was not considered complete until May 1942 when it was assigned to Western Front.[38] Upon arrival it joined the 7th Guards Rifle Corps in the Front reserves.[39] After two months in these reserves the brigade went to the 33rd Army and remained under that command either as a separate unit or assigned to 7th Guards Corps until January 1943 when it returned to the Front reserves. In February the 125th joined the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, initially as part of 10th Army,[40] but between February 28 and March 3 it was transferred to 16th Army. This Army had been ordered to carry out an offensive toward Zhizdra and Oryol from the north and the 8th Guards Corps (11th, 31st Guards and 217th Rifle Divisions, 125th and 128th Rifle Brigades, plus three tank brigades) now formed its shock group, attacking southward at dawn on March 4 from a 6 km-wide bridgehead over the Yasenka River, 11 km north of Zhizdra. It faced forces of the 5th Panzer, 208th and 211th Infantry, and a few days later elements of 9th Panzer Division as well. In four days of intense fighting the Corps managed to gain only 3–4 km at a heavy cost in casualties. After a regrouping the offensive was renewed on March 7 with even less success and the entire effort was suspended on March 10. The 125th Brigade began in the Corps' second echelon but also suffered significant losses following the regrouping.[41] On April 19, after leaving 8th Guards Corps, the brigade was reassigned to 50th Army, joining the 4th Brigade.[42]

Once the division completed forming its order of battle, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of December 10, 1942, was as follows:

• 369th Rifle Regiment
• 669th Rifle Regiment
• 692nd Rifle Regiment
• 655th Rifle Regiment[43]
• 37th Antitank Battalion
• 292nd Reconnaissance Company
• 380th Sapper Battalion
• 593rd Signal Battalion (later 395th Signal Company)
• 379th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
• 84th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
• 73rd Motor Transport Company
• 327th Field Bakery
• 25th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
• 18058th Field Postal Station
• 1613th Field Office of the State Bank

Col. Andrei Prokopevich Maltsev, who had been in command of 4th Brigade, took command of the division on the day it officially formed. Between the two brigades there were eight rifle battalions, two mortar battalions and two artillery battalions to provide personnel and equipment so the formation proceeded quickly.[44]

Map of Operation Kutuzov. Note position of 50th Army.

50th Army was located well to the north of the German summer offensive and played no direct role in it, but once the forces of German 9th Army had been stymied on the north face of the salient the STAVKA ordered the Bryansk Front and the southern armies of Western Front to attack the north face of the German salient around Oryol. 50th Army's main mission was to secure the right (north) flank of 11th Guards Army, but also to launch an attack of its own on its left flank on a 6 km-wide front with the 212th and 324th Rifle Divisions toward the Kolpino–marker 199.9 sector. This effort would be supported by the fire of three artillery regiments, an artillery battalion, a mortar battalion and two Guards-mortar regiments. The attack would be supported by the 64th Rifle Division and the objective was to encircle and destroy units of the 134th Infantry Division and subsequently to advance toward Zikeevo and capture it.[45]

The assault began on the morning of July 13 following a short artillery preparation. By 0700 hours both the 212th and 324th had forced the Zhizdra River and broken into the German trenches north of Rechitsa but due to an insufficient density of artillery (21 tubes per kilometre of front) they did not manage to break through the German defense. This was based on an organized fire plan and a well-developed system of wire obstacles and minefields. The commander of 50th Army, Lt. Gen. I. V. Boldin, called off further attacks in favor of a regrouping along a narrower sector. The following day the main forces of the two divisions concentrated on a 2.5 km-wide front, now backed by the main mass of the Army's artillery and, following a 30-minute preparation, broke through east of Rechitsa. The 64th Rifle Division made a supporting attack and on July 15 the 49th Rifle Division was committed into the breach. Two days later these were joined by the 413th Rifle Division in a general offensive. This continued despite German resistance and difficult conditions of near-roadless wooded and swampy terrain until July 20 when the Army began to consolidate along the line Paliki–Nemetskii–Alekseevskii.[46]

Early in August 50th Army was transferred to Bryansk Front. As Operation Kutuzov continued the important center of Karachev was liberated on August 15. The 50th and 11th Armies attacking the morning of August 14 as it became apparent that the German Zhizdra grouping was finally pulling back. By August 18 the 50th had reached a line from Yasenok to Inochka to Orlya.[47] Later in the month the 212th returned to Western Front, now as part of 10th Army.[48]

Later in the month the division joined the 64th and 385th Divisions in 38th Corps.[53] The Novyi Bykhov - Propoisk Offensive began on November 22, but 10th Army did not join in until the 28th, attacking across the Pronya River just north of Petukhovka on its boundary with 50th Army. 38th Corps struck at the boundary between the German 131st and 260th Infantry Divisions' defenses south of Chausy, in cooperation with attacks by 50th Army's 369th Rifle Division. The 385th was in first echelon with the 64th, and the 212th in second. Within two days the two lead divisions had penetrated German defenses at Vysokoe, wheeled northward, and attacked their positions at Chausy, a city that anchored the right flank of German 9th Army. The 212th advanced as far as Shaparovo, 5 km south of Chausy; meanwhile the 64th and 385th seized Lepeny and other villages southwest of the city.[54]

Chausy remained the objective of 10th Army during the following months. On December 14 Colonel Maltsev left command of the division; he went on to study at the K. E. Voroshilov Military Academy before returning to the front as deputy commander of the 71st Rifle Corps and later as commander of the 88th Rifle Division. He was replaced by Col. Vladimir Georgievich Kuchinev, who had previously commanded the 338th Rifle Division. On January 4, 1944 the 3rd and 50th Armies launched a new attack in the direction of Bykhov. In support of this, 10th Army was ordered to attack German defenses north and south of Chausy at the junction of the Sozh and Pronya. 38th Corps, now consisting of just the 64th and 212th, was to attack the defenses of Corps Detachment D in the 12 km-wide sector from just south of Chausy to Golovenchitsy, penetrate the Detachment's defenses, and advance to link up with other 10th Army forces advancing westward north of the city. By this stage the divisions of the three Soviet armies were averaging about 3,500 personnel each. In the event the Corps made only minor gains and late on January 8 the offensive was shut down.[55]

On July 17 the Front began a drive towards Brest and Siedlce as the offensive began to slow due to logistics and German reinforcements. 61st Army launched its main attack with its right flank in the direction of Strigovo and Chernavchitsi and aided by the success of the left flank of 28th Army broke through the German defense along the Mukhavets River and on July 20 captured the major rail and road junction of Kobryn.[60] In recognition on July 25 the 212th was decorated with the Order of the Red Banner,[61] while the 369th (Lt. Colonel Voloshchenko, Vladimir Grigorevich), 669th (Major Derevyanko, Andrei Ivanovich) and 692nd Rifle Regiments (Colonel Podberezin, Ilya Mikhailovich) plus the 655th Artillery Regiment (Major Larichev, Nikifor Timofeevich) all received the town's name as a battle honor.[62]

Later on July 20 the bulk of 61st Army was removed to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command but due to still-stubborn German resistance the Front commander, Marshal Rokossovskii, was authorized to retain 9th Guards Corps to assist the 28th and 70th Armies in the ongoing offensive towards Brest. Over the next four days of heavy fighting the Corps managed to advance from 16–20 km due west and there appeared to be a developing opportunity to encircle the German Brest grouping. On July 25 and 26 the Corps continued advancing slowly while repelling counterattacks while 70th Army's right flank broke through the first positions of the Brest fortified area. By the end of July 27 the Corps was on a line from Zadworce to Wulka-Zastavska and Brest was encircled while the German force was seeking at any price to break out. The town and fortress were both liberated the next day and only small groups of defenders managed to break out to the west while most were captured or destroyed in the woods west of the town.[63] The 212th received considerable recognition for its part in the victory; on August 10 it was presented with the Order of Suvorov, 2nd Degree, while all four regiments were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.[64] Soon afterwards the 9th Guards Corps rejoined 61st Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command.

While in the Reserve the division was moved to the 80th Rifle Corps, joining the 82nd and 356th Rifle Divisions.[65] It would remain in this Corps for the duration of the war.[66] 61st Army rejoined the active fighting on September 13 as part of 3rd Baltic Front, and was soon advancing into southeastern Estonia. In early October the division advanced west past Valmiera, Latvia as its Army pushed on towards Riga, helping to seal off the Courland pocket following the liberation of that city.[67] On October 31 the 212th was further honored for its role in the battle for Riga with the award to the Order of Kutuzov, 2nd Degree.[68] When 3rd Baltic was disbanded shortly after Riga was taken the Army was reassigned to 1st Baltic Front until nearly the end of November.[69] On November 29 the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front received the following:

"By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the following are being transferred to you by railroad:... b) 61st Army, consisting of:... 80th Rifle Corps (82nd, 212th and 356th Rifle Divisions)... along with reinforcements, service establishments and rear organs. The army will arrive approximately between 9 December and 1 January at the Lukow station."

A further directive on December 7 ordered that the personnel strength of the Army's nine rifle divisions be reinforced to 6,500 men each, as well as 900 horses.[70] On November 17 Colonel Kuchinev had left his command due to illness; he was moved to the reserve and then later to the training establishment before his retirement in 1947. He was replaced by Col. Sergei Mikhailovich Maslov who had previously served as chief of staff of the 397th Rifle Division before being wounded in August. He would lead the 212th until it was disbanded.

At the start of the Berlin operation, 61st Army was deployed along the east bank of the Oder on a sector from Nipperwiese to Alt Rudnitz. The 80th Corps was on the Army's right flank with just two divisions; the 234th was in first echelon and the 212th in second. Although the main offensive began on April 16, 61st Army did not attack until the next day, when it won a bridgehead 3 km wide and up to 1,000m deep. By the 22nd the 61st had cleared the Oder and Alte Oder and had turned its front completely to the north and three days later had reached points 55 km west of the Oder. On April 29 it forced the Havel River in the area of Zehdenick against minimal resistance. Finally, on May 2, having advanced 60 km during the day against no resistance, reached the Elbe River in the area of Havelberg, and the next day met up with elements of the U.S. 84th Infantry Division near Gnefsdorf. It was here that the 212th and its Army ended its combat path.[75]

• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967a). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть I. 1920 - 1944 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part I. 1920–1944] (PDF) (in Russian). Moscow. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2019-03-27. Retrieved 2021-11-30.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967b). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть II. 1945 – 1966 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part II. 1945–1966] (in Russian). Moscow.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. pp. 99, 206
• Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. pp. 209, 338