2013–2014 Bulgarian protests against the Oresharski cabinet

Following the 2013 Bulgarian protests against the Borisov cabinet of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov over government austerity measures encouraged by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund during the recession[70] and high utility bills, the Borisov government resigned and brought forward the Bulgarian parliamentary election, 2013, which saw a very low voter turnout.[71] Though Borisov's party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) won a plurality with 97 deputies in the National Assembly, it could not form a government and gave up its mandate. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) led the government under technocratic Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski.[72] The left-wing government of Plamen Oresharski was approved by the 120 members of the BSP and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.[73] Outside support to the Oresharski Government was also given by nationalist party Ataka,[74] dubbed by some sources as the "hidden coalition partner",[75] or Siderov's "golden finger",[76] and regarded as a key instrument for allowing the Parliament to proceed with its functions,[77] until June 2014.[78]

On 12 May 2013, a group of more than 100 demonstrators alleging electoral machinations were involved in confrontations with police close to the National Palace of Culture after election day polls indicated that GERB was the projected winner.[79][80] Mass protests for political causes are relatively uncommon in Bulgaria, but have become more frequent since the mid to late 2000s,[81] with environmental issues such as the demands for the preservation of the Strandzha Mountain nature areas on occasions also triggering anti-establishment activism and discontent against governments.[82][83] In Badzhakov's contention, these were the third notable protests against the post-communist status quo in Bulgaria, the first ones encompassing the period between 1989-1991 and directed against the collapsing communist regime and the first democratically elected government that was formed by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, with the second ones opposing the Zhan Videnov government (as well as the possibility of another Socialist successor to it) and occurring as a result of an economic and political crisis between December 1996 and February 1997.[84][85] Student occupations of universities had previously been considered in the autumn of 2010 (due to the Borisov government's policy in the realm of education) and in February 2013 (because of proposed increases in tuition fees for the semesters).[86]

Initially the demonstrations started as a protest by environmentalists and green activists against the nomination of Kalin Tiholov as Investment Planning Minister. Tiholov has been involved in the controversial "Dyuni-gate" affair, whereby he had invested in a major building project at the Dyuni ("dunes") nature spot on the Black Sea coast.[87][88][89] Due to the protests Tiholov withdrew his candidature.[90][91] Protests arose for a variety of topics, with most important the restart of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant and construction in protected areas.[92][93][94]

On 30 May 2013, there was also public discontent against a government proposal (supported by Attack) to remove the smoking ban in restaurants and eateries.[95] In December 2013, the Parliament voted against reversing the prohibition on smoking in enclosed spaces.[96]

On 8 October 2013, the Constitutional Court effectively allowed Delyan Peevski to return to Parliament after failing to reach a decision on whether to strip him of his MP status.[104] Several hundred people turned out for the 117th day of protests, a slightly higher number than in previous days. There were some violent episodes between protesters and police.[187][188] According to media reports, six people were detained for public order offences.[189]

On 22 October 2013, 171 deputies in the National Parliament (GERB, BSP and Ataka joined together) voted for the extension of the ban on the sale of Bulgarian land to foreigners until 2020. 38 were against and 12 did not exercise their right to vote.[190] Analysts considered the resulting legal implications to be negligible, though they also cautioned that the motion could be in violation of the conditions surrounding Bulgaria's entry in the EU and also encourage other EU states to apply job market restrictions when it comes to Bulgarian citizens.[191]

On 23 October 2013, students at Sofia University joined the anti-Oresharski Government protests and occupied the main lecture hall in protest against the "façade democracy" and asked for "accountability from their professors", mainly from their history of law professor Dimitar Tokushev, who is also chairman of the Constitutional Court and was blamed for voting in favor of Peevski continuing in his role as a deputy in the National Parliament.[192] The student protests and the occupation of university buildings injected new life into a persistent anti-government movement that was into its 140th day on 1 November.[193][194][195][196][197] Three of the initiators of the student occupation had held a meeting with Mihail Mikov a few days prior to its beginning, during which the then chairman of the National Parliament is believed to have been dismissive of and expressed a lack of understanding of the demonstrations.[198] The protest intensified over the next few days, and on 27 October counter-protesters, joined by a Bulgarian Socialist Party MPs, made their way into the university and clashed with students. Police arrived at the place, but left shortly thereafter. The video of the clash could be seen at the following link: [199][200] By the next day, several universities across the country were occupied by students, including NBU, NATFIZ, VTU and UNWE.[201][202] The occupation attempt of NBU was short-lived and not comparable in scale to the Sofia University one, as the students soon realized that the higher-ups within the university hierarchy were on their side (having actually participated in the protests), which would defeat the purpose of a prolonged standoff within the university buildings.[203][204]

In a statement read to the public on 25 October 2013, the occupying students explained that they were: "...angered by the systemic violations of constitutional order in the country by the current government led by Plamen Oresharski". Among their objectives was to force the resignation of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski's government and see new general elections as soon as possible.[195] The occupation was backed by approximately 600 academics, though the occupiers did not constitute a majority among either the students or members of staff at Sofia University.[205]

On 10 November 2013, March of Justice was organized on the 24th anniversary of 10 November 1989 events (resignation of the former communist head of state Todor Zhivkov), which led to the protests against the left-wing Oresharski cabinet gaining new momentum.[206]

On 12 November 2013, the anti-government protesters on the 152nd day of anti-government protests attempted to siege Parliament for a second time (the first time being 23–24 July).[207] Pro-protest sources alleged that close to 7000 police employees had been deployed in order to stifle the protests that were joined by the occupying students.[208] On that date, the police received signals of provocateur infiltrations and possible arson threats against the Parliament.[55] Tension also developed between protesters and police officers after a demonstrator jumped on a deputy's car close to National Assembly Square.[209] In the assessment of student protest leader Ivaylo Dinev, a much higher citizen turnout as well as better coordination and unity between protester groups (some were entirely committed to peaceful demonstrations, while others were more radically minded) could have brought down the government on that date.[210] One of the most iconic images of the protests was also captured on 12 November - a photo of a tearful teenage girl hugging a sympathetic police officer in full riot gear.[211]

On 13 November, the occupation of Plovdiv University came to an end, with the students vowing to redirect their activities to Sofia.[212] On the same date, the occupying students in Sofia wrote an official note in which they explicitly distanced themselves from Boyko Borisov and denied having sought any support from GERB.[213]

In addition to the protests that took place every day, a massive protest was organized by GERB on 16 November in Plovdiv,[214] with the number of participants estimated as close to 15,000 by the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs,[215] and by the labor unions on 20 November in Sofia.[216]

On 18 November, the student occupation of Sofia University was partially lifted, with the Aula Magna room becoming the only exclusive domain of the occupiers and restrictions on access to the university premises remaining in place.[217][218]

On 20 November, the students protested together with the taxi drivers and some of the syndicates (though the participation of the latter two was regarded as half-hearted) in the vicinity of the National Assembly. The student participants were unsuccessful in laying siege to the National Parliament due to the heavy concentration of police officers in the area and engaged in "performance demonstrations".[219]

On 2 December 2013, the protests started with a demonstration by leading Bulgarian actors who made a symbolic funeral of the Parliament.[220] One of them, Filip Avramov, made an emotional appeal for resignation of the government in front of a reporter of the Bulgarian National Television. The general turnout continued to be low, with the protests attracting between 200 and 300 participants.[221]

December was a month of Christian holidays which was feted with protests on Christmas.[222] On 26 December 2013, approximately 3000 protesters (including many emigrants who had returned for the holidays) held a rally in front of the Parliament.[67]

Analysis conducted by Gallup Research noted that December had seen somewhat of a reduction in intra-societal tensions compared to November, though the conclusion was reached that the potential for further protests was still very much in the picture.[223]

On 10 January 2014, the protesters against the cabinet of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski blocked for a while the traffic in front of the Council of Ministers.[224] While the protest turnout remained low, the central parts of the city near the main government buildings saw a heavy police presence due to tip-offs suggesting that illegal disruption activities of a radical nature were being planned and the date coinciding with the 17-year anniversary of the 1997 siege and storming of the Parliament.[225][226]

In the late evening hours of 13 January 2014, the occupying students held a general meeting and subsequently decided to fully lift the occupation of Sofia University, thus vacating the Aula Magna room. One of the participants commented that the students recognized the need to break the cycle of predictability and from now on would concentrate their activities in the areas of the city close to the National Parliament. The students from the South-West University in Blagoevgrad followed suit by declaring the occupation of their institution of higher education to be over.[227][228]

On 15 January 2014, the protests continued during the opening session of the National Parliament for the new year (though the number of participants remained in the hundreds), with the added demand that the MEPs vote for the revocation of Volen Siderov's parliamentary immunity – the Ataka party leader had earlier in the month been involved in a confrontation with the French cultural attaché for Bulgaria, Stéphanie Dumortier, a Bulgarian airplane passenger and Varna-based police officers.[229] Siderov also had on numerous occasions criticized the protesters, dismissing their demands as illegitimate and anti-patriotic.[230] Besides that, he had voiced disapproval at the police's leniency towards the anti-Oresharski crowd, perceiving the demonstrators as a threat to the normal functioning of the Bulgarian government institutions,[231] and suggested "citizen's arrests" for certain demonstrators.[232] During the demonstrations, Biser Milanov and fellow members of the National Liberty movement (Bulgarian: Национално движение "Свобода"), who were identified by some of the protesters as having affiliations with Nikolay Barekov's party "Bulgaria without Censorship" (Bulgarian: "България без цензура") and being driven by an interest in discrediting the protests,[233][234] were arrested by a specialized squad of the Bulgarian police on the insistence of the prosecutor-general due to a criminal charge filed against Milanov (unrelated to his immediate presence at the protests).[235] Milanov is currently on trial for allegedly uttering threats against a female protester on 6 July 2013, inciting racial hatred against dark-skinned refugees on 2 November 2013 and behaving in a threatening manner during a TV broadcast.[236][237] He spent time in prison between January and August 2014.[238] In an interview with journalist and TV host Martin Karbovski, the chairman of the National Liberty movement, Yordan Bonev, claimed to have attended a meeting with Boyko Borisov in mid January 2014 (alongside Biser Milanov), during which the possibility of organizing a massive anti-government demonstration had been discussed.[239] While Barekov has corroborated this (though he has downplayed his own association with Milanov),[240] Borisov has denied any knowledge of such a gathering having taken place.[237][241] Yordan Bonev had also been implicated as a provocateur during the February 2013 demonstrations against the Borisov cabinet.[242]

On 25 January 2014, the protest in the Sofia University started again, with a new occupation.[243] The stated demands included the resignation of the government, a dissolution of the National Parliament and the stepping down of university dean Ivan Ilchev.[244] In addition, alleged provocations on the part of university staff members during the previous strike action as well the conclusions of the European Commission's most recent report on Bulgaria have been cited among the trigger factors for the university students' decision to renew the occupation.[245] The leading figures behind the new occupation were profiled as belonging to a "radical wing" of the previous occupying students (who had been against their colleagues' decision – that was taken in mid January – to restore full access to the university facilities for the staff and non-occupying students)[246] and did not receive the full backing of all the previous participants in the occupation,[247] some of whom adopted the stance that the timing of the occupation was not well-chosen and had caused them to postpone the public debate in the form of round table discussions, which was supposed to begin on that date and was envisioned as a new phase of the protest.[248] It has also been suggested that the new student protesters did not shun the politicization of their activities, as they were seeking a "decapsulation" and unlike the other occupiers were open to cooperating with political parties and civil society organizations that are in opposition to the Oresharski government,[249] as well as with football fan clubs.[250] There were discussions regarding the possibility of starting a second occupation at Plovdiv University as well, but the idea was eventually discarded by the students.[251]

On 27 January 2014, counter-occupiers attempted to enter the university grounds and demanded that the occupation come to an end; police eventually arrived on the scene to prevent any arguments from arising between the occupiers and their opponents.[252]

On 28 January 2014, the new occupiers voluntarily lifted the occupation after intensive negotiations with administrative personnel, university staff and fellow students (including some key figures behind the first occupation), though some of them stated that they had faced undue pressure to come to such a decision[253][254] and also expressed disappointment that they did not receive sufficient support from the wider society.[255] The likelihood of a forceful eviction by the police was also cited as a contributing factor to the limited duration of the second university-based protest.[256] Opinion polls confirmed that the second occupation did not garner the same approval as the first one, with less than 50% of Bulgarian citizens expressing encouragement for the actions of the occupiers.[257][258] In the aftermath, the possibility of a third occupation was not ruled out.[259][260]

On 1 February 2014, Justin Tomms, Miriana Zaharieva and other informal protest leaders officially registered the non-governmental organization "Movement for European Unity and Solidarity" (Bulgarian: Движение за европейско обединение и солидарност), which was expected to soon become a new political party, though it was not able to take part in the European elections. The members of DEOS do not envision themselves as a "protest party", but a regular liberal-leaning faction.[261]

On 6 February 2014, student and other protesters demonstrated by carrying banners against the mafia, expressing outrage and opposition to the deputies' decision to raise their personal work salaries after months of constant protests.[262]

On 7 February 2014, student and other protesters showed their anti-government stances by carrying and throwing around computer mice in front of the Parliament building, criticizing what they view as the government's reluctance to implement a system of electronic voting.[263]

On 9 February 2014, some of the participants in the 2013 Bulgarian protests against the Borisov cabinet rallied on the streets of Sofia and Plovdiv in commemoration of the events that took place in February 2013. While they did not call for a resignation of the Oresharski cabinet, the protesters expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of action taken by Oresharski (and Sofia mayor Yordanka Fandakova) against the monopoly companies, lamenting the lack of significant transformations in the economic realm in the 12 months since the end of the Borisov cabinet's tenure.[264] The newly formed party Bulgaria without Censorship was among the main organizers of the citizen gatherings.[265]

In late February 2014, mostly with the consent of the demonstrators, the protest tent cities in the area of the National Parliament were taken down in preparation for the Bulgarian national holiday celebrations held on 3 March.[159][266]

The major activity of the March protesters was the collection of signatures for the holding of a referendum on electoral rules. Thus they applied pressure on the government for the referendum to take place together with the European elections.[267] A number of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protests took place near the Russian embassy in Sofia during that month, with alleged provocateurs who had previously attempted to create discord during the anti-Oresharski demonstrations, participating in the pro-Russian rallies.[268]

After it became known that the government had given green light to construction works in the Karadere area, massive protests on 23 March 2014 were held in the cities of Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna; and a counter-protest in Byala.[269] The protesters expressed their view that the few environmentally well-preserved areas in the country should not be turned into concrete landscapes. Allegations have surfaced that architect Georgiy Stanishev, brother of Sergei Stanishev, had been behind this project, but he has denied any involvement.[270]

A new wave of protests occurred in April after rumour spread in the media that Delyan Peevski would be included in the elections list of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) for the upcoming European Parliament election that are going to take place in late May.[271] A group called "Делян Европеевски" (English: Delyan Europeevski) had already been created in Facebook with the motto 'We did not allow the mummy's boy to be appointed in DANS, let us not allow him to be elected in the European Parliament'. As of 10 April 2014, the group reached more than 700 followers. On 9 April 2014, a protest took place in front of the building of the Council of Ministers.[272] The protesters organized themselves using the social network.

On 12 May 2014, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in front of the Council of Ministers to mark the 333rd day of protests (as well as one year since the 2013 Parliamentary elections that were held ahead of schedule). The protesters took a detour from their usual route towards the National Parliament and Eagles' Bridge, marching in the direction of the MRF and BSP party headquarters. Members of "protest network" also extended an invitation to Peevski to discuss with them his European Parliament campaign as well as his positions on the main EU-related debates.[273] A small protest and counter-protest were held on 28 May, during the first Parliament session in the aftermath of the European Parliament election, which saw an unsatisfactory performance of the main governing electoral alliance Coalition for Bulgaria[274] and were interpreted by experts as being likely to strengthen the protest potential (with a more prominent political involvement in the demonstrations) due to the continued decline of the legitimacy of the government.[275] Shortly after the EP elections, Peevski decided against becoming a member of the European Parliament, explaining that his motivation to participate in the election process had stemmed from a desire to simply restore his reputation.[276]

On 5 June 2014, MRF leader Lyutvi Mestan held a press conference, announcing that the results of the recent European Parliament election make it impossible for the Oresharski cabinet to fulfill its full mandate. He sketched out three different early election scenarios, expressing a preference for them to be held at the end of 2014. The MRF party's statements were widely regarded as an indication that the junior coalition party has withdrawn its support from the government, making its prospects to continue to be in charge of decision-making quite slim.[277] Mestan has downplayed the role of the protests or the configurations in Parliament as a reason for his declaration.[278] Disagreements between the MRF and BSP regarding the possible implementation of the South Stream energy project have been identified as one additional factor behind the change in the coalition dynamics.[75][279] The nationalist Attack also joined the calls for a resignation of the government, stating that it was no longer in a position to support it, criticizing the lack of sufficient social policies implemented by the cabinet and the "bowing down to American pressure" due to Oresharski's decision to put a stop to South Stream.[78] The Prime Minister's choice of action regarding the energy project was not reflective of a consensus within the ranks of the BSP party and some prominent socialist politicians were taken aback and expressed disapproval.[280]

In the aftermath of Mestan's announcement, Stanishev voiced support for compulsory voting and on 10 June insisted that the early elections be held by the end of July.[281] Stanishev was overruled by his party colleagues regarding his idea for prompt July elections and BSP confirmed that it will be entering talks with the other main parties and the president of the country Rosen Plevneliev, so that an exact date for the early elections could be agreed upon.[282] A jubilee protest took place on 14 June in Sofia and a few other major cities, with a number of the protest leaders holding a press conference in the area close to the people's library in the capital.[283] Estimates suggested a turnout in the high thousands.[284] On 17 June, following a meeting in the presidency that saw the presence of Rosen Plevneliev, Plamen Oresharski and the leaders of all the parties represented in the National Parliament, a consensus was reached that the early elections will be scheduled at some point between 28 September and 12 October.[285] During the negotiations, anti-government demonstrators, Ataka sympathizers[286] and affiliates of the citizen movement "Today" (Bulgarian: Гражданско движение "ДНЕС") (who set up a symbolic round table with the photos of all the main politicians to emphasize their message of national unity) held various protests simultaneously.[287] On 27 June, after another meeting of the heads of all the major parties (Attack was the only one not represented, as Volen Siderov did not attend, but Nikolay Barekov participated in the negotiations despite his party then holding no seats in the National Parliament), the date of 5 October 2014 was fixed for the next election.[36] The 42nd National Assembly was set to dissolve itself on 6 August 2014.[288] The protests are believed to have helped mobilize the Bulgarian electorate to vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections.[289]

On 17 July 2014, Mihail Mikov announced that the government would likely resign on 23 July and the National Parliament was prepared to subject the matter to a vote on that date.[290] At 17:59 (Bulgarian time) on 23 July, Oresharski submitted his resignation.[34] On that date, protests had occurred in order to put pressure on the government to keep its promise to resign and a "Protest of joy" (Bulgarian: "Протест на радостта") took place in the aftermath of Oresharski's depositing of his resignation.[291][292] The resignation was accepted in the National Parliament on the next day, with 180 MPs voting "for", 8 "against" and 8 abstaining.[293] A caretaker government was then expected to assume power to prepare the ground for the October elections after the major parties declined to form a new cabinet.[294]

Georgi Bliznashki's government was announced on 5 August and began its two-month mandate on the next day.[35] On 6 August, in accordance with the previously made agreement among the main parties, Rosen Plevneliev officially disbanded the National Parliament.[295] On 10 August, in an open letter to the media, Krasimira Medarova stated that she had requested from the president to step down from her position as minister in charge of the preparation for the early elections in order not to impede the work of the caretaker government after her appointment faced criticism from citizen organizations, protest network and the Reformist Bloc due to a presumed conflict of interest because of her previous affiliations with GERB.[296] Medarova's case also sparked discussions regarding the viability of a separate ministerial post for the organization of the electoral processes and caused some controversy due to creating the impression that protest network was applying undue pressure on the provisional government.[297][298] BSP has publicly criticized the composition of the caretaker cabinet, viewing it as almost exclusively consisting of figures affiliated with GERB, the Reformist Bloc and protest network. The issue has been the cause of media cross-fires between the two main political parties in Bulgaria.[299][300] Volen Siderov has also suggested that protest network plays a prominent role in the caretaker government.[301]

On 19 June, Oresharski acknowledged that he had made a political miscalculation with the DANS appointment and apologized to the protesters and the rest of the Bulgarian citizens, while also stating that stepping down would not be conducive to his overarching aim of restoring political stability. He also requested a grace period from the general public until a number of urgent social policy reforms are implemented.[343] Oresharski emphasized that he was always open to engaging in discussions with the protesters.[344] Minister of Education Aneliya Klisarova characterized the protests as motivational in the sense of providing further impetus for the government to work for the betterment of the country. However, she also criticized the occupation of the universities and expressed concerns regarding the nature of the student demands, seeing them as solely political rather than education-related.[345] Sergei Stanishev and Oresharski maintained that the ongoing protests were an indication that the "chains of fear" that had gripped society and the media in previous years have been removed from the popular consciousness of the citizens.[346] Valeri Zhablyanov, a BSP party deputy, insisted that from the outset the origins of the protest movement lied in an unwillingness to recognize the election results rather than opposition to the Peevski appointment, believing that they could thus set a dangerous precedent with regard to the stability of the democratic mechanisms in the country.[347] In late June 2013, the chairperson of the National Parliament Mihail Mikov criticized the general media coverage of the protests, stating that the ways in which the demonstrations were being framed could (alongside other factors) bring about their escalation, and urged media representatives to show responsibility and the necessary measure of calm when it came to their reporting.[348] Mikov's statement was in turn condemned by prominent journalists and media outlets as well as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee due to being interpreted as indicating a potential willingness on the part of the government to infringe on media freedom.[349][350] Oresharski, Minister of Interior Tzvetlin Yovchev as well as other members of the cabinet held a number of meetings with protest figures (in the Council of Ministers building), though doubts have been expressed with regard to the extent to which the people who took part in these discussions were sufficiently representative of the protest movement as a whole, with some of those staunchly opposed to the government even labeling the participants in these events as "convenient protesters".[328][351] Since September 2013, the government tended to refer to the protests as explicitly political due to GERB supposedly showing its interest in assuming leadership of the demonstrations.[352][353] MRF leader Lyutvi Mestan stated that the main opposition party (GERB) itself has a history of being closely linked to oligarchic structures.[354]

While initially (prior to Peevski's resignation), opinion polls revealed that 85% of Sofia citizens were supportive of the protests (with only 23% declaring trust in the Oresharski cabinet),[8][355][356] approval for the protests dropped to 56% in mid July 2013 (with 37% expressing opposition to them and 48% believing them to be "politically motivated") based on nationwide surveys administered by Sova Harris.[357] In the months of September and October, societal reactions to the protests continued to be mixed, with a relatively even split between pro- and anti-protest voices.[358][359] However, Alpha Research surveys (administered nationwide between 26 and 31 October as well as covering the period between 30 November and 8 December) indicated that the student protests enjoyed a slightly higher degree of popular support than the original demonstrations involving other societal members.[360][361] In response to Gallup Research questions regarding their voting preferences if the elections were to be held on the same day in which the October surveys were administered, approximately 22% of interviewees stated that they would likely pick the governing Bulgarian Socialist Party and circa 19% affirmed that they would be inclined to vote for the main one in opposition – Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, which was reflective of the parity when it came to popular support in the case of the two parties.[362][363]

A petition entitled "Sofia without roadblocks" (Bulgarian: "София без блокади") was circulated in late July 2013 due to dissatisfaction on the part of some citizens because of the traffic disruptions on the main boulevards in the central part of the capital city and noise pollution as a result of the protest activities (caused by both protesters and counter-protesters). Former Bulgarian Interior Minister Bogomil Bonev was among the initiators of the petition.[364] 90% of Sofia citizens insisted that protests were to be conducted in full compliance with the legal regulations pertaining to mass citizen gatherings.[365]

The protests against the Oresharski cabinet were supported by 60 percent of Bulgarians, according to a poll by the independent Alpha Research for the month of November.[206] Research conducted by the Sofia Open Society Institute (analyzing the political situation in the country over the course of the June and July months) reveals that the most active participants in the protests tended to be young (aged below 30 years), were based in the capital Sofia, leaned to the centre-right or right of the political spectrum and possessed a higher than average income.[366] The middle class social stratum from Sofia has been singled out as constituting a core of the protest.[139][367] Similarly, Leviev-Sawyer believes that even during their short escalation phase in late July 2013, the demonstrations retained features of protests typical of the middle class.[368] A generational gap as well as an urban-rural divide have been an aspect of the public reactions to the demonstrations, with those residing in non-urban areas and aged over 60 on the whole significantly less supportive of the protests.[369][370][371] Goranova identifies the primacy of economic over political concerns due to poverty, the presence of remnants of feudalist structures in the smaller cities and villages (causing a certain built-in reluctance to protest due to fears of job losses), the significant proportion of elderly people (who have a natural aversion to instability) and the lack of sufficient trust in the youth as some of the reasons for the lacking protest activities outside the major cities.[372] In addition, members of ethnic minority groups were generally not as favorably disposed to the protests,[373] with this finding especially applicable to ethnic Turks and Romani people who typically declared a lesser willingness to participate in demonstrations in comparison to ethnic Bulgarians.[11] Confederation of Labour Podkrepa president Konstantin Trenchev, in an August 2013 interview, did not call for national strike action against the government, but cautioned that conditions may become ripe for resorting to such activities at some point in the autumn.[374] The trade union has been criticized by some experts for violating the constitution by setting political targets for itself and engaging in the type of political activism that is the prerogative solely of political parties.[375] Figures provided by Gallup, based on interviews with more than 1000 citizens held between 9 and 16 January 2014, indicated that 40% believed that the protests should continue, with the same percentage of people having the opposite view.[376] A late January 2014 survey conducted by the Confederation of Independent Syndicates in Bulgaria revealed that at least one third of their members were adamant that Parliamentary elections need to be held alongside the upcoming European elections.[377] According to a Gallup poll, 43% of Bulgarians regarded the media reporting on the protests as objective, while 30% characterized the electronic and printed media outlets as displaying subjectivity in their coverage. Of the latter respondents, 19% considered the bias to be pro-protest and 11% identified it as pro-government.[378] The electronic and print media in Bulgaria are generally regarded as tending to shy away from publishing materials explicitly critical of governments,[379] but businessman and direct democracy supporter Petar Klisarov insists that the main media were passive and relatively objective in their reporting of the 2013 anti-Borisov protests while from the very beginning they unequivocally took the side of the protesters in their coverage of the anti-Oresharski movement.[380] According to academic Orlin Spasov, the protests saw significantly more intra-societal cleavages (Russophiles vs. Russophobes, communists vs. anti-communists and so on) compared to the winter discontent against Borisov's cabinet that mainly juxtaposed the political elites against the people, which made it much more difficult for the media anchors to cover them.[381]

In the first two months (prior to the minor escalation phase of 23–24 July), the protests did not receive significant coverage in international media, especially relative to the more numerous and violent demonstrations in Turkey, Brazil as well as the anti- and post-Morsi unrest in Egypt.[382] The protest activities and messages were endorsed by prominent European Union politicians such as European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Viviane Reding and also garnered the approval of the French and German ambassadors to Bulgaria, Philippe Autié and Matthias Höpfner.[383][384] The latter two welcomed Rosen Plevneliev's call for a new morality in politics that was in accordance with European values, also emphasizing that there was a crisis of trust when it comes to the institutions and elites in the country as well as some worrying signs pertaining a concentration of media ownership, which could herald risks for the continued thriving of freedom of speech. The ambassadors praised both the protesters and the Bulgarian police for behaving in a way that was conducive to the peaceful expression of the civil society spirit. In addition, Autié and Höpfner stressed that the "oligarchic model" was not suitable for any country and could only lead to the creation of a "state within a state".[385] Dutch ambassador to Bulgaria Karel van Kesteren referred to the protests as a "sign of hope" and the first clear instance of civil society rearing its head to clamor for the observance of European values since Bulgaria's accession to the EU. He also expressed disquiet about the role of Attack as well as its ability to influence proceedings and reminded the government that election wins are just one component of democracy that should not be a substitute for responsible governance and lack of secrecy in decision-making. His Belgian counterpart to Bulgaria Anik van Kalster stated that "the best solution [to the crisis of legitimacy] was the one that was widely supported by the society as a whole" and also played down the concerns that Belgian investments in Bulgaria could be negatively affected due to the political uncertainty. In relation to the Peevski situation, she reminded the government of the European Commission's insistence for certain standards to be respected when high-level appointments are made and the need for the primacy of the legal order to remain unchallenged. Van Kalster lauded the peaceful character of the protests and depicted them as a continuation of the February demonstrations, but with a higher premium placed on ideals and principles rather than economic issues.[386] In June 2013, Hannes Swoboda, President of the group of the S&D in the European Parliament, stated that the Oresharski government deserves support, maintaining that the social measures suggested by the cabinet were necessary for the country. He also commended Stanishev for being forward-looking and having a long record in promoting modernization. However, Swoboda criticized the appointment of Delyan Peevski as well as the decision to elect Volen Siderov as chairman of the Parliamentary commission for fighting corruption, warning the governing BSP party that it would need to go to extra lengths in order to preserve its values and provide a true "left alternative" to the Borisov cabinet (due to the BSP's alliance with the MRF and Ataka). He also emphasized that Bulgaria needed fundamental changes in its political system and urged the government to be constantly engaged in a dialogue with the wider society and prioritize the promotion of political transparency and democratic principles.[387] In Antoniy Galabov's view, PES' support for Stanishev was a risky strategy, as it could negatively affect the electoral fortunes for the European political party in the 2014 European election.[388] The EU urged BSP and GERB to exhibit cooperative behaviour towards each other.[389][390] French ambassador to Bulgaria, Xavier Lapeyre de Cabanes, diagnosed Bulgaria's corruption problems as deeply rooted, stipulating that the underlying motivations for such protests had been brewing under the surface since the 1990s. He also acknowledged that a variety of anti-corruption measures have been implemented since the collapse of communism and observed that the country's xenophobia had not reached dangerous levels.[391] Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a leading personality during the 1968 student protests in France, sent out a note, in which he expressed support for the Bulgarian student occupiers.[392] Polish historian and prominent former anti-communist dissident Adam Michnik was more cautious in his assessment of the protests, stating that the main reason for them was the "lack of a political culture as well as an absence of a culture of compromise", which from his standpoint is still an issue for other Eastern European countries besides Bulgaria because of the effects of communism on the mentality of citizens and the paucity of democratic traditions. He sees the political elites as a reflection of society and emphasizes that in cases when fair elections bring unsympathetic "old [communist] apparatus" members to power, this needs to be accepted, as "democracy should apply to all, not only to those who are intelligent and have perfectly sound moral qualities".[393][394]

The security-related expenditures resulting from the protests (encompassing the period from 14 June to late November) have been evaluated as approximating 2 million BGN.[458]

On 13 December 2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services amended its outlook for Bulgaria from "stable" to "negative", in part due to the political uncertainty that started with the February 2013 protests against the Borisov cabinet (and the then looming possibility of early elections as a result of the ongoing protests against the Oresharski cabinet). However, the country, as of mid December 2013, has retained its 'BBB/A-2' long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings.[459][460] In June 2014, Standard & Poor's downgraded Bulgaria's short- and long-term credit ratings from 'BBB/A-2' to 'BBB/A-3' (though the country continues to be with a stable financial outlook), citing as the main reason the lack of political predictability.[461]

In September 2013, two freelance journalists at Deutsche Welle's Bulgarian desk were released from their contracts. The German media company explained that this was for failing to retain "objectivity, neutrality and balance" in their reporting of the protests. While DW publicly denied this to be linked to a recent letter of complaint from the CCB, opinion pieces in Bulgarian media outlets were predominantly of the opinion that the bank had put pressure on the broadcaster.[511][512][513]

On 25 October, students from Sofia University occupied the central building of the university in downtown Sofia. They demanded immediate government resignation and new elections, as well as rule of law and a prioritization of education. The declaration was publicly read before present media. After that, the entrances to the University were fully blocked and almost all activities at the building ceased. According to students, between 70 and 100 people were present inside and only students were allowed in and out.[514]

In early December, а three-person student delegation from Bulgaria that was accompanied by members of "protest network" visited Ukraine in order to voice their support for the Euromaidan participants. One of the occupying students read out their declaration at Maidan Nezalezhnosti.[515] The occupying students also revealed that they intend to make a film about the events in the former Soviet republic and posted a trailer on YouTube.[516] While admiring the underlying ideas behind Euromaidan and being touched by the reception that the Bulgarians received, Ivaylo Dinev, one of the most recognizable figures behind the occupation, in retrospect expressed sadness about how the anti-Yanukovych protests turned out due to the human casualties and the Ukrainian people eventually being pitted against each other rather than banding together to confront the national and global elites.[517]

On 7 November 2014, a coalition government headed by Boyko Borisov succeeded the interim cabinet of Georgi Bliznashki.[518] The main group that was behind the student protests against Oresharski, which called itself "the early rising students" (Bulgarian: ранобудните студенти), has continued to rally against what they view as controversial appointments connected to the new government, mainly against Slavi Binev's chairmanship of the Commission for Culture and Media (Bulgarian: Комисия по култура и медии).[519] Binev resigned on 8 December 2014 as a result of the controversy.[520]

BSP is believed to have suffered both electoral (reduced support among its core sympathizers) and political losses (losing ground to new populist and nationalist parties) due to its supposed role in the entrenchment of the "Who" model (Bulgarian: моделът "КОЙ"), which is assumed to have been exemplified by the Oresharski government.[521] References to this model - implying inappropriate interlinkages between government, big business, media and other "shadowy forces" which bring about an erosion of constitutional and democratic practices - were frequently made during the anti-Oresharski demonstrations. The protests also intensified the split between two main wings of BSP - the one loyal to Sergei Stanishev and the one taking cues from Georgi Parvanov,[522][523] with the latter group forming the political project ABV in January 2014,[524] which officially became a full-fledged political party in June of the same year.[525] The protests are believed to have been a factor in making political actors more reluctant to include the MRF as part of governing coalitions.[526] Oresharski's administration has drawn parallels with the Lyuben Berov cabinet,[527] being regarded as another unsuccessful experiment with "expert" or "programme" governments.[147][528]

In the late evening hours of 18 August 2013, a gas bottle explosion occurred in a Chinese restaurant near the main area of the demonstrations. On 19 August 2013, the protesters observed two minutes of silence. In the subsequent days, a donation box was also set up in order to collect funds for the injured people. A woman from a nearby store (also among those who had sustained injuries) had previously offered products to the protesters at a discount.[529] On 15 October 2013, in the 14th minute of the World Cup qualifier between Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, part of the supporters in the stadium erupted with shouts "Resignation!", followed by the chanting of then manager Luboslav Penev's name (to indicate that the coach was not the target of the fans' dissatisfaction).[530] 'The protester' received the most votes for politician of the year 2013 in Bulgaria, while the anti-Oresharski protests were singled out as the event of the year in the country, based on the annual survey of Darik Radio.[531] Between 10 September and 30 November 2014, the international festival Fotofabric took place in Sofia and included two main exhibitions at different locations in the city - "the protester" (an assortment of photo reports from recent protests around the world) and "the human and his states [of mind]" (consisting of artistic representations from the "Alcobendas" collection in Spain). Photos from the anti-Oresharski demonstrations that had been selected by Vasil Garnizov were also featured as part of the first exhibit.[532]

• 2020–2021 Bulgarian protests - a similar protest movement involving Delyan Peevski
• List of protests in the 21st century

Books

• Åslund, Anders; Dyankov, Simeon, eds. (2015). След Стената. Преходът в Източна Европа (1st ed.). Sofia: ИК „Колибри". ISBN 978-619-150-714-6.
• Daynov, Evgeniy (2017). Записки по революцията (1997-2017), том 3 (1st ed.). Sofia: „Ера". ISBN 978-954-389-450-5.
• Dinev, Ivaylo (2014). Наш ред е! (1st ed.). Sofia: Изток-Запад. ISBN 978-619-152-519-5.
• Ditchev, Ivaylo (2019). Културни сцени на политическото (1st ed.). Sofia: Просвета. ISBN 978-954-01-3909-8.
• Georgiev, Plamen (2013). За демокрацията и нейното българско приключение (1st ed.). Sofia: Пескадо. ISBN 978-619-901-811-8.
• Kanev, Dobrin; Todorov, Antoniy, eds. (2014). Качество на демокрацията в България (1st ed.). Sofia: Изток-Запад. ISBN 978-619-152-473-0.
• Klisarov, Petar (2014). Огледало на протестите 2013-2014 (1st ed.). Sofia: Изток-Запад. ISBN 978-619-152-484-6.
• Kozhouharov, Kantcho (2014). Превратът срещу ГЕРБ и войната срещу демокрацията (1st ed.). Sofia: Лингея. ISBN 978-954-92471-7-6.
• Leviev-Sawyer, Clive (2015). Bulgaria: Politics and Protests in the 21st Century (1st ed.). Sofia: Рива. ISBN 978-954-32053-9-4.
• Lilov, Grigor (2013). Най-богатите българи (1st ed.). Sofia: "Кайлас" ЕООД. ISBN 978-954-92098-9-1.
• Nekov, Momchil (2013). От първо лице (1st ed.). Sofia: Ciela. ISBN 978-954-28143-3-7.
• Nikolov, Toni (2015). Пропуканата България - Записки по суматохата (1st ed.). Sofia: Хермес. ISBN 978-954-26141-8-0.
• Shemtov, Hristo (2013). Протест - Лозунги и отзвуци (1st ed.). Sofia: Фама. ISBN 978-954-59747-9-3.
• Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea, eds. (2013). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013 (1st ed.). Sofia: Изток-Запад. ISBN 978-619-152-351-1.
• Stoyanov, Hristo (2014). Протестните деца на България (народопсихологии) (1st ed.). Sofia: издателство "Христо" (self-published). ISBN 978-954-92722-5-3.
• Sugarev, Edvin (2013). Подлите времена (2nd ed.). Sofia: Изток-Запад. ISBN 978-619-152-291-0. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 6 March 2015.
• Todorov, Orlin (2016). България. Версия 0.5 (1st ed.). Sofia: Изток-Запад. ISBN 978-619-152-910-0.
• Vuchkov, Yulian (2013). България: преди, днес и утре (Мемоарна история на страната 1944–2013) (1st ed.). Sofia: Издателство "Даниела Убенова". ISBN 978-619-90174-1-8.

Articles and book excerpts

Babikian, Arman (9 July 2013). "Уроци от изборите във Варна". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 379–380.

Bezlov, Tihomir (4 July 2013). "Властта и протестът – кои фактори могат да докарат обрат". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 221–225.

Dimitrov, Ivan; Moskovska, Nadezhda (29 July 2013). "Няма по-малкото зло". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 181–184.

Galabov, Antoniy (24 June 2013). "Атака" говори на висок глас това, което БСП мисли". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 398–400.

Gochev, Georgi (24 July 2013). "Къци, Мишо, неговите фенки и тяхната България". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 293–296.

Ivancheva, Maria (26 July 2013). "Класовата война на България". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 193–194.

Kolarova, Rumyana (1 July 2013). "ГЕРБ имат притеснения за парламентарната си група". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 479–480.

Lambrev, Yovko (1 July 2013). "От блоговете: #ignorevolen е грешка". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 379–380.

Levchev, Vladimir (29 June 2013). "За хулиганите и превратаджиите". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 381–382.

Medarov, Georgi (19 July 2013). "Гражданите срещу задкулисието!". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 71–73.

Nikolov, Toni (15 August 2013). "Театрализация и политика". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 336–339.

Popov, Yulian (24 June 2013). "От блоговете: 7 причини за това защо изборите не проработиха и ще трябва да се повторят". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 458–459.

Simeonov, Parvan (17 July 2013). "ДАНСwithme, млад меринджей". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 204–206.

Simov, Aleksandar (23 June 2013). "Харта 2013 – моят прочит и критика". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 83–87.

Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (16 December 2013b). "Предговор". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 13–23.

Spahiyski, Emil (9 July 2013). "Битът убива протеста". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 341–343.

Volgin, Petar (7 September 2013). "Голямата протестърска измама". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 228–230.

Yanakiev, Kalin (1 July 2013). "Политическото дъно". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 371–375.

Interviews (published)

Boyadzhiev, Tsocho (16 July 2013). "Фотография и протест". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 124–131.

Garnizov, Vasil (15 July 2013). "Протестът дава шанс да се изгради нов институционален ред (интервю на Слав Оков)". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 137–145.

Gyrdev, Yavor (19 June 2013). "Бунт за самоуважение". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 111–117.

Genova, Angelina (18 July 2013). "Да възразиш срещу чуждите планове, или какво прави Правдолюб Иванов през последния месец". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 150–154.

Krastev, Ivan (31 July 2013). "Протестиращите рискуват да останат политически изолирани". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 452–453.

Veleva, Valeriya (15 June 2013). "Интервю на Валерия Велева с Делян Пеевски: "над никого няма да има чадър". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 27–32.

Blog posts and official declarations

Autié, Philippe; Höpfner, Matthias (8 July 2013). "Изявлението на посланиците на Франция и Германия: доброто държавно управление е в интерес на всички". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 365–367.

Genov, Asen (16 August 2013). "Протест, контрапротест, манифестация...". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 297–298.

Swoboda, Hannes (24 June 2013). "ПЕС и Ханес Свобода". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 150–154.

Протестна Мрежа (21 September 2013). "100-те успеха на протеста". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 525–531.

Opinion polls

Галъп (1 August 2013). "Данни на Галъп". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 323–324.

НЦИОМ (15 July 2013). "Данни на НЦИОМ". In Smilov, Daniel; Vaysova, Lea (eds.). #Протестът. Анализи и позиции в българската преса. Лято 2013. Изток-Запад. pp. 313–315.

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Protests in Bulgaria.

• London Says – OSTAVKA! (RESIGN!)
• Протестна Мрежа
• NOрешарски
• Students Take Bulgaria's Protests to the Next Level